Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts

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Abstract—Emerging smart contract systems over decentralized cryptocurrencies allow mutually distrustful parties to transact safely without trusted third parties. In the event of contractual breaches or aborts, the decentralized blockchain ensures that honest parties obtain commensurate compensation. Existing systems, however, lack transactional privacy. All transactions, including flow of money between pseudonyms and amount transacted, are exposed on the blockchain.

We present Hawk, a decentralized smart contract system that does not store financial transactions in the clear on the blockchain, thus retaining transactional privacy from the public’s view. A Hawk programmer can write a private smart contract in an intuitive manner without having to implement cryptography, and our compiler automatically generates an efficient cryptographic protocol where contractual parties interact with the blockchain, using cryptographic primitives such as zero-knowledge proofs.

To formally define and reason about the security of our protocols, we are the first to formalize the blockchain model of cryptography. The formal modeling is of independent interest. We advocate the community to adopt such a formal model when designing applications atop decentralized blockchains.

I. INTRODUCTION

Decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [52] and altcoins [20] have rapidly gained popularity, and are often quoted as a glimpse into our future [5]. These emerging cryptocurrency systems build atop a novel blockchain technology, where miners run distributed consensus whose security is ensured if no adversary wields a large fraction of the computational (or other forms of) resource. The terms “blockchain” and “miners” are therefore often used interchangeably.

Blockchains like Bitcoin reach consensus not only on a stream of data but also on computations involving this data. In Bitcoin, specifically, the data include money transfer transactions proposed by users, and the computation involves transaction validation and updating a data structure called the unspent transaction output set which, imprecisely speaking, keeps track of users’ account balances. Newly emerging cryptocurrency systems such as Ethereum [61] embrace the idea of running arbitrary user-defined programs on the blockchain, thus creating an expressive decentralized smart contract system.

In this paper, we consider smart contract protocols where parties interact with such a blockchain. Assuming that the decentralized consensus protocol is secure, the blockchain can be thought of as a conceptual party (in reality decentralized) that can be trusted for correctness and availability but not for privacy. Such a blockchain provides a powerful abstraction for the design of distributed protocols.

The blockchain’s expressive power is further enhanced by the fact that blockchains naturally embody a discrete notion of time, i.e., a clock that increments whenever a new block is mined. The existence of such a trusted clock is crucial for attaining financial fairness in protocols. In particular, malicious contractual parties may prematurely abort from a protocol to avoid financial payment. However, with a trusted clock, timeouts can be employed to make such aborts evident, such that the blockchain can financially penalize aborting parties by redistributing their collateral deposits to honest, non-aborting parties. This makes the blockchain model of cryptography more powerful than the traditional model without a blockchain where fairness is long known to be impossible in general when the majority of parties can be corrupt [8], [17], [25]. In summary, blockchains allow parties mutually unbeknownst to transact securely without a centrally trusted intermediary, and avoiding high legal and transactional cost.

Despite the expressiveness and power of the blockchain and smart contracts, the present form of these technologies lacks transactional privacy. The entire sequence of actions taken in a smart contract are propagated across the network and/or recorded on the blockchain, and therefore are publicly visible. Even though parties can create new pseudonymous public keys to increase their anonymity, the values of all transactions and balances for each (pseudonymous) public key are publicly visible. Further, recent works have also demonstrated deanonymization attacks by analyzing the transactional graph structures of cryptocurrencies [46], [56].

We stress that lack of privacy is a major hindrance towards the broad adoption of decentralized smart contracts, since financial transactions (e.g., insurance contracts or stock trading) are considered by many individuals and organizations as being highly secret. Although there has been progress in designing privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies such as Zerocash [11] and several others [27], [47], [58], these systems forgo programmability, and it is unclear a priori how to enable programmability without exposing transactions and data in cleartext to miners.

A. Hawk Overview

We propose Hawk, a framework for building privacy-preserving smart contracts. With Hawk, a non-specialist programmer can easily write a Hawk program without having to
implement any cryptography. Our Hawk compiler is in charge of compiling the program to a cryptographic protocol between the blockchain and the users. As shown in Figure 1, a Hawk program contains two parts:

1) A private portion denoted $\phi_{\text{priv}}$ which takes in parties’ input data (e.g., choices in a “rock, paper, scissors” game) as well as currency units (e.g., bids in an auction). $\phi_{\text{priv}}$ performs computation to determine the payout distribution amongst the parties. For example, in an auction, winner’s bid goes to the seller, and others’ bids are refunded. The private Hawk program $\phi_{\text{priv}}$ is meant to protect the participants’ data and the exchange of money.

2) A public portion denoted $\phi_{\text{pub}}$ that does not touch private data or money.

Our compiler will compile the Hawk program into the following pieces which jointly define a cryptographic protocol between users, the manager, and the blockchain:

- the blockchain’s program which will be executed by all consensus nodes;
- a program to be executed by the users; and
- a program to be executed by a special facilitating party called the manager which will be explained shortly.

Security guarantees. Hawk’s security guarantees encompass two aspects:

- **On-chain privacy.** On-chain privacy stipulates that transactional privacy be provided against the public (i.e., against any party not involved in the contract) – unless the contractual parties themselves voluntarily disclose information. Although in Hawk protocols, users exchange data with the blockchain, and rely on it to ensure fairness against aborts, the flow of money and amount transacted in the private Hawk program $\phi_{\text{priv}}$ is cryptographically hidden from the public’s view. Informally, this is achieved by sending “encrypted” information to the blockchain, and relying on zero-knowledge proofs to enforce the correctness of contract execution and money conservation.

- **Contractual security.** While on-chain privacy protects contractual parties’ privacy against the public (i.e., parties not involved in the financial contract), contractual security protects parties in the same contractual agreement from each other. Hawk assumes that contractual parties act selfishly to maximize their own financial interest. In particular, they can arbitrarily deviate from the prescribed protocol or even abort prematurely. Therefore, contractual security is a multi-faceted notion that encompasses not only cryptographic notions of confidentiality and authenticity, but also financial fairness in the presence of cheating and aborting behavior. The best way to understand contractual security is through a concrete example, and we refer the reader to Section I-B for a more detailed explanation.

Minimally trusted manager. The execution of Hawk contracts are facilitated by a special party called the manager. The manager can see the users’ inputs and is trusted not to disclose users’ private data. However, the manager is NOT to be equated with a trusted third party — even when the manager can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol or collude with the parties, the manager cannot affect the correct execution of the contract. In the event that a manager aborts the protocol, it can be financially penalized, and users obtain compensation accordingly.

The manager also need not be trusted to maintain the security or privacy of the underlying currency (e.g., it cannot double-spend, inflate the currency, or deanonymize users). Furthermore, if multiple contract instances run concurrently, each contract may specify a different manager and the effects of a corrupt manager are confined to that instance. Finally, the manager role may be instantiated with trusted computing hardware like Intel SGX, or replaced with a multiparty computation among the users themselves, as we describe in Section IV-C and Appendix A.

**Terminology.** In Ethereum [61], the blockchain’s portion of the protocol is called an Ethereum contract. However, this paper refers to the entire protocol defined by the Hawk program as a contract; and the blockchain’s program is a constituent of the bigger protocol. In the event that a manager aborts the protocol, it can be financially penalized, and users obtain compensation accordingly.

**B. Example: Sealed Auction**

**Example program.** Figure 2 shows a Hawk program for implementing a sealed, second-price auction where the highest bidder wins, but pays the second highest price. Second-price auctions are known to incentivize truthful bidding under certain assumptions, [59] and it is important that bidders submit bids without knowing the bid of the other people. Our example auction program contains a private portion $\phi_{\text{priv}}$ that determines the winning bidder and the price to be paid; and a public portion $\phi_{\text{pub}}$ that relies on public deposits to protect bidders from an aborting manager.

For the time being, we assume that the set of bidders are known a priori.

**Contractual security requirements.** Hawk will compile this auction program to a cryptographic protocol. As mentioned earlier, as long as the bidders and the manager do not voluntarily disclose information, transaction privacy is maintained against the public. Hawk also guarantees the following contractual security requirements for parties in the contract:
• Financial fairness. Parties may attempt to prematurely abort from the protocol to avoid payment or affect the redistribution of wealth. If a party aborts or the auction manager aborts, the aborting party will be financially penalized while the remaining parties receive compensation. As is well-known in the cryptography literature, such fairness guarantees are not attainable in general by off-chain only protocols such as secure multi-party computation [7], [17]. As explained later, Hawk offers built-in mechanisms for enforcing refunds of private bids after certain timeouts. Hawk also allows the programmer to define additional rules, as part of the Hawk contract, that govern financial fairness.

• Security against a dishonest manager. We ensure authenticity against a dishonest manager: besides aborting, a dishonest manager cannot affect the outcome of the auction and the redistribution of money, even when it colludes with a subset of the users. We stress that to ensure the above, input independent privacy against a faulty manager is a prerequisite. Moreover, if the manager aborts, it can be financially penalized, and the participants obtain corresponding remuneration.

An auction with the above security and privacy requirements cannot be trivially implemented atop existing cryptocurrency systems such as Ethereum [61] or Zerocash [11]. The former allows for programmability but does not guarantee transactional privacy, while the latter guarantees transactional privacy but at the price of even reduced programmability than Bitcoin.

Aborting and timeouts. Aborting is dealt with using timeouts. A Hawk program such as Figure 2 declares timeout parameters using the HawkDeclareTimeouts special syntax. Three timeouts are declared where \( T_1 < T_2 < T_3 \): \( T_1 \) : The Hawk contract stops collecting bids after \( T_1 \).

\( T_2 \) : All users should have opened their bids to the manager within \( T_2 \); if a user submitted a bid but fails to open by \( T_2 \), its input bid is treated as 0 (and any other potential input data treated as \( \bot \)), such that the manager can continue.

\( T_3 \) : If the manager aborts, users can reclaim their private bids after time \( T_3 \).

The public Hawk contract \( \phi_{pub} \) can additionally implement incentive structures. Our sealed auction program redistributes the manager’s public deposit if it aborts. Specifically, in our sealed auction program, \( \phi_{pub} \) defines two functions, namely check and managerTimeOut. The check function will be invoked when the Hawk contract completes execution within \( T_3 \), i.e., manager did not abort. Otherwise, if the Hawk contract does not complete execution within \( T_3 \), the managerTimeOut function will be invoked. We remark that although not explicitly written in the code, all Hawk contracts have an implicit default entry point for accepting parties’ deposits — these deposits are withheld by the contract till they are redistributed by the contract. Bidders should check that the manager has made a public deposit before submitting their bids.

Additional applications. Besides the sealed auction example, Hawk supports various other applications. We give more sample programs in Section VI-B.

c. Contributions

To the best of our knowledge, Hawk is the first to simultaneously offer transactional privacy and programmability in a decentralized cryptocurrency system.

Formal models for decentralized smart contracts. We are among the first ones to initiate a formal, academic treatment of the blockchain model of cryptography. We present a formal, Universal Composability (UC) model for the blockchain model of cryptography – this formal model is of independent interest,
and can be useful in general for defining and modeling the security of protocols in the blockchain model. Our formal model has also been adopted by the Gyges work [39] in designing criminal smart contracts.

In defining for formal blockchain model, we rely on a notion called wrappers to modularize our protocol design and to simplify presentation. Wrappers handle a set of common details such as timers, pseudonyms, global ledgers in a centralized place such that they need not be repeated in every protocol.

New cryptography suite. We implement a new cryptography suite that binds private transactions with programmable logic. Our protocol suite contains three essential primitives freeze, compute, and finalize. The freeze primitive allows parties to commit to not only normal data, but also coins. Committed coins are frozen in the contract, and the payout distribution will later be determined by the program \( \phi_{\text{priv}} \). During compute, parties open their committed data and currency to the manager, such that the manager can compute the function \( \phi_{\text{priv}} \). Based on the outcome of \( \phi_{\text{priv}} \), the manager now constructs new private coins to be paid to each recipient. The manager then submits to the blockchain both the new private coins as well as zero-knowledge proofs of their well-formedness. At this moment, the previously frozen coins are now redistributed among the users. Our protocol suite strictly generalizes Zerocash since Zerocash implements only private money transfers between users without programmability.

We define the security of our primitives using ideal functionalities, and formally prove security of our constructions under a simulation-based paradigm.

Implementation and evaluation. We built a Hawk prototype and evaluated its performance by implementing several example applications, including a sealed-bid auction, a “rock, paper, scissors” game, a crowdfunding application, and a swap financial instrument. We propose interesting protocol optimizations that gained us a factor of 10 \( \times \) in performance relative to a straightforward implementation. We show that for at about 100 parties (e.g., auction and crowdfunding), the manager’s cryptographic computation (the most expensive part of the protocol) is under 2.85 min using 4 cores, translating to under $0.14 of EC2 time. Further, all on-chain computation (performed by all miners) is very cheap, and under 20 ms for all cases. We will open source our Hawk framework in the near future.

D. Background and Related Work

1) Background: The original Bitcoin offers limited programmability through a scripting language that is neither Turing-complete nor user friendly. Numerous previous endeavors at creating smart contract-like applications atop Bitcoin (e.g., lottery [7], [17], micropayments [4], verifiable computation [44]) have demonstrated the difficulty of in retrofitting Bitcoin’s scripting language – this serves well to motivate a Turing-complete, user-friendly smart contract language.

Ethereum is the first Turing-complete decentralized smart contract system. With Ethereum’s imminent launch, companies and hobbyists are already building numerous smart contract applications either atop Ethereum or by forking off Ethereum, such as prediction markets [3], supply chain provenance [6], crowd-based fundraising [1], and security and derivatives trading [30].

Security of the blockchain. Like earlier works that design smart contract applications for cryptocurrencies, we rely on the underlying decentralized blockchain to be secure. Therefore, we assume the blockchain’s consensus protocol attains security when an adversary does not wield a large fraction of the computational power. Existing cryptocurrencies are designed with heuristic security. On one hand, researchers have identified attacks on various aspects of the system [31], [37]; on the other, efforts to formally understand the security of blockchain consensus have begun [35], [49].

Minimizing on-chain costs. Since every miner will execute the smart contract programs while verifying each transaction, cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin and Ethereum collect transaction fees that roughly correlate with the cost of execution. While we do not explicitly model such fees, we design our protocols to minimize on-chain costs by performing most of the heavy-weight computation off-chain.

2) Additional Related Works: Leveraging blockchain for financial fairness. A few prior works have explored how to leverage the blockchain technology to achieve fairness in protocol design. For example, Bentov et al. [17], Andrychowicz et al. [7], Kumaresan et al. [44], Kiayias et al. [40], as well as Zyskind et al. [63], show how Bitcoin can be used to ensure fairness in secure multi-party computation protocols. These protocols also perform off-chain secure computation of various types, but do not guarantee transactional privacy (i.e., hiding the currency flows and amounts transacted). For example, it is not clear how to implement our sealed auction example using these earlier techniques. Second, these earlier works either do not offer system implementations or provide implementations only for specific applications (e.g., lottery). In comparison, Hawk provides a generic platform such that non-specialist programmers can easily develop privacy-preserving smart contracts.

Smart contracts. The conceptual idea of programmable electronic “smart contracts” dates back nearly twenty years [57]. Besides recent decentralized cryptocurrencies, which guarantee authenticity but not privacy, other smart contract implementations rely on trusted servers for security [50]. Our work therefore comes closest to realizing the original vision of parties interacting with a trustworthy “virtual computer” that executes programs involving money and data.

Programming frameworks for cryptography. Several works have developed programming frameworks that take in high-level programs as specifications and generate cryptographic implementations, including compilers for secure multi-party computation [19], [43], [45], [55], authenticated data structures [48], and (zero-knowledge) proofs [12], [33], [34], [53]. Zheng et al. show how to generate secure distributed protocols such as sealed auctions, battleship games, and banking applications [62]. These works support various notions of security, but
none of them interact directly with money or leverage public blockchains for ensuring financial fairness. Thus our work is among the first to combine the “correct-by-construction” cryptography approach with smart contracts.

**Concurrent work.** Our framework is the first to provide a full-fledged formal model for decentralized blockchains as embodied by Bitcoin, Ethereum, and many other popular decentralized cryptocurrencies. In concurrent and independent work, Kiayias et al. [40] also propose a blockchain model in the (Generalized) Universal Composability framework [23] and use it to derive results that are similar to what we describe in Appendix G-A, i.e., fair MPC with public deposits. However, the “programmability” of their formalism is limited to their specific application (i.e., fair MPC with public deposits). In comparison, our formalism is designed with much broader goals, i.e., to facilitate protocol designers to design a rich class of protocols in the blockchain model. In particular, both our real-world wrapper (Figure 11) and ideal-world wrapper (Figure 10) model the presence of arbitrary user defined contract programs, which interact with both parties and the ledger. Our formalism has also been adopted by the Gyges work [39] demonstrating its broad usefulness.

II. THE BLOCKCHAIN MODEL OF CRYPTOGRAPHY

A. The Blockchain Model

We begin by informally describing the trust model and assumptions. We then propose a formal framework for the “blockchain model of cryptography” for specifying and reasoning about the security of protocols.

In this paper, the blockchain refers to a decentralized set of miners who run a secure consensus protocol to agree upon the global state. We therefore will regard the blockchain as a conceptual trusted party who is trusted for correctness and availability, but not trusted for privacy. The blockchain not only maintains a global ledger that stores the balance for every pseudonym, but also executes user-defined programs. More specifically, we make the following assumptions:

- **Time.** The blockchain is aware of a discrete clock that increments in rounds. We use the terms rounds and epochs interchangeably.
- **Public state.** All parties can observe the state of the blockchain. This means that all parties can observe the public ledger on the blockchain, as well as the state of any user-defined blockchain program (part of a contract protocol).
- **Message delivery.** Messages sent to the blockchain will arrive at the beginning of the next round. A network adversary may arbitrarily reorder messages that are sent to the blockchain within the same round. This means that the adversary may attempt a front-running attack (also referred to as the rushing adversary by cryptographers), e.g., upon observing that an honest user is trading a stock, the adversary preempts by sending a race transaction trading the same stock. Our protocols should be proven secure despite such adversarial message delivery schedules.

We assume that all parties have a reliable channel to the blockchain, and the adversary cannot drop messages a party sends to the blockchain. In reality, this means that the overlay network must have sufficient redundancy. However, an adversary can drop messages delivered between parties off the blockchain.

- **Pseudonyms.** Users can make up an unbounded polynomial number of pseudonyms when communicating with the blockchain.
- **Correctness and availability.** We assume that the blockchain will perform any prescribed computation correctly. We also assume that the blockchain is always available.

**Advantages of a generic blockchain model.** We adopt a generic blockchain model where the blockchain can run arbitrary Turing-complete programs. In comparison, previous and concurrent works [7], [17], [44], [54] retrofit the artifacts of Bitcoin’s limited and hard-to-use scripting language. In Section VII and Appendix G, we present additional theoretical results demonstrating that our generic blockchain model yields asymptotically more efficient cryptographic protocols.

B. Formally Modeling the Blockchain

Our paper adopts a carefully designed notational system such that readers may understand our constructions without understanding the precise details of our formal modeling.

We stress, however, that we give formal, precise specifications of both functionality and security, and our protocols are formally proven secure under the Universal Composability (UC) framework. In doing so, we make a separate contribution of independent interest: we are the first to propose a formal, UC-based framework for describing and proving the security of distributed protocols that interact with a blockchain — we refer to our formal model as “the blockchain model of cryptography”.

**Programs, wrappers, and functionalities.** In the remainder of the paper, we will describe ideal specifications, as well as pieces of the protocol executed by the blockchain, the users, and the manager respectively as **programs** written in pseudocode. We refer to them as the ideal program (denoted Ideal), the blockchain program (denoted B or Blockchain), and the user/manager program (denoted UserP) respectively.

All of our pseudo-code style programs have precise meanings in the UC framework. To “compile” a program to a UC-style functionality or protocol, we apply a wrapper to a program. Specifically, we define the following types of wrappers:

- The **ideal wrapper** $\mathcal{F}(\cdot)$ transforms an ideal program IdealP into a UC ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}$(IdealP).
- The **blockchain wrapper** $\mathcal{G}(\cdot)$ transforms a blockchain program B to a blockchain functionality $\mathcal{G}(B)$. The blockchain functionality $\mathcal{G}(B)$ models the program executing on the blockchain.
- The **protocol wrapper** $\Pi(\cdot)$ transforms a user/manager program UserP into a user-side or manager-side protocol $\Pi$(UserP).

One important reason for having wrappers is that wrappers implement a set of common features needed by every smart contract application, including time, public ledger, pseudonyms,
and adversarial reordering of messages — in this way, we need not repeat this notation for every blockchain application.

We defer our formal UC modeling to Appendix B. This will not hinder the reader in understanding our protocols as long as the reader intuitively understands our blockchain model and assumptions described in Section II-A. Before we describe our protocols, we define some notational conventions for writing “programs”. Readers who are interested in the details of our formal model and proofs can refer to Appendix B.

C. Conventions for Writing Programs

Our wrapper-based system modularizes notation, and allows us to use a set of simple conventions for writing user-defined ideal programs, blockchain programs, and user protocols. We describe these conventions below.

Timer activation points. The ideal functionality wrapper $\mathcal{F}(\cdot)$ and the blockchain wrapper $\mathcal{G}(\cdot)$ implement a clock that advances in rounds. Every time the clock is advanced, the wrappers will invoke the Timer activation point. Therefore, by convention, we allow the ideal program or the blockchain program can define a Timer activation point. Timeout operations (e.g., refunding money after a certain timeout) can be implemented under the Timer activation point.

Delayed processing in ideal programs. When writing the blockchain program, every message received by the blockchain program is already delayed by a round due to the $\mathcal{G}(\cdot)$ wrapper.

When writing the ideal program, we introduce a simple convention to denote delayed computation. Program instructions that are written in gray background denote computation that does not take place immediately, but is deferred to the beginning of the next timer click. This is a convenient shorthand because in our real-world protocol, effectively any computation done by a blockchain functionality will be delayed. For example, in our IdealP\textsubscript{cash} ideal program (see Figure 3), whenever the ideal functionality receives a mint or pour message, the ideal adversary $\mathcal{S}$ is notified immediately; however, processing of the messages is deferred till the next timer click. Formally, delayed processing can be implemented simply by storing state and invoking the delayed program instructions on the next Timer click. By convention, we assume that the delayed instructions are invoked at the beginning of the Timer call. In other words, upon the next timer click, the delayed instructions are executed first.

Pseudonymity. All party identifiers that appear in ideal programs, blockchain programs, and user-side programs by default refer to pseudonyms. When we write “upon receiving message from some $P$”, this accepts a message from any pseudonym. Whenever we write “upon receiving message from $P$”, without the keyword some, this accepts a message from a fixed pseudonym $P$, and typically which pseudonym we refer to is clear from the context.

Whenever we write “send $m$ to $\mathcal{G}(B)$ as nym $P$” inside a user program, this sends an internal message (“send”, $m$, $P$) to the protocol wrapper $\Pi$. The protocol wrapper will then authenticate the message appropriately under pseudonym $P$. When the context is clear, we avoid writing “as nym $P$”, and simply write “send $m$ to $\mathcal{G}(B)$”. Our formal system also allows users to send messages anonymously to the blockchain — although this option will not be used in this paper.

Ledger and money transfers. A public ledger is denoted ledger in our ideal programs and blockchain programs. When a party sends $\$\text{amt}$ to an ideal program or a blockchain program, this represents an ordinary message transmission. Money transfers only take place when ideal programs or blockchain programs update the public ledger ledger. In other words, the symbol $\$\text{are}$ is only adopted for readability (to distinguish variables associated with money and other variables), and does not have special meaning or significance. One can simply think of this variable as having the money type.

III. CRYPTOGRAPHY ABSTRACTIONS

We now describe our cryptography abstraction in the form of ideal programs. Ideal programs define the correctness and security requirements we wish to attain by writing a specification assuming the existence of a fully trusted party. We will later prove that our real-world protocols (based on smart contracts) securely emulate the ideal programs. As mentioned earlier, an ideal program must be combined with a wrapper $\mathcal{F}$ to be endowed with exact execution semantics.

Overview. Hawk realizes the following specifications:

- Private ledger and currency transfer. Hawk relies on the existence of a private ledger that supports private currency transfers. We therefore first define an ideal functionality called IdealP\textsubscript{cash} that describes the requirements of a private ledger (see Figure 3). Informally speaking, earlier works such as Zerocash [11] are meant to realize (approximations of) this ideal functionality — although technically this ought
to be interpreted with the caveat that these earlier works prove indistinguishability or game-based security instead of UC-based simulation security.

- **Hawk-specific primitives.** With a private ledger specified, we then define Hawk-specific primitives including freeze, compute, and finalize that are essential for enabling transactional privacy and programmability simultaneously.

A. Private Cash Specification IdealP_{cash}

At a high-level, the IdealP_{cash} specifies the requirements of a private ledger and currency transfer. We adopt the same “mint” and “pour” terminology from Zerocash [11].

**Mint.** The mint operation allows a user \( P \) to transfer money from the public ledger denoted ledger to the private pool denoted \( \text{Coins}[P] \). With each transfer, a private coin for a user \( P \) is created, and associated with a value \( v \).

For correctness, the ideal program IdealP_{cash} checks that the user \( P \) has sufficient funds in its public ledger ledger\([P]\) before creating the private coin.

**Pour.** The pour operation allows a user \( P \) to spend money in its private bank privately. For simplicity, we define the simple case with two input coins and two output coins. This is sufficient for users to transfer any amount of money by “making change,” although it would be straightforward to support more efficient batch operations as well.

For correctness, the ideal program IdealP_{cash} checks the following: 1) for the two input coins, party \( P \) indeed possesses private coins of the declared values; and 2) the two input coins sum up to equal value as the two output coins, i.e., coins neither get created or vanish.

**Privacy.** When an honest party \( P \) mints, the ideal-world adversary \( A \) learns the pair \((P, v)\) – since minting is raising coins from the public pool to the private pool. Operations on the public pool are observable by \( A \).

When an honest party \( P \) pours, however, the adversary \( A \) learns only the output pseudonyms \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \). It does not learn which coin in the private pool Coins is being spent nor the name of the spender. Therefore, the spent coins are anonymous with respect to the private pool Coins. To get strong anonymity, new pseudonyms \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) can be generated on the fly to receive each pour. We stress that as long as pour hides the sender, this “breaks” the transaction graph, thus preventing linking analysis.

If a corrupted party is the recipient of a pour, the adversary additionally learns the value of the coin it receives.

**Additional subtleties.** Later in our protocol, honest parties keep track of a wallet of coins. Whenever an honest party pours, it first checks if an appropriate coin exists in its local wallet – and if so it immediately removes the coin from the wallet (i.e., without delay). In this way, if an honest party makes multiple pour transactions in one round, it will always choose distinct coins for each pour transaction. Therefore, in our IdealP_{cash} functionality, honest pourers’ coins are immediately removed from Coins. Further, an honest party is not able to spend a coin paid to itself until the next round. By contrast, corrupted parties are allowed to spend coins paid to them in the same round – this is due to the fact that any message is routed immediately to the adversary, and the adversary can also choose a permutation for all messages received by the blockchain in the same round (see Section II and Appendix B).

Another subtlety in the IdealP_{cash} functionality is while honest parties always pour to existing pseudonyms, the functionality allows the adversary to pour to non-existing pseudonyms denoted \( \bot \) — in this case, effectively the private coin goes into a blackhole and cannot be retrieved. This enables a performance optimization in our UserP_{cash} and BlockchainP_{cash} protocol later – where we avoid including the \( c_t \)’s in the NIZK of \( \mathcal{L}_{\text{POUR}} \) (see Section IV). If a malicious pourer chooses to compute the wrong \( c_t \), it is as if the recipient \( P_i \) did not receive the pour, i.e., the pour is made to \( \bot \).

B. Hawk Specification IdealP_{hawk}

To enable transactional privacy and programmability simultaneously, we now describe the specifications of new Hawk primitives, including freeze, compute, and finalize. The formal specification of the ideal program IdealP_{hawk} is provided in Figure 4. Below, we provide some explanations. We also refer the reader to Section I-C for higher-level explanations.

**Freeze.** In freeze, a party tells IdealP_{hawk} to remove one coin from the private coins pool Coins, and freeze it in the blockchain by adding it to FrozenCoins. The party’s private input denoted \( i \) is also recorded in FrozenCoins. IdealP_{hawk} checks that \( P \) has not called freeze earlier, and that a coin \((P, v)\) exists in Coins before proceeding with the freeze.

**Compute.** When a party \( P \) calls compute, its private input in and the value of its frozen coin val are disclosed to the manager \( P_M \).

**Finalize.** In finalize, the manager \( P_M \) submits a public input in\(_M\) to IdealP_{hawk}. IdealP_{hawk} now computes the outcome of \( \phi_{\text{priv}} \) on all parties’ inputs and frozen coin values, and redistributes the FrozenCoins based on the outcome of \( \phi_{\text{priv}} \). To ensure money conservation, the ideal program IdealP_{hawk} checks that the sum of frozen coins is equal to the sum of output coins.

**Interaction with public contract.** The IdealP_{hawk} functionality is parameterized by a public Hawk contract \( \phi_{\text{pub}} \), which is included in IdealP_{hawk} as a sub-module. During a finalize, IdealP_{hawk} calls \( \phi_{\text{pub}}.\text{check} \). The public contract \( \phi_{\text{pub}} \) typically serves the following purposes:

- **Check the well-formedness of the manager’s input** in\(_M\). For example, in our financial derivatives application (Section VI-B), the public contract \( \phi_{\text{pub}} \) asserts that the input corresponds to the price of a stock as reported by the stock exchange’s authentic data feed.

- **Redistribute public deposits.** If parties or the manager have aborted, or if a party has provided invalid input (e.g., less than a minimum bet) the public contract \( \phi_{\text{pub}} \) can now redistribute the parties’ public deposits to ensure financial fairness. For example, in our “Rock, Paper, Scissors” example (see Section VI-B), the private contract \( \phi_{\text{priv}} \) checks if
Our construction adopts a Zerocash-like protocol for implementing private cash and private currency transfers. For completeness, we give a brief explanation below, and we mainly focus on the pour operation which is technically more interesting. The blockchain program Blockchain\_cash maintains a set Coins of private coins. Each private coin is of the format

\[
(P, \text{coin} := \text{Comm}_s(\$\text{val}))
\]

where \(P\) denotes a party’s pseudonym, and coin commits to the coin’s value \$\text{val} under randomness \(s\).

During a pour operation, the spender \(P\) chooses two coins in Coins to spend, denoted \((P, \text{coin}_1)\) and \((P, \text{coin}_2)\) where \(\text{coin}_i := \text{Comm}_s(\$\text{val}_i)\) for \(i \in \{1, 2\}\). The pour operation

\[
\text{IdealP\_cash}(\{P_M, \{P_i\}_{i \in [N]}, T_1, T_2, \phi_{\text{priv}}, \phi_{\text{pub}}\})
\]

\[\text{Init: Call IdealP\_pub\_Init. Additionally:}\]

- FrozenCoins: a set of coins and private inputs received by this contract, each of the form \((P, \text{in}, S\text{val})\). Initialize FrozenCoins := \(\emptyset\).

\[
\text{Freeze: Upon receiving (freeze, S\text{val}_i, \text{in}_i) from } P_i \text{ for some } i \in [N]:
\]

assert current time \(T < T_1\)
assert \(P_i\) has not called freeze earlier.
assert at least one copy of \((P_i, S\text{val}_i)\) in Coins
send (freeze, \(P_i\)) to \(A\)
add \((P_i, S\text{val}_i, \text{in}_i)\) to FrozenCoins
remove one \((P_i, S\text{val}_i)\) from Coins

\[
\text{Compute: Upon receiving compute from } P_i \text{ for some } i \in [N]:
\]

assert current time \(T_1 \leq T < T_2\)
if \(P_M\) is corrupted, send (compute, \(P_i, S\text{val}_i, \text{in}_i\)) to \(A\)
else send (compute, \(P_i\)) to \(A\)
let \((P_i, S\text{val}_i, \text{in}_i)\) be the item in FrozenCoins corresponding to \(P_i\)
send (compute, \(P_i, S\text{val}_i, \text{in}_i\)) to \(P_M\)

\[
\text{Finalize: Upon receiving (finalize, in}_{M,i}, out) from } P_M:\n\]

assert current time \(T \geq T_2\)
assert \(P_M\) has not called finalize earlier for \(i \in [N]\):
let \((S\text{val}_i, \text{in}_i) := (0, \perp)\) if \(P_i\) has not called compute
\((\{S\text{val}_i\}, \text{out}_i) := \phi_{\text{priv}}((\{S\text{val}_i\}, \text{in}_i), \text{in}_{M,i})\)
assert \text{out}_i \neq \perp
assert \sum_{i \in [N]} S\text{val}_i = \sum_{i \in [N]} S\text{val}_i^\prime\)
send (finalize, \text{in}_{M,i}, \text{out}) to \(A\)
for each corrupted \(P_i\) that called compute: send (\(P_i, S\text{val}_i^\prime\)) to \(A\)

\[
\text{\phi_{pub}: Run a local instance of public contract \phi_{pub}. Messages between the adversary to \phi_{pub}, and from \phi_{pub} to parties are forwarded directly.}
\]

Upon receiving message (pub, \(m\)) from party \(P\): notify \(A\) of (pub, \(m\))

\[
\text{send \(m\) to } \phi_{\text{pub}} \text{ on behalf of } P
\]

\[\text{IdealP\_cash: include IdealP\_cash (Figure 3).}\]
pays $\text{val}_1'$ and $\text{val}_2'$ amount to two output pseudonyms denoted $\mathcal{P}_1$ and $\mathcal{P}_2$, respectively, such that $\text{val}_1' + \text{val}_2' = \text{val}_1' + \text{val}_2'$. The spender chooses new randomness $s_i'$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, and computes the output coins as

$$\text{(P}_i, \text{coin}_i := \text{Comm}_s' (\text{val}_i'))$$

The spender gives the values $s_i'$ and $\text{val}_i'$ to the recipient $\mathcal{P}_i$ for $\mathcal{P}_i$ to be able to spend the coins later.

Now, the spender computes a zero-knowledge proof to show that the output coins are constructed appropriately, where correctness compasses the following aspects:

- **Existence of coins being spent.** The coins being spent $(\mathcal{P}, \text{coin})$ and $(\mathcal{P}, \text{coin}_i)$ are indeed part of the private pool $\text{Coins}$. We remark that here the zero-knowledge property allows the spender to hide which coins it is spending – this is the key idea behind transactional privacy.

To prove this efficiently, Blockchain$_{\text{cash}}$ maintains a Merkle tree over the private pool $\text{Coins}$. Membership in the set can be demonstrated by a Merkle branch consistent with the root hash, and this is done in zero-knowledge.

- **No double spending.** Each coin $(\mathcal{P}, \text{coin})$ has a graphically unique serial number $\text{sn}$ that can be computed as a pseudorandom function of $\mathcal{P}$’s secret key and coin. To pour a coin, its serial number $\text{sn}$ must be disclosed, and a zero-knowledge proof given to show the correctness of $\text{sn}$. Blockchain$_{\text{cash}}$ checks that no $\text{sn}$ is used twice.

- **Money conservation.** The zero-knowledge proof also attests to the fact that the input coins and the output coins have equal total value.

We make some remarks about the security of the scheme. Intuitively, when an honest party pours to an honest party, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ does not learn the values of the output coins assuming that the commitment scheme $\text{Comm}$ is hiding, and the NIZK scheme we employ is computational zero-knowledge. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can observe the nyms that receive the two output coins. However, as we remarked earlier, since these nyms can be one-time, leaking them to the adversary would be okay. Essentially we only need to break linkability at spend time to ensure transactional privacy.

When a corrupted party $\mathcal{P}^*$ pours to an honest party $\mathcal{P}$, even though the adversary knows the opening of the coin, it cannot
Blockchain_{hawk}(P_M, \{P_i\}_{i \in [N]}, T_1, T_2, \phi_{priv}, \phi_{pub})

Init: See IdealP_{hawk} for description of parameters
Call Blockchain_{hawk}.Init.

Freeze: Upon receiving (freeze, \pi, sn, cm) from P_i:
assert current time \leq T_1
assert this is the first freeze from P_i
let MT be a merkle tree built over Coins
assert sn, \notin \text{SpentCoins}
statement := (P_i, MT.root, sn_i, cm_i)
assert NIZK.Verify(L_{FREEZE}, \pi, \text{statement})
add sn_i to SpentCoins and store cm_i for later

Compute: Upon receiving (compute, \pi, ct) from P_i:
assert T_1 \leq T < T_2 for current time T
assert NIZK.Verify(L_{COMPUTE}, \pi, (P_M, cm, ct))
send (compute, \pi, ct) to P_M

Finalize: On receiving (finalize, \pi, in_M, out, \{\text{coin}', \text{ct} \}_{i \in [N]}) from P_M:
assert current time T > T_2
for every P_i that has not called compute, set cm_i := \perp
statement := (in_M, out, \{cm_i, \text{coin}', \text{ct} \}_{i \in [N]})
assert NIZK.Verify(L_{FINALIZE}, \pi, \text{statement})
for i \in [N]:
assert \text{coin}'_i \notin \text{Coins}
add \text{coin}'_i to Coins
send (finalize, \text{coin}', \text{ct}) to P_i
Call \phi_{pub}.check(in_M, out)

Blockchain_{hawk}: include Blockchain_{hawk}
\phi_{pub}: include user-defined public contract \phi_{pub}

Relation (statement, witness) \in L_{FREEZE} is defined as:
parse statement as (P, MT.root, sn, cm)
parse witness as (coin, sk_{\text{reg}}, branch, s, \text{Sval}, in, k, s')
coin := \text{Com}_s(\text{Sval})
assert MerkleBranch(MT.root, branch, (P||\text{coin}))
P.p_{\text{reg}} := sk_{\text{reg}}(0)
assert sn = \text{PRF}_{sk_{\text{reg}}}(P||\text{coin})
assert cm := \text{Com}_m(\text{Sval}, in, k)

Relation (statement, witness) \in L_{COMPUTE} is defined as:
parse statement as (P_M, cm, ct)
parse witness as (\text{Sval}, in, k, s', r)
assert cm := \text{Com}_m(\text{Sval}, in, k)
assert ct = \text{ENC}(P_M, epk, r, (\text{Sval}, in, k, s'))

Relation (statement, witness) \in L_{FINALIZE} is defined as:
parse statement as (in_M, out, \{cm_i, \text{coin}', \text{ct} \}_{i \in [N]})
parse witness as (s_i, \text{Sval}, in_i, s'_i, k_i)_{i \in [N]}
\{\text{Sval}'_i\}_{i \in [N]} := \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_i, \text{Sval}, in_i)
assert \sum_{i \in [N]} \text{Sval}'_i = \sum_{i \in [N]} \text{Sval} for i \in [N]:
assert cm_i = \text{Com}_s(\text{Sval}, in_i, k_i)
\forall (\text{Sval}, in_i, k_i, s_i, cm_i) = (0, \perp, \perp, \perp, \perp)
assert ct = \text{SEnc}_k(s_i||\text{Sval})
assert \text{coin}'_i = \text{Com}_m(\text{Sval})

Protocol UserP_{hawk}(P_M, \{P_i\}_{i \in [N]}, T_1, T_2, \phi_{priv}, \phi_{pub})

Init: Call UserP_{hawk}.Init.

Protocol for a party P \in \{P_i\}_{i \in [N]}:
Freeze: On input (freeze, \text{Sval}, \text{in}) as party P:
assert current time T < T_1
assert this is the first freeze input
let MT be a merkle tree over Blockchain_{hawk}.Coins
assert that some entry (s, \text{Sval}, \text{coin}) is in Wallet for some (s, \text{coin})
remove one (s, \text{Sval}, \text{coin}) from Wallet
sn := \text{PRF}_{sk_{\text{reg}}}(P||\text{coin})
let branch be the branch of (P, \text{coin}) in MT
sample a symmetric encryption key k
sample a commitment randomness s'

\text{cm} := \text{Com}_m(\text{Sval}, in, k, s')
\text{statement} := (P, MT.root, sn, cm)
\text{witness} := (coin, sk_{\text{reg}}, branch, s, \text{Sval}, in, k, s')
\pi := NIZK.Prove(L_{FREEZE}, statement, witness)
send (freeze, \pi, sn, cm) to \mathcal{G}(Blockchain_{hawk})
store in, \text{Sval}, s', and k to use later (in compute)

Compute: On input (compute) as party P:
assert current time T_1 \leq T < T_2
sample encryption randomness r
\text{ct} := \text{ENC}(P_M, epk, r, (\text{Sval}, in, k, s'))
\pi := NIZK.Prove(L_{COMPUTE}, \text{statement}, witness)
send (compute, \pi, ct) to \mathcal{G}(Blockchain_{hawk})

Finalize: Receive (finalize, \text{coin}, ct) from \mathcal{G}(Blockchain_{hawk})
decrypt (s||\text{Sval}) := \text{DEnc}_c(\text{ct})
store \text{Sval}, \text{coin} in Wallet
output (finalize, \text{Sval})

Protocol for manager P_M:
Compute: On receive (compute, \pi, ct) from \mathcal{G}(Blockchain_{hawk}):
decrypt and store (\text{Sval}, in, k, s') := \text{DEnc}(\text{sk}, ct)
store cm := \text{Com}_m(\text{Sval}, in, k)
output (P_i, \text{Sval}, in)

If this is the last compute received:
for i \in [N] such that P_i has not called compute,
(\text{Sval}, in, k_i, s_i, cm_i) := (0, \perp, \perp, \perp, \perp)
\{\text{Sval}'_i\}_{i \in [N]} := \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_i, \text{Sval}, in_i)
store and output \{\text{Sval}'_i\}_{i \in [N]}

Finalize: On input (finalize, in_M, out):
assert current time T \geq T_2
for i \in [N]:
 sample a commitment randomness s'_i
\text{coin}'_i := \text{Com}_s(\text{Sval})
\text{ct}_i := \text{SEnc}_k(s'_i||\text{Sval})
\text{statement} := (in_M, out, \{cm_i, \text{coin}', \text{ct} \}_{i \in [N]})
\text{witness} := \{s_i, \text{Sval}, in_i, s'_i, k_i\}_{i \in [N]}
\pi := NIZK.Prove(statement, witness)
send (finalize, \pi, in_M, out, \{\text{coin}', \text{ct} \})
to \mathcal{G}(Blockchain_{hawk})

UserP_{cash}: include UserP_{cash}.

Fig. 6. Blockchain_{hawk} and UserP_{hawk} construction.
spend the coin \((P, \text{coin})\) once the transaction takes effect by the Blockchain\_cash, since \(P^*\) cannot demonstrate knowledge of \(P\)’s secret key. We stress that since the contract binds the owner’s nym \(P\) to the coin, only the owner can spend it even when the opening of coin is disclosed.

**Technical subtleties.** Our Blockchain\_cash uses a modified version of Zerocash to achieve stronger security in the simulation paradigm. In comparison, Zerocash adopts a strictly weaker, indistinguishability-based privacy notion called ledger indistinguishability. In multi-party protocols, indistinguishability-based security notions are strictly weaker than simulation security. Not only so, the particular ledger indistinguishability notion adopted by Zerocash [11] appears subtly questionable upon scrutiny, which we elaborate on in the Appendix. This does not imply that the Zerocash construction is necessarily insecure – however, there is no obvious path to proving their scheme secure under a simulation based paradigm.

### B. Binding Privacy and Programmable Logic

So far, Blockchain\_cash, similar to Zerocash [11], only supports direct money transfers between users. We allow transactional privacy and programmable logic simultaneously.

**Freeze.** We support a new operation called freeze, that does not spend directly to a user, but commits the money as well as an accompanying private input to a smart contract. This is done using a pour-like protocol:

- The user \(P\) chooses a private coin \((P, \text{coin}) \in \text{Coins}\), where \(\text{coin} := \text{Comm}_n(\text{Sval})\). Using its secret key, \(P\) computes the serial number \(sn\) for \(\text{coin}\) – to be disclosed with the freeze operation to prevent double-spending.

- The user \(P\) computes a commitment \((\text{val} || \text{in} || k)\) to the contract where \(\text{in}\) denotes its input, and \(k\) is a symmetric encryption key that is introduced due to a practical optimization explained later in Section V.

- The user \(P\) now makes a zero-knowledge proof attesting to the statement of a pour operation, i.e., that the spent coin exists in the pool Coins, the \(sn\) is correctly constructed, and that the \(\text{val}\) committed to the contract equals the value of the coin being spent. See \(L_{\text{FREEZE}}\) in Figure 6 for details of the NP statement being proven.

**Compute.** Next, computation takes place off-chain to compute the payout distribution \(\{\text{val}\}_i\) and a proof of correctness. In Hawk, we rely on a minimally trusted manager \(P_M\) to perform computation. All parties would open their inputs to the manager \(P_M\), and this is done by encrypting the opening to the manager’s public key:

\[
\text{ct} := \text{ENC}(\text{P}_M, \text{epk}, r_i (\text{Sval} || \text{in} || k || s'))
\]

The ciphertext \(\text{ct}\) is submitted to the smart contract along with appropriate zero-knowledge proofs of correctness. While the user can also directly send the opening to the manager off-chain, passing the ciphertext \(\text{ct}\) through the smart contract would make any aborts evident such that the contract can financially punish an aborting user.

After obtaining the openings, the manager now computes the payout distribution \(\{\text{val}\}_i\) and public output out by applying the private contract \(\phi_{\text{priv}}\). The manager also constructs a zero-knowledge proof attesting to the outcomes.

**Finalize.** When the manager submits the outcome of \(\phi_{\text{priv}}\) and a zero-knowledge proof of correctness to Blockchain\_hawk. Blockchain\_hawk verifies the proof and redistributes the frozen money accordingly. Here Blockchain\_hawk also passes the manager’s public input \(in_M\) and public output out to the public Hawk contract \(\phi_{\text{pub}}\). The public contract \(\phi_{\text{pub}}\) can be invoked to check the validity of the manager’s input, as well as redistribute public collateral deposit.

**Theorem 1.** Assuming that the hash function in the Merkle tree is collision resistant, the commitment scheme Comm is perfectly binding and computationally hiding, the NIZK scheme is computationally zero-knowledge and simulation sound extractable, the encryption schemes ENC and SENC are perfectly correct and semantically secure, the PRF scheme PRF is secure, then, our protocols in Figures 5 and 6 securely emulate the ideal functionality \(F(\text{IdealP}_{\text{hawk}})\) against a malicious adversary in the static corruption model.

**Proof.** Deferred to the Appendix.

### C. Extensions and Discussions

**Refunding frozen coins to users.** In our implementation, we extend our basic scheme to allow the users to reclaim their frozen money after a timeout \(T_3 > T_2\). To achieve this, user \(P\) simply sends the contract a newly constructed coin \((P, \text{coin} := \text{Comm}_n(\text{Sval}))\) and proves in zero-knowledge that its value \(\text{Sval}\) is equal to that of the frozen coin. In this case, the user can identify the previously frozen coin in the clear, i.e., there is no need to compute a zero-knowledge proof of membership within the frozen pool as is needed in a pour transaction.

**Instantiating the manager with trusted hardware.** In some applications, it may be a good idea to instantiate the manager using trusted hardware such as the emerging Intel SGX. In this case, the off-chain computation can take place in a secret SGX enclave that is not visible to any untrusted software or users. Alternatively, in principle, the manager role can also be split into two or more parties that jointly run a secure computation protocol – although this approach is likely to incur higher overhead.

We stress that our model is fundamentally different from placing full trust in any centralized node. Trusted hardware cannot serve as a replacement of the blockchain. Any off-chain only protocol that does not interact with the blockchain cannot offer financial fairness in the presence of aborts – even when trusted hardware is employed.

Furthermore, even the use of SGX does not obviate the need for our cryptographic protocol. If the SGX is trusted only by a subset of parties (e.g., just the parties to a particular private contact), rather than globally, then those users can benefit from the efficiency of an SGX-managed private contract, while still utilizing the more widely trusted underlying currency.
Pouring anonymously to long-lived pseudonyms. In our basic formalism of IdealP\textsubscript{cash}, the pour operation discloses the recipient’s pseudonyms to the adversary. This means that IdealP\textsubscript{cash} only retains full privacy if the recipient generates a fresh, new pseudonym every time. In comparison, Zero-cash [11] provides an option of anonymously spending to a long-lived pseudonym (in other words, having IdealP\textsubscript{cash} not reveal recipients’ pseudonyms to the adversary).

It would be straightforward to add this feature to Hawk as well (at the cost of a constant factor blowup in performance); however, in most applications (e.g., a payment made after receiving an invoice), the transfer is subsequent to some interaction between the recipient and sender.

Open enrollment of pseudonyms. In our current formalism, parties’ pseudonyms are hardcoded and known a priori. We can easily relax this to allow open enrollment of any pseudonym that joins the contract (e.g., in an auction). Our implementation supports open enrollment. Due to SNARK’s preprocessing, right now, each contract instance must declare an upper-bound on the number of participants. An efficient fee can potentially be adopted to prevent a DoS attack where the attacker joins the contract with many pseudonyms thus preventing legitimate users from joining. How to choose the correct fee amount to achieve incentive compatibility is left as an open research challenge. The a priori upper bound on the number of participants can be avoided if we adopt recursively composable SNARKs [18], [26] or alternative proofs that do not require circuit-dependent setup [16].

V. ADOPTING SNARKs IN UC PROTOCOLS AND PRACTICAL OPTIMIZATIONS

A. Using SNARKs in UC Protocols

Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge [12], [36], [53] provide succinct proofs for general computation tasks, and have been implemented by several systems [12], [53], [60]. We would like to use SNARKs to instantiate the NI\textsubscript{ZK} proofs in our protocols — unfortunately, SNARK’s security is too weak to be directly employed in UC protocols. Specifically, SNARK’s knowledge extractor is non-blackbox and cannot be used by the UC simulator to extract witnesses from statements sent by the adversary and environment — doing so would require that the extractor be aware of the environment’s algorithm, which is inherently incompatible with UC security.

UC protocols often require the NI\textsubscript{ZK}s to have simulation extractability. Although SNARKs do not satisfy simulation extractability, Kosba et al. show that it is possible to apply efficient SNARK-lifting transformations to construct simulation extractable proofs from SNARKs [42]. Our implementations thus adopt the efficient SNARK-lifting transformations proposed by Kosba et al. [42].

B. Practical Considerations

Efficient SNARK circuits. A SNARK prover’s performance is mainly determined by the number of multiplication gates in the algebraic circuit to be proven [12], [53]. To achieve efficiency, we designed optimized circuits through two ways: 1) using cryptographic primitives that are SNARK-friendly, i.e. efficiently realizable as arithmetic circuits under a specific SNARK parametrization. 2) Building customized circuit generators to produce SNARK-friendly implementations instead of relying on compilers to translate higher level implementation.

The main cryptographic building blocks in our system are: collision-resistant hash function for the Merkle trees, pseudorandom function, commitment, and encryption. Our implementation supports both 80-bit and 112-bit security levels. To instantiate the CRH efficiently, we use an Ajtai-based SNARK-friendly collision-resistant hash function that is similar to the one used by Ben-Sasson et al. [14]. In our implementation, the modulus \( q \) is set to be the underlying SNARK implementation 254-bit field prime, and the dimension \( d \) is set to 3 for the 80-bit security level, and to 4 for the 112-bit security level based on the analysis in [42]. For PRFs and commitments, we use a hand-optimized implementation of SHA-256. Furthermore, we adopt the SNARK-friendly primitives for encryption used in the study by Kosba et al. [42], in which an efficient circuit for hybrid encryption in the case of 80-bit security level was proposed. The circuit performs the public key operations in a prime-order subgroup of the Galois field extension \( \mathbb{F}_{p^\mu} \), where \( \mu = 4 \), \( p \) is the underlying SNARK field prime (typically 254-bit prime, i.e. \( p^\mu \) is over 1000-bit ), and the prime order of the subgroup used is 398-bit prime. This was originally inspired by Pinocchio coin [27]. The circuit then applies a lightweight cipher like Speck [10] or Chaskey-LTS [51] with a 128-bit key to perform symmetric encryption in the CBC mode, as using the standard AES-128 instead will result in a much higher cost [42]. For the 112-bit security, using the same method for public key operations requires intensive factorization to find suitable parameters, therefore we use a manually optimized RSA-OAEP encryption circuit with a 2048-bit key instead.

In the next section, we will illustrate how using SNARK-friendly implementations can lead to 2.0-3.7× savings in the size of the circuits at the 80-bit security level, compared to the case when naive straightforward implementation are used. We will also illustrate that the performance is also practical in the higher security level case.

Optimizations for finalize. In addition to the SNARK-friendly optimizations, we focus on optimizing the \( O(N) \)-sized finalize circuit since this is our main performance bottleneck. All other SNARK proofs in our scheme are for \( O(1) \)-sized circuits. Two key observations allow us to greatly improve the performance of the proof generation during finalize.

Optimization 1: Minimize SSE-secure NI\textsubscript{ZK}s. First, we observe that in our proof, the simulator need not extract any new witnesses when a corrupted manager submits proofs during a finalize operation. All witnesses necessary will have been learned or extracted by the simulator at this point. Therefore, we can employ an ordinary SNARK instead of a stronger simulation sound extractable NI\textsubscript{ZK} during finalize. For
freeze and compute, we still use the stronger NIZK. This optimization reduces our SNARK circuit sizes by \(1.5\times\) as can be inferred from Figure 9 of Section VI, after SNARK-friendly optimizations are applied.

**Optimization 2: Minimize public-key encryption in SNARKs.**

Second, during finalize, the manager encrypts each party \(P_i\)'s output coins to \(P_i\)'s key, resulting in a ciphertext \(c_t_i\). The ciphertexts \(\{c_t_i\}_{i \in [N]}\) would then be submitted to the contract along with appropriate SNARK proofs of correctness. Here, if a public-key encryption is employed to generate the \(c_t_i\)'s, it would result in relatively large SNARK circuit size. Instead, we rely on a symmetric-key encryption scheme denoted SENC in Figure 6. This requires that the manager and each \(P_i\) perform a key exchange to establish a symmetric key \(k_i\). During an compute, the user encrypts this \(k_i\) to the manager’s public key \(P_M.epk\), and prove that the \(k\) encrypted is consistent with the \(k\) committed to earlier in cm\(_t\). The SNARK proof during finalize now only needs to include commitments and symmetric encryptions instead of public key encryptions in the circuit – the latter much more expensive.

This second optimization additionally gains us a factor of \(1.9\times\) as shown in Figure 9 of Section VI after applying the previous optimizations. Overall, all optimizations will lead to a gain of more than \(10\times\) in the finalize circuit.

**Remarks about the common reference string.** SNARK schemes require the generation of a common reference string (CRS) during a pre-processing step. This common reference string consists of an evaluation key for the prover, and a verification key for the verifier. Unless we employ recursively composed SNARKs [18], [26] whose costs are significantly higher, the evaluation key is circuit-dependent, and its size is proportional to the circuit’s size. In comparison, the verification key is \(O(|in| + |out|)\) in size, i.e., depends on the total length of inputs and outputs, but independent of the circuit size. We stress that only the verification key portion of the CRS needs to be included in the public contract that lives on the blockchain.

We remark that the CRS for protocol UserP\(_{cash}\) is shared globally, and can be generated in a one-time setup. In comparison, the CRS for each Hawk contract would depend on the Hawk contract, and therefore exists per instance of Hawk contract. To minimize the trust necessary in the CRS generation, one can employ either trusted hardware or use secure multi-party computation techniques as described by Ben-Sasson et al. [13].

Finally, in the future when new primitives become sufficiently fast, it is possible to drop-in and replace our SNARKs with other primitives that do not require per-circuit pre-processing. Examples include recursively composed SNARKs [18], [26] or other efficient PCP constructions [16]. The community’s efforts at optimizing these constructions are underway.

**VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION**

**A. Compiler Implementation**

Our compiler consists of several steps, which we illustrate in Figure 7 and describe below:

**Preprocessing:** First, the input Hawk program is split into its public contract and private contract components. The public contract is Serpent code, and can be executed directly atop an ordinary cryptocurrency platform such as Ethereum. The private contract is written in a subset of the C language, and is passed as input to the Pinocchio arithmetic circuit compiler [53]. Keywords such as HawkDeclareParties are implemented as C preprocessors macros, and serve to define the input (Inp) and output (Outp) datatypes. Currently, our private contract inherits the limitations of the Pinocchio compiler, e.g., cannot support dynamic-length loops. In the future, we can relax these limitations by employing recursively composition of SNARKs.

**Circuit Augmentation:** After compiling the preprocessed private contract code with Pinocchio, we have an arithmetic circuit representing the input/output relation \(\phi_{priv}\). This becomes a subcomponent of a larger arithmetic circuit, which we assemble using a customized circuit assembly tool. This tool is parameterized by the number of parties and the input/output datatypes, and attaches cryptographic constraints, such as computing commitments and encryptions over each party’s output value, and asserting that the input and output values satisfy the balance property.

**Cryptographic Protocol:** Finally, the augmented arithmetic circuit is used as input to a state-of-the-art zkSNARK library, Libsnark [15]. To avoid implementing SNARK verification in Ethereum’s Serpent language, we must add a SNARK verification opcode to Ethereum’s stack machine. We finally compile an executable program for the parties to compute the Libsnark proofs according to our protocol.

**B. Additional Examples**

Besides our running example of a sealed-bid auction (Figure 2), we implemented several other examples in Hawk, demonstrating various capabilities:

**Crowdfunding:** A Kickstarter-style crowdfunding campaign, (also known as an assurance contract in economics literature [9]) overcomes the “free-rider problem,” allowing a large number of parties to contribute funds towards some social good. If the minimum donation target is reached before the deadline, then the donations are transferred to a designated party (the entrepreneur); otherwise, the donations are refunded.
TABLE I

Table of performance for zk-SNARK circuits for user-side circuits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>80-bit security</th>
<th>112-bit security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pour</td>
<td>freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KeyGen(s) MUL</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prove(s) MUL</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify(ms)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EvalKey(MB)</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VerKey(KB)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof(KB)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stmt(KB)</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Performance Evaluation

We evaluated the performance for various examples, using an Amazon EC2 r3.8xlarge virtual machine. We assume a maximum of 2^{64} leaves for the Merkle trees, and we present results for both 80-bit and 112-bit security levels. Our benchmarks actually consume at most 27GB of memory and 4 cores in the most expensive case. Tables I and II illustrate the results – we focus on evaluating the zk-SNARK performance since all other computation time is negligible in comparison.

We highlight some important observations:

- **On-chain computation** (dominated by zk-SNARK verification time) is very small in all cases, ranging from 9 to 20 milliseconds. The running time of the verification algorithm is just linearly dependent on the size of the public statement, which is far smaller than the size of the computation, resulting into small verification time.
On-chain public parameters: As mentioned in Section IV-C, not the entire SNARK common reference string (CRS) need to be on the blockchain, but only the verification key part of the CRS needs to be on-chain. Our implementation suggests the following: the private cash protocol requires a verification key of 23KB to be stored on-chain – this verification key is globally shared and there is only a single instance. Besides the globally shared public parameters, each Hawk contract will additionally require 13-114 KB of verification key to be stored on-chain, for 10 to 100 users. This per-contract verification key is circuit-dependent, i.e., depends on the contract program. We refer the readers to Section IV-C for more discussions on techniques for performing trusted setup.

Manager computation: Running private auction or crowdfunding protocols with 100 participants requires under 6.5min proof time for the manager on a single core, and under 2.85min on 4 cores. This translates to under $0.14 of EC2 time [2].

User computation: Users’ proof times for pour, freeze, and compute are under one minute, and independent of the number of parties. Additionally, in the worst case, the peak memory usage of the user is less than 4 GB.

Savings from protocol optimizations. Figure 8 illustrates the performance gains attained by using a SNARK-friendly implementation for the user-side circuits, i.e., pour, freeze, and compute w.r.t. the naive implementation at the 80-bit security level. We calculate the naive implementation cost using conservative estimates for the straightforward implementation of standard cryptographic primitives. The figure shows a gain of 2.0-2.6× compared to the naive implementation. Furthermore, Figure 9 illustrates the performance gains attained by our protocol optimizations described in Section V. The figure considers the sealed-bid auction finalize circuit at different numbers of bidders. We show that the SNARK-friendly implementation along with our two optimizations combined significantly reduce the SNARK circuit sizes, and achieve a gain of 10× relative to a straightforward implementation. The figure also illustrates that the manager’s cost is proportional to the number of participants. (By contrast, the user-side costs are independent of the number of participants).

VII. ADDITIONAL THEORETICAL RESULTS

Last but not the least, we present additional theoretical results to further illustrate the usefulness of our formal blockchain model. In the interest of space, we defer details to Appendix G, and only state the main findings here.

Fair MPC with public deposits in the generic blockchain model. As is well-understood, fairness is in general impossible in plain models of multi-party computation when the majority can be corrupted. This was first observed by Cleve [25] and later extended in subsequent papers [8]. Assuming a blockchain trusted for correctness and availability (but not for privacy), an interesting notion of fairness which we refer to as “financial fairness” can be attained as shown by recent works [7], [17], [44]. In particular, the blockchain can financially penalize aborting parties by confiscating their deposits. Earlier works in this space [7], [17], [44], [54] focus on protocols that retrofit the artifacts of Bitcoin’s limited scripting language. Specifically, a few works use Bitcoin’s scripting language to construct intermediate abstractions such as “claim-or-refund” [17] or “multi-lock” [44], and build atop these abstractions to construct protocols. Table VII shows that by assuming a generic blockchain model where the blockchain can run Turing-complete programs, we can improve the efficiency of financially fair MPC protocols.

Fair MPC with private deposits. We further illustrate how to perform financially fair MPC using private deposits, i.e., where the amount of deposits cannot be observed by the public. The formal definitions, constructions, and proofs are supplied in Appendix G-B.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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**APPENDIX A  
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS**

We address frequently asked questions. Some of this content repeats what is already stated earlier, but we hope that addressing these points again in a centralized section will help reiterate some important points that may be missed by a reader.

A. Motivational

“How does Hawk’s programming model differ from Ethereum?” Our high-level approach may be superior than Ethereum: Ethereum’s language defines the blockchain program, where Hawk allows the programmer to write a single global program, and Hawk auto-generates not only the blockchain program, but also the protocols for users.

“Why not spin off the formal blockchain modeling into a separate paper?” The blockchain formal model could be presented on its own, but we gain evidence of its usefulness by implementing it and applying it to interesting practical examples. Likewise our system implementation benefits from the formalism because we can use our framework to provide provable security.
“SNARKs do not offer simulation extractability required for UC.” See Section V-A as well as Kosba et al. [42].

**SNARK’s common reference string.** See discussions in Section V-B.

“Why are the recipient pseudonyms \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) revealed to the adversary? And what about Zerocash’s persistent addresses feature?” See discussions in Section IV-C.

“Isn’t the manager a trusted-third party?” No, our manager is not a trusted third party. As we mention upfront in Sections I-A and I-B, the manager need not be trusted for correctness and input independence. Due to our use of zero-knowledge proofs, if the manager deviates from correct behavior, it will get caught.

Further, each contract instance can choose its own manager, and the manager of one contract instance cannot affect the security of another contract instance. Similarly, the manager also need not be trusted to retain the security of the cryptocurrency as a whole. Therefore, the only thing we trust the manager for is posterior privacy.

As mentioned in Section IV-C we note that one can possibly rely on secure multi-party computation (MPC) to avoid having to trust the manager even for posterior privacy – however such a solution is unlikely to be practical in the near future, especially when a large number of parties are involved. The theoretical formulation of this full-generality MPC-based approach is detailed in Appendix G. In our implementation, we made a conscious design choice and opted for the approach with a minimally trusted manager (rather than MPC), since we believe that this is a desirable sweet-spot that simultaneously attains practical efficiency and strong enough security for realistic applications. We stress that practical efficiency is an important goal of Hawk’s design.

In Section IV-C, we also discuss practical considerations for instantiating this manager. For the reader’s convenience, we iterate: we think that a particularly promising choice is to rely on trusted hardware such as Intel SGX to obtain higher assurance of posterior privacy. We stress again that even when we use the SGX to realize the manager, the SGX should not have to be trusted for retaining the global security of the cryptocurrency. In particular, it is a very strong assumption to require all participants to globally trust a single or a handful of SGX processor(s). With Hawk’s design, the SGX is only very minimally trusted, and is only trusted within the scope of the current contract instance.

**APPENDIX B**

**FORMAL TREATMENT OF PROTOCOLS IN THE BLOCKCHAIN MODEL**

We are the first to propose a UC model for the blockchain model of cryptography. First, our model allows us to easily capture the time and pseudonym features of cryptocurrencies. In cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, time progresses in block intervals, and the blockchain can query the current time, and make decisions accordingly, e.g., make a refund operation after a timeout. Second, our model captures the role of a blockchain as a party trusted for correctness and availability but not for privacy. Third, our formalism modularizes our notations by factoring out common specifics related to the smart contract execution model, and implementing these in central wrappers.

For simplicity, we assume that there can be any number of identities in the system, and that they are fixed a priori. It is easy to extend our model to capture registration of new identities dynamically. We allow each identity to generate an arbitrary (polynomial) number of pseudonyms as in Bitcoin and Ethereum.

**A. Programs, Functionalities, and Wrappers**

To make notations simple for writing ideal functionalities and smart contracts, we make a conscious notational choice of introducing **wrappers**. Wrappers implement in a central place a set of common features (e.g., timer, ledger, pseudonyms) that are applicable to all ideal functionalities and contracts in our blockchain model of execution. In this way, we can modularize our notational system such that these common and tedious details need not be repeated in writing ideal, blockchain and user/manager programs.

**Blockchain functionality wrapper \( G \):** A blockchain functionality wrapper \( G(B) \) takes in a blockchain program denoted \( B \), and produces a blockchain functionality. Our real world protocols will be defined in the \( G(B) \)-hybrid world. Our blockchain functionality wrapper is formally presented in Figure 11. We point out the following important facts about the \( G(·) \) wrapper:

- **Trusted for correctness and availability but not privacy.** The blockchain functionality wrapper \( G(·) \) stipulates that a blockchain program is trusted for correctness and availability but not for privacy. In particular, the blockchain wrapper exposes the blockchain program’s internal state to any party that makes a query.

- **Time and batched processing of messages.** In popular decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, time progresses in block intervals marked by the creation of each new block. Intuitively, our \( G(·) \) wrapper captures the following fact. In each round (i.e., block interval), the blockchain program may receive multiple messages (also referred to as transactions in the cryptocurrency literature). The order of processing these transactions is determined by the miner who mines the next block. In our model, we allow the adversary to specify an ordering of the messages collected in a round, and our blockchain program will then process the messages in this adversary-specified ordering.

- **Rushing adversary.** The blockchain wrapper \( G(·) \) naturally captures a rushing adversary. Specifically, the adversary can first see all messages sent to the blockchain program by honest parties, and then decide its own messages for this round, as well as an ordering in which the blockchain program should process the messages in the next round. Modeling a rushing adversary is important, since it captures a class of well-known front-running attacks, e.g., those that exploit transaction malleability [11], [28]. For example, in
\( \mathcal{F}(\text{idealP}) \) functionality

Given an ideal program denoted idealP, the \( \mathcal{F}(\text{idealP}) \) functionality is defined as below:

**Init:** Upon initialization, perform the following:
- **Time:** Set current time \( T := 0 \). Set the receive queue \( r\text{queue} := \emptyset \).
- **Pseudonyms:** Set \( \text{nyms} := \{(P_1, P_1), \ldots, (P_N, P_N)\} \), i.e., initially every party’s true identity is recorded as a default pseudonym for the party.
- **Ledger:** A ledger dictionary structure \( \text{ledger}[P] \) stores the endowed account balance for each identity \( P \in \{P_1, \ldots, P_N\} \).

Before any new pseudonyms are generated, only true identities have endowed account balances. Send the array \( \text{ledger}[] \) to the ideal adversary \( S \).

**idealP_Init:** Run the **Init** procedure of the idealP program.

**Tick:** Upon receiving \( \text{tick} \) from an honest party \( P \): notify \( S \) of \( (\text{tick}, P) \). If the functionality has collected \( \text{tick} \) confirmations from all honest parties since the last clock tick, then
- Call the **Timer** procedure of the idealP program.
- Apply the adversarial permutation \( \text{perm} \) to the \( r\text{queue} \) to reorder the messages received in the previous round.
- For each \( (m, \bar{P}) \in r\text{queue} \) in the permuted order, invoke the delayed actions (in gray background) defined by ideal program idealP at the activation point named “Upon receiving message \( m \) from pseudonym \( \bar{P} \)”.
- Queue the message by calling \( r\text{queue}.\text{add}(m, \bar{P}) \).

**Permute:** Upon receiving \( (\text{permut}, \text{perm}) \) from the adversary \( S \), record \( \text{perm} \).

**GetTime:** On receiving \( \text{gettime} \) from a party \( P \), notify the adversary \( S \) of \( (\text{gettime}, P) \), and return the current time \( T \) to party \( P \).

**GenNym:** Upon receiving \( \text{gennym} \) from an honest party \( P \): Notify the adversary \( S \) of \( \text{gennym} \). Wait for \( S \) to respond with a new nym \( \bar{P} \) such that \( \bar{P} \notin \text{nyms} \). Now, let \( \text{nyms} := \text{nyms} \cup \{(P, \bar{P})\} \), and send \( \bar{P} \) to \( P \). Upon receiving \( (\text{gennym}, \bar{P}) \) from a corrupted party \( P \): if \( \bar{P} \notin \text{nyms} \), let \( \text{nyms} := \text{nyms} \cup \{(P, \bar{P})\} \).

**Ledger operations:** // inner activation

**Transfer:** Upon receiving \( (\text{transfer}, \text{amount}, \bar{P}_r) \) from some pseudonym \( \bar{P}_r \):
- Notify \( (\text{transfer}, \text{amount}, \bar{P}_r, \bar{P}_s) \) to the ideal adversary \( S \).
- Assert that \( \text{ledger}[\bar{P}_s] \geq \text{amount} \).
- \( \text{ledger}[\bar{P}_s] := \text{ledger}[\bar{P}_s] - \text{amount} \)
- \( \text{ledger}[\bar{P}_r] := \text{ledger}[\bar{P}_r] + \text{amount} \)

/* \( \bar{P}_s, \bar{P}_r \) can be pseudonyms or true identities. Note that each party’s identity is a default pseudonym for the party. */

**Expose:** On receiving \( \text{exposeledger} \) from a party \( P \), return ledger to the party \( P \).

Fig. 10. The \( \mathcal{F}(\text{idealP}) \) functionality is parameterized by an ideal program denoted idealP. An ideal program idealP can specify two types of activation points, immediate activations and delayed activations. Activation points are invoked upon receipt of messages. Immediate activations are processed immediately, whereas delayed activations are collected and batch processed in the next round. The \( \mathcal{F}(\cdot) \) wrapper allows the ideal adversary \( S \) to specify an order \( \text{perm} \) in which the messages should be processed in the next round. For each delayed activation, we use the leak notation in an ideal program idealP to define the leakage which is immediately exposed to the ideal adversary \( S \) upon receipt of the message.

A “rock, paper, scissors” game, if inputs are sent in the clear, an adversary can decide its input based on the other party’s input. An adversary can also try to maul transactions submitted by honest parties to potentially redirect payments to itself. Since our model captures a rushing adversary, we can write ideal functionalities that preclude such front-running attacks.

**Ideal functionality wrapper \( \mathcal{F} \):** An ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}(\text{idealP}) \) takes an ideal program denoted idealP. Specifically, the wrapper \( \mathcal{F}(\cdot) \) part defines standard features such as time, pseudonyms, a public ledger, and money transfers between parties. Our ideal functionality wrapper is formally presented in Figure 10.

**Protocol wrapper \( \Pi \):** Our protocol wrapper allows us to modularize the presentation of user protocols. Our protocol wrapper is formally presented in Figure 12.

**Terminology.** For disambiguation, we always refer to the user-defined portions as programs. Programs alone do not have complete formal meanings. However, when programs are wrapped with functionality wrappers (including \( \mathcal{F}(\cdot) \)
Given a blockchain program denoted $B$, the $G(B)$ functionality is defined as below:

**Init:** Upon initialization, perform the following:

- A ledger data structure $\text{ledger}[\bar{P}]$ stores the account balance of party $\bar{P}$. Send the entire balance ledger to $A$.
- Set current time $T := 0$. Set the receive queue $\text{rqueue} := \emptyset$.
- Run the **Init** procedure of the $B$ program.
- Send the $B$ program’s internal state to the adversary $A$.

**Tick:** Upon receiving $\text{tick}$ from an honest party, if the functionality has collected $\text{tick}$ confirmations from all honest parties since the last clock tick, then:

- Apply the adversarial permutation $\text{perm}$ to the $\text{rqueue}$ to reorder the messages received in the previous round.
- Call the **Timer** procedure of the $B$ program.
- Pass the reordered messages to the $B$ program to be processed. Set $\text{rqueue} := \emptyset$.
- Set $T := T + 1$

**Other activations:**

- **Authenticated receive:** Upon receiving a message (authenticated, $m$) from party $P$:
  - Send $(m, P)$ to the adversary $A$.
  - Queue the message by calling $\text{rqueue}.\text{add}(m, P)$.
- **Pseudonymous receive:** Upon receiving a message of the form (pseudonymous, $m$, $\bar{P}$, $\sigma$) from any party $P$:
  - Send $(m, \bar{P}, \sigma)$ to the adversary $A$.
  - Parse $\sigma := (\text{nonce}, \sigma')$, and assert $\text{Verify}(\bar{P}.\text{spk}, (\text{nonce}, T, \bar{P}.\text{epk}, m), \sigma') = 1$.
  - If message (pseudonymous, $m$, $\bar{P}$, $\sigma$) has not been received earlier in this round, queue the message by calling $\text{rqueue}.\text{add}(m, P)$.
- **Anonymous receive:** Upon receiving a message (anonymous, $m$) from party $P$:
  - Send $m$ to the adversary $A$.
  - If $m$ has not been seen before in this round, queue the message by calling $\text{rqueue}.\text{add}(m)$.
- **Permute:** Upon receiving (permute, perm) from the adversary $A$, record perm.
- **Expose:** On receiving exposestate from a party $P$, return the functionality’s internal state to the party $P$. Note that this also implies that a party can query the functionality for the current time $T$.

**Ledger operations:** // inner activation

- **Transfer:** Upon recipient of (transfer, amount, $P_r$) from some pseudonym $\bar{P}_s$:
  - Assert $\text{ledger}[\bar{P}_s] \geq \text{amount}$
  - $\text{ledger}[\bar{P}_s] := \text{ledger}[\bar{P}_s] - \text{amount}$
  - $\text{ledger}[\bar{P}_r] := \text{ledger}[\bar{P}_r] + \text{amount}$

\[ G(B) \] functionality in the real-world execution. On collecting “tick” messages from all honest parties, the $F(\text{idealP})$ or $G(B)$ functionality would then advance the time $T := T + 1$. The functionality also allows parties to query the current time $T$.

When multiple messages arrive at the blockchain in a time interval, we allow the adversary to choose a permutation to specify the order in which the blockchain will process the messages. This captures potential network attacks such as delaying message propagation, and front-running attacks (a.k.a. rushing attacks) where an adversary determines its own message after seeing what other parties send in a round.

**C. Modeling Pseudonyms**

We model a notion of “pseudonymity” that provides a form of privacy, similar to that provided by typical cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Any user can generate an arbitrary
### Pseudonym related:

**GenNym:** Upon receiving input `gennym` from the environment $E$, generate $(epk, esk) \leftarrow \text{Keygen}_{\text{nc}}(1^\lambda)$, and $(spk, ssk) \leftarrow \text{Keygen}_{\text{sign}}(1^\lambda)$. Call payload := prot.GenNym($1^\lambda$, (epk, spk)). Store $\text{nyms} := \text{nyms} \cup \{(epk, spk, \text{payload})\}$, and output $(epk, spk, \text{payload})$ as a new pseudonym.

**Send:** Upon receiving internal call $(\text{send}, m, \bar{P})$:

- If $\bar{P} == P$: send (authenticated, $m$) to $G(B)$. // this is an authenticated send
- Else, // this is a pseudonymous send
  - Assert that pseudonym $\bar{P}$ has been recorded in $\text{nyms}$;
  - Query current time $T$ from $G(B)$. Compute $\sigma' := \text{Sign}(ssk, (\text{nonce}, T, epk, m))$ where ssk is the recorded secret signing key corresponding to $\bar{P}$, nonce is a freshly generated random string, and epk is the recorded public encryption key corresponding to $\bar{P}$. Let $\sigma := (\text{nonce}, \sigma')$.
  - Send $(\text{pseudonymous}, m, \bar{P}, \sigma)$ to $G(B)$.

**AnonSend:** Upon receiving internal call $(\text{anonsend}, m, \bar{P})$: send (anonymous, $m$) to $G(B)$.

### Timer and ledger transfers:

**Transfer:** Upon receiving input $(\text{transfer}, \$\text{amount}, \bar{P}, \bar{P})$ from the environment $E$:

- Assert that $\bar{P}$ is a previously generated pseudonym.
- Send $(\text{transfer}, \$\text{amount}, \bar{P}, \bar{P})$ to $G(B)$ as pseudonym $\bar{P}$.

**Tick:** Upon receiving tick from the environment $E$, forward the message to $G(B)$.

### Other activations:

**Act as pseudonym:** Upon receiving any input of the form $(m, \bar{P})$ from the environment $E$:

- Assert that $\bar{P}$ was a previously generated pseudonym.
- Pass $(m, \bar{P})$ the party’s local program to process.

**Others:** Upon receiving any other input from the environment $E$, or any other message from a party: Pass the input/message to the party’s local program to process.

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Fig. 12. Protocol wrapper.
any order). The ledger state is public knowledge, and can be queried immediately using the `exposeledger` instruction.

There are many conceivable policies for introducing new currency into such a system: for example, Bitcoin “mints” new currency as a reward for each miner who solves a proof-of-work puzzles. We take a simple approach of defining an arbitrary, publicly visible (i.e., common knowledge) initial allocation that associates a quantity of money to each party’s real identity. Except for this initial allocation, no money is created or destroyed.

**E. Simulator Wrapper**

We also define a simulator wrapper which will later be useful in aiding the construction of the ideal-world simulator in our proofs in Appendices E and F. In particular, in our proofs later, we will only write the simulator program denoted `simp`. We will apply the wrapper `S` to the simulator program to obtain the actual simulator `S(simp)`. The simulator wrapper modularizes the simulator construction by factoring out the common part of the simulation pertaining to all protocols in this model of execution.

The simulator wrapper is defined formally in Figure 13.

**F. Composability and Multiple Contracts**

**Extending to multiple contracts.** So far, our formalism only models a single running instance of a user-specified contract (\( \phi_{\text{priv}}, \phi_{\text{pub}} \)). It will not be too hard to extend the wrappers to support multiple contracts sharing a global ledger, clock, pseudonyms, and Blockchain\(_{\text{cash}}\) (i.e. private cash). While such an extension is straightforward (and would involve segregating different instances by associating them with a unique session string or subsession string, which we omit in our presentation), one obvious drawback is that this would result in a monolithic functionality consisting of all contract instances. This means that the proof also has to be done in a monolithic manner simultaneously proving all active contracts in the system.

**Future work.** To further modularize our functionality and proof, new composition theorems will be needed that are not covered by the current UC [21] or extended models such as GUC [23] and GNUC [38]. We give a brief discussion of the issues below. Since our model is expressed in the Universal Composability framework, we could apply to our functionalities and protocols standard composition operators, such as the multi-session extension [24]. However, a direct application of this operator to the wrapped functionality \( \mathcal{F}(\text{IdealP}_{\text{hawk}}) \) would give us multiple instances of separate timers and ledgers, one for each contract - which is not what we want! The Generalized UC (GUC) framework [23] is a better starting point; it provides a way to compose multiple instances of arbitrary functionalities along with a single instance of a shared functionality as a common resource. To apply this to our scenario, we would model the timer and ledger as a single shared functionality, composed with an arbitrary number of instances of Hawk contracts. However, even the GUC framework is inadequate for our needs since it does not allow interaction between the shared functionality and others, so this approach cannot be applied directly. In our ongoing work, we further generalize GUC and overcome these technical obstacles and more. As these details are intricate and unrelated to our contributions here, we defer further discussion to a forthcoming manuscript.

**A remark about UC and Generalized UC.** A subtle distinction between our work and that of Kiayias et al. [40] is that while we use the ordinary UC framework, Kiayias et al. define their model in the GUC framework [23]. Generalized UC definitions appear a priori to be stronger. However, we believe the GUC distinction is unnecessary, and our definition is equally strong; in particular, since the clock, ledger, and pseudonym functionality involves no private state and is available in both the real and ideal worlds, the simulator cannot, for example, present a false view of the current round number. We plan to formally clarify this in a forthcoming work.

**APPENDIX C**

**ADDITIONAL EXAMPLE PROGRAMS**

We provide the Hawk programs for the applications used in our evaluation in Section VI. For the sealed auction contract, please refer to Section I-B.

**Crowdfunding example.** In the crowdfunding example in Figure 14, parties donate money for a kickstarter project. If the total raised funding exceeds a pre-set budget denoted `BUDGET`, then the campaign is successful and the kickstarter obtains the total donations. Otherwise, all donations are returned to the donors after a timeout. In this case, no public deposit is necessary to ensure the incentive compatibility of the contract. If a party does not open after freezing its money, the money is unrecoverable by anyone.
The simulator $S$ simulates a $G(B)$ instance internally. Here $S$ calls $G(B).init$ to initialize the internal states of the contract functionality. $S$ also calls $simp.init$.

Simulating honest parties.

- **Tick**: Environment $E$ sends input $tick$ to an honest party $P$: simulator $S$ receives notification (tick, $P$) from the ideal functionality. Simulator forwards the tick message to the simulated $G(B)$ functionality.
- **GenNym**: Environment $E$ sends input $gennym$ to an honest party $P$: simulator $S$ receives notification $gennym$ from the ideal functionality. Simulator $S$ honestly generates an encryption key and a signing key as defined in Figure 12, and remembers the corresponding secret keys. Simulator $S$ now calls $simp.GenNym(epk, spk)$ and waits for the returned value payload. Finally, the simulator passes the nym $P = (epk, spk, payload)$ to the ideal functionality.

Other activations. // From the inner idealP
If ideal functionality sends (transfer, $\$amount$, $\_P$, $\_S$), then update the ledger in the simulated $G(Contract)$ instance accordingly.
Else, forward the message to the inner $simp$.

Simulating corrupted parties.

- **Permute**: Upon receiving (permute, perm) from the environment $E$, forward it to the internally simulated $G(B)$ and the ideal functionality.
- **Expose**: Upon receiving exposestate from the environment $E$, expose all states of the internally simulated $G(B)$.
- **Other activations**.
  - Upon receiving (authenticated, $m$) from the environment $E$ on behalf of corrupted party $P$: Forward to internally simulated $G(B)$. If the message is of the format (transfer, $\$amount$, $\_P$, $\_S$), then forward it to the ideal functionality. Otherwise, forward to $simp$.
  - Upon receiving (pseudonymous, $m$, $\_P$, $\sigma$) from the environment $E$ on behalf of corrupted party $P$: Forward to internally simulated $G(B)$. Now, assert that $\sigma$ verifies just like in $G(B)$. If the message is of the format (transfer, $\$amount$, $\_P$, $\_S$), then forward it to the ideal functionality. Else, forward to $simp$.
  - Upon receiving (anonymous, $m$) from the environment $E$ on behalf of corrupted party $P$: Forward to internally simulated $G(B)$. If the message is of the format (transfer, $\$amount$, $\_P$, $\_S$), then forward it to the ideal functionality. Else, forward to $simp$.

Fig. 13. Simulator wrapper.

**Swap instrument example.** In this financial swap instrument, Alice is betting on the stock price exceeding a certain threshold at a future point of time, while Bob is betting on the reverse. If the stock price is below the threshold, Alice obtains $20; else Bob obtains $20. As mentioned earlier in Section VI-B, such a financial swap can be used as a means of insurance to hedge investment risks. This swap contract makes use of public deposits to provide financial fairness when either Alice or Bob cheats.

This swap assumes that the manager is a well-known public entity such as a stock exchange. Therefore, the contract does not protect against the manager aborting. In the event that the manager aborts, the aborting event can be observed in public, and therefore external mechanisms (e.g., legal enforcement or reputation) can be leveraged to punish the manager.

**Rock-Paper-Scissors example.** In this lottery game in Figure 16, each party deposits $3$ in total. In the case that all parties are honest, then each party has a 50% chance of leaving with $4$ (i.e., winning $1$) and a 50% chance of leaving with $2$ (i.e., losing $2$).

The lottery game is fair in the following sense: if any party cheats, then the remaining honest parties are guaranteed a payout distribution that stochastically dominates the payout distribution they would expect if every party was honest.

This is achieved using standard “collateral deposit” techniques [7], [17]. For example, if Alice aborts, then her deposit is used to compensate Bob by the maximum amount $4$. If the Manager aborts, then both Alice and Bob receive $8$.

Unlike the lottery games found in Bitcoin and Ethereum [7], [17], [29], our contract also provides privacy. If the Manager and both parties do not voluntarily disclose information, then no one else in the system learns which of Alice or Bob won. Even when the Manager, Alice, and Bob are all corrupted, the underlying ecash cash system still provides privacy for other contracts and guarantees that the total amount of money is conserved.

**Appendix D**

**Technical Subtleties in ZeroCash**

In general, a simulation-based security definition is more straightforward to write and understand than ad-hoc indistinguishability games – although it is often more difficult to prove or require a protocol with more overhead. Below we highlight a subtle weakness with ZeroCash’s security definition [11], which motivates our stronger definition.

**Ledger indistinguishability leaks unintended information.** The privacy guarantees of ZeroCash [11] are defined by a
“Ledger Indistinguishability” game (in [11], Appendix C.1).

In this game, the attacker (adaptively) generates two sequences of queries, $Q_{\text{left}}$ and $Q_{\text{right}}$. Each query can either be a raw “insert” transaction (which corresponds in our model to a transaction submitted by a corrupted party) or else a “mint” or “pour” query (which corresponds in our model to an instruction from the environment to an honest party). The attacker receives (incrementally) a pair of views of protocol executions, $V_{\text{left}}$ and $V_{\text{right}}$, according to one of the following two cases, and tries to discern which case occurred: either $V_{\text{right}}$ is generated by applying all the queries in $Q_{\text{right}}$ and respectively for $V_{\text{right}}$; or else $V_{\text{left}}$ is generated by interweaving the “insert” queries of $Q_{\text{left}}$ with the “mint” and “pour” queries of $Q_{\text{right}}$, and $V_{\text{right}}$ is generated by interweaving the “insert” queries of $Q_{\text{right}}$ with the “mint” and “pour” queries of $Q_{\text{left}}$. The two sequences of queries are constrained to be “publicly consistent”, which effectively defines the information leaked to the adversary. For example, the $i^{th}$ queries in both sequences must be of the same type (either “mint”, “pour”, or “insert”), and if a “pour” query includes an output to a corrupted recipient, then the output value must be the same in both queries.

However, the definition of “public consistency” is subtly overconstraining: it requires that if the $i^{th}$ query in one sequence is an (honest) “pour” query that spends a coin previously created by a (corrupt) “insert” query, then the $i^{th}$ queries in both sequences must spend coins of equal value created by prior “insert” queries. Effectively, this means that if a corrupted party sends a coin to an honest party, then the adversary may be alerted when the honest party spends it.

We stress that this does not imply any flaw with the Zerocash construction itself — however, there is no obvious path to proving their scheme secure under a simulation based paradigm. Our scheme avoids this problem by using an SSE-NIZK instead of a zkSNARK.

**APPENDIX E**

**FORMAL PROOF FOR PRIVATE CASH**

We now prove that the protocol in Figure 5 is a secure and correct implementation of $\mathcal{F}(\text{IdealP}_{\text{hawk}})$. For any real-world adversary $A$, we construct an ideal-world simulator $S$, such that no polynomial-time environment $E$ can distinguish whether it is in the real or ideal world. We first describe the construction of the simulator $S$ and then argue the indistinguishability of the real and ideal worlds.

**Theorem 2.** Assuming that the hash function in the Merkle tree is collision resistant, the commitment scheme Comm is perfectly binding and computationally hiding, the NIZK scheme is computationally zero-knowledge and simulation sound extractable, the encryption schemes ENC and SENC are perfectly correct and semantically secure, the PRF scheme PRF is secure, then our protocol in Figure 5 securely emulates the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}(\text{IdealP}_{\text{cash}})$.

**A. Ideal World Simulator**

Due to Canetti [21], it suffices to construct a simulator $S$ for the dummy adversary that simply passes messages to and from the environment $E$. The ideal-world simulator $S$ also interacts with the $\mathcal{F}(\text{IdealP}_{\text{cash}})$ ideal functionality. Below we construct the user-defined portion of our simulator simP. Our ideal adversary $S$ can be obtained by applying the simulator wrapper $S(\text{simP})$. The simulator wrapper (formally defined earlier in Appendix B-E) modularizes the simulator construction by factoring out the common part of the simulation pertaining to all protocols in this model of execution.

Recall that the simulator wrapper performs the ordinary setup procedure, but retains the “trapdoor” information used in creating the crs for the NIZK proof system, allowing it to forge proofs for false statement and to extract witnesses from valid proofs. Since the real world adversary would see the entire state of the contract, the simulator allows the environment
Hawk contract for a rock-paper-scissors game. This program defines both a private contract and a public contract. The private contract guarantees that only Alice, Bob, and the Manager learn the outcome of the game. Public collateral deposits are used to guarantee financial fairness such that if any of the parties cheat, the remaining honest parties receive monetary compensation.

Init. The simulator \( \text{simP} \) runs \( (\tilde{crs}, \tau, \text{esk}) \leftarrow \text{NIZK} . \tilde{\mathcal{K}} (1^\lambda) \), and gives \( \tilde{crs} \) to the environment \( \mathcal{E} \).

Simulating corrupted parties. The following messages are sent by the environment \( \mathcal{E} \) to the simulator \( \hat{\mathcal{S}}(\text{simP}) \) which then forwards it on to both the internally simulated contract \( \mathcal{G}(\text{Blockchain}_{\text{cash}}) \) and the inner simulator \( \text{simP} \).

- \( \text{simP} \) receives a pseudonymous mint message \( \langle \text{mint}, \text{Val}, \tau \rangle \). No extra action is necessary.
- \( \text{simP} \) receives an anonymous pour message, \( \langle \text{pour}, \{ \langle n_i, P_i, \text{coin}_i, \text{ct}_i \rangle \}^i_{i=1,2} \rangle \). The simulator uses \( \tau \) to extract the witness from \( \pi \), which includes the sender \( \mathcal{P} \) and values \( \text{Val}_1, \text{Val}_2 \), \( \text{Val}_1' \) and \( \text{Val}_2' \). If \( \mathcal{P} \) is an uncorrupted party, then the simulator must check whether each encryption \( \text{ct}_i \) is performed correctly, since the NIZK proof does not guarantee that this is the case. The simulator performs a trial decryption using \( \mathcal{P} . \text{esk} \); if the decryption is not a valid opening of \( \text{coin}_i \), then the simulator must avoid causing \( P_i \) in the ideal world to output anything (since \( P_i \) in the real world would not output anything either). The simulator therefore substitutes some default value (e.g., the name of any corrupt party
Case 2: 

\[ \text{Simulated NIZK proof before passing it onto the environment} \]

Now the adversary (also referred to as the simulator) will call \( \text{Hybrid 1} \) is the same as the real world, except that \( \text{Hybrid 1} \). We start with the real world with a dummy adversary that simply passes messages to and from the environment.

**Simulating honest parties.** When the environment \( \mathcal{E} \) sends inputs to honest parties, the simulator \( \mathcal{S} \) needs to simulate messages that corrupted parties receive, from honest parties or from functionalities in the real world. The honest parties will be simulated as below:

- **GenNym**(\( \text{epk}, spk \)): The simulator \( \text{simP} \) generates and records the PRF keypair, (\( pk_{\text{PRF}}, sk_{\text{PRF}} \)) and returns payload := \( pk_{\text{PRF}} \).
- Environmental \( \mathcal{E} \) gives a \texttt{mint} instruction to party \( \mathcal{P} \). The simulator \( \text{simP} \) receives (\( \text{mint}, \mathcal{P}, \text{val}, r \)) from the ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}(\text{IdealP}_{\text{cash}}) \). The simulator has enough information to run the honest protocol, and posts a valid \texttt{mint} transaction to the contract.
- Environmental \( \mathcal{E} \) gives a \texttt{pour} instruction to party \( \mathcal{P} \). The simulator \( \text{simP} \) receives (\( \text{pour}, \mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2 \)) from \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{cash}} \). However, the simulator does not learn the name of the honest sender \( \mathcal{P} \), or the correct values for each input coin \( \text{val}_i \) (for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \)). Instead, the simulator uses \( \tau \) to create a false proof using arbitrary values for these values in the witness. To generate each serial number \( \text{sn}_i \) in the witness, the simulator chooses a random element \( \text{val}_i \) from the codomain of PRF. For each recipient \( \mathcal{P}_i \) (for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \)), the simulator behaves differently depending on whether or not \( \mathcal{P}_i \) is corrupted.

**Case 1:** \( \mathcal{P}_i \) is honest. The simulator does not know the correct output value, so instead sets \( \text{val}_i := 0 \), and computes \( \text{coin}_i \) and \( \text{ct}_i \) as normal. The environment therefore sees a commitment and an encryption of 0, but without \( \mathcal{P}_{i,esk} \) it cannot distinguish between an encryption of 0 or of the correct value.

**Case 2:** \( \mathcal{P}_i \) is corrupted. Since the ideal world recipient would receive \( \$ \text{val}_i \) from \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{cash}} \), and since \( \mathcal{P}_i \) is corrupted, the simulator learns the correct value \( \$ \text{val}_i \) directly. Hence \( \text{coin}_i \) is a correct encryption of \$val_i under \( \mathcal{P}_i \)'s registered encryption public key.

**B. Indistinguishability of Real and Ideal Worlds**

To prove indistinguishability of the real and ideal worlds from the perspective of the environment, we will go through a sequence of hybrid games.

**Real world.** We start with the real world with a dummy adversary that simply passes messages to and from the environment.

**Hybrid 1.** Hybrid 1 is the same as the real world, except that now the adversary (also referred to as the simulator) will call \( \text{NIZK.\mathcal{K}(1^\lambda)} \) to perform a simulated setup for the NIZK scheme. The simulator will pass the simulated \( \text{\mathcal{K}s} \) to the environment \( \mathcal{E} \). When an honest party \( \mathcal{P} \) publishes a NIZK proof, the simulator will replace the real proof with a simulated NIZK proof before passing it onto the environment \( \mathcal{E} \). The simulated NIZK proof can be computed by calling the NIZK, \( \widehat{\mathcal{P}}(\text{crs}, \tau, \cdot) \) algorithm which takes only the statement as input but does not require knowledge of a witness.

**Fact 1.** It is immediately clear that if the NIZK scheme is computational zero-knowledge, then no polynomial-time environment \( \mathcal{E} \) can distinguish Hybrid 1 from the real world except with negligible probability.

**Hybrid 2.** The simulator simulates the \( \mathcal{G}(\text{Blockchain}_{\text{cash}}) \) functionality. Since all messages to the \( \mathcal{G}(\text{Blockchain}_{\text{cash}}) \) functionality are public, simulating the contract functionality is trivial. Therefore, Hybrid 2 is identically distributed as Hybrid 1 from the environment \( \mathcal{E} \)'s view.

**Hybrid 3.** Hybrid 3 is the same as Hybrid 2 except the following changes. When an honest party sends a message to the contract (now simulated by the simulator \( \mathcal{S} \)), it will sign the message with a signature verifiable under an honestly generated nym. In Hybrid 3, the simulator will replace all honest parties’ nyms and generate these nyms itself. In this way, the simulator will simulate honest parties’ signatures by signing them itself. Hybrid 3 is identically distributed as Hybrid 2 from the environment \( \mathcal{E} \)'s view.

**Hybrid 4.** Hybrid 4 is the same as Hybrid 3 except for the following changes:

- When an honest party \( \mathcal{P} \) produces a ciphertext \( \text{ct} \), for a recipient \( \mathcal{P}_i \), and if the recipient is also uncorrupted, then the simulator will replace this ciphertext with an encryption of 0 before passing it onto the environment \( \mathcal{E} \).
- When an honest party \( \mathcal{P} \) produces a commitment coin, then the simulator replaces this commitment with a commitment to 0.
- When an honest party \( \mathcal{P} \) computes a pseudorandom serial number \( \text{sn} \), the simulator replaces this with a randomly chosen value from the codomain of PRF.

**Fact 2.** It is immediately clear that if the encryption scheme is semantically secure, if PRF is a pseudorandom function, and if \( \text{Comm} \) is a perfectly hiding commitment scheme, then no polynomial-time environment \( \mathcal{E} \) can distinguish Hybrid 4 from Hybrid 3 except with negligible probability.

**Hybrid 5.** Hybrid 5 is the same as Hybrid 4 except for the following changes. Whenever the environment \( \mathcal{E} \) passes to the simulator \( \mathcal{S} \) a message signed on behalf of an honest party’s nym, if the message and signature pair was not among the ones previously passed to the environment \( \mathcal{E} \), then the simulator \( \mathcal{S} \) aborts.

**Fact 3.** Assume that the signature scheme employed is secure; then the probability of aborting in Hybrid 5 is negligible. Notice that from the environment \( \mathcal{E} \)'s view, Hybrid 5 would otherwise be identically distributed as Hybrid 4 modulo aborting.

**Hybrid 6.** Hybrid 6 is the same as Hybrid 5 except for the following changes. Whenever the environment passes \( \text{pour}, \pi, \{\text{sn}, \mathcal{P}_i, \text{coin}_i, \text{ct}_i\} \) to the simulator (on behalf
of corrupted party $P$), if the proof $\pi$ verifies under statement, then the simulator will call the NIZK’s extractor algorithm $E$ to extract witness. If the NIZK $\pi$ verifies but the extracted witness does not satisfy the relation $L_{\text{pour}}(\text{statement}, \text{witness})$, then abort the simulation.

**Fact 4.** Assume that the NIZK is simulation sound extractable, then the probability of aborting in Hybrid 6 is negligible. Notice that from the environment $E$’s view, Hybrid 6 would otherwise be identically distributed as Hybrid 5 modulo aborting.

Finally, observe that Hybrid 6 is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal simulation $S$ unless one of the following bad events happens:

- A value $\text{val}'$ decrypted by an honest recipient is different from that extracted by the simulator. However, given that the encryption scheme is perfectly correct, this cannot happen.
- A commitment coin is different than any stored in Blockchain$_{\text{cash, coins}}$, yet it is valid according to the relation $L_{\text{pour}}$. Given that the merkle tree MT is computed using collision-resistant a hash function, this occurs with at most negligible probability.
- The honest public key generation algorithm results in key collisions. Obviously, this happens with negligible probability if the encryption and signature schemes are secure.

**Fact 5.** Given that the encryption scheme is semantically secure and perfectly correct, and that the signature scheme is secure, then Hybrid 6 is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal simulation to any polynomial-time environment $E$.

**APPENDIX F**

**FORMAL PROOF FOR HAWK**

We now prove our main result, Theorem 1 (see Section IV-B). Just as we did for private cash in Theorem 2, we will construct an ideal-world simulator $S$ for every real-world adversary $A$, such that no polynomial-time environment $E$ can distinguish whether it is in the real or ideal world.

**A. Ideal World Simulator**

Our ideal program (IdealP$_{\text{hawk}}$) and construction (Blockchain$_{\text{hawk}}$ and HAWK) borrows from our private cash definition and construction in a non-blackbox way (i.e., by duplicating the relevant behaviors). As such, our simulator program sim$P$ also duplicates the behavior of the simulator from Appendix E-A involving mint and pour interactions. Hence we will here explain the behavior involving the additional $\text{freeze}$, compute, and finalize interactions.

**Init.** Same as in Appendix E.

**Simulating corrupted parties.** The following messages are sent by the environment $E$ to the simulator $S(\text{sim}P)$ which then forwards it on to both the internally simulated contract $G(\text{Blockchain}_{\text{hawk}})$ and the inner simulator sim$P$.

- **Corrupt party $P$ submits a transaction** ($\text{freeze}, \pi, \text{sn}, \text{cm}$) to the contract. The simulator forwards this transaction to the contract, but also uses the trapdoor $\tau$ to extract a witness from $\pi$, including $\$\text{val}$ and in. The simulator then sends ($\text{freeze}, \$\text{val}, \text{in})$ to $F_{\text{HAWK}}$.
- **Corrupt party $P$ submits a transaction** ($\text{compute}, \pi, \text{ct}$) to the contract. The simulator forwards this to the contract and sends compute to $F_{\text{HAWK}}$. The simulator also uses $\tau$ to extract a witness from $\pi$, including $k_i$, which is used later. These is stored as CorruptOpen$_{\pi} := k_i$.
- **Corrupt party $P_M$ submits a transaction** ($\text{finalize}, \pi, \text{in}_M, \text{out}\{\text{coin}', \text{ct}\}$). The simulator forwards this to the contract, and simply sends ($\text{finalize}, \text{in}_M$) to $F_{\text{HAWK}}$.

**Simulating honest parties.** When the environment $E$ sends inputs to honest parties, the simulator $S$ needs to simulate messages that corrupted parties receive, from honest parties or from functionalities in the real world. The honest parties will be simulated as below:

- **Environment $E$ gives a $\text{freeze}$ instruction to party $P$.** The simulator sim$P$ receives ($\text{freeze}, P$) from $F(\text{IdealP}_{\text{hawk}})$. The simulator does not have any information about the actual committed values for $\$\text{val}$ or in. Instead, the simulator creates a bogus commitment $\text{cm} := \text{Comm}_M(0 || \bot || \bot)$ that will later be opened (via a false proof) to an arbitrary value. To generate the serial number $\text{sn}$, the simulator chooses a random element from the codomain of PRF. Finally, the simulator uses $\tau$ to generate a forged proof $\pi$ and sends ($\text{freeze}, \pi, \text{sn}, \text{cm}$) to the contract.
- **Environment $E$ gives a $\text{compute}$ instruction to party $P$.** The simulator sim$P$ receives ($\text{compute}, P$) from $F(\text{IdealP}_{\text{hawk}})$. The simulator behaves differently depending on whether or not the manager $P_M$ is corrupted.

**Case 1:** $P_M$ is honest. The simulator does not know values $\$\text{val}$ or in. Instead, the simulator samples an encryption randomness $r$ and generates an encryption of $0$, $\text{ct} := \text{ENC}(P_M, \text{epk}, r, 0)$. Finally, the simulator uses the trapdoor $\tau$ to create a false proof $\pi$ that the commitment $\text{cm}$ and ciphertext $\text{ct}$ are consistent. The simulator then passes ($\text{compute}, \pi, \text{ct}$) to the contract.

**Case 2:** $P_M$ is corrupted. Since the manager $P_M$ in the ideal world would learn $\$\text{val}$, in, and $k$ at this point, the simulator learns these values instead. Hence it samples an encryption randomness $r$ and computes a valid encryption $\text{ct} := \text{ENC}(P_M, \text{epk}, r, (\$\text{val} || \text{in} || k))$. The simulator next uses $\tau$ to create a proof $\pi$ attesting that $\text{ct}$ is consistent with $\text{cm}$. Finally, the simulator sends ($\text{compute}, \pi, \text{ct}$) to the contract.

- **Environment $E$ gives a $\text{finalize}$ instruction to party $P_M$.** The simulator sim$P$ receives ($\text{finalize}, \text{in}_M, \text{out}$) from $F(\text{IdealP}_{\text{hawk}})$. The
simulator generates the output coin\(_i\) for each party \(P_i\) depending on whether \(P_i\) is honest or not:

- **\(P_i\) is honest:** The simulator does not know the correct output value for \(P_i\), so instead creates a bogus commitment coin\(_i' := \text{Comm}_{\pi'}(0)\) and a bogus ciphertext \(ct_i' := \text{SENC}_{k_i}(s_i||0)\) for sampled randomnesses \(k_i\) and \(s_i\).

- **\(P_i\) is corrupted:** Since the ideal world recipient would receive \(\$val_i\) from \(\mathcal{F}(\text{IdealP}_{\text{hawk}})\), the simulator learns the correct value \(\$val_i\) directly. Notice that since \(P_i\) was corrupted, the simulator has access to \(k_i := \text{CorruptOpen}_i\) which it extracted earlier. The simulator therefore draws a randomness \(s_i'\), and computes coin\(_i' := \text{Comm}_{\pi'}(\$val_i')\) and \(ct_i := \text{SENC}_{k_i}(s_i'||\$val_i')\).

The simulator finally constructs a forged proof \(\pi\) using the trapdoor \(\tau\), and then passes \((\text{finalize}, \pi, \text{in}_M, \text{out}, \{\text{coin}_i', \text{ct}_i\}_{i \in [N]})\) to the contract.

### B. Indistinguishability of Real and Ideal Worlds

To prove indistinguishability of the real and ideal worlds from the perspective of the environment, we will go through a sequence of hybrid games.

**Real world.** We start with the real world with a dummy adversary that simply passes messages to and from the environment \(E\).

**Hybrid 1.** Hybrid 1 is the same as the real world, except that now the adversary (also referred to as the simulator) will call \((\text{crl}_s, \tau, \text{ek}) \leftarrow \text{NIZK}_{\text{hawk}}(1^\lambda)\) to perform a simulated setup for the NIZK scheme. The simulator will pass the simulated crl\(_s\) to the environment \(E\). When an honest party \(P\) publishes a NIZK proof, the simulator will replace the real proof with a simulated NIZK proof before passing it onto the environment \(E\). The simulated NIZK proof can be computed by calling the NIZK souls\((\text{crl}_s, \tau, \cdot)\) algorithm which takes only the statement as input but does not require knowledge of a witness.

**Fact 6.** It is immediately clear that if the NIZK scheme is computational zero-knowledge, then no polynomial-time environment \(E\) can distinguish Hybrid 1 from the real world except with negligible probability.

**Hybrid 2.** The simulator simulates the \(G(\text{Blockchain}_{\text{hawk}})\) functionality. Since all messages to the \(G(\text{Blockchain}_{\text{hawk}})\) functionality are public, simulating the contract functionality is trivial. Therefore, Hybrid 2 is identically distributed as Hybrid 1 from the environment \(E\)’s view.

**Hybrid 3.** Hybrid 3 is the same as Hybrid 2 except the following changes. When an honest party sends a message to the contract (now simulated by the simulator \(S\)), it will sign the message with a signature verifiable under an honestly generated nym. In Hybrid 3, the simulator will replace all honest parties’ nym and generate these nym itself. In this way, the simulator will simulate honest parties’ signatures by signing them itself. Hybrid 3 is identically distributed as Hybrid 2 from the environment \(E\)’s view.

**Hybrid 4.** Hybrid 4 is the same as Hybrid 3 except for the following changes:

- When an honest party \(P\) produces a ciphertext \(ct\), for a recipient \(P_i\), and if the recipient is also uncorrupted, then the simulator will replace this ciphertext with an encryption of 0 before passing it onto the environment \(E\).
- When an honest party \(P\) produces a commitment coin or cm, then the simulator replaces this commitment with a commitment to 0.
- When an honest party \(P\) computes a pseudorandom serial number sn, the simulator replaces this with a randomly chosen value from the codomain of PRF.

**Fact 7.** It is immediately clear that if the encryption scheme is semantically secure, if PRF is a pseudorandom function, and if Comm is a perfectly hiding commitment scheme, then no polynomial-time environment \(E\) can distinguish Hybrid 4 from Hybrid 3 except with negligible probability.

**Hybrid 5.** Hybrid 5 is the same as Hybrid 4 except for the following changes. Whenever the environment \(E\) passes to the simulator \(S\) a message signed on behalf of an honest party’s nym, if the message and signature pair was not among the ones previously passed to the environment \(E\), then the simulator \(S\) aborts.

**Fact 8.** Assume that the signature scheme employed is secure; then the probability of aborting in Hybrid 5 is negligible. Notice that from the environment \(E\)’s view, Hybrid 5 would otherwise be identically distributed as Hybrid 4 modulo aborting.

**Hybrid 6.** Hybrid 6 is the same as Hybrid 5 except for the following changes. Whenever the environment passes \((\text{pour}, \pi, \{\text{sn}_i, P_i, \text{coin}_i, \text{ct}_i\})\) (or \((\text{freeze}, \pi, \text{sn}, \text{cm})\)) to the simulator (on behalf of corrupted party \(P\)), if the proof \(\pi\) verifies under statement, then the simulator will call the NIZK’s extractor algorithm \(E\) to extract witness. If the NIZK \(\pi\) verifies but the extracted witness does not satisfy the relation \(L_{\text{PDR}}(\text{statement}, \text{wit})\) (or \(L_{\text{FREEZE}}(\text{statement}, \text{wit})\)), then abort the simulation.

**Fact 9.** Assume that the NIZK is simulation sound extractable, then the probability of aborting in Hybrid 6 is negligible. Notice that from the environment \(E\)’s view, Hybrid 6 would otherwise be identically distributed as Hybrid 5 modulo aborting.

Finally, observe that Hybrid 6 is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal simulation \(S\) unless one of the following bad events happens:

- A value \(\text{val}'\) decrypted by an honest recipient is different from that extracted by the simulator. However, given that the encryption scheme is perfectly correct, this cannot happen.
A commitment coin is different than any stored in Blockchain_{samt, coins}. Yet, it is valid according to the relation \( L_{\text{DES}} \). Given that the merkle tree MT is computed using collision-resistant a hash function, this occurs with at most negligible probability.

- The honest public key generation algorithm results in key collisions. Obviously, this happens with negligible probability if the encryption and signature schemes are secure.

**Fact 10.** Given that the encryption scheme is semantically secure and perfectly correct, and that the signature scheme is secure, then Hybrid 6 is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal simulation to any polynomial-time environment \( E \).

### APPENDIX G

**ADDITIONAL THEORETICAL RESULTS**

In this section, we describe additional theoretical results for a more general model that “shares” the role of the (minimally trusted) manager among \( n \) designated parties. In contrast to our main construction, where posterior privacy relies on a specific party (the manager) following the protocol, in this section posterior privacy is guaranteed even if a majority of the designated parties follow the protocol. Just as in our main construction, even if all the manager parties are corrupted, the correctness of the outputs as well as the security and privacy of the underlying cryptocurrency remains intact.

**A. Financially Fair MPC with Public Deposits**

We describe a variant of the financially fair MPC result by Kumaresan et al. [44], reformulated under our formal model. We stress that while Bentov et al. [17] and Kumaresan et al. [44] also introduce formal models for cryptocurrency-based secure computation, their models are somewhat restrictive and insufficient for reasoning about general protocols in the blockchain model of secure computation — especially protocols involving pseudonymity, anonymity, or financial privacy, including the protocols described in this paper, Zerocash-like protocols [11], and other protocols of interest [39]. Further, their models are not UC compatible since they adopt special opaque entities such as coins.

Therefore, to facilitate designing and reasoning about the security of general protocols in the blockchain model of secure computation, we propose a new and comprehensive model for blockchain-based secure computation in this paper.

1) **Definitions:** Our ideal program for fair secure function evaluation is given in Figure 17. We make the following remarks about this ideal program. First, in a deposit phase, parties are required to commit their inputs to the ideal functionality and make deposits of the amount \( \text{samt} \). Next, parties send a compute command to the ideal functionality. When all honest parties have issued a compute command, then the adversary learns the outputs of the corrupt parties. If all parties (including honest and corrupt) have issued an compute command, then all parties learn their respective outputs, and the deposits are returned. Finally, if a timeout happens defined by \( T_1 \), the ideal functionality checks to see if all parties have deposited. If not, this means that the computation has not even started. Therefore, simply return the deposits to those who...
Assume that the underlying MPC protocol parties reconstruct ρ chain MPC protocol. Then, in an on-chain fair exchange, all also obtain random shares of the vector $P_i$ this off-chain protocol, party reformulated under our formal framework. The intuition is that described in Figures 18 and 19 respectively. The protocol is a $F$ is $\{\rho_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ can be used in place of $\mathcal{F}$ (IdealP de), in the presence of an arbitrary number of corruptions.

Proof. Suppose that $\Pi_f$ securely emulates the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sfe}}(\hat{f})$. For the proof, we replace the $\Pi_f$ in Figure 19 with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sfe}}(\hat{f})$, and prove the security of the protocol in the (\mathcal{F}_{\text{sfe}}(\hat{f}), G(\text{Blockchain}_{de}))-hybrid world. We describe the user-defined portion of the simulator program $\text{simP}$. The simulator wrapper was described earlier in Figure 13. During the simulation, $\text{simP}$ will receive a deposit instruction from the environment on behalf of corrupt parties. The ideal functionality will also notify the simulator that an honest party has deposited (without disclosing honest parties’ inputs). If the simulator has collected deposit instructions on behalf of all parties (from both the ideal functionality and environment), at this point the simulator

- Simulates $n-1$ shares. Among these $|K|$ shares will be assigned to corrupt parties.
- Simulates all commitments $\{\text{com}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$. $n-1$ of these commitments will be computed honestly from the simulated tokens. The last commitment will be simulated by committing to 0.

Now the simulator collects compute instructions from the ideal functionality on behalf of honest parties, and from the environment on behalf of corrupt parties. When the simulator receives a notification (compute, $s_i$, $r_i$) from the environment on behalf of a corrupt party $P_i$, if $s_i$ and $r_i$ are not consistent with what was previously generated by the simulator, ignore the message. Otherwise, send compute to the ideal functionality on behalf of corrupt party $P_i$. When the simulator receives a notification (compute, $P_i$) from the ideal functionality for some honest $P_i$, unless this is the last honest $P_i$, the simulator returns one of the previously generated and unused ($s_i$, $r_i$)’s. If this is the last honest $P_i$, then the simulator will also get the corrupt parties’ outputs $\{y_i\}_{i \in [K]}$ from the ideal functionality. At this point, the simulator simulates the last honest party’s opening to be consistent with the corrupt parties’ outputs – this can be done if the secret sharing scheme is perfectly simulatable (i.e., zero-knowledge) against $n-1$ collusions and the commitment scheme is equivocal.

It is not hard to see that the environment cannot distinguish between the real world and the ideal world simulation.

### Optimizations and on-chain costs.

Since $\mathcal{F}(\text{IdealP}_{de})$ is simultaneously a generalization of Zerocash [11] and of earlier cryptocurrency-based MPC protocols [17], [40], [44], our construction satisfies the strongest definition so far. However, our construction above requires compiling a generic NIZK prover algorithm with a generic MPC compiler, it is likely slow. Our main construction, ProtHawk (see Section IV), can be seen as an optimization when $n = 1$ (i.e., the MPC is executed by only a single party). Similarly, the earlier off-chain MPC protocols [17], [40], [44] can be used in place of

### Theorem 3.

Assume that the underlying MPC protocol $\Pi_f$ is UC-secure against an arbitrary number of corruptions, that the secret sharing scheme is perfectly secret against any $n-1$ collusions, and that the commitment scheme commit is perfectly binding, computationally hiding, and equivocal. Then, the protocols described in Figures 18 and 19 securely emulate $\mathcal{F}(\text{IdealP}_{de})$ in the presence of an arbitrary number of corruptions.

Fig. 19. User program for fair secure function evaluation.
ours if the user-specified program does not involve any private money.

Even our general construction can be optimized in several ways. One obvious optimization is that not all parties need to send the commitment set \( \{ \text{com}_1 \}_i \in [n] \) to the contract. After the first party sends the commitment set, all other parties can simply send a bit to indicate that they agree with the set.

If we adopt this optimization, the on-chain communication and computation cost would be \( O(|y| + \lambda) \) per party. In the special case when all parties share the same output, i.e., \( y_1 = y_2 = \ldots = y_n \), it is not hard to see that the on-chain cost can be reduced to \( O(|y| + \lambda) \).

If we were to rely on a (programmable) random oracle model, [32] we could further reduce the on-chain cost to \( O(\lambda) \) per party (i.e., independent of the total output size). In a nutshell, we could modify the protocol to adopt a \( \rho \) of length \( \lambda \). We then apply a random oracle to expand \( \rho \) to \(|y|\) bits. Our simulation proof would still go through as long as the simulator can choose the outputs of the random oracle.

### B. Fair MPC with Private Deposits

The construction above leaks nothing to the public except the size of the public collateral deposit. For some applications, even revealing this information may leak unintended details about the application. As an example, an appropriate deposit for a private auction might correspond to the seller’s estimate of the item’s value. Therefore, we now describe the same task in Appendix G, but with private deposits instead.

1) **Ideal Functionality**: Figure 20 defines the ideal program for fair MPC with private deposits, \( \text{IdealP}_{\text{fde-priv}} \). Here, the deposit amount is known to all parties \( \{ \mathcal{P}_i \}_i \in [n] \) participating in the protocol, but it is not revealed to other users of the blockchain. In particular, if all parties behave honestly in the protocol, then the adversary will not learn the deposit amount. Therefore, in the \textbf{Init} part of this ideal functionality, some party \( \mathcal{P}_i \) sends the deposit amount \( \text{\$amt} \) to the functionality, and the functionality notifies all parties of \( \text{\$amt} \). Otherwise, the functionality in Figure 20 is very similar to Figure 17, except that when all of \( \{ \mathcal{P}_i \}_i \in [n] \) are honest, the adversary does not learn the deposit amount.

2) **Protocol**: Figures 21 and 22 depict the user-side program and the contract program for fair MPC with private deposits.

At the beginning of the protocol, all parties \( \{ \mathcal{P}_i \}_i \in [n] \) agree on a deposit amount \( \text{\$amt} \), and \( \text{com}_0 \) and publish a commitment to \( \text{\$amt} \) on the blockchain. As in the case with public deposits, all parties first run an off-chain protocol after which each party \( \mathcal{P}_i \) obtains \( \tilde{y}_i \). \( \tilde{y}_i \) is random by itself, and must be combined with another share \( \rho_i \) to recover \( y_i \) (i.e., the output is recovered as \( y_i := \tilde{y}_i \oplus \rho_i \)). Denote \( \rho := (\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n) \). All parties also obtain random shares of the vector \( \rho \) at the end of the off-chain MPC protocol. The vector \( \rho \) can be reconstructed when parties reveal their shares on the blockchain, such that each party \( \mathcal{P}_i \) can obtain its outcome \( y_i \). To ensure fairness, parties make private deposits of \( \text{\$amt} \) to the blockchain, and can only obtain their private deposit back if they reveal their share of \( \rho \) to the blockchain. The private deposit and private refund protocols make use of commitment schemes and \textbf{NIZK}s in a similar fashion as Zerocash and Hawk.

**Theorem 4.** Assuming that the hash function in the Merkle tree is collision resistant, the commitment scheme \textbf{Comm} is perfectly binding and computationally hiding, the \textbf{NIZK} scheme is computationally zero-knowledge and simulation sound extractable, the encryption scheme \textbf{ENC} is perfectly correct and semantically secure, the \textbf{PRF} scheme \textbf{PRF} is secure, then, our protocols in Figures 21 and 22 securely emulate the ideal functionality \( F(\text{IdealP}_{\text{fde-priv}}) \) in Figure 20.  

**Proof.** The proof can be done in a similar manner as that of Theorem 1 (see Appendix F).
UserP_{sfe-priv}((\{P_i\}_{i \in [n]}, f))

Init: Same as Figure 19. Additionally, let \( P \) denote the present pseudonym, let crs denote an appropriate common reference string for the NIZK.

If current (pseudonymous) party is \( P_i \):
- send \((\text{amt}, r_0)\) to all \( \{P_j\}_{j \in [n]} \)
- let \( cm_0 \) := \text{Comm}_{r_0}(\text{amt})
- and send \((\text{init}, cm_0)\) to \( G(\text{Blockchain}_{sfe-priv}) \)
Else, on receiving \((\text{amt}, r_0)\), store \((\text{amt}, r_0)\)

On receiving \((\text{init}, cm_0)\) from \( G(\text{Blockchain}_{sfe-priv}) \):
- verify that \( cm_0 \) = \text{Comm}_{r_0}(\text{amt})

Deposit: Upon receiving the first input of the form \((\text{deposit}, s, \text{val}, s_i)\): Same as Figure 19. Additionally,
- assert initialization was successful
- assert current time \( T < T_i \)
- assert this is the first deposit input
- let \( \text{MT} \) be a merkle tree over \( \text{Blockchain}_{sfe-priv}. \)
- Coins assert that some entry \((s, \text{val}, \text{coin})\) from Wallet where \( \text{val} = \text{amt} \)
- remove one such \((s, \text{val}, \text{coin})\) from Wallet
- \( \text{sn} := \text{PRF}_{sk_{priv}}(\text{P}[\text{coin}]) \)
- let branch be the branch of \((\text{P}, \text{coin})\) in MT
- statement := \((\text{MT}.\text{root}, \text{sn}, \text{cm}_0)\)
- witness := \((\text{P}, \text{coin}, \text{sk}_{priv}, \text{branch}, s, \text{val}, r_0)\)
- \( \pi := \text{NIZK. Prove}(L_{\text{DEPOSIT}}, \text{statement}, \text{witness}) \)
- send \((\text{deposit}, \pi, \text{sn})\) to \( G(\text{Blockchain}_{sfe-priv}) \)

Compute: Same as Figure 19

Refund: On input \((\text{refund}, \pi, \text{coin})\) from \( \text{P} \):
- assert \( T > T_i \)
- assert \( \text{P_i} \) did not call \text{refund} earlier
- assert \( \text{P_i} \) called \text{compute}
- if not all parties have deposited or parties deposited different \( \{\text{com}_j\}_{j \in [n]} \) sets, \( k := 0 \)
- else \( k := \) (number of aborting parties)
- statement := \((\text{coin}, \text{cm}_0, k, n)\)
- assert NIZK. Verify(L_{\text{REFUND}}, \pi, \text{statement})
- add \((\text{P_i}, \text{coin})\) to Coins

Relation (statement, witness) \( \in L_{\text{DEPOSIT}} \) is defined as:
- parse statement := \((\text{MT}.\text{root}, \text{sn}, \text{cm}_0)\)
- parse witness := \((\text{P}, \text{coin}, \text{sk}_{priv}, \text{branch}, s, \text{val}, r_0)\)
- coin := \text{Comm}_{r_0}(\text{val})
- \( cm_0 := \text{Comm}_{r_0}(\text{amt}) \)
- assert MerkleBranch(MT.\text{root}., \text{branch}., (\text{P}[\text{coin}])\)
- assert \( \text{P}.p_{sk_{priv}} = \text{sk}_{priv}(0) \)
- assert \( \text{sn} = \text{PRF}_{sk_{priv}}(\text{P}[\text{coin}]\)

Relation (statement, witness) \( \in L_{\text{REFUND}} \) is defined as:
- parse statement := \((\text{coin}, \text{cm}_0, k, n)\)
- parse witness := \((s, r_0, \text{val}, \text{val}')\)
- assert \( \text{cm}_0 := \text{Comm}_{r_0}(\text{val}) \)
- assert \( \text{val}' := \text{val} + (k \cdot \text{val})/(n - k) \)
- assert \( \text{coin}_i := \text{Comm}_{r_0}(\text{val}') \)

Fig. 21. User program for fair SFE with private deposit.

Blockchain_{sfe-priv}(\{P_i\}_{i \in [n]})

Init: Let crs denote an appropriate common reference string for the NIZK.
- On first receiving \((\text{init}, cm_0)\) from \( P_i \) for some \( i \in [n] \), send \( cm_0 \) to all \( \{P_j\}_{j \in [n]} \).

Deposit: On receive \((\text{deposit}, \{\text{com}_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \pi, \text{sn})\) from \( P_i \):
- assert initialization was successful
- assert \( T < T_i \)
- assert \( sn \notin \text{SpentCoins} \)
- statement := \((\text{MT}.\text{root}, \text{sn}, cm_0)\)
- assert NIZK. Verify(L_{\text{DEPOSIT}}, \pi, \text{statement})
- assert \( P_i \) has not called deposit earlier
- record that \( P_i \) has called deposit

Compute: Upon receiving \((\text{compute}, s_i, r_i)\) from \( P_i \):
- assert \( T < T_i \)
- assert that all \( P_j \)s have deposited, and that they have all deposited the same set \( \{\text{com}_j\}_{j \in [n]} \)
- assert that \( (s_i, r_i) \) is a valid opening of \( \text{com}_i \)
- record that \( P_i \) has called compute

Refund: Upon receiving \((\text{refund}, \pi, \text{coin})\) from \( P_i \):
- assert \( T > T_i \)
- assert \( P_i \) did not call \text{refund} earlier
- assert \( P_i \) called \text{compute}
- if not all parties have deposited or parties deposited different \( \{\text{com}_j\}_{j \in [n]} \) sets, \( k := 0 \)
- else \( k := \) (number of aborting parties)
- statement := \((\text{coin}, \text{cm}_0, k, n)\)
- assert NIZK. Verify(L_{\text{REFUND}}, \pi, \text{statement})
- add \((P_i, \text{coin})\) to Coins

Fig. 22. Blockchain program for fair SFE with private deposit.