Homework 2

Due at the beginning of class on Sept. 29

1. (Exercise 2.2.) Prove or refute: For every encryption scheme that is perfectly secret it holds that for every distribution over the message space \mathcal{M} , every $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$, and every $c \in \mathcal{C}$:

$$\Pr[M = m \mid C = c] = \Pr[M = m' \mid C = c].$$

2. (Exercise 2.9.) Consider the following definition of perfect secrecy for the encryption of two messages. An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) over a message space \mathcal{M} is perfectly-secret for two messages if for all distributions over \mathcal{M} , all $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$, and all $c, c' \in \mathcal{C}$ with $\Pr[C = c \land C' = c'] > 0$:

$$\Pr\left[M = m \land M' = m' \mid C = c \land C' = c'\right] = \Pr\left[M = m \land M' = m'\right],$$

where m and m' are sampled independently from the same distribution over \mathcal{M} . Prove that no encryption scheme satisfies this definition. (Hint: Take $m \neq m'$ but c = c'.)

- 3. Define $G: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ by $G(x_1,\ldots,x_n) = x_1 \oplus x_2, x_1, \cdots, x_n$. (Note that the output of G is one bit longer than its input.) Prove that this G is not a pseudorandom generator.
- 4. Define $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ as follows: $F_k(x) = k \oplus x$. In class we proved that this F is not a pseudorandom function by showing an algorithm that could distinguish F from random using two queries. Can you construct a distinguishing algorithm that uses only one query? Either describe and analyze such an algorithm, or argue informally why no such algorithm exists.
- 5. Define $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ as follows: $F_{k_1,\dots,k_n}(x_1,\dots x_n) = \bigoplus_i k_i x_i$, where $k_i, x_i \in \{0,1\}$. (Note that, different from the usual convention, F takes an n-bit key and an n-bit input, but has only a single-bit output.) Prove that this F is not a pseudorandom function.