Static Analysis to Improve Software Quality

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Software Quality Today

Trustworthy Computing is computing that is available, reliable, and secure as electricity, water services and telephony....No Trustworthy Computing platform exists today.

-- Bill Gates, January 15, 2002
(highest priority for Microsoft)

[T]he national annual costs of an inadequate infrastructure for software testing is estimated to range from $22.2 to $59.5 billion.

-- NIST Planning Report 02-3, May 2002
Conclusions?

• Software is buggy
  - It’s hard to ensure that it’s reliable
  - ...and doing so is important
Current Practice

• Testing
  - Make sure program runs correctly on set of inputs
    - Drawbacks: Expensive, difficult, hard to cover all code paths, no guarantees
Current Practice (cont’d)

- Code Auditing
  - Convince someone else your source code is correct
  - Drawbacks: Expensive, hard, no guarantees
And If You’re Worried about Security…

A malicious adversary is trying to exploit anything you miss!

What more can we do?
Tools for Software Quality

• Build tools that analyze source code (static analysis)
  - Reason about all possible runs of the program
• Check limited but very useful properties
  - Eliminate categories of errors
  - Let people concentrate on the deep reasoning
• Develop programming models
  - Avoid mistakes in the first place
  - Encourage programmers to think about and make manifest their assumptions
Oops — We Can’t Do This!

- Rice’s Theorem: No computer program can precisely determine anything interesting about arbitrary source code
  - Does this program terminate?
  - Does this program produce value 42?
  - Does this program raise an exception?
  - Is this program correct?
The Art of Static Analysis

- Programmers don’t write arbitrarily complicated programs
- Programmers have ways to control complexity
  - Otherwise they couldn’t make sense of them
- Target: Be precise for the programs that programmers want to write
  - It’s OK to forbid yucky code in the name of safety
Research at the University of Maryland

- Developed a number of practical tools addressing different software quality issues
  - **CQual** — User-defined type qualifiers for C
  - **Locksmith** — C data race detection
  - **FindBugs** — Finding (Java) bugs is easy
  - **Cyclone** — Language for safe, low-level programming
  - **Ginseng** — Safe updates to running software
  - **Saffire** — Type checking multi-lingual programs
  - **Pistachio** — Checking network protocol implementations
CQual: Background

• Tools need specifications
  
  ```c
  spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->read_lock, flags);
  put_tty_queue_nolock(c, tty);
  spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->read_lock, flags);
  ```

• Goal: Add specifications to programs
  
  In a way that...
  
  - Programmers will accept
    
    • Lightweight
  
  - Scales to large programs
  
  - Solves many different problems
Type Qualifiers

- Extend standard type systems (C, Java, ML)
  - Programmers already use types
  - Programmers understand types
  - Get programmers to write down a little more...

const int                      ANSI C
ptr(tainted char)              Format-string vulnerabilities
kernel ptr(char) ➔ char       User/kernel vulnerabilities
Application: Format String Vulnerabilities

• I/O functions in C use format strings
  
  printf("Hello!");  Hello!
  printf("Hello, %s!", name);  Hello, name!

• Instead of
  
  printf("%s", name);

  Why not
  
  printf(name);  ?
Format String Attacks

• Adversary-controlled format specifier
  name := <data-from-network>
  printf(name); /* Oops */

  - Attacker sets name = "%s%s%s" to crash program
  - Attacker sets name = "...%n..." to write to memory
    • Yields (often remote root) exploits

• Lots of these bugs in the wild
  - New ones weekly on bugtraq mailing list
  - Too restrictive to forbid variable format strings
Using Tainted and Untainted

• Add qualifier annotations

  ```c
  int printf(untainted char *fmt, ...)
  tainted char *getenv(const char *)
  ```

tainted = may be controlled by adversary
untainted = must not be controlled by adversary
Subtyping

void f(tainted int);
untainted int a;
f(a);

OK

f accepts tainted or untainted data
untainted ≤ tainted

untainted < tainted

void g(untainted int);
tainted int b;
f(b);

Error

g accepts only untainted data
tainted ≤ untainted

untainted < tainted
Demo of cqual

http://cqual.sourceforge.net
Type Qualifier Inference

• Two kinds of qualifiers
  - Explicit qualifiers: tainted, untainted, ...
  - Unknown qualifiers: $a_0, a_1, ...$

• Program yields constraints on qualifiers
  \[
  \text{tainted} \leq a_0 \quad a_0 \leq \text{untainted}
  \]

• Solve constraints for unknown qualifiers
  - Error if no solution
Types as Trees

\[
\text{ptr(tainted char)}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{a ptr} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{tainted char}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\text{int \rightarrow user ptr(int)}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
a_0 \\
a_1 \text{ int} \\
a_2 \text{ ptr}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{user int}
\end{array}
\]
Constraint Generation

\[ \text{ptr(int) } f(x : \text{int}) = \{ \ldots \} \quad y := f(z) \]
Constraints as Graphs

\[ a_0 \leq a_1 \leq a_2 \leq a_4 \]
\[ a_3 = a_5 \]
\[ a_6 \leq \text{untainted} \]
\[ a_7 \]
\[ a_8 \leq \text{tainted} \]

untainted

tainted
Satisfiability via Graph Reachability

Is there an inconsistent path through the graph?

untainted

a₆ ≤ a₁
a₂ ≤ a₄
a₃ = a₅

...
Satisfiability via Graph Reachability

Is there an inconsistent path through the graph?
Satisfiability via Graph Reachability

tainted ≤ a₆ ≤ a₁ ≤ a₃ ≤ a₅ ≤ a₇ ≤ untainted

untainted

untainted

a₆ ≤ a₁
a₂ ≤ a₄
a₃ = a₅
•
•
•
tainted

a₈
Satisfiability in Linear Time

• Initial program of size $n$
  - Fixed set of qualifiers tainted, untainted, ...

• Constraint generation yields $O(n)$ constraints
  - Recursive abstract syntax tree walk

• Graph reachability takes $O(n)$ time
  - Works for semi-lattices, discrete p.o., products
Experiment: Format String Vulnerabilities

• Analyzed 10 popular unix daemon programs
  - Annotations shared across applications
    • One annotated header file for standard libraries
    • Includes annotations for polymorphism
      - Critical to practical usability

• Found several known vulnerabilities
  - Including ones we didn’t know about

• User interface critical
## Results: Format String Vulnerabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Warn</th>
<th>Bugs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>identd-1.0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mingetty-0.9.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bftpd-1.0.11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muh-2.05d</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>~2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cfengine-1.5.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imapd-4.7c</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ipopd-4.7c</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mars_nwe-0.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apache-1.3.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>openssh-2.3.0p1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other CQual Applications

- User/kernel pointer vulnerabilities
  - Common security bug in the Linux kernel
- Deadlock in the Linux kernel
- File open/close
  - Both require flow-sensitivity
- Initialization in the Linux kernel
- const inference
CQual — Summary

• Type qualifiers are specifications that...
  - Programmers will accept
    • Lightweight
  - Scale to large programs
  - Solve many different problems

• In the works: ccqual, jqual, Eclipse interface
Data Races

• Two threads access the same location simultaneously (and one is a write)

• 2 of the “top ten bugs of all time” due to races
  - 2003 Northeastern US blackout
  - 1985-87 Therac-25 medical accelerator

• Data races complicate program understanding
Programming Against Races

• **Correlation** $\rho \otimes l$:
  - “Lock $l$ is *correlated* with location $\rho$ if lock $l$ is held whenever $\rho$ is dereferenced

• **Consistent Correlation**
  - Each location $\rho$ is always correlated with the same lock(s)

• Sometimes say that $\rho$ is *guarded by* $l$
Inferring consistent correlation

- **Locksmith** is a static analysis tool we have built to discover consistent correlation statically for C programs

- Contradictions of consistent correlation are possible races

- *Sound*: applies to all possible program executions
Correlation

```c
pthread_mutex_t L1, L2;
int x, y, z;
void foo(pthread_mutex_t *l, int *p) {
    pthread_mutex_lock(l);
    *p = 3;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(l);
}
...
foo(&L1, &x);
foo(&L2, &y);
foo(&L2, &z);
```

Correlation

```c
pthread_mutex_t L1, L2;
int x, y, z;
void foo(pthread_mutex_t *l, int *p) {
    pthread_mutex_lock(l);
    *p = 3;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(l);
}

... foo(&L1, &x);
foo(&L2, &y);
foo(&L2, &z);
```

![Diagram showing variables and mutexes](image)
Correlation

```c
pthread_mutex_t L1, L2;
int x,y,z;
void foo(pthread_mutex_t *l, int *p) {
    pthread_mutex_lock(l);
    *p = 3;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(l);
}
...
foo(&L1,&x);
foo(&L2,&y);
foo(&L2,&z);
```

```
x    y    z    L1    L2
p    l
⊗
```
Correlation

```c
pthread_mutex_t L1, L2;
int x, y, z;
void foo(pthread_mutex_t *l, int *p) {
    pthread_mutex_lock(l);
    *p = 3;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(l);
}
...
foo(&L1, &x);
foo(&L2, &y);
foo(&L2, &z);
```

Correlation

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foo(&L1, &x);
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}
...
foo (&L1,&x);
foo (&L2,&y);
foo (&L2,&z);
```
Correlation

```c
pthread_mutex_t L1, L2;
int x,y,z;
void foo(pthread_mutex_t *l, int *p) {
    pthread_mutex_lock(l);
    *p = 3;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(l);
}
...
foo(&L1,&x);
foo(&L2,&y);
foo(&L2,&z);
```

Context Sensitivity

• The problem arises because within `foo()` we were not distinguishing different call sites

• Solution: *context sensitivity*
  - label each call site
  - label edges induced by that call site
  - propagate constraints along like-labeled paths
Correlation

```c
pthread_mutex_t L1, L2;
int x, y, z;
void foo(pthread_mutex_t *l, int *p) {
    pthread_mutex_lock(l);
    *p = 3;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(l);
}
...
foo1(&L1, &x);
foo2(&L2, &y);
foo3(&L2, &z);
```

Diagram:

```
x    y    z    L1    L2
p    l
⊗
1    1    1    1
```

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Correlation

```c
pthread_mutex_t L1, L2;
int x, y, z;
void foo(pthread_mutex_t *l, int *p) {
    pthread_mutex_lock(l);
    *p = 3;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(l);
}
...
foo1(&L1, &x);
foo2(&L2, &y);
foo3(&L2, &z);
```

\[ \times \]
Correlation

```c
pthread_mutex_t L1, L2;
int x, y, z;

void foo(pthread_mutex_t *l, int *p) {
    pthread_mutex_lock(l);
    *p = 3;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(l);
}

foo1(&L1, &x);
foo2(&L2, &y);
foo3(&L2, &z);
```

Correlation

```c
pthread_mutex_t L1, L2;
int x, y, z;
void foo(pthread_mutex_t *l, int *p) {
    pthread_mutex_lock(l);
    *p = 3;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(l);
}
...
foo1(&L1, &x);
foo2(&L2, &y);
foo3(&L2, &z);
```
Soundness

• Formalized correlation inference in a small formal language
• Proved that if constraints induced by the program have a solution, the program is consistently correlated
• May have other applications
  - Correlating a pointer with the region it points to
  - Correlation an array with its length
Scaling to C: Challenges

• Aliasing data structures containing locks
  - Danger of not identifying locks precisely
• Determining which locks are held
  - Which locks are held is a flow-sensitive, interprocedural property
• Determining which locations are shared
  - A flow-sensitive property
• Type-unsafe idioms
  - Casts to/from void*
• Scaling to large data structures
Locks in data structures

```c
struct foo {
    pthread_mutex_t l;
    int *data;
    struct foo *next;
};
```

- Alias analysis cannot distinguish individual elements
- Want to precisely reason about correlation within an particular element.
Locks in data structures

```c
struct foo { ∃ l, ρ. ρ ⊗ l
    pthread_mutex_t< l > l;
    int *ρ data;
    struct foo *next;
};
```

- Alias analysis cannot distinguish individual elements
- Want to precisely reason about correlation within an particular element.
Experimental Results

- Ran Locksmith on a series of benchmarks
  - Standalone POSIX threads programs
  - Linux device drivers
- Measurements on a dual core Xeon with 4 GB of RAM.
## Standalone Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Size (KLOC)</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Warn.</th>
<th>Unguarded</th>
<th>Races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aget</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.8s</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ctrace</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9s</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pfscan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.7s</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engine</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2s</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smtprc</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.0s</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knot</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5s</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Device Drivers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driver</th>
<th>Size (KLOC)</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Warn.</th>
<th>Unguarded</th>
<th>Races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>plip</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>24.9s</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eql</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>3.2s</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c501</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>240.1s</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sundance</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>98.2s</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sis900</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>61.0s*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>slip</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>16.5s*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hp100</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>31.8s*</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Run without lock linearity analysis
Summary

• Discover races automatically by inferring consistent correlation
• Formalized and proved correct for a core language
• Implemented a tool for C programs
  - Available at http://www.cs.umd.edu/~polyvios/locksmith
Other Tools We’ve Built

• **Cyclone** — Language for safe, low-level programming
• **FindBugs** — Finding (Java) bugs is easy
• **Ginseng** — Safe updates to running software
• **Saffire** — Type checking multi-lingual programs
• **Pistachio** — Checking network protocol implementations
Cyclone: Safe Low-Level Programming

• Today, our economy, government, and military depend upon the proper functioning of our computing and communications infrastructure.

• That infrastructure is coded in low-level, error-prone languages (i.e., C).
  - device drivers, kernels
  - file systems, web servers, email systems
  - switches, routers, firewalls
Cyclone: An Experimental Safe-C

• Start with ANSI-C
• Throw out anything that can lead to a delayed core-dump:
  - Arbitrary casts, unchecked pointer arithmetic, etc.
• Add advanced typing mechanisms and dynamic checks to cover what’s missing
  - Programmer will have to specify additional details at procedure boundaries
• Minimize re-coding for safe idioms.
  - Best case: leave the code alone
  - Next best: add typing annotations
  - Worst case: re-write the code
Unifying Theme: Region types

• Conceptually divide memory into regions
  - Different kinds of regions (e.g., not just bulk-free)
• Associate every pointer with a region
• Prevent dereferencing pointers into dead regions

```c
int *`r x; // x points into region `r
*r = 3; // deref allowed if `r is live
```

(inference often obviates annotations `r)
Liveness by static analysis
LIFO Arenas

- Dynamic allocation mechanism
- Lifetime of entire arena is scoped
  - At conclusion of scope, all data allocated in the arena is freed.
FILE *infile = ...

Image *i;

if (tag(infile) == HUFFMAN) {
    region<`r> h;  // region `r created
    struct hnode *`r huff_tree;
    huff_tree = read_tree(h, infile);  // allocates with h
    i = decode_image(infile, huff_tree,...);  // region `r deallocated upon exit of scope
} else ...

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## Regions Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region Variety</th>
<th>Allocation (objects)</th>
<th>Deallocation (what) (when)</th>
<th>Aliasing (objects)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stack</td>
<td>static</td>
<td>whole region</td>
<td>free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFO</td>
<td>dynamic</td>
<td>exit of scope</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heap</td>
<td></td>
<td>single objects</td>
<td>GC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refcounted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>restricted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Application Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Non-comment Lines of Code</th>
<th>Manual mechs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Cyc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boa</td>
<td>5217</td>
<td>$\pm$ 284 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BetaFTPD</td>
<td>1146</td>
<td>$\pm$ 191 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epic</td>
<td>2123</td>
<td>$\pm$ 217 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiss-FFT</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>$\pm$ 73 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MediaNet</td>
<td>8715</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CycWeb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CycScheme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U = unique pointers \hspace{1cm} R = ref-counted pointers
L = LIFO regions \hspace{1cm} D = dynamic arenas
Throughput: MediaNet

![Graph showing throughput (Mbps) vs. packet size (bytes)]

- **GC+free**
- **GC only**
Conclusions

• High degree of control, safely:

• Sound mechanisms for programmer-controlled memory management
  - Region-based and object-based deallocation
  - Manual and automatic reclamation

• Region-annotated pointers within a simple framework
  - Scoped regions unifying theme (alias, open)
  - Region polymorphism, for code reuse
FindBugs

• Programmers make lots of dumb mistakes in their code
  - Dereferencing a pointer that’s obviously null
  - Writing an infinite loop
  - Ignoring the return value of a method
  - Assigning a field to itself

• Idea: Develop **bug pattern detectors** to find coding styles that are certain to be, or likely to be, bugs
private final String foundType;
public String foundType() {
    return this.foundType();
}

- 5 Sun’s JDK 1.5.0_01
- 10 Sun’s AppServer 8.1 2005Q1
- 14 IBM’s WebSphere 6.0.2
- 13 JBoss 4.0.2
- 3 Eclipse 3.1M7
- 2 Tomcat 5.5.9
Results: Null Pointers

```java
public String getContentId()
{
    ...
    if (header != null || header.length > 0 )
        ...
}
```

- 43 Sun’s JDK 1.5.0_01
- 199 Sun’s AppServer 8.1 2005Q1
- 465 IBM’s WebSphere 6.0.2
- 108 JBoss 4.0.2
- 90 Eclipse 3.1M7
- 16 Tomcat 5.5.9
Program Analysis in Practice

• We've described a number of practical tools
  - At least, we can effectively use them
  - Several have also been used by others
    • E.g., >100,000 downloads of FindBugs

• Sophisticated program analyses are moving into practice
  - Microsoft static driver verifier
  - Microsoft PREFix/PREFast
  - Coverity
  - Fortify
Research Challenge: Explaining the Analyses

• When a tool reports a potential problem, how do we explain it to the user?
  - less than 10% of the “code mass” of PREFix is the actual program analysis (Pincus)

• What our tools do
  - CQual: Show a path through the graph
  - Locksmith: Show two paths through the graph, plus some other stuff (e.g., locks held)
Limitations of Current Explanations

- In our experience, a path often conveys enough information
  - E.g., the earlier CQual demo

- However, in some cases paths are confusing
  - Paths may go in and out of functions
    - And our analysis is context-sensitive
  - Aliasing can cause non-intuitive “backward” flow
  - Paths may be correlated
    - Acquiring locks vs. data flow of accessed locations
The Abstraction Barrier

• In order to attack an undecidable problem (program analysis), we needed to make an approximation
  - We performed a kind of abstract interpretation of the program
• When the abstraction matches the programmer’s intuition, then it’s great
• But when the programmer doesn’t understand the abstraction, explanations are hard
User-Centered Program Analysis

• The field of program analysis has made great strides in recent years
• We believe we need new techniques that are user-centered
  - We need to be better at integration into the software engineering process
  - We need to match programmer intuitions
  - But we also need to train programmers that a little effort on their part (e.g., annotations, not coding in complex ways) can gain them benefits
Multi-level analysis

• Low threshold, high ceiling
  - Tool should be initially easy to use and understand
  - But should scale up to more sophisticated users

• Multiple levels: vary a parameter to aid programmer understanding

• Example: varying soundness
  - Simplest mode: all alarms certain to be errors
  - Advanced mode: all emitted warnings cover all possible errors
Finding Bugs, Fixing Bugs

• The tool develops a model of the program
  - A contradiction suggests a bug
• The programmer must determine
  - Is the bug for real?
  - How do I fix it?

• Idea: provide access to the model in terms that the programmer can understand
  - Queries/filters in terms of program text
  - More direct than generic search (e.g., grep)
One Possible Framework
Evaluation Techniques

• User studies
  - Control well for variables as users carry out specific tasks using our program analysis tools

• Pluses
  - Reliable scientific technique
  - Can measure length of time to solve problem etc

• Minuses
  - Requires tool to be fixed throughout experiment
  - Hard to carry out long-term study
    • State of the art might change during the study!
Evaluation Techniques (cont'd)

• Multi-dimensional in-depth longitudinal case studies
  - A “soft” technique where we observe programmers over a long period of time

• Plusses
  - Lets the tools evolve as part of the experimental process
  - Longitudinal input about tools from users

• Cons
  - Cannot control variables well; hard to perform quantitative measurements
Summary

• Software is buggy
• Bugs can lead to crashes and security vulnerabilities

• Static analysis tools can help
  - find bugs
  - prove the absence of certain flaws
  - programmers understand software

• At Maryland, we have developed a variety of tools, and continue to push the state of the art to make them more effective
For More Information

http://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/PL

Code, papers, and more.