University of Maryland CMSC858K — Introduction to Cryptography Professor Jonathan Katz

Review Questions

- 1. Exercise 3.3.
- 2. Exercise 3.4.
- 3. Exercise 3.6.
- 4. Exercise 3.7.
- 5. Exercise 3.8.
- 6. Consider the following (informal) definition of security for a private-key encryption scheme: The adversary outputs a set of *three* (equal-length) messages m_1, m_2, m_3 ; an index $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ is chosen uniformly at random; then m_i is encrypted and the resulting ciphertext is given to the adversary. The adversary outputs i', and succeeds if i' = i. A scheme Π is secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries it holds that $\Pr[i' = i] \leq 1/3 + \operatorname{negl}(n)$.
 - (a) Write a formal definition corresponding to the above.
 - (b) Prove that if a symmetric-key encryption scheme Π is computationally indistinguishable, then Π is secure in the sense defined above.
- 7. Recall the "pseudo-one-time pad" encryption scheme where $\text{Enc}_k(m) = G(k) \oplus m$. In class we proved that if G is a pseudorandom generator than the pseudo-one-time pad scheme is computationally indistinguishable. Prove the converse.
- 8. Let G be a pseudorandom generator whose output is twice as long as its input. Define a keyed function F as follows: $F_k(x) = G(k) \oplus x$ (the block length of F is twice the key length). Prove that F is not a pseudorandom function.
- 9. Exercise 3.14.
- 10. Exercise 3.15.
- 11. Exercise 3.16.
- 12. (*) Exercise 3.20.
- 13. (*) Exercise 3.21.

- 14. Exercise 4.2.
- 15. Exercise 4.3.
- 16. Exercise 4.4.
- 17. (*) Exercise 4.5.
- 18. Exercise 4.6.
- 19. Exercise 4.8.
- 20. Exercise 4.9.
- 21. (*) Prove that *appending* the message length before applying CBC-MAC does not yield a secure MAC for variable-length messages.
- 22. (**) Consider instantiating CBC-MAC using a deterministic, fixed-length message authentication code Π (with tag length equal to the message length) in place of a pseudorandom function. Show that it is possible for Π to be a secure MAC, yet for the resulting CBC-MAC to be insecure even for messages of some fixed block length.
- 23. Exercise 4.11.
- 24. Exercise 4.15.
- 25. Exercise 4.17.
- 26. Exercise 4.20.
- 27. Exercise 4.21.