University of Maryland

Capital Area Theory Seminar: Fall 2007

The Capital Area Theory Symposia is an UMIACS sponsored series of symposia in theoretical computer science bringing computer scientists from around the world to the Capital area. The Symposia are given at the University of Maryland in cooperation with the Computer Science Department.

Schedule

CATS usually meets on Fridays 11:00pm-12:00pm  AVW 4185  but some talks may be at a different place and time.

 
Date Time Location Speaker Title
Sep 7th 11:00 AM AVW 4185 Matt McCutchen Optimality Criteria for Matching with One-Sided Preferences
Sep 14th 11:00 AM AVW 4185 Julian Mestre A Look at the Optimization Landscape of the Maximum Independent Set Problem
Sep 21st 11:00 AM AVW 4185 Jian Li More Efficient Algorithms and Analyses for Unequal Letter Cost Prefix-Free Coding
Sep 28th 11:15 AM AVW 4185 Azarakhsh Malekian
Basic concepts in game Theory
Oct 05th 11:00 AM AVW 4185 Azarakhsh Malekian Basic Concepts in game Theory
Oct 26th 11:00 AM AVW 4185 Andrea Olea Windows Scheduling
Oct 30th 2:00 PM AVW 2460 Jason Hartline Optimal Mechanism Design
Nov 9th 11:00 AM AVW 4185 Matt McCutchen Approximation algorithms for streaming-model k-center clustering
Nov 16th 11:00 AM AVW 3258 Sandra Zilles A formal analysis of iterative machine learning methods
Nov 30th 11:00 AM AVW 4185 Dov Gordon A Survey of Private Approximation of Search Problems
Dec 7th 11:00 AM AVW 4185 Mohammadreza Ghodsi Max SAT Problem

For additional information send email to Samir Khuller.

If you want to receive announcements of upcoming talks join the theory-local mailing list.


Talks from previous semesters


Other cats

A cat sleeping

Abstracts


Optimality Criteria for Matching with One-Sided Preferences

Matt McCutchen

ABSTRACT

Given a set of people, a set of positions available to them (e.g.,houses or jobs), and each person's preference ordering of the positions, how shall we assign the people to the positions?  Sincedifferent matchings inevitably favor different people, it is not obvious which matching should be considered best overall; many
different optimality criteria are possible.  This talk covers three optimality criteria that share a property that may help them resist manipulation by the people.  First, we introduce the criterion of ``popularity'' studied by Abraham et al., under which an optimal matching might not exist but can be found efficiently if it does. Then, we discuss two generalizations under which an optimal matching always exists, namely ``least unpopularity factor'' and ``least unpopularity margin''.  Unfortunately, it is NP-hard to find a matching of least unpopularity factor (as we show); the complexity of finding a matching of least unpopularity margin is not yet known. This work represents a step toward the goal of a computer program to automatically solve real-world matching problems according to a good optimality criterion.


A Look at the Optimization Landscape of the Maximum Independent Set Problem
 

Julian Mestre

ABSTRACT


Local search is a widely-used heuristic that can be applied to many optimization problems. The high-level idea is simple: Starting from a given feasible solution, make small improvements until reaching a locally optimal solution. Physics provides a nice analogy for this approach: Stating from a given state, a physical system tries to minimize its potential energy until finally settling on a stable (locally optimal) configuration. Needless to say, this approach has an obvious pitfall: If the "optimization landscape" of our problem is rugged then a local optimum may be far away from a globally optimal solution.

While in practice local search algorithms tend to do very well, this landscape ruggedness proves, more often than not, a big obstacle for worst case analysis. In this talk I will survey some results from the literature on local search algorithms for the Maximum Independent Set problem, which show how sometimes these obstacles can be overcome... even in theory!
 

 


More Efficient Algorithms and Analyses for Unequal Letter Cost Prefix-Free Coding

Jian Li

ABSTRACT

 

There is a large literature devoted to the problem of finding an optimal (min-cost) prefix-free code with an unequal letter-cost encoding alphabet of size. While there is no known polynomial time algorithm for solving it optimally there are many good heuristics that all provide additive errors to optimal. The additive error in these algorithms usually depends linearly upon the largest encoding letter size. This paper was motivated by the problem of finding optimal codes when the encoding alphabet is infinite. Because the largest letter cost is infinite, the previous analyses could give infinite error bounds. We provide a new algorithm that works with infinite encoding alphabets. When restricted to the finite alphabet case, our algorithm often provides better error bounds than the best previous ones known.
(Joint work with Mordecai Golin)
 

 


Basic concepts in game Theory
Azarakhsh Malekian

 

ABSTRACT

 

We are going to go over the classical games, basic solution concepts and some computational issues. The goal is to introduce some preliminary concepts in
game theory that are interesting for the people in Computer Science as well.

 


Windows Scheduling
Andrea Olea

ABSTRACT

Given n items (we can think of them as information pages) and a sequence of numbers w_1, w_2, ...w_n (representing window lengths), the goal is to
schedule all items on different time slots on broadcasting channels such that the number of slots between consecutive occurrences of the i'th item
is at most w_i, and the number of channels is minimized. This problem is called Windows Scheduling and has interesting connections to bin packing.
References: Bar-Noy A., Ladner R., Tamir T., "Windows Scheduling as a Restricted
Version of Bin Packing" (SODA 04)
Bar-Noy A., Ladner R., Tamir T., VanDeGrift T., "Windows Scheduling of
Arbitratry Length Jobs on Parallel Machines" (SPAA 05)

 


 Optimal Mechanism Design: from the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics to the Foundations of Internet Algorithms
Jason Hartline

ABSTRACT

As the Internet has developed to become the single most important arena for resource sharing among parties with diverse and selfish interests, traditional algorithmic and distributed systems
approaches are insufficient.  To prevent undesirable Internet phenomena such as spam in email systems, bid-sniping in eBay's auction marketplace, free-loading in file-sharing networks, and click-fraud in
Internet advertising; game-theoretic and economic considerations must be made.  This issue is addressed by the economics field of mechanism design.  Consider a mechanism to be a protocol in which selfish agentsinteract with a central server that then chooses an outcome (e.g.,which agents are given access to which Internet resources) and possible payments (sometimes it is necessary to make agents pay for the resources they use).
The first half of this talk surveys the seminal 1981 work of economist Roger Myerson who was recognized last Thursday with the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics.  His work gave a characterization of the kinds of outcomes that are implementable by a mechanism.  From this characterization, he reduces the problem of optimizing the total payments (i.e., the profit of the mechanism) to the problem optimizing
the social welfare (i.e., total utility generated by the outcome selected).  This result has since directly and indirectly implied countless other significant results in economics, hence the Nobel
recognition.
For the second part of this talk we discuss implications and extensions of this result to the design of Internet algorithms.  In particular, implementation of good mechanisms often requires the
agents make payments.  E.g., spam wound not exist in an email mechanism that charged one cent for each email sent.  Yet, many Internet protocols do not allow payment to be made.  Would you pay for
email?  A computational approach to solve this problem is to use computational payments instead of monetary payments.  E.g., to send an email the sender's computer must first solve a computational task that provably takes ten seconds to solve; this would effectively stop email spam.  Notice that in order to obtain a desirable outcome (no spam) we have to waste the computational resources of good agents (which is a loss to society).  We show how Myerson's characterization can be used to design a mechanism that optimizes the social welfare when payments are not monetary but in instead in units of wasted resources.  These results apply in very general settings.


 Approximation algorithms for streaming-model k-center clustering
Matt McCutchen

ABSTRACT

The *k-center clustering problem* is: given a set of input points in some metric space, find a set of k spherical clusters such that every input point lies in at least one cluster, and minimize the radius of the largest cluster.  This problem is easy to approximate with factor 2 but NP-hard to approximate with any smaller constant factor.  We consider this problem in the *streaming model*: the algorithm is fed input points one at a time and does not have enough memory to hold all of them.  Charikar et al. [1] present a streaming-model 8-approximation algorithm.  We use the results of Khuller et al. [2] to extend this algorithm to a streaming-model 24-approximation for k-center clustering with a small constant number of outliers.  On two additional assumptions, we improve these algorithms to (2 + epsilon)- and (3 + epsilon)-approximation schemes, respectively, where the constant factor of memory usage increases as epsilon decreases.

[1] M. Charikar, C. Chekuri, T. Feder, and R. Motwani. "Incremental Clustering and Dynamic Infomation Retrieval."  http://theory.stanford.edu/~tomas/cluster.ps.gz

[2] M. Charikar, S. Khuller, D. Mount, and G. Narasimhan.  "Algorithms for Facility Location Problems with Outliers."  http://www.cs.umd.edu/users/samir/grant/outlier.ps

 

 


 A formal analysis of iterative machine learning methods
Sandra Zilles

ABSTRACT

When trying to learn classifiers from data streams, it is in general infeasible to compute a completely new hypothesis from scratch for each data point, taking all the data seen up to that moment into account. Iterative algorithms, updating the previous hypothesis using only the current training example, very often seem to be the better choice.
The talk will deal with the question whether we can impose certain intuitive requirements on such iterative learning algorithms without reducing their general capabilities. For that purpose, we analyse
iterative learning on the abstract level of Gold's identification in the limit. The intuitive requirements we deal with are consistency (hypotheses must never contradict known data) and conservativeness
(hypotheses must be maintained as long as they are consistent). Both are for instance satisfied by Rosenblatt's perceptron algorithm (a classical example of an iterative algorithm), but not necessarily by
every iterative learning method. The results obtained in a formal analysis illustrate in which way different consistency and conservativeness demands can affect the capabilities of iterative learners. Interestingly, some of the results (and open questions) seem to relate to the open problem of how to characterise the structure of typical classes learnable iteratively and thus how to design uniform iterative learning methods.

 


 A Survey of Private Approximation of Search Problems
Dov Gordon

 

ABSTRACT

In a setting where a server holds a private instance x of some NP-hard problem f(), and wishes to provide an approximation to one solution (of possibly many) in the set f(x), we ask whether it's possible to ensure that the approximation reveals nothing more about x than the optimal solution would reveal.  We will prove that for vertex cover the above is impossible; a similar approach rules out private approximation for the k-center problem.  We will then introduce a relaxation of the definitions and prove some results, positive and negative, regarding private approximations that reveal partial information about x.
Note that none of this work is my own.  The references are here:
A. Beimel, P. Carmi, K. Nissim, and E. Weinreb. Private Approximation of
Search Problems. In Proc. of 38th Annu. ACM Symp. on the Theory of
Computing (STOC), pages 119-128, 2006
A. Beimel, R. Hallak, and K. Nissim. Private Approximation of Clustering
and Vertex Cover. In the Fourth Theory of Cryptography Conference,
volume 4932 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 338-403, 2007

found here: http://www.cs.bgu.ac.il/~beimel/Papers/BHNTCC.pdf
and here: http://www.cs.bgu.ac.il/~beimel/Papers/BCNWJournal.pdf
 

 


Max SAT Problem
Mohammadreza Ghodsi

 

ABSTRACT

Maximum satisfiability is a classical problem in approximation algorithm. The unweighted MAX-SAT is: given a boolean formula in CNF,
find an assignment to the variables that maximizes the number of satisfied clauses. I will present a 3/4 approximation algorithm for
MAX-SAT. The algorithm is based on two simple randomized algorithms. This algorithm appears in Vazirani's Approximation Algorithms book and is due to Goemans and Williamson. Time permitting I will also show a hardness result: there does not exists a PTAS for MAX-SAT assuming P!=NP. This result uses the PCP theorem. Better bounds are known. a hardness result of 7/8=0.875 and a 0.833-approximation.


 

 

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