Michael L. Anderson, Ph.D.

Department of Psychology

Institute for Advanced Computer Studies

Franklin & Marshall College

Program in Neuroscience and Cognitive Science

Lancaster, PA 17604

University Of Maryland

michael -dot- anderson -at- fandm -dot- edu

College Park, MD 20742

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Books

Metacognition in Computation: Papers from the 2005 AAAI Spring Symposium. Michael L. Anderson and Tim Oates, eds. (Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press, 2005).
  Abstract: The importance of metacognition in human thinking, learning, and problem solving is well established. Humans use metacognitive monitoring and control to choose goals, assess their own progress, and, if necessary, adopt new strategies for achieving those goals, or even abandon a goal entirely. For instance, students preparing for an examination will make judgments about the relative difficulty of the material, and use this to choose study strategies. Since in such cases accuracy of metacognitive judgments correlates with academic performance, understanding human metacognition has been an important part of work on automated tutoring systems, and has led to the use of computer assistants that help improve human metacognition.

However, there has also been growing interest in trying to create, and investigate the potential benefits of, intelligent systems which are themselves metacognitive. It is thought that systems that monitor themselves, and proactively respond to problems, can perform better, for longer, with less need for (expensive) human intervention. Thus has IBM widely publicized their "autonomic computing" initiative, aimed at developing computers which are (in their words) self-aware, self-configuring, self-optimizing, self-healing, self-protecting, and self-adapting. More ambitiously, it is hypothesized that metacognitive awareness may be one of the keys to developing truly intelligent artificial systems. DARPA's recent Cognitive Information Processing Technology initiative, for instance, foregrounds reflection (along with reaction and deliberation) as one of the three pillars required for flexible, robust AI systems.

On the other side of the coin, it has also been established that metacognition can actually interfere with performance. Metacognition is no panacea, and therefore one of the issues that require further inquiry is the scope and limits of its usefulness.

Content and Comportment: On Embodiment and the Epistemic Availability of the World. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
  Abstract: Content and Comportment argues that the answer to some long-standing questions in epistemology and metaphysics lies in taking up the neglected question of the role of our bodily activity in establishing connections between representational states--knowledge and belief in particular--and their objects in the world. It takes up these ideas from both current mainstream analytic philosophy--Frege, Dummett, Davidson, Evans--and from mainstream continental work--Heidegger and his commentators and critics.

The Incorporated Self: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Embodiment. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson, ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).
  Abstract: The Incorporated Self demonstrates that although embodiment has long been a central concern of the theoretical humanities, its potential to alter epistemology and open up new areas of dualistic inquiry has not been pursued far enough. This anthology collects the the works of scholars from a broad range of disciplines, each examining the nature of the body and the necessity of embodiment to the human experience--for our self awareness, our sense of identity, and the workings of the mind.

 

Journal Articles / Book Chapters

Active logic semantics for a single agent in a static world. Michael L. Anderson, Walid Gomaa, John Grant and Don Perlis. Artificial Intelligence, in press.
  Abstract: For some time we have been developing, and have had significant practical success with, a time-sensitive, contradiction-tolerant logical reasoning engine called the active logic machine (ALMA). The current paper details a semantics for a general version of the underlying logical formalism, active logic. Central to active logic are special rules controlling the inheritance of beliefs in general (and of beliefs about the current time in particular), very tight controls on what can be derived from direct contradictions (P &￢P), and mechanisms allowing an agent to represent and reason about its own beliefs and past reasoning. Furthermore, inspired by the notion that until an agent notices that a set of beliefs is contradictory, that set seems consistent (and the agent therefore reasons with it as if it were consistent), we introduce an “apperception function” that represents an agent’s limited awareness of its own beliefs, and serves to modify inconsistent belief sets so as to yield consistent sets. Using these ideas, we introduce a new definition of logical consequence in the context of active logic, as well as a new definition of soundness such that, when reasoning with consistent premises, all classically sound rules remain sound in our new sense. However, not everything that is classically sound remains sound in our sense, for by classical definitions, all rules with contradictory premises are vacuously sound, whereas in active logic not everything follows from a contradiction.

Evolution, embodiment and the nature of the mind. Michael L. Anderson. In: B. Hardy-Vallee & N. Payette, eds. Beyond the brain: embodied, situated & distributed cognition. (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar's Press), in press.
  Abstract: In this article, I do three main things:

1. First, I introduce an approach to the mind motivated primarily by evolutionary considerations. I do that by laying out four principles for the study of the mind from an evolutionary perspective, and four predictions that they suggest. This evolutionary perspective is completely compatible with, although broader than, the embodied cognition approach.

2. Then I look at one prediction in depth, the idea that the brain evolved by exaptation--reusing exiting functional units, and combining them in novel ways to generate new cognitive capacities.

3. Finally, I try to lay out some of the implications, both of the in-depth example, and of the more general approach.

Content and action: The guidance theory of representation. Michael L. Anderson, Gregg Rosenberg. In: D. Smith (ed) Evolutionary Biology and the Central Problems of Cognitive Science, a special issue of Journal of Mind and Behavior, in press.
  Abstract: The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. The guidance theory offers a way of fixing representational content that gives the causal and evolutionary history of the subject only an indirect (non-necessary) role, and an account of representational error, based on failure of action, that does not rely on any such notions as proper functions, ideal conditions, or normal circumstances. Moreover, because the notion of error is defined in terms of failure of action, the guidance theory meets the “meta-epistemological requirement” that representational error should be potentially detectable by the representing system itself. In this essay, we offer a brief account of the biological origins of representation, a formal characterization of the guidance theory, some examples of its use, and show how the guidance theory handles some traditional problem cases for representation: the problems of error and of representation of fictional and abstract entities. Being both representational and action-grounded, the guidance theory may provide some common ground between embodied and cognitivist approaches to the study of the mind.

A self-help guide for autonomous systems. Michael L. Anderson, Scott Fults, Darsana P. Josyula, Tim Oates, Don Perlis, Matt D. Schmill, and Shomir Wilson. AI Magazine, in press.
  Abstract: When things go badly, we notice that something is amiss, figure out what went wrong and why, and attempt to repair the problem. Artificial systems depend on their human designers to program in responses to every eventuality and therefore typically don’t even notice when things go wrong, following their programming over the proverbial, and in some cases literal, cliff. This article describes our work on the Meta-Cognitive Loop, a domain-general approach to giving artificial systems the ability to notice, assess, and repair problems. The goal is to make artificial systems more robust.

Massive redeployment, exaptation, and the functional integration of cognitive operations. Michael L. Anderson. Synthese, 159(3): 329-345.
  Abstract: The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components-originally developed to serve some specific purpose-were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs. If the evolution of cognition was indeed driven by such exaptation, then we should be able to make some specific empirical predictions regarding the resulting functional topography of the brain. This essay discusses three such predictions, and some of the evidence supporting them. Then, using this account as a background, the essay considers the implications of these findings for an account of the functional integration of cognitive operations. For instance, MRH suggests that in order to determine the functional role of a given brain area it is necessary to consider its participation across multiple task categories, and not just focus on one, as has been the typical practice in cognitive neuroscience. This change of methodology will motivate (even perhaps necessitate) the development of a new, domain-neutral vocabulary for characterizing the contribution of individual brain areas to larger functional complexes, and direct particular attention to the question of how these various area roles are integrated and coordinated to result in the observed cognitive effect. Finally, the details of the mix of cognitive functions a given area supports should tell us something interesting not just about the likely computational role of that area, but about the nature of and relations between the cognitive functions themselves. For instance, growing evidence of the role of "motor" areas like M1, SMA and PMC in language processing, and of "language" areas like Broca's area in motor control, offers the possibility for significantly reconceptualizing the nature both of language and of motor control.

A review of recent research in reasoning and metareasoning. Michael L. Anderson, Tim Oates. AI Magazine, 28(1): 7-16, 2007. Article featured on the cover of AI Magazine!
  Abstract: Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the use of metacognition in intelligent systems. This essay is part of a small section meant to give interested researchers an overview and sampling of the kinds of work currently being pursued in this broad area. The current essay offers a review of recent research in two main topic areas: the monitoring and control of reasoning (metareasoning) and the monitoring and control of learning (metalearning).

Evolution of cognitive function via redeployment of brain areas. Michael L. Anderson. The Neuroscientist, 13(1): 13-21, 2007.
  Abstract: The creative re-use of existing neural components may have played a significant role in the evolutionary development of cognition. There are obvious evolutionary advantages to such redeployment, and the data presented here confirm three important empirical predictions of this account of the development of cognition: (1) a typical brain area will be utilized by many cognitive functions in diverse task categories, (2) evolutionarily older brain areas will be deployed in more cognitive functions and (3) more recent cognitive functions will utilize more, and more widely scattered brain areas. These findings have implications not just for our understanding of the evolutionary origins of cognitive function, but also for the practice of both clinical and experimental neuroscience.

The massive redeployment hypothesis and the functional topography of the brain. Michael L. Anderson. Philosophical Psychology, 21(2): 143-174, 2007.
  Abstract: This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by three case studies of redeployment, and compared and contrasted with other theories of the localization of function.

How to study the mind: An introduction to embodied cognition. Michael L. Anderson. In F.Santoianni and C. Sabatano, eds. Brain Development in Learning Environments: Embodied and Perceptual Advancements , Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007.
  Abstract: Embodied Cognition (EC) is a comprehensive approach to, and framework for, the study of the mind. EC treats cognition as a coordinated set of tools evolved by organisms for coping with their environments. Each of the key terms in this characterization-tool, evolved, organism, coping, and environment-has a special significance for understanding the mind that is discussed in this article.

The metacognitive loop I: Enhancing reinforcement learning with metacognitive monitoring and control for improved perturbation tolerance (preprint, published version). Michael L. Anderson, Tim Oates, Waiyian Chong and Don Perlis Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 18(3): 387-411, 2006.
  Abstract: Maintaining adequate performance in dynamic and uncertain settings has been a perennial stumbling-block for intelligent systems. Nevertheless, any system intended for real-world deployment must be able to accommodate unexpected change--that is, it must be perturbation-tolerant. We have found that meta-cognitive monitoring and control--the ability of a system to self-monitor its own decision-making processes and ongoing performance, and to make targeted changes to its beliefs and action-determining components--can play an important role in helping intelligent systems cope with the perturbations that are the inevitable result of real-world deployment. In this paper we present the results of several experiments demonstrating the efficacy of metacognition in improving the perturbation tolerance of reinforcement learners, and discuss a general theory of metacognitive monitoring and control, in a form we call the metacognitive loop (MCL)

Cognitive science and epistemic openness (preprint, published version). Michael L. Anderson. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5(2): 125-154, 2006.
  Abstract: Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism.

The roots of self-awareness. (preprint, published version) Michael L. Anderson and Don Perlis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(3): 297-333, 2005.
  Abstract: In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account-by way of suggestions for how to build a genuinely self-referring artificial agent-and a biological account, via a discussion of the role of somatoception in supporting and structuring self-awareness more generally. Central to the account is a discussion of the necessary motivational properties of self-representing mental tokens, in light of which we offer a novel definition of self-representation. We also discuss the role of such tokens in organizing self-specifying information, which leads to a naturalized restatement of the guarantee that introspective awareness is immune to error due to mis-identification of the subject.

Logic, self-awareness and self-improvement: The metacognitive loop and the problem of brittleness. (preprint, published version) Michael L. Anderson and Donald R. Perlis. Journal of Logic and Computation, 15(1), 2005. The #1 most read article from Journal of Logic and Computation for 2005; top 5 for 2006!
  Abstract: This essay describes a general approach to building perturbation-tolerant autonomous systems, based on the conviction that artificial agents should be able notice when something is amiss, assess the anomaly, and guide a solution into place. We call this basic strategy of self-guided learning the metacognitive loop; it involves the system monitoring, reasoning about, and, when necessary, altering its own decision-making components. In this essay, we (a) argue that equipping agents with a metacognitive loop can help to overcome the brittleness problem, (b) detail the metacognitive loop and its relation to our ongoing work on time-sensitive commonsense reasoning, (c) describe specific, implemented systems whose perturbation tolerance was improved by adding a metacognitive loop, and (d) outline both short-term and long-term research agendas.

Embodied cognition: A field guide. Michael L. Anderson. Artificial Intelligence 149(1):91-130, 2003.
An Artificial Intelligence top 10 most downloaded article for 2003; top 25 for 2004 and 2006!
 

Abstract: The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus.

Representations, symbols and embodiment. Michael L. Anderson. Artificial Intelligence 149(1):151-6, 2003.
An Artificial Intelligence top 25 most downloaded article for 2003!
 

Abstract: Response to "Embodied artificial intelligence", a commentary by Ron Chrisley.

Prelinguistic agents will form only egocentric predicates. Michael L. Anderson and Tim Oates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26(3):284-5, 2003. (Commentary on The neural basis of predicate-argument structure by James Hurford)
  Abstract: The representations formed by the ventral and dorsal streams of a prelinguistic agent will tend to be too qualitatively similar to support the distinct roles required by PREDICATE(x) structure. We suggest that the attachment of qualities to objects is not a product of the combination of these separate processing streams, but is instead a part of the processing required in each. In addition, we suggest that the formation of objective predicates is inextricably bound up with the emergence of language itself, and so cannot be cleanly identified with any prelinguistic cognitive capacities.

Symbol systems. Michael L. Anderson and Donald R. Perlis. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (New York: Nature Publishing Group), 2002.
  Abstract: A symbol is a pattern (of physical marks, electromagnetic energy, etc.) which denotes, designates, or otherwise has meaning. The notion that intelligence requires the use and manipulation of symbols, and that humans are therefore symbol systems, has been extremely influential in artificial intelligence. The article has two parts. We begin with a presentation and discussion of the idea of a physical symbol system (PSS), as formulated by Newell and Simon. This notion, and the associated physical symbol system hypothesis (PSSH), were first presented--under somewhat different names--in (Newell and Simon 1972), with later fuller formulations (Newell and Simon 1976, Newell 1980) and still later elaborations (Newell 1990). The second part consists of a discussion of various objections to PSS/PSSH and replies, especially with reference to the themes of symbol grounding, situated cognition, embodiment, and situated robotics.

Representations of dialogue state for domain and task independent meta-dialogue. David Traum, Carl Andersen, Yuan Chong, Darsana Josyula, Michael O'Donovan-Anderson, Yoshi Okamoto, Khemdut Purang and Don Perlis. Electronic Transactions on AI 6, 2002.
  Abstract: We propose a representation of local dialog context motivated by the need to react appropriately to meta-dialogue, such as various sorts of corrections to the sequence of an instruction and response action. Such context includes at least the following aspects: the words and linguistic sturctures uttered, the domain correlates of those linguistic structures, and plans and actions in response. Each of these is needed as part of the context in order to be able to correctly interpret the range of possible corrections. Partitioning knowledge of dialog structure in this way may lead to an ability to represent dialog structure (e.g., in the form of axioms), which can be particularized to the domain, topic and content of the dialog.

The Big Lie: Some thoughts on liberal education. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson. Salon Magazine, January, 1999.
  Abstract: Why students don't respect their own education enough to resist cheating.

Wittgenstein and Rousseau on the context of justification. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson. Philosophy and Social Criticism 22(3):75-92, 1996.
  Abstract: The historical aim of this paper is to reveal some striking similarities in Wittgenstein's treatment of epistemic justification, and Rousseau's treatment of political justification. The theoretical aim is to open up the possibility of an understanding of justification which requires neither the discovery of some fundamental ground for judgment nor the alienation of the judge from the community or practice to be justified. Against the prevailing tradition in which justification occurs by reflectively rooting the practice in question in some unquestioned ground outside of and unaffected by that practice, a process that requires of the judge that her reason be untainted by practical involvements, both thinkers assert that justification can take place only within, being practically engaged with, whatever is to be justified. Indeed, we can go so far as to say for these thinkers that practical involvement is precisely the production of the grounds of legitimacy, and reasoned judgment is possible only from an engaged perspective.

 

Conference Proceedings

Do redeployed finger representations underlie math ability?. Michael L. Anderson, Marcie Penner-Wilger. Member Poster, Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2007.
  Abstract: Finger gnosia is the ability to distinguish, without visual feedback, which fingers have been lightly touched. Developmentally, finger gnosia has been found to predict children’s mathematics performance (for a review see Penner-Wilger et al., 2007). The question of why finger gnosia and math are related is an issue of debate. 
Our purpose in this poster is to (1) outline a novel hypothesis explaining the observed correlation, (2) point out some evidence in support of the hypothesis, and (3) suggest some further empirical predictions of the hypothesis.

Massive redeployment and the evolution of cognition. Michael L. Anderson. Publication-based talk, Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2007.
  Abstract: The creative re-use of existing neural components may have played a significant role in the evolutionary development of cognition. There are obvious evolutionary advantages to such redeployment, and the data presented here confirm three important empirical predictions of this account of the development of cognition: (1) a typical brain area will be utilized by many cognitive functions in diverse task categories, (2) evolutionarily older brain areas will be deployed in more cognitive functions and (3) more recent cognitive functions will utilize more, and more widely scattered brain areas. These findings have implications not just for our understanding of the evolutionary origins of cognitive function, but also for the practice of both clinical and experimental neuroscience.

Evidence for massive redeployment of brain areas in cognitive functions. Michael L. Anderson. Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2006.
  Abstract: This essay discusses evidence for the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by case studies of redeployment, as well as an empirical review of 135 brain imaging experiments.

On the types, frequency, uses and characteristics of meta-language in conversation. Michael L. Anderson, Bryant Lee, Jon Go, Shuda Li, Ben Sutandio and LuoYan Zhou. Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2006.
  Abstract: Human dialog is a highly collaborative and interactive process, that includes the ability to talk about the dialog itself and its linguistic constituents, and to use meta-linguistic interactions to help coordinate the ongoing conversation. However, very little is known about the frequency and conditions under which people resort to meta-language, its range of uses, and any characteristics that may be useful to its automated identification. This paper presents the results of a corpus study in which a markup scheme for meta-language was applied to a sub-set of the British National Corpus. The corpus study made it possible to demonstrate that sentences containing meta-language show a high degree of correlation with instances of dialog management, and that automated detection of meta-language should be feasible, based on word-frequency analysis.

On the reasoning of real-world agents: Toward a semantics for active logic. Michael L. Anderson Walid Gomaa, John Grant and Don Perlis. Proceedings of the 7th Annual Symposium on the Logical Formalization of Commonsense Reasoning, Dresden University Technical Report (ISSN 1430-211X), 2005.
  Abstract: For some time we have been developing, and have had significant practical success with, a time-sensitive, contradiction-tolerant logical reasoning engine called active logic. The current paper details a restricted semantics for active logic. Central to active logic are special rules controlling the inheritance of beliefs in general, and beliefs about the current time in particular, very tight controls on what can be derived from direct contradictions (P & -P), and mechanisms allowing an agent to represent and reason about its own beliefs and past reasoning. Furthermore, inspired by the notion that until an agent notices that a set of beliefs is contradictory, that set seems consistent (and the agent therefore reasons with it as if it were consistent), we introduce a "perception function'' that represents an agent's limited awareness of (the consequences of) its own beliefs, and serves to modify inconsistent belief sets so as to yield consistent sets. Based on these ideas, this paper introduces a new definition of model and of logical consequence, as well as a new definition of soundness such that, when reasoning with consistent premises, all classically sound rules are sound for active logic. However, not everything that is classically sound remains sound in our sense, for by classical definitions, all rules with contradictory premises are vacuously sound, whereas in active logic not everything follows from a contradiction.

Metacognition for dropping and reconsidering intentions. Darsana Josyula, Michael L. Anderson, and Don Perlis. Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium on Metacognition in Computation, 2005.
  Abstract: In this paper, we present an approach for dropping and reconsidering intentions, wherein concurrent actions and results are allowed, in the framework of the time-sensitive and contradiction-tolerant active logic. In this approach, a metacognitive process strives to dynamically mark intentions as achievable, unachievable or achieved, drop futile or achieved intentions and create alternative intentions for currently unachievable intentions when possible. Since, this process runs concurrently (and shares resources) with the cognitive activities of the agent, the amount of resources available for the process depends on real-time conditions. Therefore, when and whether intentions are dropped or reconsidered depends on the conditions and resources available at run-time.

A brief introduction to the guidance theory of representation. Gregg Rosenberg and Michael L. Anderson. Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2004.
  Abstract: Recent trends in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science can be fruitfully characterized as part of the ongoing attempt to come to grips with the very idea of homo sapiens--an intelligent, evolved, biological agent--and its signature contribution is the emergence of a philosophical anthropology which, contra Descartes and his thinking thing, instead puts doing at the center of human being. Applying this agency-oriented line of thinking to the problem of representation, this paper introduces the Guidance Theory, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. We offer a brief account of the motivation for the theory, and a formal characterization.

Specification of a test environment and performance measures for perturbation-tolerant cognitive agents. Michael L. Anderson. Proceedings of the AAAI Workshop on Intelligent Agent Architectures, 2004.
  Abstract: In this paper I propose a flexible method of characterizing a test environment such that its environmental complexity, information density, variability and volatility can be easily measured. This allows one to determine the task performance of a cognitive agent as a function of such measures, and therefore permits derivative measures of the perturbation tolerance of cognitive agents--that is, their ability to cope with a complex and changing environment.

Active Logic for more effective human-computer interaction and other commonsense applications. Michael L. Anderson, Darsana Josyula, Khemdut Purang and Don Perlis. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning, Workshop on Empirically Successful First Order Reasoning, 2004.
  Abstract: The demands of real-time commonsense reasoning---as evidenced for example in the pragmatics of human-computer dialog---put stringent requirements on the underlying logic, including those of (i) perturbation tolerance, (ii) contradiction tolerance and (iii) time situatedness. Active logic is an attempt to meet all of these needs. In this paper we present this work and its application to natural language dialog via time-sensitive meta-reasoning. We illustrate this with a description of ALFRED, a cooperative natural language interface to multiple task-oriented domains.

Empirical results for the use of meta-language in dialog management.. Michael L. Anderson and Bryant Lee. Member Poster, Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2004
  Abstract: As is well known, dialog partners manage the uncertainty inherent in conversation by continually providing and eliciting feedback, monitoring their own comprehension and the apparent comprehension of their dialog partner, and initiating repairs as needed. Given the nature of such monitoring and repair, one might reasonably hypothesize that a good portion of the utterances involved in dialog management employ meta-language. But while there has been a great deal of work on the specific topic of dialog management, and it is widely (if often tacitly) accepted that meta-language is frequently involved, there has been no work specifically investigating and quantifying the role of meta-language in dialog management. Thus, this small study investigated the correlation between meta-language and dialog management utterances in three dialog files of the British National Corpus (BNC).

Talking to Computers. Michael L. Anderson, Darsana Josyula and Don Perlis. Proceedings of the Workshop on Mixed Initiative Intelligent Systems, IJCAI-2003.
  Abstract: Our broad claim is that time-sensitive metareasoning can enhance the ability of natural language HCI systems to converse with human interlocutors, by giving these systems both the time-awareness and meta-linguistic skills (including especially the ability to recognize and repair dialog problems, by learning if need be) which appear to be necessary for free, flexible, and natural conversation. We illustrate this enhancement with a desciption of our ongoing work in cooperative natural language HCI systems.

Toward task-oriented, domain independent conversational adequacy. Darsana Josyula, Michael L. Anderson and Don Perlis. Intelligent System Demonstrations, Proceedings of IJCAI, 2003.
  Abstract: A description of ALFRED, our natural-language HCI system, which can use and understand meta-language, and acts as an interface between the user and a task-oriented system, providing a bed for dialog correction and repair.

Time Situated Agency: Active Logic and Intention Formation. Michael L. Anderson, Darsana Josyula, Yoshi Okamoto, and Don Perlis. Proceedings of the Cognitive Agents Workshop, German Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2002.
  Abstract: In recent years, embodied cognitive agents have become a central research focus in Cognitive Science. We suggest that there are at least three aspects of embodiment---physical, social and temporal---which must be treated simultaneously to make possible a realistic implementation of agency. In this paper we detail the ways in which attention to the temporal embodiment of a cognitive agent (perhaps the most neglected aspect of embodiment) can enhance the ability of an agent to act in the world, both in itself, and also by supporting more robust integrations with the physical and social world.

The Use-Mention Distinction and its Importance to HCI. Michael L. Anderson, Yoshi Okamoto, Darsana Josyula, and Don Perlis. Proceedings of EDILOG: Sixth Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialog, 2002.
  Abstract: In this paper we contend that the ability to engage in meta-dialog is necessary for free and flexible conversation. Central to the possibility of meta-dialog is the ability to recognize and negaotiate the distinction between the use and mention of a word. The paper surveys existing theoretical approaches to the use-mention distinction, and briefly describes some of our ongoing efforts to implement a system which represents the use-mention distinction in the service of simple meta-dialog.

Seven Days in the Life of a Robotic Agent. Waiyian Chong, Michael O'Donovan-Anderson, Yoshi Okamoto and Don Perlis. Proceedings of the GSFC/JPL Workshop on Radical Agent Concepts, 2002.
  Abstract: Bootstrapping is a widely employed technique in the process of building highly complex systems such as microprocessors, language compilers, and computer operating systems. It could play an even more prominent role in the creation of computation systems capable of supporting intelligent agent behaviors because of the even higher level of complexity. The prospect of a self-bootstrapping, self-improving intelligent system has motivated various fields of research in machine learning. However, a robust, generalizable methodology of machine learning is yet to be found; there are still a lot of learning behaviors that no existing learning techniqueer and flexibility (but is slow) and the latter is very fast but hard to adapt to new situations. We will explore the possibilities of using reflection and continual computation towards this end.

Handling Uncertainty with Active Logic. M. Anderson, M. Bhatia, P. Chi, W. Chong, D. Josyula, Y. Okamoto, D. Perlis and K. Purang. Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium, 2001
  Abstract: Reasoning in a complex and dynamic world requires considerable flexibility on the part of the reasoner; flexibility to apply -- in the right circumstances -- the right tools (e.g. probabilities, defaults, metareasoning, belief revision, contradiction-resolution, and so on). A formalism that has been developed with this purpose in mind is that of active logic. Active logic is combines inference rules with a constantly evolving measure of time (a 'now') that itself can be referenced in those rules.

 

Invited Talks

Circuit sharing for action-grounded meaning. Michael L. Anderson. Symposium on Language and Robotics, University of Aveiro, Portugal, 2007.
  Abstract: In this talk I will review some of the interesting behavioral evidence that human language and motor systems are deeply intertwined—such as the action sentence compatibility effect; linguistic and spatio-motor disfluency effects; and various conceptual-motor simulation theories .  I will then try to place these findings in the context of a novel theory of the evolution and organization of the human cortex, the massive redeployment hypothesis, which suggests that the brain evolved via the continual redeployment of existing neural circuits, integrating them into new functional complexes, on roughly the model of component re-use in software engineering.  My suggestion will be that the best way to understand the apparent interrelations between language and motor control is in terms of the activation of shared brain regions not due to real-time perceptual-motor simulations of conceptual structures, but rather due to the sharing of the same neural circuits by different functional complexes.  This, I will argue, has significant implications for our understanding of both motor control and of language, and for what it might take to build “meaning machines”, implications somewhat different from those that have generally been taken to follow from the prevailing simulation-based theories.

The Massive Redeployment Hypothesis and the functional organization of the cortex. Michael L. Anderson. University of Murcia, Spain, 2007.
  Abstract: The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional organization of the human cortex, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components—originally developed to serve some specific purpose—were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs. If the evolution of cognition was indeed driven by such exaptation, then we should be able to make some specific empirical predictions regarding the resulting functional topography of the brain. This talk discusses four such predictions, and some of the evidence supporting them.

Evolution, embodiment, and the nature of the mind: a field guide to embodied cognition. Michael L. Anderson. University of Murcia, Spain, 2007.
  Abstract: Embodied Cognition (EC) is a comprehensive approach to, and framework for, the study of the mind. EC treats cognition as a coordinated set of tools evolved by organisms for coping with their environments. Each of the key terms in this characterization—tool, evolved, organism, coping, and environment—has a special significance for understanding the mind that is discussed in this talk.

Of special interest to EC is the way in which organisms take advantage of--and even alter--stable features of their environments for cognitive ends. Consider, for a simple example, using pencil and paper to offload and store the results of intermediate steps in a longer mathematical calculation. In this way, people use the world to do something cognitive (remember numbers) that might otherwise be done "in the head".

One possible implication of this line of thinking that will be raised in the talk is whether we should think of the mind not as something "in the head" (or in the brain), but rather as something that extends into and incorporates parts of the environment.

Action-grounded cognition: Evolution, embodiment, and the nature of the mind. Michael L. Anderson. Keynote address, Cognitio conference for young researchers in cognitive science, University of Quebec at Montreal, August 2006.
  Abstract: Action-grounded cognition combines the strengths of cognitivist and embodied/situated approaches to the mind, by commandeering the overall structure of the cognitivist approach, that is, rule-based transforms of representations, but replacing these abstract elements with their biologically-grounded counterparts. In this model of the mind, abstract symbols are replaced with action-grounded representations defined in terms of the situated perceptual-motor abilities of the agent, and abstract rules are replaced with specialized motor-based transforms (i.e. operations on affordances). This approach allows for both the flexibility of compositional, symbol-based approaches to cognition, and the physical grounding that is the strength of the perception-to-action transducer approaches.

Consider, for instance, that (just as would be predicted by an evolutionary account of cognition) there is strong empirical evidence for the involvement of the motor-control system in supporting higher-order cognition such as language understanding. How should this be understood? Action-grounded cognition treats motor control in terms of affordance processing. Since affordances, the perceived availability of objects for certain kinds of interaction, aren't just motor programs, but interpretations of the environment, this opens the possibility that the motor control system is also, already, a primitive meaning processor. This would offer one explanation for how it is even possible to leverage motor control to support and constrain higher-order processes like language understanding.

In addition to presenting such examples of action-grounded cognition, this talk will discuss an account of the functional structure of the brain that sheds light on the nature of cognition and its evolutionary development.

Internal supports for external symbol grounding. Michael L. Anderson. External Symbol Grounding Workshop, University of Plymouth, 2006.
  Abstract: In this talk, I will try to present my work on the bodily and behavioral roots of intentionality in terms useful to the broader project of situating symbol grounding in social/cultural context. Topics to be discussed include an action-grounded theory of mental representation, the bodily basis of intersubjective interpretation, the role of action in grounding the normativity of content, and an account of the functional structure of the brain that supports these various capacities. I will also say a few words about robotic/AI implementations of action-grounded theories of representation.

The future of the extended mind: on the temporal orientation of cognition. Michael L. Anderson and Tony Chemero. The Extended Mind 2: Just When You Thought It Was Safe To Go Back in The Head. University of Hertfordshire, July 2006.
  Abstract: Whether or not the cognition is extended ultimately depends on what cognition is for. We begin this essay with some thoughts on this general topic--picking up on an un-remarked aspect of Clark & Chalmers' original 1998 essay--by distinguishing between past- and future-oriented theories of cognition and content. As is well known, many theories individuate content in terms of causal history; cognition is to this extent oriented toward and determined by the past. We argue that this is one of the undesirable legacies from picture theories of content (the other being "detection" theories of representation), and ought to be given up. In contrast, theories of cognition that take the primary function of cognition to be the guidance of action (such as those advocated by Clark, Beer, Bickhard, etc.) are naturally future- oriented, and suggest and support future-oriented, action-grounded theories of content. We discuss some key characteristics of future- oriented theories of cognition and content, and argue that, in general, future-oriented theories support the thesis of extended cognition.

Having laid out what we take to be an attractive general orientation for a theory of cognition and content, we turn to some specific criticisms of the extended cognition thesis (e.g. Adams & Aizawa 2001 and Rupert 2004) that are at least partly illuminated (and made easier to address) by our general considerations. Specifically, we will show that A&A's and Rupert's arguments turn on taking cognition to be a sort of thing that no one should take cognition to be.

Finally, we address whether the considerations above support the extension of cognition along temporal and not just spatial dimensions.

Cognitive science and epistemic openness. Michael L. Anderson. University of Maryland, Cognitive Psychology Seminar Series, September 2005.
  Abstract: The orthodox view of the nature of perception involves a number of distinct, implicit assumptions, all of which are highly questionable. Relying on recent work in cognitive science, on physiological descriptions of the different functional structures of the sense organs and the sensory processing pathways, as well as on phenomenological considerations, I shall argue: (a) that although the orthodox view may accurately characterize one epistemically relevant mode of openness to the world, human beings in fact have many; (b) that each operates according to its own logic and for its particular purposes; (c) that our physical intervention in the world is among the most important of these modes of epistemic openness; and (d) that each mode produces or contributes to some (distinct) element of our beliefs about the world (which are not necessarily all centrally represented, explicit, or conscious). This "multiple modes theory" of epistemic openness offers stronger grounding for realism than the orthodox view.

An introduction to the guidance theory of representation. Michael L. Anderson. Interactivism Summer Institute, September 2005.
  Abstract: As part of the ongoing attempt to fully naturalize the concept of human being--and, more specifically, to re-center it around the notion of agency--this essay discusses an approach to defining the content of representations in terms ultimately derived from their central, evolved function of providing guidance for action. This "guidance theory" of representation is discussed in the context of, and evaluated with respect to, two other biologically inspired theories of representation: Dan Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation and Ruth Millikan's biosemantics.

The metacognitive loop and the problem of brittleness. Michael L. Anderson. BBN Technologies, May 2005.
  Abstract: This talk describes a general approach to building perturbation-tolerant autonomous systems, based on the conviction that artificial agents should be able notice when something is amiss, assess the anomaly, and guide a solution into place. We call this basic strategy of self-guided learning the metacognitive loop; it involves the system monitoring, reasoning about, and, when necessary, altering its own decision-making components. In this talk, I will (a) argue that equipping agents with a metacognitive loop can help to overcome the brittleness problem, (b) detail the metacognitive loop and its relation to our ongoing work on time-sensitive commonsense reasoning, (c) describe specific, implemented systems whose perturbation tolerance was improved by adding a metacognitive loop, and (d) outline both short-term and long-term research agendas.

The multiple-modes theory of epistemic access: Or, why Johnson's refutation of Berkeley was right, after all. Michael L. Anderson. Lehigh University, March 2005.
  Abstract: The orthodox view of the nature of perception involves a number of distinct, implicit assumptions, all of which are highly questionable. Relying on recent work in cognitive science, on physiological descriptions of the different functional structures of the sense organs and the sensory processing pathways, as well as on phenomenological considerations, I shall argue: (a) that although the orthodox view may accurately characterize one epistemically relevant mode of openness to the world, human beings in fact have many; (b) that each operates according to its own logic and for its particular purposeness of typical AI systems.

How bodies matter to minds. Michael L. Anderson. University of Maryland, Baltimore County, March 2003.
  Abstract: In this talk I will discuss the theoretical background of the "embodied" view of cognition, and its implications for central AI topics like perception, planning, and reasoning. In addition, I will present a series of examples in which illustrate the effect or influence of the body on (or the role of bodily activity in) cognition; we will discuss the effect of both physiology and bodily activity on conceptual content, the part played by habitual or stereotyped behaviors in determining the rules of reasoning, and the role of the body in various problem-solving behaviors. The central aim will be to begin to see the range of ways in which the body matters to the mind.

Metareasoning for conversational adequacy. Michael L. Anderson. DFKI (Deutsches Forschungszentrum fur Kunstliche Intelligenz), September 2002.
  Abstract: We use the term conversational adequacy to denote the ability to engage in free and flexible conversation. It is our contention that the ability to engage in meta-dialog is necessary for conversational adequacy, and more importantly, that a robust meta-dialogic ability can make up for weaknesses in other areas of linguistic ability. For this reason, we think that time spent understanding and implementing meta-dialog in natural language HCI systems will be well rewarded; the ability to engage in even simple meta-dialog can be used to fruitfully enhance the performance of interactive systems, even those having relatively limited speech recognition and language processing abilities.

Embodied cognition: Threads and overview. Michael L. Anderson.University of Maryland, LAISEM, February 2002;  University of Memphis, Embodied Cognition Seminar, January 2002.
  Abstract: This talk surveys some central themes and insights from the large and diverse research area known as embodied, or situated cognition. Included will be discussions of behavior-based robotics, conceptual blending, phenomenologically inspired approaches to AI, the nature of representation, etc.

Being and Becoming in the Iliad. Michael L. Anderson. Maine Humanities Council, Summer Classics Program, 1998. Adapted from The Iliad and the Meaning of Life, in preparation.
  Abstract: Something of a sequel to "Did Achilles commit suicide?", this aligns the confrontation between Hector and Achilles with the Iliad's larger themes of life, death and change.

Did Achilles commit suicide? Michael L. Anderson. St. John's College, Annapolis, September 1997.
  Abstract: This essay is guided by a simple, if broad, question: "Why does the poem end with Hector's funeral, when it begins with Achilles' wrath?" I detail the symbolic unification of Hector and Achilles in the Iliad, and argue that we should interpret Achilles' slaying of Hector as a kind of self-annihilation.

Freedom and determinism with Aristotle. Michael L. Anderson.St. John's College, Annapolis, May 1997.
  Abstract: This paper is engaged in two things at once. It is first of all a way of asking questions of real human significance--questions like "What is autonomy?"; "What sort of freedom do we have, or should we strive for?"; "When is a person morally responsible for her actions?"--and it is also a way of asking Aristotle these same questions, of getting him to help with our own inquiry. In the end I argue that responsibility rests not on undetermined choice, but on the capacity of free agents to express their character in appropriate response to the situations of the world; to see the world, through character, as beckoning for particular responses.

 

Conference Talks

Implications of the massive redeployment hypothesis for our understanding of the nature of cognitive functions. Michael L. Anderson. Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2007.
  Abstract: The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components—originally developed to serve some specific purpose—were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs, with the result that a typical brain area supports many different functions in diverse cognitive domains. If this is the right sort of story, then we should be able to make some specific empirical predictions regarding the resulting functional topography of the brain. This essay discusses three such predictions, some of the evidence supporting them, and the implications of these findings for understanding the nature of cognitive functions and domains. For instance, MRH suggests that to determine the functional role of a given brain area it is necessary to consider its participation across multiple task categories, and not just focus on one, as has been the typical practice. This change of methodology may necessitate and facilitate the development of a task-neutral vocabulary (presumably computational rather than cognitive) for describing the functional contributions of individual brain areas. Moreover, the details of the mix of cognitive functions a given area supports will tell us something interesting not just about the likely computational role of that area, but about the nature of and relations between the cognitive functions themselves. For instance, growing evidence of the role of “motor” areas like M1, SMA and PMC in language processing, and of “language” areas like Broca’s area in motor control, offers the possibility for significantly reconceptualizing the nature both of language and of motor control.

The massive redeployment hypothesis and the functional structure of the brain. Michael L. Anderson. Conference of the British Society for Philosophy of Science, 2006.
  Abstract: This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH), an account of the functional organization of the brain that offers a middle ground between strict localization and holism. The defense of MRH includes both theoretical and empirical considerations.

The localization-holism debate has generally been presented in terms of a choice between whether cognitive functions are typically instantiated by a few and closely grouped neural participants, or by many and widely distributed ones. Yet this is not a useful distinction between localization and holism, for localization is perfectly compatible with the fact that cognitive functions typically have many and widely distributed participants (Mundale 2002). Thus I explicitly identify two other issues: (1) are brain areas that support a given function largely dedicated to--that is, are they not just necessary participants, but also exclusive participants in--the cognitive function(s) in question?; and (2), when a brain area participates in more than one cognitive function, is it doing the same thing in each case? The believer in localization answers "yes" to both questions (although question 2 does not really arise), whereas the holist answers "no".

In contrast both to both localization and holism, a redeployment hypothesis splits the difference, answering "no" to question 1, and "yes" to question 2. That is, a redeployment hypothesis claims that parts of the brain are specialized, in that they do the same thing each time they are activated. However, the thing that they do--the function they compute or transformation they effect--does not line up with any specific cognitive function. Rather, brain areas must work in concert with other areas to do anything interesting, and are generally deployed in many different functional complexes, which do many different (interesting) things.

Evidence for massive redeployment of brain areas in cognitive functions. Michael L. Anderson. Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2006.
  Abstract: This talk introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH), an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous cognitive functions.  MRH offers a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. MRH is supported by some case studies of redeployment, and an empirical review of 135 imaging experiments.

 The guidance theory of representation: a brief introduction. Michael L. Anderson and Gregg Rosenberg. Neurophilosophy: The state of the art, CalTech, 2005.
  Abstract: Recent trends in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science can be fruitfully characterized as part of the ongoing attempt to come to grips with the very idea of homo sapiens-an intelligent, evolved, biological agent-and its signature contribution is the emergence of a philosophical anthropology which, contra Descartes and his thinking thing, instead puts doing at the center of human being. Applying this agency-oriented line of thinking to the problem of representation, this talk introduces the guidance theory, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. We offer a brief account of the motivation for the theory, and a formal characterization.

 Meta-language for dialog management. Michael L. Anderson and Bryant Lee. 16th Annual Winter Conference on Discourse, Text, and Cognition, 2005.
  Abstract: There has been a great deal of work on the topic of dialog management, and it is widely (if often tacitly) accepted that meta-language is frequently involved. However, there has been no work specifically investigating and quantifying the role of meta-language in dialog management. This small study investigated the correlation between meta-language and dialog management utterances in three dialog files of the British National Corpus (BNC).

On the types and frequency of meta-language in conversation. Michael L. Anderson, Andrew Fister, Bryant Lee, Luwito Tardia, and Danny Wang. 14th Annual Meeting of the Society for Text and Discourse, 2004.
  Abstract: Human dialog is a highly collaborative and interactive process, which includes the ability to talk about the dialog itself and its linguistic constituents, and to use meta-linguistic interactions to help coordinate the ongoing conversation. However, the frequency and conditions under which people resort to meta-language is not Lee. Member Poster, 26th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2004.

What mindedness is. Michael L. Anderson. Brain Power: 12th Annual Cultural Studies Symposium, Kansas State University, March, 2003.
  Abstract: The picture that cognitive science encourages is of an intelligence that lies less in the individual brain, and more in the dynamic interaction of agents with the wider world. Mindedness emerges as a kind of adaptive integration with one's environment, including especially the social and cultural worlds that are so important to human cognition. Discovering and detailing the particular physical characteristics and environmental integrations that shape and support the various aspects of mindedness is, therefore, the central project of cognitive science. It encompasses questions ranging from the particular influence of physical or neurological structures on the contents of (higher-order) experience; to the simple interactions with the physical environment which aid in calculation, memory, and decision-making; to the more complex case of symbol grounding--of how we give abstract, generally linguistic symbols concrete meaning--something which involves supporting integrations not just with the physical environment, but also, and perhaps especially, with the social world; all the way to the extremely difficult question of how to understand the very formation, in its social and physical context, of subjectivity and self-hood.

Cognitive science and epistemic openness. Michael L. Anderson. Society for Realist/Anti-Realist Discussion, APA Eastern Division, December 2003.
  Abstract: Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism.

Understanding Bodily Knowledge. Michael L. Anderson. Tucson 2002, Towards a Science of Consciousness, April 2002.

  Abstract: This paper situates the claim, found in, e.g., O'Shaughnessy (1980), that bodily awareness is not to be understood on a perceptual model--that we have an unmediated epistemic awareness of the disposition of our limbs, for instance--within two ongoing enquiries in cognitive science. The first concerns the possibility of learning, that is, understanding how experience can be a rational constraint on thinking. More particularly, it is claimed that this faculty of bodily awareness can be used to solve the modern version of the paradox of the learner, according to which it is difficult to see how conceptual change, or learning, can take place. The second concerns the relation between perception and action, and suggests how the notion of a body-schema can be used to help understand the possibility of an affordance (Gibson, 1979), the perceived availability of a given object for, or openness of a situation to, certain actions.

Merleau-Ponty and the fourth dogma of empiricism. Michael L. Anderson. Society for Realist/Anti-Realist Discussion, APA Eastern Division, December 2000.
  Abstract: The fourth dogma of empiricism is the notion that the deliverances of the sense organs constitute our only mode of epistemic access to the world. I argue that if we accept this dogma, we will be unable to avoid the conclusion that the contents of our experience can be attributed only to our conceptual schema, and not to the world. But without epistemic connection, we cannot justify the claim to intentional connection. If we want our thoughts to reach the world, then we must allow that the world can reach our thoughts. I end by pointing to the work of Merleau-Ponty as one example of epistemological thinking without the fourth dogma.

Embodiment and intentionality. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson. Society for Realist/Anti-Realist Discussion, APA Eastern Division, December 1996.

Epistemology and embodiment: Knowing the boundaries of material objects. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson. Society for Realist/Anti-Realist Discussion, APA Eastern Division, December 1995.

Science & Things: On Scientific Method as Embodied Access to the World. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson. Stonehill College, April 1995.

Embodiment and the limits of things. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson. Cornell University, March 1995

Science & things: On scientific method as embodied access to the world. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson. Stonehill College, April 1995.

Wittgenstein and Rousseau on belief justification. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson. Harvard/MIT Philosophy Conference, March 1995.

Is essence essential to modern science?: Thoughts on the Importance of Natural Kinds" Michael L. Anderson. Ninth Annual Graduate Student Conference in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, March 1990.

Science & Things: On Scientific Method as Embodied Access to the World. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson. Stonehill College, April 1995.

 

Book Reviews

A review of Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge, by Gerald Edelman. Teachers College Record, 2008.

Embodied cognition: the teenage years. A review of How the Body Shapes the Mind, by Shaun Gallagher. Philosophical Psychology, 20(1): 127-31, 2007.

Strike while the iron is. A review of Reconstructing the Cognitive World, by Michael Wheeler. Artificial Intelligence 170(18): 1213-17, 2006.

Why is AI so scary? (Multiple book review essay) Artificial Intelligence 169(2): 201-8, 2005.
The #2 most downloaded article from Artificial Intelligence for Q4 2005; top 15 for 2006!

Evan's Varieties of Reference and the Anchoring Problem, Robotics and Autonomous Systems Journal 43(2-3): 189-92, 2003.

Philosophy in the Flesh, by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson The Review of Metaphysics, June 2000.

Socratic Puzzles, by Robert Nozick The Review of Metaphysics, June 1999.

God and the Natural World: Religion and Science in Antebellum America, by Walter H. Conser, Jr. The Journal of the History of Medicine, June 1995.

Genius and Talent, by David A Weiner The Philosopher, April 1994.

Wittgenstein on Words as Instruments, by J.F.M. Hunter The Philosopher, April 1993.

 

Commentaries

Freedom without alienation. Comments on "The Permeable Self: Empathy and the Moral Life" by Patricia Sayre, Wheaton College, IL, October 1994.

Determinism and moral truth. Comments on "Responsible Agency and the Project of Personhood in Aristotle's Ethics" by J. Colin Sample, Yale University, November 1991.

"Descartes' Apperception of Human Life" Comments on "Descartes: Imagination and the Image of Human Life" by Michael McDuffie, Yale University, November 1990.

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