CMSC498W: Economics and Computation

Spring 2026 · University of Maryland, College Park

Overview

This undergraduate course explores the interaction between the disciplines of economics and computer science. In one direction, we will see how computational thinking gives a new perspective on areas of economic theory such as game theory, mechanism design, and social choice. In the other direction, we will discuss how economic approaches can address timely questions in computer science and artificial intelligence.

Instructor and TA

Instructor: Han Shao, hanshao@umd.edu, office hours: Mon 2-3, IRB 5132
TA: Shashaank Aiyer, saiyer1@umd.edu, office hours: Tue 12:30-1:30, AVW 4117

Prerequisites

This will be a mathematically rigorous theory course for advanced undergraduates. Students should have taken a course in algorithms, or be taking one concurrently, and be mathematically mature. All homeworks and exams will consist of proof-based questions.

Homeworks

Homework Assignments

Grading

Grading will be based on participation (5%), homeworks (35%), midterm (30%), and final exam (30%).

Q & A

We will use Piazza for Q & A. Please post your questions here.

Textbook

There is no required textbook. The recommended book is Algorithmic Game Theory. If you are interested in learning more about no-regret learning, you can refer to the online learning bible: Prediction, Learning, and Games.

Acknowledgement

Course materials are built based on courses developed by Ariel Procaccia and Aaron Roth.

Schedule

This is a temporary schedule and subject to change.

Date Topic
1/26/2026 No class. Campus closed due to winter storm.
1/28/2026 No class. Campus closed due to winter storm.
2/2/2026 Course Info and Nash Equilibrium
2/4/2026 Equilibrium Computation
2/9/2026 Best Response Dynamics
2/11/2026 Best Response Dynamics (proofs)
2/16/2026 Learning in Games
2/18/2026 Minimax Theorem via No Regret (Proofs on the whiteboard)
2/23/2026 Equilibria and Regret Characterizations
2/25/2026 The Price of Anarchy and Stability (Details of the examples on the whiteboard)
3/2/2026 Mechanism Design: VCG
3/4/2026 Mechanism Design: Single Parameter Domains
3/9/2026 Mechanism Design: Approximation (Notes)
3/11/2026 Mechanism Design: Maximizing Revenue in Expectation
3/16/2026 Spring Break
3/18/2026 Spring Break
3/23/2026 Midterm Practices
3/25/2026 Midterm Exam
3/30/2026 Social Choice: Voting Rules
4/1/2026 Social Choice: The Epistemic Approach to Voting (Proof for unanimity of Kemeny)
4/6/2026 Social Choice: Strategic Manipulation in Elections
4/8/2026 Matching: Online Matching Algorithms
4/13/2026 Matching: Kidney Exchange
4/15/2026 Matching: Stable Matching
4/20/2026 Matching: Random Assignment
4/22/2026 Proper Scoring Rules
4/27/2026 Bayesian Persuasion
4/29/2026 Calibrated Forecasting
5/4/2026 Incentives for Data Sharing
5/6/2026 Data Valuation