# Touring the Internet in a TCP Sidecar

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## Topology Discovery: Along for the Ride


### Goal: Internet's complete router-level topology


- Challenges:
  - Accuracy: Noisy data creates false links, nodes
  - Completeness: Sections difficult to probe
  - Validation: No complete map exists
- Tools/Contributions:
  - Passenger: augment probes with IP RR option
  - Sidecar: attach probes to TCP streams
- Previous work:
  - Limited coverage
  - Predominantly traceroute-based


Tool that uses TTL-limited probes to discover routers along the path from source to destination.














Tool that uses TTL-limited probes to discover routers interface addresses along the path some set of paths from source to destination.



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- Will never see layer 2 devices or backup links.
- Will see abuse reports confusing traceroute probes for attack traffic.

# Summary of Traceroute's Limitations

- Unresolved aliases: false nodes
- Undetected multiple paths: false links
- Fails to discover hidden routers

- Firewalls/NATs block probes
- Abuse reports limit scope of experiments

Layer 2 devices and unused/backup links never discovered

### Mitigating Traceroute's Limitations

### Passenger: IP Record Route Option

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#### Not Addressed

 Layer 2 devices and unused/backup links never discovered

### Record Route IP Option

RFC791: Record path into packet's IP header

At most 9 IP addresses recorded

#### Conventional Wisdom:

- Nine hops is too few to be useful
  - Average path length > 9
- Firewalls drop packets with IP options
  - Additional cause for abuse reports
- IP options increase router processing time

### Passenger: TR+RR

Augment traceroute (TR) probes with IP Record Route option (RR):

- RR records the outgoing address
- Prevents false links
- New alias resolution technique

#### Making RR work:

- 9 hops + PlanetLab = 87-98% of addresses
- Avoid firewalls: Don't probe close to end-hosts
- Destination support not required
  - IP options included in ICMP response

- TR records incoming IP
- RR records outgoing IP

TTL	TR	:	RR array

TR records incoming IP

 RR records outgoing IP


TTL	TR	:	RR array
1	A1	:	Ø



TR records incoming IP


 RR records outgoing IP

TTL	TR	:	RR array
1	A1	:	Ø
2	B1	:	A2



- TR records incoming IP
- RR records outgoing IP

TTL	TR	:	RR array
1	A1	:	Ø
2	B1	:	A2
3	C1	:	A3,E2




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- RR records outgoing IP

TTL TR : RR array


1 A1 : ∅
2 B1 : A2
3 C1 : A3,E2

D1 : A2,B2,F2



TR records incoming IP

RR records outgoing IP




	TTL	TR	:	RR array
• TR records	1	A1	:	Ø
incoming IP	2	B1	:	(A2)
<ul><li>RR records outgoing IP</li></ul>	3	C1	:	A3,E2
outgoing ir	4	D1	:	A2,B2,F2
	5	DST	:	A2,B2,F2,D3

 Alias resolution: ith TR IP is an <u>alias</u> for ith RR IP along the same path

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	5	DST	:	A2,B2,F2,D3

- Alias resolution: ith TR IP is an <u>alias</u> for ith RR IP along the same path
- ... but varying RR implementation make this not true in general

### Matching TR and RR IPs



- RR classification is a new problem
- Imperfect classification heuristics in paper
- Formal system subject of continued work

## Sidecar: Transparent Probing

- Inject measurement packets into non-measurement TCP streams
- Probes are replayed packets with lower TTL and RR option
  - Transparent w.r.t. end-points
  - No abuse reports triggered by Sidecar probes
- Sidecar probes traverse NATs/Firewalls
- Technique generalizes to non-topology measurements [WORLDS'06]

### Preliminary Experiments and Results

### Inject Passenger+Sidecar probes into:


- All CoDeeN traffic: May 17-24th
  - 13M (src,dst) pairs
  - 22K IP addresses/891 ASes discovered
  - 65.8% of links corroborated with RR
- Web Crawl
  - PlanetLab × 160K web servers
  - 51M (src,dst) pairs
  - 375K IP addresses/8,739 ASes discovered
  - 69.1% of links corroborated with RR

### Conclusions and Future Work


- RR option prematurely dismissed
  - Prevents false link assertions
  - Discovers hidden routers
  - New alias resolution technique
- New problem of RR implementation classification
- Sidecar: new technique for unobtrusive measurements
  - Less abuse reports → more destinations
- Future work:
  - Better router classification
  - More traffic sources




Matching RR to TR addresses is difficult
 Most routers don't RR when expiring probes



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


Some implement RR but not TR
 Some don't implement RR
 TTL TR : RR array A1 : ∅
 B1 : A2,B2
 C1 : A2,B2,F2



Some routers drop packets with IP options

TTL	TR	:	RR array
1	A1	:	Ø
2	B1	:	A2,B2
3	C1	:	A2,B2,F2
4	?	:	dropped



 Alias resolution requires classifying RR behavior

TTL	TR	:	RR array
1	A1	:	Ø
2	В1	:	A2,B2
3	C1	:	A2,B2,F2
4	?	:	dropped

Not on Expire	RR on Expire	Hidden	No RR	Drop Options	
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