# REVIEW FOR MIDTERM PART TWO

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# Vig and One-Time Pad

**Key:** 
$$k = (k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_n)$$
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**Decrypt** Decryption just reverses the process

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1. Standard Vig: Use a longish-sentence. Key is Sentence.

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- 1. Standard Vig: Use a longish-sentence. Key is Sentence.
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- 1. Standard Vig: Use a longish-sentence. Key is Sentence.
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3. One-time pad: Key is random gen sequence.

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2. Try all key lengths of length 1,2,3,... until you hit it.

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1. Separate text T into L streams depending on position mod L.

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Step Two:

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- 2. For each steam try every shift and use **Is English** to determine which shift is correct.
- 3. You now know all shifts for all positions. Decrypt!

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• Gen: choose a uniform key  $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ .

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Correctness:

$$Dec_k(Enc_k(m)) = k \oplus (k \oplus m)$$
$$= (k \oplus k) \oplus m$$
$$= m$$

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- 3. PRO Uncrackable if use truly random bits.
- 4. **CON** Hard to get truly random bits.

## Ways to Get Random-Looking Bits

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### Ways to Get Random-Looking Bits

 Linear Cong Gen Pick x<sub>0</sub>, A, B, M at random and then use: x<sub>0</sub> x<sub>i+1</sub> = Ax<sub>i</sub> + B (mod M) We summarize how to crack VERY BRIEFLY after this slide.

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- 4. We will see better methods later in the course.

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1. Have some word or phrase that you think is there. E.g., **PAKISTAN.** Say its 8 letters.

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**Decode:** Do the same only with  $M^{-1}$ .

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1. Can test if  $M^{-1}$  exists, and if so find it, easily.

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2. Caveat: the linear algebra is over mod 26.

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Takes roughly 26<sup>64</sup> steps.

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The attack in the last slide went through every Matrix. Better Idea: We take life one row at a time. Example:  $3 \times 3$  matrix cipher. Decode Matrix *M*.

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Takes  $8 \times 26^8$  steps.

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#### **Important Lesson**

**Assume:** 26<sup>64</sup> time is big enough to thwart Eve.

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Assume: 26<sup>64</sup> time is big enough to thwart Eve.

- 1. If we think that best Eve can do is  $O(26^{n^2})$  then we take n = 8, so Eve needs  $O(26^{64})$ .
- 2. If we think that best Eve can do is  $O(n26^n)$  then we take n = 80, so Eve needs  $O(80 \times 26^{80})$ .

The  $O(n \times 26^n)$  cracking **does not** show that Matrix Cipher is insecure, but it still is very important: Alice and Bob must increase their parameters. That is already a win since it makes life harder for Alice and Bob.

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- 2. I will later have Kunal or someone else look into more sophisticated **IS-ENGLISH** programs to see if we can make this work.
- 3. Lesson Learned A method to crack a code that looks good on paper may run into difficulties when really tried.

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Above attack on Matrix Cipher is a microcosm of this history. Proofs rely on limiting what Eve can do, and hence do not work if Eve does something else.

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## Upshot



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- 3. We need to better refine our notion of **attack** (we do this later, after midterm).
- 4. We will do this in the next set of slides.

# **Other Ciphers**

 The AutoKey Cipher Use the message itself as the key. We skip details here, but note that could be good if If Eve does not know you are using it. So might be good if Kerckhoff's Principle does not hold.

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- 2. (Another) Book Cipher Alice and Bob agree on a book to be the key. Specify words by page/line/word.

Security Both are crackable, but won't go into that here.

# A Problem with MOST of our Ciphers/Terminology

- 1. Most of our ciphers are deterministic so always code *m* the same way. This leaks information.
- 2. One-Time Pad and Book Ciphers avoid this, but have very long keys.
- 3. The problem of the same message leading to the same ciphertext is called

The NY,NY Problem.

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2.1 Find  $(c_1 - f(r_1), \ldots, c_L - f(r_L))$ .

Security Randomized Shift is crackable, but needs a longer text than ordinary shift. We won't get into that here—Our point is that adding randomization to shift (and other encoding systems) solves the NY,NY problem.

1. Det. Ciphers: Message *M* always maps to the same thing. Boo!

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4. Cracking it takes a much longer text.

# BILL, STOP RECORDING LECTURE!!!!

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