A Simple Byzantine Agreement Protocol

JONATHAN KATZ*

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Berman, Garay, and Perry [1] give a simple BA protocol for single-bit inputs with polynomial complexity and optimal resilience. The protocol involves running the following phase-king subroutine with parties $P_1, \ldots, P_{t+1}$ successively playing the role of the king.

**Round 1** Each party $P_i$ sends their input $v_i$ to all other parties.

$P_i$ then sets $C^b_i := 1$ (for $b \in \{0, 1\}$) iff at least $n-t$ parties sent it the bit $b$.

**Round 2** Each party $P_i$ sends $C^0_i$ and $C^1_i$ to all other parties. Let $C^b_{i \rightarrow j}$ denote the relevant value received by $P_j$ from $P_i$.

Each party $P_i$ sets $D^b_i := \left| \{ j : C^b_{j \rightarrow i} = 1 \} \right|$. If $D^1_i > t$, it sets $v_i := 1$; otherwise, it sets $v_i := 0$.

**Round 3** The king $P_k$ sends $v_k$ to all parties. Each party $P_i$ then updates their input as follows:

If $D^v_i < n-t$ then set $v_i$ equal to the value the king sent to $P_i$; otherwise, leave $v_i$ unchanged.

We begin with two lemmas about the phase king (sub-)protocol.

**Lemma 1** Let $t < n/2$, and assume all $n-t$ honest parties begin the phase-king subroutine holding the same input $b$. Then all honest parties terminate that subroutine with the same output $b$.

**Proof** Since all honest parties begin with input $b$, in the first round each honest party receives $b$ from at least $n-t$ parties, and receives $1-b$ from at most $t < n-t$ parties. So each honest $P_i$ sets $C^b_i := 1$ and $C^{1-b}_i := 0$. It follows that in round 2, each honest $P_i$ has $D^b_i \geq n-t > t$ and $D^{1-b}_i \leq t$, and $v_i = b$ at the end of that round. Since $D^v_i = D^b_i \geq n-t$ for an honest $P_i$, all honest parties ignore the value sent by the king and terminate the phase-king subroutine with output $b$.

**Lemma 2** Let $t < n/3$. If the king is honest in some execution of the phase-king subroutine, then the outputs of all honest parties agree at the end of that subroutine.

**Proof** An honest king sends the same value $v_k$ to all parties. So the only way agreement can possibly fail to hold is if some honest party $P_i$ does not set their input to the king’s value, i.e., if $D^v_i \geq n-t$. We claim that if there exists an honest party $P_i$ for whom $D^v_i \geq n-t$, then $v_i = v_k$ and so agreement holds anyway. To see this, consider the two possibilities:

- **Case 1:** $v_1 = 1$. Since $D^1_i \geq n-t$ we have $D^1_k \geq n-2t > t$, and so $v_k = 1$ as well.

*jkatz@cs.umd.edu. Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland.
• **Case 2:** $v_i = 0$. The fact that $D_i^0 \geq n - t$ implies $D_k^0 \geq n - 2t > t$. So at least one honest party $P_j$ sent $C_{j\rightarrow k}^0 = 1$ to $P_k$, implying that at least $n - t$ parties sent the bit ‘0’ to $P_j$ in round 1 and consequently at most $t$ parties sent ‘1’ to $P_j$ in round 1. But then any honest party received a ‘1’ from at most $2t < n - t$ parties in round 1, and so any honest party $P_i$ has $C_i^1 = 0$. It follows that each honest party, and $P_k$ in particular, has $D_k^1 \leq t$; we conclude that $v_k = 0$ as desired.

\[\square\]

**Theorem 1**  
The above protocol achieves Byzantine agreement for any $t < n/3$.

**Proof**  
Say all honest parties begin holding the same input. Then Lemma 1 implies that none of the honest parties ever change their input value in any of the phase-king subroutines, and so in particular they all terminate with the same output.

In any other case, we know that there must be at least one execution of the phase-king subroutine in which the king is honest. Following that execution, Lemma 2 guarantees that all honest parties hold the same input. Lemma 1 ensures that this will not change throughout the rest of the protocol.

\[\square\]

**References**