BILL RECORDED LECTURE

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REVIEW FOR MIDTERM

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SHIFT CIPHER

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The Shift Cipher, Formally

M = {all texts in lowercase English alphabet}
M for Message space.
All arithmetic mod 26.

• Choose uniform $s \in \mathcal{K} = \{0, \dots, 25\}$. \mathcal{K} for Keyspace.

• Encode
$$(m_1 \dots m_t)$$
 as $(m_1 + s \dots m_t + s)$.

• Decode
$$(c_1 \ldots c_t)$$
 as $(c_1 - s \ldots c_t - s)$.

Can verify that correctness holds.

Freq Vectors

Let T be a long text. Length N. May or may not be coded.

Let N_a be the number of a's in T. Let N_b be the number of b's in T.

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The **Freq Vector of** T is

$$\vec{f_T} = \left(\frac{N_a}{N}, \frac{N_b}{N}, \cdots, \frac{N_z}{N}\right)$$

English freq shifted by 0 is $\vec{f_0}$

For $1 \le i \le 25$, English freq shifted by i is $\vec{f_i}$.



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► English freq shifted by 0 is $\vec{f_0}$ ► For $1 \le i \le 25$, English freq shifted by i is $\vec{f_i}$. $\vec{f_0} \cdot \vec{f_0} \sim 0.065$ max_{1≤i≤25} $\vec{f_0} \cdot \vec{f_i} \sim 0.038$ Upshot $\vec{f_0} \cdot \vec{f_0}$ big For $i \in \{1, ..., 25\}$, $\vec{f_0} \cdot \vec{f_i}$ small

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English freq shifted by 0 is $\vec{f_0}$ For 1 < i < 25, English freq shifted by i is $\vec{f_i}$. $\vec{f_0} \cdot \vec{f_0} \sim 0.065$ $\max_{1 \le i \le 25} \vec{f_0} \cdot \vec{f_i} \sim 0.038$ Upshot $\vec{f}_0 \cdot \vec{f}_0$ big For $i \in \{1, ..., 25\}$, $\vec{f_0} \cdot \vec{f_i}$ small **Henceforth** \vec{f}_0 will be denoted \vec{f}_F . E is for English

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We describe a way to tell if a text **Is English** that we will use throughout this course.

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- 1. Input(T) a text
- 2. Compute $\vec{f_T}$, the freq vector for T
- 3. Compute $\vec{f_E} \cdot \vec{f_T}$. If ≈ 0.065 then output YES, else NO

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Note: What if $\vec{f_T} \cdot \vec{f_E} = 0.061$?

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If simple ciphers used, this will never happen.

If **complicated cipher** used, we may use different IS-ENGLISH function.

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For s = 0 to 25

• Create T_s which is T shifted by s.

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 - Create T_s which is T shifted by s.
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Note: No Near Misses. There will not be two values of s that are both close to 0.065.

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- 2. Differnt languages.

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- 2. Differnt languages.
- 3. Different domains (e.g., Credit Card Numbers).

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4. $\Sigma = \{0, \ldots, 9\}$ (e.g, Credit Cards).

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4. $\Sigma = \{0, \ldots, 9\}$ (e.g, Credit Cards).

These all have

- 1. Small key spaces.
- 2. Uneven distribution of symbols.

So can be cracked.

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Eve knows The encryption scheme.

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- Eve knows the alphabet and the language.

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- Eve does not know the key

- Eve knows The encryption scheme.
- Eve knows the alphabet and the language.
- Eve does not know the key
- ▶ The key is chosen at random.

Other Single Letter Ciphers

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Affine Cipher

Def The Affine cipher with *a*, *b*:

1. Encrypt via $x \rightarrow ax + b \pmod{26}$. (*a* has to be rel prime to 26 so that $a^{-1} \pmod{26}$ exists.

2. Decrypt via $x \to a^{-1}(x-b) \pmod{26}$.

Limit on Keys (a, b) must be such that a has an inverse. **Number of** $(a, b) \phi(|\Sigma|) \times |\Sigma|$. **Easily cracked** Only 312 keys. Use **Is-English** for each key.

The Quadratic Cipher

Def The Quadratic cipher with a, b, c: Encrypt via $x \rightarrow ax^2 + bx + c \pmod{26}$.

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The Quadratic Cipher

Def The Quadratic cipher with a, b, c: Encrypt via $x \rightarrow ax^2 + bx + c \pmod{26}$. Does not work and was never used because: **No easy test for Invertibility (depends on def of easy).**

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Def Gen Sub Cipher with perm f on $\{0, \ldots, 25\}$.



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1. Encrypt via $x \to f(x)$.

Def Gen Sub Cipher with perm f on $\{0, \ldots, 25\}$.

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PRO Very Large Key Space: 26!, so brute force not an option.
CON 100 years ago Hard to use, so we will look at alternatives that take a short seed and get a random looking perm.
CON today Crackable. We discuss how later.

 $\Sigma = \{a, ..., k\}$. Key: (jack, 4).



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1. List out the key word and then the remaining letters:

2. Now do Shift 4 on this:

$$| f | g | h | i | j | a | c | k | b | d | e$$

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$$|f|g|h|i|j|a|c|k|b|d|e$$

This is where a, b, c, \ldots go, so:

$$\begin{vmatrix} a & b & c & d & e & f & g & h & i & j & k \\ f & g & h & i & j & a & c & k & b & d & e \end{vmatrix}$$

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1000 years ago

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- 2. Keyword Shift cipher was easy to use and hard to crack since **looked** random..

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Today

- 1. General Sub Student easy to use and easy to crack.
- 2. Keyword Shift cipher is a pedagogical example of a psuedo-random generator.

1000 years ago

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Today

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- 4. Psuedo-random generators are important in modern crypto to use a psuedo-one-time-pad.
- 5. We will see examples of modern psuedo-random generators later in the course.

Terminology: 1-Gram, 2-Gram, 3-Gram

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- 4. One usually talks about the freq of *n*-grams.

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The parameters R and I need to be picked carefully.