


Language-Based Security on Android (call for participation)

Avik Chaudhuri

+ What is Android?




- Open-source platform for mobile devices
- Designed to be a complete software stack
 - Operating system
 - Middleware
 - Core applications
- Accompanied with an SDK
 - Tools and APIs to develop new applications
 - Based on the Java programming language
 - Compiled to run on a VM designed to optimize memory and hardware resources in a mobile environment

+ Why should I care?



- Open Handset Alliance
 - major mobile operators (T-Mobile, Vodafone,...)
 - semiconductor companies (Intel, NVIDIA,...)
 - handset manufacturers (LG, Motorola, Samsung, Sony Ericsson,...)
 - software companies (**Google**,...)
- **Free** and **open-source** software
- **Core applications** and **new applications** on par
 - All applications can access the underlying mobile device
 - All applications have similar structure, and can share functionality

+ How can I join in?




- Maturing into a major platform in the mobile phone industry
 - Some Android-based phones available
 - More planned for release
 - Many Android applications available
 - Many more developed and installed every day
- Actually a source of concern!

What do we understand about security on Android?

- **Costs of ignorance?** (Same as in other settings)
- **Benefits of knowledge?** (Perhaps more than in other settings)

+ This reminds me of PCC!



- Alice downloads on her phone a new app developed by Bob
- How does she know whether it is safe to run the app?
 - Can she trust the app to safely access her data?
 - If she cannot, is there still a way to safely run the app?

These concerns are important for Alice (user).

These concerns are also important for Bob (developer).

- How does Bob convince Alice that his app is safe to run?


+ How about certified installation?

- **Bob** constructs a safety proof for his app
 - Sound static analysis of the Java code
- **Alice** verifies the proof before installing the application

Ingredients?

- **Operational semantics** for applications on Android
 - Formal specifications of the APIs provided by the SDK
- **Static checking** for safety of Android applications
 - Formalized as a security type system for application code
 - Soundness of type system provides proofs

+ What are Android applications?



- Package of **components**
 - Can be run as necessary (possibly even by other apps)
- Components follow structure


Activity controls some **window** of the app

Service runs in **background** (even if window is switched),
exposes interface for communication with other apps

Receiver reacts asynchronously to **messages** from other apps

Provider stores **content** relevant to the app (usually in database),
allows sharing of data with other apps

+ Show me an example.




Music player app




+ How do I develop this in the SDK?

Inherit built-in classes, override their methods!

```
Activity { ..., onCreate(x), onActivityResult(x), ... }  
Service { ..., onBind(x), ... }  
Receiver { ..., send(x), onReceive(x), ... }  
Provider { ..., query(x), update(x), ... }
```



+ What about security?




- Apps require **permissions** to access components of other apps
 - To **call** activities
 - To **bind** to services
 - To **send** messages to receivers, and to **receive** messages from apps
 - To **query** and to **update** content stored by providers


Permissions are set at install time, not at run time

- Required permissions are **declared** in a manifest
- Permissions are set **statically** by the package installer
- The app **blocks** if it requires other permissions at run time

+ I don't know how my app is run!



Semantics



+ A formal abstract syntax

Program syntax

$v ::=$	value
n	name
x	variable
void	void
$i ::= (n, v)$	intent
$t ::=$	code
call(i)	call activity
return(v)	return from activity
bind($i, \lambda x.t$)	bind to service
register(SEND, $\lambda x.t$)	register new receiver
send(RECEIVE, i)	send to receiver
! n	read from provider
$n := v$	write to provider
let $x = t$ in t'	evaluate
$\uparrow t$	fork
$t + t'$	choice
v	result

model UI

enforce permissions

Application syntax

$d ::=$	definition
activity(CALL, PERMS, $\lambda x.t, \lambda x.t'$)	activity
service(BIND, PERMS, $\lambda x.t$)	service
receiver(SEND, PERMS, $\lambda x.t$)	receiver
provider(READ, WRITE, v)	provider
$D ::= \emptyset \mid D, n \mapsto d$	hash of definitions

locate definitions

Encode away services

Encodings

service(BIND, PERMS, $\lambda x.t$)	\triangleq	receiver(BIND, PERMS, $\lambda x.t$)
bind($((n, v), \lambda x.t$)	\triangleq	let $x = \text{send}(\perp, (n, v))$ in t

+ A formal operational semantics

Local reduction $D; e; E \rightarrow D'; e'; E'$


- (Red let-distr) $\frac{D; [\text{PERMS}] \text{ let } x = t \text{ in } t'; E \rightarrow D; \text{ let } x = [\text{PERMS}] t \text{ in } [\text{PERMS}] t'; E}{D; e; E \rightarrow D'; e'; E'}$
- (Red let-eval) $\frac{D; e; E \rightarrow D'; e'; E'}{D; \text{ let } x = e \text{ in } [\text{PERMS}] t; E \rightarrow D'; \text{ let } x = e' \text{ in } [\text{PERMS}] t; E'}$
- (Red let-return) $\frac{D; \text{ let } x = [\text{PERMS}'] v \text{ in } [\text{PERMS}] t; E \rightarrow D; [\text{PERMS}] t\{v/x\}; E}{E' = E, [\text{PERMS}] t}$
- (Red fork) $\frac{E' = E, [\text{PERMS}] t}{D; [\text{PERMS}] \uparrow t; E \rightarrow D; [\text{PERMS}] \text{ void}; E'}$
- (Red read) $\frac{D(n) = \text{provider}(\text{READ}, -, v) \quad \text{PERMS} \sqsupseteq \text{READ}}{D; [\text{PERMS}] !n; E \rightarrow D; [\text{PERMS}] v; E}$
- (Red write) $\frac{D(n) = \text{provider}(\text{READ}, \text{WRITE}, -) \quad \text{PERMS} \sqsupseteq \text{WRITE} \quad D' = D[n \mapsto \text{provider}(\text{READ}, \text{WRITE}, v)]}{D; [\text{PERMS}] n := v; E \rightarrow D'; [\text{PERMS}] \text{ void}; E}$
- (Red register) $\frac{n \text{ fresh} \quad D' = D, n \mapsto \text{receiver}(\text{SEND}, \text{PERMS}, \lambda x.t)}{D; [\text{PERMS}] \text{ register}(\text{SEND}, \lambda x.t); E \rightarrow D'; [\text{PERMS}] n; E}$
- (Red send) $\frac{D(n) = \text{receiver}(\text{SEND}, \text{PERMS}', \lambda x.t) \quad \text{PERMS} \sqsupseteq \text{SEND} \quad \text{PERMS}' \sqsupseteq \text{RECEIVE}}{D; [\text{PERMS}] \text{ send}(\text{RECEIVE}, (n, v)); E \rightarrow D; [\text{PERMS}'] t\{v/x\}; E}$
- (Red choice-l) $D; [\text{PERMS}] t + t'; E \rightarrow D; [\text{PERMS}] t; E$
- (Red choice-r) $D; [\text{PERMS}] t + t'; E \rightarrow D; [\text{PERMS}] t'; E$

data flows +
control flows +
permission checks

Global reduction $D; S; E \longrightarrow D'; S; E'$

- (Red local) $\frac{D; e; E \rightarrow D'; e'; E'}{D; \langle e, \lambda x.e'' \rangle :: S; E \longrightarrow D'; \langle e', \lambda x.e'' \rangle :: S; E'}$
- (Red call) $\frac{D(n) = \text{activity}(\text{CALL}, \text{PERMS}', \lambda x.t, \lambda x.t') \quad \text{PERMS} \sqsupseteq \text{CALL} \quad S' = \langle [\text{PERMS}] \text{ void}, \lambda x.e \rangle :: S}{D; \langle [\text{PERMS}] \text{ call}((n, v)), \lambda x.e \rangle :: S; E \longrightarrow D; \langle [\text{PERMS}'] t\{v/x\}, \lambda x.[\text{PERMS}'] t' \rangle :: S'; E}$
- (Red return) $\frac{S = \langle [\text{PERMS}'] \text{ void}, \lambda x.e' \rangle :: S'}{D; \langle [\text{PERMS}] \text{ return}(v), \lambda x.e \rangle :: S; E \longrightarrow D; \langle e' \{v/x\}, \lambda x.e' \rangle :: S'; E}$
- (Red thread) $\frac{D; e; E \rightarrow D'; e'; E'}{D; S; E, e \longrightarrow D'; S; E', e'}$

+ A security type system



+ What guarantees do I get?

- **Sub-typing** captures **data flow**
- **Type preservation** implies **data-flow security**


Well-typed programs preserve their types [PLAS 09]

- Focus on data flow rather than information flow
- Guarantees should extend under refinement

Future work

Type-check concrete application code

- Build on existing static analysis tools for Java (e.g., WALA)



+ How does this help?

- Alice can safely run any well-typed app on her phone
 - Guaranteed to preserve the secrecy and integrity of her data
- Any app type-checks if it has no permission
 - Alice can safely run such an app on her phone (w/o permissions)
- Bob can convince Alice that his app is safe if it type-checks

Certified installer for Android applications

Install apps that type-check, or are certified to type-check

Opportunity to bring language-based security to the mainstream!

+ Questions?

