Network

Influence through a Social Maximizing the Spread of

Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos (2003)

Paper Overview

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- History
- **Diffusion Models**
- Paper Contributions
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- 0
- 0 Example Network Efficient Approximation
- Experimental Results
- Generalization
- Non progressive processes
- Marketing Strategies

Introduction

Problem: Need to try to convince a people to adopt a product/behavior

Constraints: Let's say you have a limited budget

Approach?



History

Traditional Methods:

- Mass Marketing
- Direct Marketing



Customers don't necessarily make decisions in a vacuum

Diffusion of ideas

Social networks play a fundamental role as a medium for the spread of information

Dynamics of adoption is important

Prior research work in diffusion processes:

- I. "viral marketing" effects in the success of new products
- I. adoption of various strategies in game theoretic settings
- cascading failures in power systems.

Diffusion Models

Activation of Nodes (Users) in a directed Social Network Graph (G)

Models considered:

- Independent Cascades
- Linear Threshold

Initial Assumption: Progressive



Check activation condition and update state A_t at every time step





Diffusion Models: Independent Cascades



Model Parameters

Edge weight p_{v,w}: Activation success probability

Diffusion proceeds in discrete time steps:

- Select initial set of active nodes A_o
- Nodes active at time step t are also active at time step t+1
- Active node v given a single chance to activate neighbor w
- Multiple neighbors' attempted sequenced in random order



Diffusion Models: Independent Cascades

Influence Maximization Problem

 $\sigma(A_0)$ Domingos-Richardson framework: Find a k-node subset A₀ of maximum influence

Questions:

- How is influence defined?
- What is a submodular function?
- Why is this important?

THIS IS NP-HARD!

Paper Contributions

- First provable approximation guarantee to within a factor of $(1 1/e \varepsilon)$
- Experimental validation: Comparison with popular heuristics
- Extensions
- General Framework
- Complex Marketing Actions
- Non-Progressive

for these types of influence problems in social network A general approach for reasoning about the performance guarantees of algorithms

Approximation Guarantees

We want to find k-element set A_0 for which $\sigma(A_0)$ is maximized

a set that maximizes the value of f over all k-element sets element that provides the largest marginal increase in the function value. Let S* be of size k obtained by selecting elements one at a time, each time choosing an **THEOREM**: For a non-negative, monotone submodular function σ , let S be a set

(Nemhauser, Wolsey, Fisher, 78) Then $\sigma(S) \ge (1-1/e) \cdot \sigma(S^*)$; in other words, S provides a (1-1/e) approximation.

Influence function σ submodularity proof?

Approximation Guarantees

Assumptions:

- σ is non-negative
- Submodular function: $\sigma(S \cup \{v\}) \sigma(S) \ge \sigma(T \cup \{v\}) \sigma(T)$
- Monotone: $\sigma(S \cup \{v\}) \ge \sigma(S)$

Submodularity: Independent Cascades

Pre-flip coins for each pair of nodes (v,w) using $p_{v,w}$

 $\sigma(A) =$ $\sigma_{X}(S \cup \{V\}) - \sigma_{X}(S) = R(V, X \cup_{u \in S} R(u, X))$ R(v,X): Set of nodes with live-edge paths from x $\sigma_{X}(S \cup \{v\}) - \sigma_{X}(S) \geq \sigma_{X}(T \cup \{v\}) - \sigma_{X}(T)$ X: State of edges (live/blocked) outcomes X $\operatorname{Prob}[X] \cdot \sigma_X(A)$ 0.4 0.3 3 0.5 0.2 0. 3 0.5 <u>0</u>.1 0.2

NP-Hardness: Independent Cascades

Reduce to set-cover problem

- Sets X₁,...,X_m
- Nodes u₁,...,u_n
- Edge between X_i and u_j if u_j in X_i Set of k nodes A $\sigma(A) \ge n+k$

Optimization is NP-Hard



Submodularity Proof: Linear Threshold

Slightly more complicated: Activation dependent on aggregate

Trigger Graph Model: Pick a live incoming edge for each node v using $b_{v,w}$.

- X: State of edges (live/blocked)
- R(v,X): Set of nodes with live-edge paths from x

Claim: Trigger graph model = Linear threshold model

Submodularity Proof: Linear Threshold

- State of model is the pair (A_{t-1},A_t)
- Show that transition probabilities between states are same in both models
- Both models start in same state
- Distribution over states is always identical
- Pr(v becomes active at time = t+1)
- In model 1: Chance that influence weights in $A_t \setminus A_{t-1}$ push it over threshold given not already exceeded
- 0 In model 2: Chance that its live edge comes from $A_t \setminus A_{t-1}$ and not $A_{t-1}, A_{t-2}, ..., A_0$
- \circ In both cases it is the same:

$$\frac{\sum_{u \in A_t \setminus A_{t-1}} b_{v,u}}{1 - \sum_{u \in A_{t-1}} b_{v,u}}$$

NP-Hardness: Linear Threshold

Show to be equivalent to vertex-cover problem

Optimization is NP-Hard

Experimental Results

physics theory section of the e-print arXiv (2003) Run on co-authorship network from the complete list of papers in the high energy

10748 nodes (researchers), and 53000 edges (co-authorship)

Greedy Algorithm VS

- Structural measures
- Degree Centrality
- Distance Centrality
- Random selection

Experimental Results

- $(u \rightarrow v) = C_{uv} / d_{u}$ Linear Threshold Model: multiplicity of edges as weights. Weight of edge
- Independent Cascade Model:
- Case 1: uniform probabilities p on each edge (parallel edges?)
- 0 Case 2: edge from u to v has probability 1/ $d_{\rm v}$ of activating v.

thresholds or edge outcomes pseudo-randomly from [0, 1] every time For $\sigma(A)$: Simulate the process 10000 times for each targeted set, re-choosing

Linear Threshold Model



Greedy algorithm outperforms

- Degree centrality node heuristic by about 18%
- Distance centrality heuristic by over 40%



Independent Cascade Model: Case 2

Independent Cascade Model : Case 1



Generalizations of Diffusion Models

- Generalized threshold
- 0 Define monotone threshold function $f_{V}(S)$ such that node v is activated for $f_{V}(S) \ge \theta_{V}$
- Linear Threshold: $\sum_{w \text{ active neighbor of } v} b_{v,w} \geq \theta_{v}$.
- General cascade
- \circ Define success probability probability p_v(u, S)
- \circ Independent cascade $p_{v,u}$ independent of S

These can be shown to be equivalent

NP-hard to approximate in general

Non-progressive processes

- Nodes can switch back to inactivity
- Can be reduced to progressive case
- k interventions rather than k nodes

only if v_{\uparrow} is activated in the progressive process. horizon τ is equivalent to the progressive influence maximization problem on the layered graph GT . Node v is active at time t in the non-progressive process if and Theorem: The non-progressive influence maximization problem on G over a time

General Marketing Strategies

- m: #marketing actions M
- Different nodes may respond to marketing actions in different ways
- Marketing strategy vector x
- $h_{v}(\mathbf{x})$: probability that node v is activated by strategy \mathbf{x}
- 0 Non-decreasing $h_v(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{a}) - h_v(\mathbf{x}) \leq h_v(\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{a}) - h_v(\mathbf{y})$

General Marketing Strategies

Expected revenue from final activated set $\sigma(A)$

$$(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{A \subseteq V} \sigma(A) \cdot \prod_{u \in A} h_u(\mathbf{x}) \cdot \prod_{v \notin A} (1 - h_v(\mathbf{x})).$$

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Maximize this using a hill-climbing algorithm

solution subject to P i $x^i \le k$ guarantees that $g(x) \ge (1 - e - k \cdot \gamma k + \delta \cdot n) \cdot g(x)$, where x denotes the optimal THEOREM 6.1. When the hill-climbing algorithm finishes with strategy x, it

Questions?