Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to gain kernel privileges

How to cause and exploit single bit errors

Mark Seaborn and Thomas Dullien
Bit flips!

This talk is about single bit errors -- i.e. bit flips:

- How to cause them
- How to exploit them

Specifically: bit flips caused by the “rowhammer” bug
The rowhammer DRAM bug

Repeated row activations can cause bit flips in adjacent rows

- A fault in many DRAM modules, from 2010 onwards
- Bypasses memory protection: One process can affect others
- The three big DRAM manufacturers all shipped memory with this problem
  - A whole generation of machines
Overview of talk

- How to cause bit flips by row hammering
- Proof-of-concept exploits
- Mitigations and the industry’s response

- Topics covered in our Project Zero blog post
- Plus things we’ve learned since the blog post
  - Rowhammer from Javascript?
Exploiting random bit flips

How would one exploit a truly random bit flip in physical memory?

2003 paper:
“Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine”

- by Sudhakar Govindavajhala, Andrew Appel
- Escape from Java VM
Exploiting random bit flips

How would one exploit a truly random bit flip in physical memory?

- Generic strategy:
  - Identify data structure that, if randomly bit-flipped, yields improved privileges
  - Fill as much memory as possible with this data structure
  - Wait for the bit flip to occur
- Apply this to JVM:
  - Spray memory with references
  - Bit flip causes reference to point to object of wrong type
Types of memory error

Totally random (e.g. cosmic ray) vs. repeatable

Rowhammer is inducable by software, and *often repeatable*

- Similar exploit techniques can be used in both cases
- But repeatable bit flips offer more control
Intro to DRAM

- Cells are capacitors → refresh contents every 64ms
- "Analogue" device → sense amplifiers
- Accessed by row → “currently activated row”, row buffer

Figure 1. DRAM consists of cells
DRAM disturbance errors

- Cells smaller and closer together
  - <40nm process
- Electrical coupling between rows
  - “Word line to word line coupling”
  - “Passing gate effect”
- Activating a row too often causes “disturbance errors”
  - Can be as low as 98,000 activations (8% of spec)
  - DDR3 spec allows up to 1,300,000 activations
  - Insufficient testing by manufacturers?
Timeline: 2014

Summer:

“Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors”

-- Yoongu Kim, Ross Daly, Jeremie Kim, Chris Fallin, Ji Hye Lee, Donghyuk Lee, Chris Wilkerson, Konrad Lai, Onur Mutlu, at CMU

- 5th September: Read the paper
- 9th September: Repro’d bit flips on spare laptop using Memtest
- Also tested some desktops
  - but they had ECC -- a pretty good mitigation
DRAM badness by year

**Figure 3.** Normalized number of errors vs. manufacture date

(Graph from Kim et al)
How to row hammer on x86

codela:
    mov (X), %eax // Read from address X
    mov (Y), %ebx // Read from address Y
    clflush (X) // Flush cache for address X
    clflush (Y) // Flush cache for address Y
    // mfence // In CMU paper, but not actually needed
    jmp codela

- Requirement #1: **Bypass the cache** → x86 CLFLUSH instruction
  - Unprivileged instruction
  - No way to disable it (unlike e.g. RDTSC)
How to row hammer on x86

codela:
  mov (X), %eax  // Read from address X
  mov (Y), %ebx  // Read from address Y
  clflush (X)   // Flush cache for address X
  clflush (Y)   // Flush cache for address Y
  // mfence     // In CMU paper, but not actually needed
  jmp codela

- Requirement #2: Search for bad rows
  - Some DRAM modules have more bad rows than others
  - Allocate big chunk of memory, try many addresses
How to row hammer on x86

codela:

```asm
mov (X), %eax  // Read from address X
mov (Y), %ebx  // Read from address Y
clflush (X)   // Flush cache for address X
clflush (Y)   // Flush cache for address Y
// mfence      // In CMU paper, but not actually needed
jmp codela
```

- DRAM is divided into **banks** → each has its own **current row**
- Requirement #3: Pick >=2 addresses
  - Map to **different rows** in the **same bank**
  - “Row-conflict address pair”
Row-conflict address pairs

Could use physical addresses
- Memtest: runs in supervisor mode (bare metal)
- On Linux: could use `/proc/$PID/pagemap`

CMU paper uses: \[ Y = X + 8\text{MB} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row #</th>
<th>Bank 0</th>
<th>Bank 1</th>
<th>Bank 2</th>
<th>...</th>
<th>Bank 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0x2000</td>
<td>0x4000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0xe000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0x10000</td>
<td>0x12000</td>
<td>0x14000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x1e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128...</td>
<td>0x800000</td>
<td>0x802000</td>
<td>0x804000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x80e000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Row-conflict address pairs

Pick address pairs **randomly**

- 8 banks → 1/8 chance of getting a row-conflict pair
- Insight on 18th Sept, ~2 weeks after reading paper
  - Repro’d bit flips in userland, under Linux

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<td>0x12000</td>
<td>0x14000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x1e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0x20000</td>
<td>0x22000</td>
<td>0x24000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x2e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3...</td>
<td>0x30000</td>
<td>0x32000</td>
<td>0x34000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x3e000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Address selection

Refinement: Try hammering >2 addresses, e.g. 4 or 8
- Tests more rows at a time
- Increases chances of row conflicts
- Hardware can often queue multiple accesses

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<td></td>
<td>0xe000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0x10000</td>
<td>0x12000</td>
<td>0x14000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0x1e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0x20000</td>
<td>0x22000</td>
<td>0x24000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0x2e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3...</td>
<td>0x30000</td>
<td>0x32000</td>
<td>0x34000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0x3e000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Double-sided row hammering

- Activate *both* neighbours of a row, not just one
- Less data: Existing papers haven’t explored this

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<td>0x10000</td>
<td>0x12000</td>
<td>0x14000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x1e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0x20000</td>
<td>0x22000</td>
<td>0x24000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x2e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0x30000</td>
<td>0x32000</td>
<td>0x34000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x3e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0x40000</td>
<td>0x42000</td>
<td>0x44000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x4e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5...</td>
<td>0x50000</td>
<td>0x52000</td>
<td>0x54000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0x5e000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Double-sided row hammering

- Figure out DRAM address mapping:
  - by bit flips observed
  - by timing
- Picking addresses:
  - Using physical addresses -- /proc/PID/pagemap, disabled
  - Huge pages (2MB) -- not disabled
  - Other chunks of contiguous physical memory
(Diagram from ARMOR project, University of Manchester)
Querying DRAM’s SPD data

$ sudo decode-dimms
...

---=== Memory Characteristics ===---

Fine time base                                  2.500 ps
Medium time base                                0.125 ns
Maximum module speed                            1333MHz (PC3-10666)
Size                                            4096 MB
Banks x Rows x Columns x Bits                   8 x 15 x 10 x 64
Ranks                                           2
...

→ 2^15 rows. Each contains 2^10 * 64 bits = 8 kbytes.
Result: rowhammer-test

- [https://github.com/google/rowhammer-test](https://github.com/google/rowhammer-test)
- Runs in userland
  - Allocates 1GB, looks for bit flips in this
- Risky: Could corrupt other processes or the kernel
  - In practice, it rarely does

Iteration 4 (after 4.42s)
  Took 99.7 ms per address set
  Took 0.997074 sec in total for 10 address sets
  Took 23.080 nanosec per memory access (for 43200000 memory accesses)
  This gives 346614 accesses per address per 64 ms refresh period
  Checking for bit flips took 0.104433 sec
## Testing more machines

### 2014 timeline:
- 7th Oct (4.5 weeks in): NaCl exploit working
- 23rd Oct (~7 weeks in): Testing more laptops → got repros

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Laptop model</th>
<th>Laptop year</th>
<th>CPU family (microarch)</th>
<th>DRAM manufacturer</th>
<th>Saw bit flip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Model #1</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Family V</td>
<td>DRAM vendor E</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Model #2</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Family W</td>
<td>DRAM vendor A</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Model #2</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Family W</td>
<td>DRAM vendor A</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Model #2</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Family W</td>
<td>DRAM vendor E</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Model #3</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Family W</td>
<td>DRAM vendor A</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further refinements

- **Easy:** Use timing to find row-conflict pairs
  - Find bad rows quicker

- **Easy:** Hammer for 128ms (= 64ms refresh period * 2)
  - Maximise row activations between refreshes
  - Maximise chance of disturbing a bad row

- **Harder:** 2-sided row hammering
  - Requires more knowledge of physical addresses
Exploitability

- Systems rely on memory staying constant!
- Two exploits:
  - Native Client (NaCl) sandbox in Chrome
    - bit flip in validated-to-be-safe code
    - easier: can read code to see bit flips
  - Linux kernel privilege escalation
    - bit flip in page table entries (PTEs)
    - gain RW access to a page table
- Dense data structures
Intro to Native Client (NaCl)

- Sandbox for running native code (C/C++)
- Part of Chrome
- Similar to Asm.js, but code generator is not trusted
- “Safe” subset of x86 -- “Software Fault Isolation”
  - Executable (nexe) checked by x86 validator
  - But it allowed CLFLUSH -- “safe in principle”
- Two variants:
  - PNaCl, on open web. Runs pexe (LLVM bitcode): compiled to nexe by in-browser translator. No CLFLUSH?
  - NNaCl, in Chrome Web Store. Could use CLFLUSH.
- Disclosure: I work on NaCl :-)

NaCl exploit

Safe instruction sequence:

\[
\text{andl } \$\sim 31, \%eax \quad \text{// Truncate address to 32 bits} \\
\text{\quad // and mask to be 32-byte-aligned.} \\
\text{addq } \%r15, \%rax \quad \text{// Add } \%r15, \text{ the sandbox base address.} \\
\text{jmp } \%\text{rax} \quad \text{// Indirect jump.}
\]

NaCl sandbox model:

- Prevent jumping into the middle of an x86 instruction
- Indirect jumps can only target 32-byte-aligned addresses
NaCl exploit

Bit flips make instruction sequence unsafe:

```c
andl $~31, %eax  // Truncate address to 32 bits
                // and mask to be 32-byte-aligned.
addq %r15, %rax  // Add %r15, the sandbox base address.
jmp *%rax        // Indirect jump.
```

e.g. `%eax → %ecx`

- Allows jumping to a non-32-byte-aligned address
NaCl exploit

Bit flips make instruction sequence unsafe:

```assembly
andl $~31, %eax  // Truncate address to 32 bits
    // and mask to be 32-byte-aligned.
addq %r15, %rax  // Add %r15, the sandbox base address.
jmp *%rax         // Indirect jump.
```

- Create many copies of this sequence -- `dyncode_create()`
  - Look for bit flips -- code is readable
- Exploit handles changes to register numbers
  - Can exploit 13% of possible bit flips
  - Test-driven development
## NaCl sandbox address space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stack (initial thread)</td>
<td>read+write</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>available for mmap()</td>
<td>anything but exec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nexe rwdata segment</td>
<td>read+write</td>
<td>variable size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nexe rodata segment</td>
<td>read</td>
<td>variable size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dynamic code area</td>
<td>read+exec</td>
<td>~256MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nexe code segment</td>
<td>read+exec</td>
<td>variable size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NaCl syscall trampolines</td>
<td>read+exec</td>
<td>64k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zero page</td>
<td>no access</td>
<td>64k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total size: 1GB or 4GB
Hiding unsafe code in NaCl

Existing technique for exploiting non-bundle-aligned jump:

20ea0: 48 b8 0f 05 eb 0c f4 f4 f4 f4

```
movabs $0xf4f4f4f4f40ceb050f, %rax
```

This conceals:

20ea2: 0f 05 syscall

20ea4: eb 0c jmp ...

20ea6: f4 hlt

// Jump to next hidden instr
// Padding
NaCl mitigations

- Disallow CLFLUSH
- Hide code?
  - Might not help
Kernel exploit

- x86 page tables entries (PTEs) are dense and trusted
  - They control access to physical memory
  - A bit flip in a PTE’s physical page number can give a process access to a different physical page
- Aim of exploit: Get access to a page table
  - Gives access to all of physical memory
- Maximise chances that a bit flip is useful:
  - Spray physical memory with page tables
  - Check for useful, repeatable bit flip first
Page table is a 4k page containing array of 512 PTEs
Each PTE is 64 bits, containing:

- Could flip:
  - “Writable” permission bit (RW): 1 bit → 2% chance
  - Physical page number: 20 bits on 4GB system → 31% chance
Virtual Address Space

Physical Memory
What happens when we map a file with read-write permissions?
What happens when we map a file with read-write permissions? Indirection via page tables.
What happens when we repeatedly map a file with read-write permissions?
What happens when we repeatedly map a file with read-write permissions?
What happens when we repeatedly map a file with read-write permissions?

PTEs in physical memory help resolve virtual addresses to physical pages.
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We can fill physical memory with PTEs.
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Each of them points to pages in the same physical file mapping.
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Chances are this wrong page contains a page table itself.
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An attacker that can read / write page tables …
What happens when we repeatedly map a file with read-write permissions?

PTEs in physical memory help resolve virtual addresses to physical pages.

We can fill physical memory with PTEs.

Each of them points to pages in the same physical file mapping.

If a bit in the right place in the PTE flips …

… the corresponding virtual address now points to a wrong physical page - with RW access.

Chances are this wrong page contains a page table itself.

An attacker that can read / write page tables can use that to map any memory read-write.
Exploit strategy

Privilege escalation in 7 easy steps …

1. Allocate a large chunk of memory
2. Search for locations prone to flipping
3. Check if they fall into the “right spot” in a PTE for allowing the exploit
4. Return that particular area of memory to the operating system
5. Force OS to re-use the memory for PTEs by allocating massive quantities of address space
6. Cause the bitflip - shift PTE to point into page table
7. Abuse R/W access to all of physical memory

In practice, there are many complications.
... but wait ...

In theory, theory and practice are the same.

In practice, there are many complications.
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… we shift where the PTE points to, but that may still point to our mapped file - which doesn’t help us.
In practice there are many complications.

The biggest one: **If** the file is contiguous in physical memory, **and** one of the lower bits flip …

… we shift where the PTE points to, but that may still point to our mapped file - which doesn’t help us. We had RW access to our mapped file beforehand.

Solution: Aggressively fragment the file data across physical memory.
Exploit strategy

Privilege escalation in 7 easy steps …
1. Allocate a large chunk of memory
2. Search for locations prone to flipping
3. Check if they fall into the “right spot” in a PTE for allowing the exploit
4. Return that particular area of memory to the operating system
5. **Force OS to re-use the memory for PTEs by allocating massive quantities of address space**
6. Cause the bitflip - shift PTE to point into page table
7. Abuse R/W access to all of physical memory

In practice, there are many complications.
Exploit strategy

Turns out it is hard to force the OS to re-use “regular” memory for PTEs.

Possible somehow. I spent a few afternoons fumbling around in the Linux physical page allocator. Not very fun code.

Mark was more clever: He simply put the system under memory pressure - when backed into a corner, the OS behaves nicely.
Mitigations

CMU paper: “The industry has been aware of this problem since at least 2012”

- Industry preparing mitigations -- but no security advisories

- ECC (Error Correcting Codes)
- TRR (Target Row Refresh)
- Higher DRAM refresh rates
Mitigation: ECC memory

- Single-bit error correction
- Double-bit error detection
- >=3 bits: not detectable
  - But not very likely?
- Reduces problem to Denial of Service

But only works if you enable proper MCE (Machine Check Exception) handling for ECC errors!

Not ideal: Expensive, and not guaranteed to work
“Ideal” fix: Target Row Refresh

- Count activations of a row
- Refresh neighbouring rows when counter reaches threshold

- Covered by LPDDR4
- DDR4 too?
- In DRAM: Micron data sheets
- In memory controllers:
  - pTRR (pseudo TRR)
  - One Intel presentation says Ivy Bridge supports pTRR. No further evidence of this?
Mitigation: 2x refresh rate

- Current CPUs support this
- tREFI parameter
  - Covered by Intel’s public memory controller docs
  - Set by BIOS
    - Coreboot covers Sandy/Ivy Bridge
- Various vendor BIOS updates do this
- How to verify refresh rate?
- Is 2x refresh enough?
Timing DRAM refreshes

From https://github.com/google/rowhammer-test/tree/master/refresh_timing
Is 2x refresh enough?

Graph from Kim et al
Rowhammer from Javascript?

- Can we do row hammering from Javascript?
  - Via normal cached memory accesses, without CLFLUSH
  - Generate many cache misses
- Javascript engine speed not a problem
  - Near-native access to typed arrays (e.g. Asm.js)
  - Cache misses are slow
- lavados reports doing this
Causing cache misses

- Have to miss at all cache levels (L1, L2, L3)
- Seems difficult?
  - Row hammering by accident in benchmarks (see paper)
  - Not with an inclusive cache!
    - Evicting cache line from L3 evicts from L1 and L2 too
    - Used by Intel CPUs
Cache profiling algorithm

- Find addresses mapping to the same L3 cache set
- e.g. For a 12-way L3 cache, find 13 addresses
  - Accessing these in turn must produce $\geq 1$ cache miss


- By timing memory accesses
- Original motivation: L3 cache side channel attacks
Cache eviction policy

- True LRU: would give 13 cache misses per iteration (for 12-way cache)
  - 6.5x reduction in row activations. Not ideal.
- Ideally want 2 cache misses per iteration
- Real CPUs:
  - Sandy Bridge: Bit-Pseudo-LRU, 1 bit per cache line
  - Ivy Bridge: Quad Age LRU, 2 bits per cache line
    - Plus adaptive policy: “set duelling”
Cache side channel mitigations?

- Reduce timer resolution (performance.now())
  - Changes in Firefox, Chrome, Safari/WebKit
- Probably doesn’t help
  - Cache profiling just takes longer?
  - Multi-threading: Build Your Own Timer
    - PNaCl
    - SharedArrayBuffers in Javascript
    - WebAssembly
- CPU performance counters?
Unknovns

- ARM and mobile devices? Depends on:
  - Cache organisation
  - Performance of CPU and memory controller

- Damage to DRAM?
  - Anecdotal observations
Conclusions

- As software-level sandboxes get better, attackers will likely target more esoteric bugs, such as hardware bugs.

- Rowhammer: not just a reliability problem.

- Hard to verify that hardware meets spec.
  - Vendors should adopt security mindset.
  - Vendors should be more transparent.
For more information

Code and notes on Github:
  ● https://github.com/google/rowhammer-test

Mailing list:
  ● https://groups.google.com/group/rowhammer-discuss/