Evolutionary Game Theory, Cultural Modeling, and Third-Party Punishment

Dana Nau

Department of Computer Science and Institute for Systems Research
University of Maryland

Work done jointly with
• Patrick Roos – one of my PhD graduates
• Michele Gelfand – Dept. of Psychology, U. of Maryland
Introduction

- My main field of research is Artificial Intelligence
  - But a lot of my work has been interdisciplinary

- I’ll talk about some collaborative research with
  - Patrick Roos – one of my PhD graduates
  - Michele Gelfand – Dept. of Psychology, U. of Maryland

- Application of evolutionary game theory in cultural psychology
- Example of how an interdisciplinary team can accomplish things that none of us could have done individually
Motivation

Suppose you’re in a store and you see someone shoplifting. What do you do?

- Try to ignore the incident?
- Confront the shoplifter?
- Report it to someone who works in the store?
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- Would you act differently if—
  - it’s a big department store in a city that you only visit rarely?
  - it’s a small “mom and pop” store in your neighborhood?
Third-Party Punishment (3PP)

- Individual C (uninvolved third party) punishes individual A for harm that A has caused to B
  - Puzzling both psychologically and game-theoretically
  - Involves a cost to C, and gives C no direct benefit

- Empirical evidence that humans (and some animals) do it
  - Fehr 2003, 2004; Raihani, 2010

- Other empirical studies in which it did not occur
  - Pederson 2013
Objectives and Outline

- Basic Questions
  - What conditions foster the existence of 3PP?
  - How do the dynamics of 3PP relate to other cultural characteristics?

- Investigate these questions using evolutionary game theory

- Outline
  - Background on evolutionary game theory and cultural evolution
  - Our model
  - Results
  - Discussion
Background: Evolutionary Game Theory

- Application of game theory to evolving populations
- Game-theoretic strategies ↔ different species
  - Each strategy is used by some proportion of the entire population
- Each individual’s reproductive success depends on both its strategy and the strategies of others
  - Influences the proportion of each strategy at the next generation
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cultural Evolution

- Use EGT to model evolution of cultural characteristics
  - Axelrod 1986, Binmore & Samuelson, 1994; Ostrum, 2000; Bicchieri, 2006; Chalub et al., 2006; Kendal et al., 2006; Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007; Enquist et al., 2008

- Game-theoretic strategies ↔ possible behaviors
- Reproduction ↔ cultural transmission
  - Humans imitate others, learn from others
  - Successful strategies have a higher probability of being adopted by others
Evolutionary Dynamics

- Interpret game-theoretic payoffs as reproductive fitness
- Several ways; I’ll discuss the best one for our purposes
- Sequence of stages / iterations / generations
  - Game-theoretic interaction at each stage
- Fermi rule (from statistical mechanics) to propagate strategies to next iteration
  - Each individual compares its payoff to that of a randomly chosen neighbor
  - \( \Pr[\text{switch to neighbor’s strategy}] = 1/(1 + e^{s(\pi - \pi')}) \)
    - \( \pi, \pi' = \) individual’s and neighbor’s payoffs
    - \( s \geq 0 \) is the selection strength
Mutation

- In biological reproduction, mutation is relatively rare
  - Game-theoretic models often omit it
- In cultural evolution, something analogous to mutation happens more frequently:
  - Individuals try out new behaviors at random
- Modify the Fermi rule to include an exploration dynamic
  - Let $S = \{\text{all available strategies}\}$
  - For each individual, a small probability $\mu$ of choosing a strategy $s$ at random from $S$
    - regardless of how successful $s$ was in the current generation
    - regardless of whether anyone is currently using $s$
What Can This Accomplish?

- Human interactions are very complicated
  - Evolutionary game-theoretic models omit most of the details
    - What the actions do physically when they are performed
    - All of the factors that might lead one to choose one action rather than another

- Can be difficult to develop a model that accurately reflects the essential nature of the interactions
  - Research papers often devote a lot of space to justifying why a proposed model should be considered a good one

- Can’t give exact numeric predictions of what would happen in real life

- But:
  - Can provide explanations of the underlying dynamics
  - Can establish support for causal relationships
Modeling Cooperation among Groups

- **Public Goods Game (PGG)**

- **N-player generalization of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma**
  - Each individual is asked to contribute an amount $c$
  - **Cooperator**: contributes
  - **Defector**: doesn’t contribute

- The sum of all contributions is multiplied by a factor $b > 1$
  - Represents the benefit that being in a society provides to individuals

- Resulting amount is distributed equally among everyone
  - With full cooperation, all get more than they contributed
  - But defectors get the same amount, without contributing anything

- Evolutionary version: use the PGG as the stage game
  - Evolve to nearly 100% defectors
  - Utility for all individuals is near 0

**why not exactly 100%?**
The Role of Punishment

- In human societies, punishment of defectors is important in the emergence and maintenance of cooperation
  - Humans are willing to pay a cost to punish deviations from cooperative norms
  - Punishment can establish and maintain cooperative norms in collective action and cooperation games
  - Different cultures have different propensities to punish deviations from their societal norms
Modeling Punishment in the PGG

- At each generation:
  - The contribution phase, then a **punishment phase**:
    - Each individual may pay an amount $\lambda$ to reduce a defector’s payoff by an amount $\rho > \lambda$
  - Each strategy involves two choices:
    - whether to defect, whether to punish defectors
- Problem: it doesn’t work
  - Punishing lowers punisher’s payoff by $\lambda$
    - Evolve to nearly 100% non-punishers
  - Without punishment, defectors have higher payoff than cooperators
    - Evolve to nearly 100% defectors
A More Sophisticated Model


- **Punishment reputation:** how likely that others will punish
  - Enables one to infer Cooperating has higher payoff than Defecting

- **Information level:** \( i = \Pr[\text{know what the punishment reputation is}] \)

- Cooperation strategies:
  - \( C \): cooperate; \( O_C \): opportunistically cooperate;
  - \( D \): defect; \( O_D \): opportunistically defect
  - Opportunistic choices depend on punishment reputation

- Punishment strategies:
  - \( R \) (Responsible): punish defectors; \( S \) (Spiteful): punish everyone;
  - \( A \) (Antisocial): punish cooperators; \( N \) (Non-punisher): punish no one

- **Result:** evolution toward stable proportions of cooperators/defectors and punishers/nonpunishers
What about Third-Party Punishment?

- What I showed you was a model of **direct** punishment
  - In the PGG, defection reduces everyone’s payoff
- Motivation for punishing a defector
  - If punishment makes them stop defecting, it directly benefits you
- In 3rd-party punishment, C punishes A for harming B
  - C incurs a cost, but gets no direct benefit if A stops harming B
- So under what conditions would C do this?

- Create a model similar to Hilbe & Traulsen’s, with two main modifications:
  - Third-party punishment
  - Environmental/structural factors related to cultural characteristics
Modeling Third-Party Punishment

- **Interaction phase**: randomly choose pairs of individuals to play a cooperation dilemma
  - $c > 0$: cost of cooperating with other
  - $b > c$: benefit to self if other cooperates

- **Punishment phase**: for each individual that interacted, randomly choose an uninvolved neighbor who may choose to punish the individual
  - Pay $\lambda$ to reduce their payoff by $\rho$

- Punishment reputation, information level, cooperation strategies, punishment strategies
  - similar to Hilbe & Traulsen’s

### Payoff Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperate</th>
<th>Defect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>$b - c$, $b - c$</td>
<td>$-c$, $b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>$b$, $-c$</td>
<td>0, 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cultural Characteristics

- **Collectivism vs. Individualism:**
  - One of several cultural scales developed by cultural psychologists
  - Individualist cultures (e.g., US, Western Europe)
    - tend to emphasize individual desires and achievements
  - Collectivist cultures (e.g., China, Korea, Japan)
    - tend to emphasize the goals of the family or work group

- Can be applied at different granularities
  - e.g., variations in different parts of the US, or different settings

- Theories of cultural psychology predict 3PP to be more common in collectivist cultures than individualist cultures
  - Can we demonstrate this game-theoretically?
Cultural Characteristics

- How to model collectivism/individualism?
  - No good way to implement them directly in our model
  - Emergent properties of the population, not environmental/structural factors that we can control

- But they correlate with structural factors that we can implement
  - Strength of social ties
    - generally higher in collectivist cultures than in individualist cultures
  - Mobility (ability to leave a social group)
    - generally higher in individualist cultures than in collectivist cultures

- Do this by adding a network structure
Games with Population Structure

- Populations are structured on a network

- Each individual is at one of the nodes
- Edges represent social connections
  - Possibilities for interaction and cultural transmission

* Figure from Ohtsuki et al. 2006
Strength-of-Ties

- **Strength of ties** between humans is measured in terms of how often individuals interact with each other during a period of time.

- If individuals interact with their neighbors and have a limited amount of interactions per time period, then
  
  nodes with many neighbors $\rightarrow$ **low** strength-of-ties
  
  nodes with few neighbors $\rightarrow$ **high** strength-of-ties

Watts-Strogatz small-world networks
High Strength-of-Ties Enables Evolution of 3PP

Long-Term Average Population

Population %

Strength-of-Ties (1/d)

Cooperation Rate
Responsible 3PP
With high strength-of-ties, there can be small groups of agents that interact primarily with each other

- If their strategies are to cooperate and to punish responsibly, they can
  - achieve high payoffs
  - induce neighbors to adopt their strategy
- Create a local environment in which agents are encouraged to cooperate and punish responsibly

With low strength-of-ties, such agents will interact with each other only occasionally

- can’t maintain high payoffs, eventually switch to other strategies
High Strength-of-Ties Example
Mobility

- Degree to which humans change their location (social network position within a population)
- Individualistic cultures tend to have very high mobility
  - People can easily exit their social groups
- Collectivistic cultures tend to have low mobility
  - Not as easy to exit social group

Implementation of Mobility:
- At each iteration, individuals may switch positions with other randomly chosen individuals, with fixed probability $m$
- High value for $m \Leftrightarrow$ high mobility
Evolution of 3PP Requires Low Mobility

- Successful clusters of 3PP individuals won’t last, because the individuals move away
  
  ➔ 3PP less likely to spread
Discussion

- Example of how an interdisciplinary team can accomplish something that none of us could have done individually

- Results provide support for causal relationship:
  - Evolution of 3PP requires high societal constraint
    - High strength-of-ties, and low mobility
  - Combination of reputation and social structure can lead 3PP to emerge as a trait ultimately beneficial to the individuals carrying it
  - 3PP can’t be sustained or uphold cooperation in environments where those factors aren’t there

- More generally
  - Individual-level interactions + different structural factors
    - differences in evolved culture
  - We hope this will help promote cross-cultural understanding
  - Foundation for more complex and ultimately predictive tools
Future Work

Culture and Conflict Contagion:

- How can we predict when a conflict between two individuals will spread to involve a multitude of others?
- How do the values and norms in different cultures affect the contagion of conflict?
- How does conflict contagion relate to factors that influence cultural evolution?
Conflict Contagion - Example

- Hatfield-McCoy feud (1863–1891)
  - Along the border between Kentucky and West Virginia
Dynamics of Conflict Contagion

Closely related to *vertical collectivism*

- Lee, Gelfand, & Shteynberg, 2013

- High *ingroup entitativity* – group members interchangeable; depersonalized undifferentiated entities

- High *outgroup entitativity* – outgroups are interchangeable

- High *transgenerational entitativity* – ingroup transcends past/future generations
Relation to Third-Party Punishment

- Combination of 3PP and entitativity
  - Punish others on behalf of someone else in your group
- Central mechanism by which conflict can spread across individuals
High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment

Patrick Roos¹,³, Michele Gelfand², Dana Nau¹,³,⁴ and Ryan Carr¹,³

Author Affiliations

¹Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
²Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
³Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
⁴Institute for Systems Research, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

e-mail: roos@cs.umd.edu

Abstract

As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that punishment reputation is not, by itself, sufficient for the evolution of 3PP. Drawing on research streams in sociology and psychology, we implement a
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Photo by Shawn on Flicker.
"Responsible Third-Party Punisher" sounds like a great idea for a caption for t-shirts.

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