# Hypergraph Clustering based on Game Theory

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
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May 8, 2014

#### Overview

- Introduction
- Related Work
- Our Model
- Algorithm
- Conclusions


# Clustering



from Google Image


# What is clustering?

Original data




## What is clustering?

Clustering using pairwise distances




Pairs within a cluster


Another example




Clustering lines using pairwise distances



Another example



Clustering lines using measurement of more than 2 points



## A general data representation: Hypergraph

Hypergraph is a generalization of a graph in which an edge can connect any number of vertices.

#### Definition (Hypergraph)

A hypergraph H is a pair H = (V, E) where V is a set of elements called nodes or vertices, and E is a set of non-empty subsets of V called hyperedges or edges.

#### Definition (Weighted Hypergraph)

A weighted hypergraph  $H(V, E, \omega)$  is a hypergraph where each hyperedge is associated with a weight defined by  $\omega$ .

#### Definition (Weighted k-graph)

A weighted k-graph (aka k-uniform hypergraph)  $H(V, E, \omega)$  is a weighted hypergraph such that all its hyperedges have size k.

## The problem we address

#### Hypergraph Clustering

Given a k-graph  $H(V, E, \omega)$  where for each vertex combinations  $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_k) \in V$ , the weight  $\omega(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_k) \in [0, 1]$  is defined by their similarity measure (the possibility that they come from the same cluster). The Hypergraph Clustering problem is to cluster the vertices from V into multiple clusters  $\{C_1, C_2, \ldots\}$  (the total number of clusters is unknown) such that

- 1. each vertex belongs to one and only one cluster;
- 2. vertices from the same cluster have higher similarities;
- 3. vertices from different clusters have lower similarities.

# Clustering is related to game theory

#### Non-cooperative games based approaches:


- Replicator dynamics
- Related works:
  - Rota Bulò and Pelillo, PAMI 2013 [1]
  - Donoser, BMVC 2013 [3]
  - Liu et al., CoRR 2013 [5]


#### Cooperative games based approaches:


- Shapley values
- Related works:
  - ▶ Garg et al., TKDE 2013 [4]
  - ▶ Dhamal et al., CoRR 2012 [2]





Replicator Dynamics based approaches (Let K=3)











# Hypergraph clustering

#### A general formulation

The problem of clustering a k-graph  $H(V, E, \omega)$  can be mathematically defined as solving,

$$C^* = \arg\max_{\mathbf{C}} S(C) \tag{1}$$

s.t. 
$$S(C) = \frac{1}{m^k} \sum_{e \in C: C \subseteq E} \omega(e)$$
 (2)

where S(C) is the cluster score.

This can be reformulated using an assignment vector,

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}} = \arg\max_{\mathbf{x}} \sum_{e \in E} \omega(e) \prod_{v_i \in e} x_{v_i}$$
 (3)

such that

$$\mathbf{x} \in \left\{0, \frac{1}{m}\right\}^N$$
 where  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{|V|})$  (4)

#### Formulation

- ► There are k players P = {1,2,...k} each with N pure strategies S={1,...N}.
- ▶ The payoff function  $\pi: S^k \mapsto \mathbb{R}$
- ▶  $\Delta = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^N : \sum_{j \in S} x_j = 1, x_j \ge 0, \forall j \in S\}$ . Let  $x^{(i)} \in \Delta$ .
- ▶ The utility function of the game  $\Gamma = (P, S, \pi)$  for any mixed strategy is given by,

$$u(x^{(1)}, \dots x^{(k)}) = \sum_{(s_1, \dots s_k) \in S^k} \pi(s_1, \dots s_k) \prod_{i=1}^k x_{s_i}^{(i)}$$
 (5)

# **Evolutionary Stable Strategy**

- ▶ Find equillibrium  $x \in \Delta$  s.t. every player obtains some expected payoff and no strategy can prevails upon others.
- ▶ For Nash equillibrium we get,  $u(e^j, x^{[k-1]}) \le u(x^{[k]}), \forall j \in S$
- ▶ Instead for any  $y \in \Delta \setminus \{x\}$  and  $w_{\delta} = (1 \delta)x + \delta y$  we need  $u(y, w_{\delta}^{[k-1]}) < u(x, w_{\delta}^{[k-1]})$ . This is ESS.

## Non-Cooperative Clustering Games

#### Assumptions, Analogy and Properties

- Assumption:  $\pi$  is supersymmetric
- Payoff function

$$\pi(s_1,\ldots,s_k)=\frac{1}{k!}\omega(s_1,\ldots,s_k),\quad\forall\{s_1,\ldots,s_k\}\in E\quad (6)$$

- Here N input data point is analogous to N pure strategies of k player game.
- ► The support of final ESS x correspond to the points belonging to that cluster.
- ► Solving for (3) is equivalent to finding maxima point of (5).(\*)
- ► ESS cluster satisfies the two basic properties of cluster, Internal coherency and External incoherency.

## Optimization Criteria

- Solving (5) optimally is NP-Hard.
- ▶ Observe that the function in (5) is homogeneous polynomial equation and thus it is a convex optimization problem.
- In [1], author proves that the Nash equilibria of game  $\Gamma$  are the critical points of  $u(x^{[k]})$  and ESS are the strict local maximizers of  $u(x^{[k]})$  over the simplex region.
- Performing Projected gradient ascent in Δ requires large number of iterations.

$$\left(u(x^{[k]}) = \sum_{(s_1,\ldots s_k)\in S^k} \pi(s_1,\ldots s_k) \prod_{i=1}^k x_{s_i}\right)$$

## Baum-Eagon Algorithm

Any homogeneous polynomial  $f(\mathbf{x})$  in variable  $x \in \Delta$  with nonnegative coefficients can be approximately solve using the following heuristics,

$$x_j^* = x_j \frac{\frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_j}}{\sum_{l=1}^n x_l \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_l}}$$
 (7)

Using this heuristics for solving (5), we obtain,

$$x_j(t+1) = x_j(t) \frac{d_j}{u(x(t)^{[k]})} \quad \forall j = 1, \dots n$$
 (8)

where  $d_j = u(e^j, x(t)^{[k-1]})$  and  $u(x(t)^{[k]}) = \sum_l x_l d_l$ 

## Frank-Wolfe Algorithm

- ▶ Use  $\epsilon$ -bounded simplex set  $\Delta_{\epsilon}$  s.t.  $x \in [0, \epsilon]^N$ .
- ▶ Initialize  $\mathbf{x}(0) \in \Delta_{\epsilon}, t \leftarrow 0$ .
- ▶ Iterate
  - 1. Compute **d**.
  - 2.  $\mathbf{y}^* \leftarrow \operatorname{arg\,max} \mathbf{d}^T \mathbf{y}$  s.t.  $\mathbf{y} \in \Delta_{\epsilon}$ .
  - 3. If  $\mathbf{d}^T(\mathbf{y}^* \mathbf{x}(t)) = 0$ , return  $\mathbf{x}(t)$ .
  - 4.  $\delta^* \leftarrow \arg\max u(w_{\delta}^{[k]})$  s.t.  $w_{\delta} = (1 \delta)\mathbf{x}(t) + \delta\mathbf{y}^*$ .
  - 5.  $\mathbf{x}(t+1) \leftarrow w_{\delta^*}$

The overall complexity of each iteration of all the algorithm is  $\mathcal{O}(N^k)$ . Frank-Wolfe algorithm converges the fastest with an average of 10 iterations.

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#### Reference

- [1] Samuel Rota Bulo and Marcello Pelillo. A game-theoretic approach to hypergraph clustering. *IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence*, 35(6):1312–1327, June 2013.
- [2] Swapnil Dhamal, Satyanath Bhat, K. R. Anoop, and Varun R. Embar. Pattern clustering using cooperative game theory. CoRR, abs/1201.0461, 2012.
- [3] Michael Donoser. Replicator graph clustering. In *Proceedings* of British Conference on Computer Vision (BMVC), 2013.
- [4] Vikas K. Garg, Y. Narahari, and M. Narasimha Murty. Novel biobjective clustering (bigc) based on cooperative game theory. Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on, 25(5):1070–1082, May 2013.
- [5] Hairong Liu, Longin Jan Latecki, and Shuicheng Yan. Revealing cluster structure of graph by path following replicator dynamic. *CoRR*, abs/1303.2643, 2013.