

Pseudorandomness

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Def: The **uniform dist** on $\{0, 1\}^n$ picks each string with prob $\frac{1}{2^n}$.

Pseudorandom generators (PRGs)

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2. Useful for psuedo One Time Pad.
3. The Keyword-shift cipher was a primitive example.

Intro to Formal Definition of PRGs

We define what a PRG is formally using **A Game!**

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Might be on HW. Might be a HS student project :-)

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Can Eve win this game with probability over $\frac{1}{2}$? Discuss.
Depends on how much Computational Power Eve has.

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Prob Eve loses is \leq prob $z \in A$ which is $\frac{2^n}{2^{p(n)}} = \frac{1}{2^{p(n)-n}} < \frac{1}{2}$.

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2. We will allow Eve to use randomization.
3. We will even allow Eve to be right $> \frac{1}{2}$ of the time, but not much bigger.

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1. A function $f : \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is **negligible** if, for every poly p , for large n , $f(n) < \frac{1}{p(n)}$. We use **neg.** **Example** $f(n) = \frac{1}{2^n}$

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2. An algorithm is **Poly Prob Time (PPT)** if there is a randomized alg for it that halts in poly time and has a **neg** prob of error. **Example** Primality.

Formal Definition of PRGs (Finally!)

Def G is a **PRG** if for all **PPT** Eves, there is a **neg function** $\epsilon(n)$ such that

$$\Pr[\text{Eve Wins}] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(n)$$

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But thought to be PRG.

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3. Can **construct** PRGs from weaker assumptions. (We will not do this.)

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4. Alice and Bob use k' for their 1-time pad.

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which is the next lecture.