It is impossible for me to reflect on the event of the Holocaust without remembering centuries of Christian theological antagonism toward Judaism—that "teaching of contempt" of which the French historian Jules Isaac spoke so perceptively. The anti-Judaic polemic spewed forth by church thinkers from early New Testamental times seeded the ground for the modern racial ideology we call anti-Semitism. There can be honest disagreement about whether Nazism represents a later, more destructive stage of the basic Christian polemic, or whether the Nazis were in essence pagans who used the adversus Judaeos tradition to rationalize their idolatrous sacrifice of Jews to the gods of blood and soil, but we must not fail to recognize the complicity of Christendom, through its doctrines, leaders and institutions, in the Holocaust. As Raul Hilberg has written,

The missionaries of Christianity had said in effect: You have no right to live among us as Jews. The secular rulers who followed had complained: You have no right to live among us. The German Nazis at last decreed: You have no right to live. . . . The process began with the attempt to drive the Jews into Christianity. The development was continued in order to force the victims into exile. It was finished when the Jews were driven to their deaths. The German Nazis, then, did not discard the past; they built upon it. They did not begin a development; they completed it.¹

I do not intend here to recite the dismal facts of Christian guilt towards Jews and Judaism. What concerns me now is a theological question: What difference does the Holocaust make to Christians in their fundamental beliefs about sin, redemption and Jesus Christ? It could, of course, be argued that it is not Christian faith per se which is to be charged with the sin of anti-Semitism, but rather a host of individuals who, lacking love and derelict in their duty as Christians, proved faithless to their lord Jesus Christ. But this argument can be taken only so far. For if Christianity possesses integrity-of-faith, an inner unity of belief and practice, then the
Christian precisely as Christian is morally and intellectually obligated to answer the question, What difference does the Holocaust make to faith in Jesus Christ? When in the first century Paul carried the message of Jesus Christ out of Jerusalem to the gentile peoples of Asia Minor, he as a Jew was convinced of its truth, and he believed that if his fellow Jews did not then accept its truth, they would eventually do so. Now, almost 2,000 years after Paul, the Christian should reflect on the truth of the gospel, not in spite of, but because of Auschwitz.

But this is easier said than done. The trouble is that, with few exceptions, the Holocaust is seen by Christians as a particularly Jewish subject, not just because so many Jews were involved in the event, but in the deeper sense, which should trouble everyone, that whatever questions it raises, whatever institutions, values, and beliefs are to be reexamined in its aftermath, are matters about which only Jews should concern themselves. We must, of course, recognize the ordinary, inescapable element of human indifference; we really do not weep over the suffering and death that only touches others. But such indifference also suggests the profound difficulty, perhaps impossibility, for Christian theology to risk confrontation with the worst disaster of Jewish history, indeed, to risk confrontation with great disasters afflicting many human communities throughout history.

What made this vividly clear to me were the remarkable exchanges that took place some twelve years ago between Richard Rubenstein and the Christian “death of God” theologians Thomas Altizer and William Hamilton. Hamilton and Altizer, along with Harvey Cox and Paul van Buren, captured public attention by speaking provocatively of the exhaustion of religious meaning, the end of Christendom, and the death of God. Heralding a new age of secular freedom, they commanded Christians to break with the Church’s repressive psychology of sin, guilt and judgment and to create new history in a modern “religionless” world as free, secular and mature human beings. The spirit of their injunction was nicely summed up in one of William Hamilton’s essays, “The New Optimism—From Prufrock to Ringo”:

I have been concerned to establish a new mood of optimism in American culture. If I have seen this mood at all accurately, then we might be able to conclude that tragedy is culturally impossible, or unlikely. We trust the world, we trust the future, we deem even many of our intractable problems just soluble enough to reject the tragic mode of facing them.2

This 1966 rejection of the “tragic mode” shows how quickly the “new mood of optimism in American culture” made us forget some older European truths about suffering, death and human destiny. By 1968, after the commitment of nearly half a million American troops in the Viet Nam war, Christian theologians no longer spoke of optimism in American culture.
In contrast, Richard Rubenstein argued that the end of religion signals not a new freedom for man, but a more frightening manifestation of perennial human despair. The “death of God” is misused as a symbol, he declared, if it expresses something other than Nietzsche’s insight into the dissolution of man’s cultural and spiritual life. In our era the “death of God” can only mean one thing—Auschwitz. The implication is clear: If we are to come to terms with the death of God, Christians no less than Jews must confront the reality of Auschwitz.

As a Jew, Rubenstein was able to offer some very provocative suggestions about what Jewish life means or ought to mean after Auschwitz “in a time of the death of God” (his phrase). He also challenged Christians to speak for themselves. As a Christian, I cannot honestly avoid this challenge, but I am much less sure what Christian faith ought to mean after Auschwitz, than what it ought not to mean.

II

Saint Paul, in his letter to the Romans, writes that “God . . . shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us.” And he concludes, “Since, therefore, we are now justified by his blood, much more should we be saved by him from the wrath of God.” (Rom 5:8–9, R.S.V.) Paul was not the first Christian to proclaim the conquest of sin in and through Jesus Christ, but he was unquestionably the most influential for all subsequent Christian thinking. The Passion narratives of the Synoptic Gospels are constructed on Paul’s view of the Cross’ victory over sin and death, and the theme of victory is raised to a majestic level in the prologue to the Gospel of John:

When all things began, the Word already was. The Word dwelt with God, and what God was, the Word was. The Word, then, was with God at the beginning and through him all things came to be; no single thing was created without him. All that came to be was alive with his life, and that life was the life of man. The light shines on in the dark, and the darkness has never quenched it. (Jn 1:1–5)

Thus God in Christ not only overcame the world’s sinful downfall, but overcame it even before the world began, “for the light shines on in the dark, and the darkness has never quenched it.”

However differently the various theological traditions of the church have interpreted the victory of the cross, it is this message of accomplished redemption that gives the essential and abiding form to Christian faith. And with that the Christian is confronted with an extraordinary problem: Why should sin appear in the world after the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ? Why, in a word, history? For however “realistically” the Christian acknowledges the record of sin, suffering and evil in the past 2,000 years, he finds himself struggling to bring a moral assessment of human action through the centuries in line with a theological commitment to the victorious cross.
Consider the argument of Henry Nelson Wieman, the distinguished American philosopher of religion, who taught for many years at the University of Chicago Divinity School. Wieman sought to reconcile his own keen sense of the brutality of history with the message of accomplished redemption. He discovered what he believed to be an appropriate analogy from World War II history. He argued that Christ's defeat of sin was like the Russians' defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad: there would be more fighting, but the decisive battle had been won, the tide of history turned. Would that it were true! It would be good to believe that history is a great war where Christ can and did win the decisive battle. But if history shows anything, it shows that Christ did not win but rather lost the decisive battle, not once, but over and over again. Karl Löwith in his brilliant study, *Meaning in History*, makes the point plainly:

As a history of the world, the empirical history after Christ is qualitatively not different from the history before Christ if judged from either a strictly empirical or a strictly Christian viewpoint. History is, through all the ages, a story of action and suffering, of power and pride, of sin and death. In its profane appearance it is a continuous repetition of painful miscarriages and costly achievements which end in ordinary failure—from Hannibal to Napoleon and the contemporary leaders.

And he adds,

There never has been and never will be an immanent solution of the problem of history, for man's historical experience is one of steady failure. Christianity, too, as a historical world religion, is a complete failure. The world is still as it was in the time of Alaric; only our means of oppression and destruction (as well as of reconstruction) are considerably improved and are adorned with hypocrisy.

But if the coming of Christ and the growth of the church have not materially affected the world's sinfulness, what of Paul's faith in Christ's victory over sin? Löwith senses the problem. Like Wieman, he wants to interpret the appearance of Jesus Christ as an actual revelation of grace which historically anticipates the complete redemption of man awaited in the End-Time. The relationship between the good which Christ brings and the failure to defeat the powers of evil is regarded as paradoxical, ambiguous. Since Christ these [evil] powers are already subjected and broken, but nevertheless remain powerfully alive. Invisibly, history has fundamentally changed; visibly, it is still the same, for the Kingdom of God is already at hand, and yet, as an *eschaton*, still to come. This ambiguity is essential to all history after Christ: the time is already fulfilled and yet not consummated.

The problem presented by a Christ who came to redeem a history which remains manifestly unredeemed is solved by Löwith by appeal to a God who, when he chooses, will replace history with the transcendent Kingdom. Thus what begins in our author's thinking with a realistic perception
of the tragedy of human history, ends with the conventional rhetoric of special Christian pleading. What sense does it make to speak of “[evil] powers . . . subjected and broken, but still . . . powerfully alive”? If they are broken, then why alive? If they are alive, then they are not broken. Lowith speaks of the “ambiguity . . . essential to all history after Christ.” But is the ambiguity in history or in the results of the struggle of Christian theology to find meaning in history in relation to Jesus Christ?

The Christian conviction in the victory of Christ’s cross is an a priori truth, established independently of history, faithfully adhered to apart from the evidence of history. It leads Christians to a homogenized picture of sin, a flattening-out of the experience of guilt. When it is claimed that Christ died for all human beings, whatever their sins, however great or small, little attention is paid to sins themselves; no degree is allowed in human culpability, no perception of the magnitude of guilt. The medieval symbol of purgatory was an insightful, if vengeful, acknowledgement of the differences in wickedness. But Martin Luther and the Reformers, led by Paul’s words, “All have sinned and fallen short of the law,” did away with these differences. The liberalization and secularization of modern western culture completed the process begun in the sixteenth century, by not only doing away with the differences between sin, but by doing away with sin itself.

It is this homogenization of sin, in my judgment, stemming as it does from the gospel of the victorious cross, that often leads Christian theologians to utter the words Auschwitz and Hiroshima in one breath. I believe there is an authentic way to associate the two events, to compare the way in which each is an expression of the modern tendency to commit what Camus called “administrative murder,” wherein human beings are regarded as objects to be cleanly and neatly disposed of by way of “a few freight trains, a few engineers, a few chemists” (André Schwarz-Bart). But there is also an inauthentic linking of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, suggesting that one crime is no worse than the other. When this assumption is made, consciously or unconsciously, the Christian theologian is “off the hook.” For, if he is persuaded to believe that Auschwitz is no worse than Hiroshima, he can treat the destruction of six million Jews and one million Gypsies as another instance of universal evil: in this way he doesn’t have to treat Auschwitz in its particularity, to look at it right there where all the terror, all the truth lies.

III

Jacques Maritain, the French Roman Catholic philosopher, might well be regarded as an exception to the prevailing pattern of Christian indifference to the Holocaust. Shortly before the second world war in 1938, he authored an essay detailing the rise of anti-Semitic actions from one European country to another; it is a remarkable statement, containing a presentiment of the extermination of Europe’s Jews. Discussing the
savagery loosed on German Jewry by the Nazis in reprisal for the assassination of one of their diplomats by a Jew, Maritain concludes with this observation:

. . . when we learned these things, we thought that truly armed men can do precisely what they will with unarmed men, we thought that we must thank the National-Socialists for not having decreed that all Jews today—and tomorrow, all Christians who prefer to obey God rather than men—be simply reduced to ashes by the most scientific means; for in the world today who can stop them?8

The full truth of the expression “reduced to ashes by scientific means” unfolded like a shroud in the next several years, a truth not wasted on Maritain. If the facts of the Holocaust did little to shake his belief in the victorious cross, they did seem to expose him to uncertainties about the relationship between suffering and salvation. In order to appreciate the change, one must note Maritain’s attitude toward Judaism before the war, comparing it with what he later said.

In an essay of 1937, “The Mystery of Israel,” Maritain refers to “the basic weakness of the mystical communion of Israel,” which is “its failure to understand the cross, its refusal of the cross.” He also speaks of the passion of historical suffering of the Jewish people:

It is the passion of a scapegoat, enmeshed in the earthly destiny of the world and in the ways of the world mixed with sin, a scapegoat against which the impure sufferings of the world strike back, when the world seeks vengeance for the misfortunes of its history upon what activates that history. Israel thus suffers the repercussion of the activation it produces, or which the world feels it is destined to produce. . . .

When one looks beneath the involutions of the writing, one recognizes that the author repeats the argument of the ancient church fathers: the Jewish people, in rejecting Christ, antagonizes the Christian world, thereby bringing down on itself calamity. The clear implication is that if the Jewish people accepts the message of the New Testament, if Israel ceases to be Israel, anti-Semitism will stop, Jewish suffering will cease.

It is impossible to know if the events of World War II and the Holocaust made Maritain recognize in the 2,000 year old church-synagogue antagonism the role of Christian triumphalism in turning the Jewish refusal of Christ against Jews themselves, thus preparing the way for modern, racial anti-Semitism. After the war, however, Maritain seems somehow more realistic in his attitude toward Jewish suffering. We no longer hear that Jews, by holding to their beliefs, cause their own suffering. There is the hint that a suffering so abysmal cannot be evaded by any thinker who truly believes, as Maritain believes, that the ways of God are intelligible and justifiable to man. In an essay of 1946, which takes its title from Jesus’ eighth beatitude, “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’s sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven,” Maritain speaks of the classical
Christian equation between suffering and salvation. There are the venerable saints of the church who chose suffering in imitation of Christ's cross, sharing his victory over death, inheriting the kingdom of heaven. But what of those who are not saints, who do not belong to the church—indeed, who were not even permitted a choice? Maritain faces the question honestly. After reciting instances of Nazi atrocities, including facts of the destruction of Jews, he asks,

Where lay the consolation of these persecuted innocents? And how many others died completely forsaken. They did not give their lives, their lives were taken from them, and under the shadow of horror. They suffered without having wanted to suffer. They did not know why they died. Those who know why they died are greatly privileged people.16

Significant in Maritain's statement is its spirit: it reveals that rare instance in which a Christian thinker perceived, if but for a moment, that a suffering so lacking in purpose, so manifestly useless, ruins the order of reason and calls into question the efficacy of the grace and judgment through which it is believed God rules the creation. Here Maritain seems to recognize what every human being should recognize—that in relation to such suffering the words "tragedy," "sacrifice," "martyrdom," lose their meaning and become hollow. After all, could there really be an eternal, divine truth on which the Holocaust victims martyred themselves? It is indecent even to search for one.

Our author no longer speaks of Jews as history's scapegoat. Rather, Jews have joined countless Christians through the ages to form a fellowship of suffering. "Like strange companions," he writes, "they have together journeyed along the road to Calvary." And he continues, "The great mysterious fact is that the sufferings of Israel have more and more distinctly taken the shape of the cross." The point is no longer Jewish suffering caused by the rejection of Christ; rather, Jews in their sufferings share Christ's cross. Those who suffer and die without consolation are one with Christ precisely at the point of Christ's own dereliction, his own despairing agony on the cross.

But Maritain wants to go further in assimilating Jewish suffering to the Christian teaching of the cross. In concluding that those who are one with Christ on the cross are also one with him in the grace that rises victorious from the cross, he turns away from the awful questions of history in order to find repose in the certainties of faith: "It's in the invisible world, beyond everything earthly, that the kingdom of God is given to these persecuted ones, and that everything becomes theirs."11 The author who began with a real sense of the uselessness of Jewish suffering in the Holocaust, now fails to grasp the same quality of useless destruction in Jesus' own death. For if history shows that the world made no moral or spiritual advance by the destruction of six million Jews in the 20th century, history also shows that nothing good, nothing redemptive came from the destruction of one man

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Jesus in the first century. New life cannot be made to come out of death. But this is not seen by Maritain because in his theology human suffering and death are swallowed up in divine glory. Heaven justifies, “makes up for,” earthly affliction—for Jesus no less than for Jews. In a curiously unconscious way Maritain sustains the tradition of Christian triumphalism. For Jewish suffering is not to be seen in its own right; rather, Jews, grafted onto the cross, become honorary Christian sufferers, sharing thereby the glory that rises from the cross. But here surely there is a monstrous problem. The New Testament teaches that Christ arose from the tomb to join his Father in heaven; however, we know of no Jews with their families who left the death chambers to return to their old neighborhoods in Europe. If the suffering of Jews is to be likened to the suffering of Jesus, then the story of the cross should end not in heaven but on earth, not with resurrection but with death, not in glory but in defeat. If the Holocaust has a truth to teach, is this not the truth it teaches Christian theology?

There is a scene in Elie Wiesel's *Night* in which I perceive a powerful and moving image of the truth of the crucifixion of Jews . . . and of Jesus:

The SS seemed more preoccupied, more disturbed than usual. To hang a boy in front of thousands of spectators was no light matter. The head of the camp read the verdict. All eyes were on the child. He was lividly pale, almost calm, biting his lips. The gallows threw its shadow over him. . . .

The three victims mounted together on the chairs.

The three necks were placed at the same moment within the nooses.

"Long live liberty!" cried the two adults.

But the child was silent.

"Where is God? Where is He?" someone behind me asked.

At a sign from the head of the camp, the three chairs tipped over.

Total silence throughout the camp. On the horizon, the sun was setting.

"Bare your heads!" yelled the head of the camp. His voice was raucous. We were weeping.

"Cover your heads!"

Then the march past began. The two adults were no longer alive. Their tongues hung swollen, blue tinged. But the third rope was still moving; being so light, the child was still alive. . . .

For more than half an hour he stayed there, struggling between life and death, dying in slow agony under our eyes. And we had to look him full in the face. He was still alive when I passed in front of him. His tongue was still red, his eyes not yet glazed. Behind me, I heard the same man asking:

"Where is God Now?"

And I heard a voice within me answer him:

"Where is He? Here He is—He is hanging here on this gallows."

I do not know if Wiesel consciously employed images from the story of
Christ's crucifixion to tell his own story. Perhaps it doesn't matter. The same elements are there: three Jews, each accused of crimes, one a youth and the symbol of innocence, all forsaken by God. I am told that some Christian theologians interpret this story as a Jewish vindication of the Christian belief in salvation through Christ's cross; it strikes me as a parody of the Christian teaching of the Cross. Christians do not teach the cross without also teaching the empty tomb. The Christian story of the cross ends not in defeat, but in victory, in resurrection. But there is no empty tomb in Wiesel's story, no resurrection; the story of this cross ends not in new life, but with more death.

Christians are exhorted to fashion their faith after Paul's words to the Christian converts of Corinth: "If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins." (I Cor 15:17) But what should the Christian believe about Christ when in the 20th century six million Jews are put to death and not one rises again? There is an elementary question of justice here. The real problem with the Christian teaching of the resurrection is not scientific, "Can it happen?", but rather moral, "What difference has it made?" Indeed if we turn St. Paul's statement around and begin with the ineffectuality of Christian faith through history, we must conclude that man is still very much in sin and Christ did not defeat death. I myself cannot read Night without feeling that the time has long since passed when one could accept the cross as the symbol of healing through sacrifice, of restoring the order of things by the shedding of innocent blood. I recognize that the experience of suffering can reveal a truth which is otherwise hid. But when suffering, as in the Holocaust, exceeds the human limit, then darkness replaces light and truth is swallowed up by emptiness. What Wiesel's story teaches me is that if God and man wait to be reconciled and the world made whole by the blood of a young innocent Jew in the twentieth century, as in the first century, perhaps salvation isn't worth the cost. Dostoevsky understood this when in The Brothers Karamozov he had Ivan say to his younger brother Alyosha, "I renounce the higher harmony altogether. It's not worth the tears of . . . one tortured child. . . ."

But if Wiesel's story is a parody of the Christian theology of the victorious cross, it is also a penetrating insight into the perennial truth of the cross. For each day of the earth's history, countless, unnamed human beings suffer their crosses unwillingly and die without hope. The Gospel writers wrote of the empty tomb because they sincerely believed that Jesus was the Messiah who, upon his death, rose to heaven to sit on the right hand of the Father. But in telling their story they did not overlook some of the deepest, most human episodes in Christ's Passion. There is the scene in Gethsemane where, as the hour of tribulation approaches, Jesus' faith is for the first time crossed with desperation, and he implores the Lord, "Abba, Father . . . all things are possible to thee; take this cup away from me. . . ." Here is a powerful symbol of the common truth that no human
being chooses his cross gladly, but rather suffers it in humiliation and defeat. The writers knew that every cross is suffered alone. Peter, who was closest to Jesus, denies his master three times, and all the disciples flee the scene of the arrest in mortal fear of their own lives. Finally, into the mouth of Jesus on the cross are put the words of universal human dereliction taken from the 22nd Psalm, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?”

No Christian artist expressed this truth of dereliction more powerfully than Matthias Gruenewald, the sixteenth century German painter, in his “Colmar” (Isenheim, 1513–1515) and “Karlsruhe” (1526) Crucifixions. The bruised, dislocated bones, the open mouth of pain, the elongated, skeletal fingers supplicating the silent heaven make us see a pitiful, broken man alone on the cross, subjected to final punishment. It is a true picture of innocent, unredeemed suffering. Emil Fackenheim reminds us that it was precisely the true picture of Jesus’ torment that aroused Christian animosity against Jews as “Christ-killers,” not the idealized pictures of the cross, where the body of Christ is transfigured, glorified in the imagery of the resurrection. To appreciate Fackenheim’s point within the tradition of Crucifixion art one has only to compare the terrifying Gruenewald pictures with Salvador Dali’s “Christ of St. John of the Cross” (1950), a masterpiece in its style, where the Christian belief in the victory of the cross is fueled by the sight of Christ’s body, full and sensuous, luminous with new life, fixed on a cross which towers majestically over the world. The terrible paradox in Jewish-Christian relations throughout history is that often the false, not the true story of the cross had to be told to safeguard the Jew from the murderous illusions of the Christian.

The same common-human cry of dereliction is expressed in Wiesel’s story of the hanged boy who symbolizes each of the Holocaust victims. Thus Wiesel expresses a truth of the New Testament seldom seen by its Christian readers—that the Jew who died on a cross in Roman Palestine portended the fate of Jews and countless other human beings in the succeeding centuries. Paul employed the language of Temple sacrifice when he stated his belief in the redemption Jesus had wrought through the shedding of his blood—“Christ Jesus whom God put forward as an expiation by his blood to be received by faith.” (Rom 3:25). But if, as Wiesel’s story suggests, the sacrifice was in vain, if Christ’s blood produces not new human life but more Jewish blood, has any redemption taken place? And if no redemption, no reconciliation between God and man, has occurred, what price in truth does the Christian pay to sustain his religion? This is the question we as Christians are bidden to ponder in our faith, for ourselves and for our different churches, now in this day whose light is shed by the fires of the Holocaust.


7 Ibid., p. 188.


11 Ibid., p. 225.


13 For an expansion of this point see my article, "Dostoevsky's Criminal Heroes: The Ethics of Russian Atheism" Cross Currents XXV (1975), 131–148.

Isenheim Altar, Crucifixion.

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