

Presented by Julian Vanecek



# Gov. Elbridge Gerry + Salamander = Gerrymander

- 1812 by the Boston Gazette
- Gov. Elbridge Gerry re-drew Massachusetts
- Favours Democrat-Republicans over Federalist party.
- District resembled Salamander
  Process existed since 1705





	CHHELSER LYNN	Š	
And Contraction of Co	44%	56%	1813 State-Wide
or the state	56%	71%	Support in Winning Districts
	29		1812 Seats Won
25 Mi	49%	51%	1812 State-Wide
30	Democrat- Republicans	Federalist	

Jain F. Kennedy 1961-1963 Democrat b. 1917 - d. 1963 Martin Van Baran 1837-1841 Damastrat h. 1742 - 4. 1862 Tractor Rosenat Tractor Rosenat Republican A 1859 - 4, 1919 Abraham Linusin 1961-1985 Napatitan A. 1909 - 4 1985 i -Lyndan B. Johnson 1943-1949 Democrat b. 1964 - d. 1973 William Howard Taff 1909-1913 Republican 5, 1957 - 4, 1930 Million Herry Harriso 1841 Million N. 1773 - d. 1841 1865-1869 1865-1869 Notes - 4 1875 George Kashington 1789-1797 Faderaliet A. 1732 - 4. 1799 Richard Nicon 1969-1974 Republican 5. 1913 - 4. 1994 Upses 5. Grant 1969-18.77 Republican 3. 1822 - 4. 1885 A 1740 - 4 1862 Afra Adams 1797-1801 Tederalit 5, 1775 - 6, 1826 Woodcow Wilson 1913-1921 Democrat 5, 1856 - 0, 1924 4 1 Garati Ford 1974-1977 Republican 8. 1913 - 4. 2006 A line water Warnes G. Marrileg 1921-1923 Republican h. 1965 - d. 1923 Ratherford B. Kisyes 1877-1881 Republican h. 1822 - d. 1893 James Kenz Pek 1145-1140 Damente h. 1795 - d. 1949 R (Ca Zachary Taylor 1849-1850 Mig h. 1794 - d. 1850 James Madam 1909-1817 1909-1817 1909-1817 1919-1-6 1839 James A. Garbeid 1831 Repúblican h. 1831 - d. 1881 Calvin Coslidge 1923-1929 Republican b. 1872 - 1933 (UTA -100 Annal Anger 1991,1999 Ngunklinan A. 1911, - 6, 2004 Willing Fillmann 1850-1853 Weig N. 1800-1 1874 1928-1933 Separation 5, 1974 - 4, 1964 Chester A. Arthur 1831-1885 Republican h. 1829 - d. 1886 James Meanse 1817-1825 Separation 5, 1758 - 4, 1811 6 Car 1 124 1000 George N, W. Bach 1940-1952 Repeaktor N. 1924 Adm Quincy Adams 1875-1873 Republican A. 1767 - 4. 1848 Frankin Pierre 1853-1857 Danuelrit 5. 1864 - d. 1869 Franklin D. Rossenski 1933-1945 Democrat N. 1882 - d. 1945 Grant Christian 1835-1887 1833-1887 Democrat 5 - 11377 - 4 1968 (IL) 11.0 C. -Bil Clinton 1993-2001 Democrat A. 1946 N AN James Bochanan 1857-1861 Democrat A. 1791 - 4. 1968 Andrew Jackson 1829-1827 Democrat 5, 1292 - 6, 1345 1 Regional Rambus 1889-1803 Republican A. 1833 - 4 1901 Herry S. Thuman 1945-1951 Democrat b. 1884 - 6, 1972 Ar B K A Line Degle D. Eherhouse 1953-1961 Republican A. 1990 - 4. 1949 Man McGay 1997.1901 Mandam teres. OF THE PRA Barack Ohama 2009-2013 Democrat b. 1961 TED

This paper applies these methods to district seat results between 1812 - 2010

## Violates Spirit of Constitution

right to public self-expression, or freedom of speech." "Packing voters into districts based on their partisan affiliation [infringes upon] the

+ "chilling of partisan choice [infringes upon] freedom of association

#### = discrimination.

- GM is judiciable since 1986 with Davis and Bandemer
- occurred. (Except in Vieth vs. Jubelierer Supreme Court case 2004, showed But there hasn't been a way to prove in court that Gerrymandering has GM unconstitutional)

## Easier than ever to gerrymander because:

- the Big Sort
- Similar geographic region <=> Similar politics
- Urban Concentration
- more detailed data
- Good census data
- computer-based districting
- Politicians don't have to do the math
- Pretty optimal
- single-party rule
- Party in power makes the choices
- X-treme Bipartisanship

### Dave's Redistricting App

Software exists to gerrymander based on **your input parameters**, with **real census data**.

For all states but Alaska

This is an example Dem. Gerrymander (8 - 0)

Only works with Internet Explorer (Dave is a Microsoft guy)

http:// swing state project .com/



### Crassly Anti-Majoritarian Outcomes Proposed Minimum Qualities for a Standard to Avoid

(1) be based on the general concept of partisan symmetry

(2) NOT lazily use geographic boundaries or districting procedures

(3) NOT use election results for offices other than the ones that are in dispute

to allow courts to instruct experts on how and where to apply more detailed (4) can clearly state without case-specific or mathematics-intensive assumptions, mathematical or other analysis

# Majority-Minority Districts & Gingles criteria

Districts MUST be drawn for minority groups, where they will dominate the vote.

Guarantees minority voices are not suppressed

The fraction of such districts does not exceed fraction of minority population

Other criteria include i.e. compactness















#### "CORRECT"

#### Packing⇔Cracking

#### **Voting Rights Act**

- Majority-minority districts
- "Packing" required

#### Michigan

- Contiguous(ish)
- >50% D
- Reps: 5D, 9R



michigan.gov

#### Results

- Non proportional representation
- Maryland is one of worst in nation
- Maryland is gerrymandered, result of paper.
- Maryland 1973 82



#### Results

- Non proportional representation
- Maryland is one of worst in nation
- Maryland is gerrymandered, result of paper.
- Maryland 2013 today



#### Arizona is not gerrymandered.

...by statistical review

Even though the LESS POPULAR party held more seats (2012)



#### **Court Request**

1986 -- Supreme Court:

- "a test for gerrymandering should demonstrate both intents and effects"
- "(1) intent—an established purpose to create a legislative districting map to disempower the voters of one party; and
- (2) effect—proof that an election based on the contested districting scheme led to a distorted outcome"

## Spirit of the Three Statistical Tests

-- WITH COMPUTER SIMULATION (1) Compare number of seats won vs. district expectations

## Spirit of the Three Statistical Tests

-- WITH COMPUTER SIMULATION (1) Compare number of seats won vs. district expectations

-- WITH SIMPLE STATISTICS, T-Test (2) a discrepancy in winning vote margins between the two parties

Are Dem. districts wins consistently close

but Rep. districts won by landslides?



## Spirit of the Three Statistical Tests

--- WITH COMPUTER SIMULATION (1) Compare number of seats won vs. district expectations

(2) a discrepancy in winning vote margins between the two parties -- WITH SIMPLE STATISTICS

-- WITH SIMPLE STATISTICS unusually even distribution of votes across districts. measured by either the difference between mean and median vote share, or an (3) the construction of reliable wins for the party in charge of redistricting, as

# Test 1: Excess Seats Test -- Analysis of Effects

curve. Does that outcome favor the redistricting party? Compare: outcome of an election after redistricting and simulated seats/votes

the difference, Delta and the simulated expected number and divide by the standard deviation to obtain For a state containing N districts, calculate the difference between the actual seats SEATS ACTUAL - SEATS SIMULATED







# Test 2: Lopsided Outcomes Test - Analysis of Intents

Compare the proportion of votes in the districts that Democrats win, with proportion in Republican wins.

In GM, the opposition party wins landslide victories in few districts, but incumbents narrowly win in many .

Use grouped t-test





וpare <b>ס</b> of Winner's districts	<u>Closely divided state</u> reliable wins occur v average and mediar differ from one anoth	(0)	Jing offers secure wins for t	ot 2. Dolioblo Win
in state vs. out of state/nat	DescriptionOne party dominicvhen the n votereliable wins occurn voteparty's strength isner.highly evenly acro	state's partisan vote:	he incumbents with narrow, t	n Tont Anning o
tionwide	r when that spread oss districts.	A CONTRACTOR	but reliable victories.	<b>f   5+05+0</b>

+ Chi-squared test

•		3
	2	
ł	b	
t		2

~
-
CP.
ŝ
1
-
-
11
in
0
9
-
1
_
-
-
H .
-
0
<b>™</b>
~
59
ŝ
<del>.</del>
00
H-
0
9
H
President and
64
1
<b>**</b>
1.0
ŝ
6.5
-
-
h
1
-
<b>w</b>
-
-
2
CD .
-
Ξ.
9
5
7
TY
try fo
try fo
try for
try for
try for t
try for th
try for th
try for the
try for the
try for the (
try for the C
try for the Co
try for the Co
try for the Cor
try for the Con
try for the Cong
try for the Congi
try for the Congr.
try for the Congre
try for the Congres
try for the Congress
try for the Congress
try for the Congression
try for the Congressio
try for the Congression
try for the Congression
try for the Congressiona
try for the Congressiona
try for the Congressional
try for the Congressional
try for the Congressional E
try for the Congressional E
try for the Congressional Ele
try for the Congressional Ele
try for the Congressional Elec
try for the Congressional Elect
try for the Congressional Elect
try for the Congressional Election
try for the Congressional Electic
try for the Congressional Election
try for the Congressional Election
try for the Congressional Elections
try for the Congressional Elections
try for the Congressional Elections of
try for the Congressional Elections o
try for the Congressional Elections of
try for the Congressional Elections of
try for the Congressional Elections of 2
try for the Congressional Elections of 20
try for the Congressional Elections of 20
try for the Congressional Elections of 201
try for the Congressional Elections of 201
try for the Congressional Elections of 2012

			_		T て の T T	5				Test 3 (Skew	ed Districts)		- -
		fest 1 (Simu	ation)	Te	st 2 (Lopside	d Margi	ns)	Directly Fro	m Elect	ion Returns	Imputing 1	Unconte	sted Races
			Δ				Δ	Average		A Average-	Average		A (Average-
	Total	Simulated	(Difference Divided hy	Democratic	Renublican		(Difference Divided by	Median		Median Divided Rv	Median		Median Divided Re
	seats	Average	Sigma)	Win %	Win %	Sigma	Sigma)	Vote (%)	Sigma	Sigma)	Vote (%)	Sigma	Sigma)
Arizona	9	2.96	D by 2.7	63.1%	66.6%	9.5%	D by 0.4	-0.5%	3.8%	D by 0.1	-3.3%	3.8%	D by 0.9
Florida	27	11.73	R by 1.3	73.0%	67.4%	7.4%	R by 0.8	4.8%	3.8%	R by 1.2	4.8%	2.4%	R by 2.0
Illinois	18	10.04	D by 1.8	66.2%	62.1%	4.9%	R by 0.8	2.1%	3.1%	R by 0.7			
Indiana	9	3.02	R by 1.3	65.1%	59.5%	3.1%	R by 1.8	1.4%	2.1%	R by 0.7	,		
Maryland	00	6.11	D by 1.2	70.4%	66.5%	ĸ		-2.8%	3.9%	D by 0.7			
Michigan	14	6.97	R by 2.0	74.4%	58.9%	4.9%	R by 3.2	6.9%	3.7%	R by 1.9			
North Carolina	13	5.94	R by 2.1	70.2%	57.5%	6.9%	R by 1.9	7.8%	3.2%	R by 2.5			
Ohio	16	6.48	R by 2.4	80.2%	62.2%	7.5%	R by 2.4	6.8%	4.3%	R by 1.6	6.8%	3.0%	R by 2.3
Pennsylvania	18	8.14	R by 2.9	76.3%	59.5%	5.5%	R by 3.1	7.6%	3.2%	R by 2.4			
Texas	36	8.68	D by 2.3	71.4%	72.1%	4.5%	D by 0.2	4.9%	3.1%	R by 1.6	7.0%	2.4%	R by 2.9
Virginia	11	4.56	R by 1.8	70.9%	58.8%	5.6%	R by 2.1	6.3%	3.4%	R by 1.9			
Wisconsin	80	3.64	R by 0.9	68.9%	59.6%	3.8%	R by 2.4	7.0%	4.2%	R by 1.7			
In all cases, the	e last c	olumn giv	es the diffe	rence betw	een expect	ations	and actual r	esults, expr	essed in	n units of si	gma, the sta	andard	deviation,
to mino a mone	ITA th	at is comm	anable anno	the the three	tacte Tact	2 otant	to from rous	Derrentane	Tacilt	e and the la	of column .		intere in

uncontested races are distributed 75%-25% for the winning party. The boldface underlined entries indicate statistically significant results. to give a measure that is comparable across the time tests. Lest 3 starts from Taw percentage results and the last column assumes voters in Test 2 could not be done for Maryland because the grouped t-test requires each group to include at least two wins.

### 3 Tests but 4 Good Things

- Don't use any maps
- "can be applied independently of evaluation of intent"
- can be used separately or combined to reduce false positives and negatives
- Combinable with other (geographic) state-mandated requirements



