

Web Workers, Unite!

Addressing Challenges of Online Laborers

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ABSTRACT

The ongoing rise of human computation as a means of solving computational problems has created an environment where human workers are often regarded as nameless, faceless computational resources. Some people have begun to think of online tasks as a “remote person call”. In this paper, we summarize ethical and practical labor issues surrounding online labor, and offer a set of guidelines for designing and using online labor in ways that support more positive relationships between workers and requestors, so that both can gain the most benefit from the interaction.

Author Keywords

Human Computation, HCOMP, collective intelligence, crowdsourcing, wisdom of crowds.

ACM Classification Keywords

H5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): Miscellaneous.

INTRODUCTION

The recent growth of the field of “human computation” [11] has brought with it expanded interest in online labor. Popularized by Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT - mturk.com), and now available through other services such as CrowdFlower (crowdfower.com) and CloudCrowd (cloudcrowd.com), online labor includes people being paid to do web-based tasks posted by “requestors”. This is also related to collective intelligence [9], crowdsourcing [7], and wisdom of crowds [14], which are frequently based on volunteer participation. Even when paid, the workers and requestors often remain anonymous

By performing tasks on demand from around the world, these “web workers” offer an inexpensive and high throughput solution to a variety of problems that only humans can solve. Web workers have the potential of earning money in places where they may otherwise have poor job prospects. Unfortunately, as with any labor market, once humans and money are involved, a host of problems surface. From privacy breaches to unpaid or underpaid labor, there are real social risks that arise with the use of these technologies [4, 13].

While these social risks may at first glance seem beyond the scope of HCI researchers (and particularly technologists), we feel that it is precisely our responsibility to address them from the beginning since it is designers, not ethicists or

policy makers, who have the power to influence what is built and to mitigate risks before any harm is done. This is especially important because technologies tend to build on one another and so once something is released, it can be difficult or impossible to reverse the social effects [5, 8].

To foreshadow the issues, it is the anonymity of all parties, control over payment by the requestor, and general information imbalance that is at the root of many of the challenges of this kind of work.

The key contributions of this paper are:

- A summary of the ethical concerns about online labor.
- A specific exploration of issues related to fair wages.
- Design strategies to help mitigate these problems.

PROBLEMS FOR WEB WORKERS

Only a handful of research papers have examined the problems web workers face [4, 12, 13]. One paper looks into the concerns web workers themselves report [13]. The biggest set of issues raised by all centers on wages. There are numerous concerns raised about unfairly rejected work, slow payment, and payments that do not fairly reflect the work performed for the given task. Furthermore, there are occasional technical problems, the cost of which is borne by the workers. When such problems arise, workers often complain that requestors are unresponsive to emails (which are mediated by AMT to maintain anonymity).

This concern about wages is reflected in comments posted at Turker Nation [15], a web-based forum where AMT workers (often called “Turkers”) are free to discuss their situations openly. They describe their concerns, often emphatically. Issues may be discussed in general terms or by naming specific requestors and problems encountered. The site contains a user-maintained blacklist of requestors to avoid. The other major resource is Turkopticon [16], a plug-in for the Firefox browser that lets workers rate the credibility of requestors. Turkopticon annotates each HIT with the collective rating of the requestor, based on communicativity, fairness, generosity, and promptness.

The fact that these grass roots efforts exist and are used is interesting because it demonstrates that at least some web workers do not feel that they are adequately supported by the existing infrastructure. It is equally clear that many

workers behave badly alongside the requestors, expending no more than the minimum effort necessary to receive payment for doing a HIT [3, 10].

This behavior is not surprising given the theory of moral hazard [6], which says that when one party does not incur the full cost of their actions, they tend to behave more riskily, and thus increase the cost of the other involved parties. Given the anonymity of all participants in AMT, moral hazard is in full play. Because requestors face few consequences, they can and do post unethical or even illegal tasks, or deny payment for work completed. Similarly, workers may do substandard work or more blatantly cheat. Cheating often takes the form of clicking or typing randomly, using scripts to enter useless input, or using online resources to find answers that are not useful to the requester, but just relevant enough to bring about payment (i.e. using an online translation engine to create a translation into a language the Turker does not know).

These kinds of behaviors, while obviously detrimental to the party who bears the costs, also have significant downsides for the market as a whole. The “market for lemons” theory models what happens when a buyer cannot accurately judge the quality of an individual product prior to committing to its purchase, leading the buyer to average the quality of all similar products in their decision as to how much to pay [1]. This creates an incentive for sellers to lower the quality of their goods, since they will be paid an average price in any case, and thus they can benefit more from each transaction if the payment they receive is greater than the value of what they gave in return. Good workers, on the other hand, tend to leave the market because they get paid less than their actual value. The result is that the market decreases in overall quality, resulting in a market that sells only poor quality items, i.e., lemons.

It is the nature of online labor that it is difficult to automatically judge the quality of the work, since the work is too difficult for computers to do in the first place. While requestors can choose not to pay for poor work, the AMT dynamics are similar to a classic market for lemons. Requestors have developed sophisticated techniques to mitigate the problem by, for example, using other web workers to judge the quality of a first round of work [11]. When effective, these measures add significantly to the cost of getting work done, thereby reducing the value of online labor markets in the first place. Other solution providers, such as CrowdFlower and CloudCrowd, have systems in place to automatically identify workers who submit poor quality work. This is typically done using some gold standard data and worker reputations.

Another area of concern, raised by Jonathan Zittrain, is “moral valence” [17], which supposes that anonymity extends *beyond* the worker and the requestor, all the way to the nature and purpose of the work itself. There are numerous tasks that are clearly objectionable (e.g., requests for posting positive reviews about products the worker is

actually not familiar with). However, tasks often extract small pieces of larger jobs and present them to workers out of context so that workers do not understand the purpose of the work they are doing. This is more challenging because the work might be objectionable if the worker understood its context. For example, Zittrain gives the example of matching photos of people, which is a task that sometimes comes up today in HITs. That same task could be used by an oppressive regime to identify citizens who have, for example, legally participated in a political demonstration.

WAGE ISSUES FOR WEB WORKERS

Wage issues have been the largest source of complaints raised by web workers. They say requestors sometimes pay late, pay too little, or don’t pay at all. Before a HIT can be created, the requester must add sufficient funds to the account with Amazon to cover all of the work. However, the funds are frozen and not paid to workers until the requester has confirmed that the work was satisfactory. Funds for unsatisfactory work are returned. To cover the possibility that the requester might neglect to approve the work, requestors are required to specify an “auto-approval delay” after which funds will be released to workers. The maximum is thirty days. We consider it polite to set the delay to three days, or a week at most, and we regularly receive e-mail from workers after just one or two days if payment has not yet been approved. This indicates how the expectations of web workers match the speed of the web, and also perhaps the lack of trust between web workers and requestors. Since the auto-approval delay is not visible to workers, they have no visible guarantee of when they will be paid.

Given that web workers also complain that some requestors unfairly and arbitrarily reject good work, this lack of trust is perhaps not surprising. AMT is set up so that the requestor has unchecked power over this important judgment. There is no rebuttal process, and if a worker is not paid by the requestor, the only recourse is to avoid the offending requestor in the future and voice their concerns using forums such as Turkoicon or Turk Nation.

Despite the problems, one can see why AMT was structured in this way. If workers had greater power to demand redress, they could always claim that their work was performed legitimately, even if it was abundantly clear that it was not. For example, in a recent experiment that we ran, we posted Chinese linguistic tasks at \$0.05 each and offered a \$0.05 bonus per task for workers who completed at least 100 tasks within the final 28 hours. Of the 8,498 responses received, 3,174 were submitted fraudulently by a single worker, apparently using a script.

The issue with the most subtleties is the most basic: How much should workers be paid for their work? Assuming the work is performed honestly, it is still difficult to judge how much web workers typically make. There clearly is significant variation, and the actual hourly wage of any individual worker depends on many factors which go

beyond the obvious price per task and the time it takes to do the task. For example, some tasks have a significant learning curve. Thus, workers can only justify the time spent understanding the task if there are many instances.

While an hourly wage is difficult to predict, it can still be estimated. But is it a good idea to offer a payment system based on time spent rather than work done? In the physical world, both models are commonly supported with both regular and temporary employees frequently paid by the hour alongside of contract workers paid by the job. Employers have various incentives for offering different wage structures. However the wages are organized, workers still frequently do their best to maximize their hourly wage.

With this structure, and the difficulty of monitoring how web workers are spending their time while working, it is easy to understand why requestors might be reluctant to offer anything like an hourly wage. Even so, hourly wage remains a hot topic of discussion as represented by a post by Luis von Ahn [2]. The fundamental issue is whether web workers should be paid based on their time spent working.

Given the current structure of online labor, this may seem like an impractical idea. But in the physical world, hourly payment with a minimum wage is not only common, but required by law in numerous situations in the vast majority of countries in the world. So, we believe it is at least worth considering the characteristics of minimum wage.

The fundamental motivation for a minimum wage is that it might decrease poverty by ensuring that workers earn enough to survive. There is also the moral argument that workers should not be taken advantage of by offering an unlivable wage when the employer knows that the worker has no other options. There are also practical arguments such as the idea that minimum wage is a better way to help the poor than welfare because it requires that people actually do something for their government assistance. Higher wages also have the potential of attracting higher quality workers, which could result in a virtuous cycle, improving the relevant industries.

However, there are a number of arguments against a minimum wage. The biggest issue is that minimum wage may not, in fact, succeed in decreasing poverty because while some workers get a higher wage, others may lose their jobs altogether since some employers won't be able to pay that higher wage. There also is a concern related to the "market for lemons" which is that guaranteeing a minimum wage would overpay poor quality workers, thus disincenting good workers from doing their job well.

Web worker characteristics bring a number of additional concerns about minimum wage. First of all, the argument that monopolistic employers can abuse workers because they offer the only employment in a region largely goes away since the decentralized nature of online labor increases worker options. An important practical issue is that minimum wages are tied to the local standards of living

where workers live. While it would be possible to establish different minimum wages for different locales, this would be problematic since online labor is a true global marketplace. Such an approach would direct work to locales with the lowest minimum wage, leaving out workers in areas with higher minimum wages. Finally, there is the practical issue that it is impossible to reliably determine of how long a web worker actually works on a given task.

These issues make a conventional minimum hourly wage for online labor likely to be impossible. Nevertheless, web workers' concerns provide enough motivation for us to at least consider issues of hourly wages.

We think that a good starting place is for requestors to calculate the expected hourly wage of workers doing their tasks – through a combination of doing some of the tasks in house as well as monitoring the time spent by (non-cheating) web workers. Even if requestors choose to offer the lowest wage possible, they could still post the information they do have. A system (such as AMT) could go further by posting the estimated hourly wage of tasks.

SYSTEM DESIGN GUIDELINES

Any system can be abused, but we think that a system's design can encourage less problematic use. To that end, we make the following recommendations for requestors, that we think if implemented, would result in more ethical utilization of this labor source that could result in better economics with higher quality and more efficient work, benefiting all parties.

Economic design guidelines

1. **Hourly pay:** Price tasks based on time. The time to do tasks can be estimated in-house before posting HITs.
2. **Pay disclosure:** Disclose the expected hourly wage.
3. **Value worker's time:** Optimize tasks to use worker's time effectively. We have seen many HITs on AMT that were poorly designed, forcing workers to spend excessive time navigating the task interface, waiting for network activity, or dealing with technical problems.
4. **Objective quality metrics:** Decide to approve or reject work based on objective metrics that have been defined in advance and disclosed to workers.
5. **Immediate Quality feedback:** Give immediate feedback to workers, showing whatever metrics are available. This technique is exemplified by CrowdFlower's system, which displays a panel above the task with the worker's estimated accuracy so far.
6. **Longer-term feedback:** Give warnings to problematic workers. For example, our system sends email to workers who submit 10 HITs below a quality threshold. After 20 unsatisfactory HITs, we block the worker, both for our benefit and so a confused worker does not waste time doing work that we will not ultimately pay for.

7. **Disclose payment terms:** Disclose in advance when payment will be made. Turkers have indicated to us that 24-48 hours is the maximum acceptable delay between submitting work and receiving payment.
8. **Follow payment terms:** Pay as promptly as possible, and always within the disclosed timeframe. Ideally, the service (such as AMT) would more explicitly disclose the payment timeframe for all HITs.
9. **Provide grievance process:** Provide a fair means for workers to request a review of work that was rejected. Having the requestor maintain complete control over the payment of work creates an imbalance of power. At the very least, requestors should explain by email to workers exactly why their work was rejected and what they would have had to do in order to get their work accepted.

Ideally, a community-run arbitration system could be set up when simple negotiation is not acceptable to the worker. While such an arbitration system would not be binding, the results could be publicized and included in a simple service such as Turkopticon.

Non-economic design guidelines

1. **Provide task context:** Given the risk of doing objectionable work, HITs should be described in the context of why the work is being done. Not only is this likely to make the work more satisfying to workers, but it lets workers make informed ethical choices about how they spend their time.
2. **Limit anonymity:** The mutually anonymous nature of most current online labor systems is a significant driver of many of the issues raised in this paper. Anonymity of requestors enables them to reject good work with near impunity. It also enables them to post unethical or illegal tasks with no public scrutiny. Anonymity for workers enables them to cheat at large scales with nearly no risk since, as with requestors, if their reputation gets damaged, they can simply create a new account.

Online labor marketplaces should make it more difficult for someone to create multiple accounts. Even if they hid the identification of the requestor and worker, they could require positive and unique identification per account. However, we think if the actual identity of requestor and worker alike were available, it would lead to fairer labor practices. Given common preference for anonymity on the web, we believe the most realistic solution is for the service provider to positively verify and store the identity of requestors and workers to limit multiple account creation, and to provide reputation and arbitration services.

CONCLUSION

We remain excited and optimistic about online labor, and believe it will continue to grow and become a significant part of the global intellectual labor pool. In order to realize the potential of this form of labor, practices must be

modified and regularly considered to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of requestors and workers alike.

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