

Lecture 16

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1 Malicious Security, Continued

To finish off our discussion of malicious security, we mention some definitional variants. Recall that an n -party protocol Π for computing some function f is t -secure if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} corrupting t parties, there exists some expected polynomial-time simulator \mathcal{S} corrupting the same parties such that

$$\left\{ \mathbf{Real}_{\bar{x},z}^{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(1^k) \right\}_{\bar{x},z} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ \mathbf{Ideal}_{\bar{x},z}^{\mathcal{S},f}(1^k) \right\}_{\bar{x},z}.$$

We have the following security variants:

- One-sided security (for two-party protocols): Malicious security only holds when a specific party is corrupted (e.g., the evaluator in Yao's 2PC protocol).
- Privacy-only: Protocol Π for computing some function f is t -private for malicious adversaries if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} corrupting t parties, there exists some expected polynomial time simulator \mathcal{S} corrupting the same parties such that

$$\left\{ \mathbf{View}_{\bar{x},z}^{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(1^k) \right\}_{\bar{x},z} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ \mathbf{Output}_{\bar{x},z}^{\mathcal{S},f}(n) \right\}_{\bar{x},z}.$$

This is usually used in cases where the attacker gets no output.

2 Zero-knowledge Proofs

Let L be an \mathcal{NP} -language, and let R_L be a polynomial-time computable relation such that $\forall x \exists w R_L(x, w) = 1 \iff x \in L$. A *zero-knowledge (ZK) proof for L* is a two-party protocol between a prover P and a verifier V , such that the following three conditions hold:


1. (Completeness): $\forall x, w, R_L(x, w) = 1 \implies \langle P(x, w), V(x) \rangle = 1$.
2. (Soundness): $\forall x \notin L, \forall P^*, \Pr[\langle P^*(x), V(x) \rangle = 1] \leq \varepsilon(k)$. (Note that there are no restrictions on the running time of P^* .)
3. (Zero-knowledge): \forall PPT $V^* \exists \mathcal{S}$ running in expected polynomial time such that

$$\left\{ \mathbf{View}_{\langle P(x,w), V^*(x) \rangle}^{V^*}(1^k) \right\}_{(x,w) \in R_L} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ \mathcal{S}(x) \right\}_{(x,w) \in R_L}.$$

A zero-knowledge argument for L is equivalent to the above definition, except soundness holds for all PPT P^* (instead of P^* 's running time being arbitrary).

We now show a zero-knowledge proof for graph Hamiltonicity¹. Since graph Hamiltonicity is \mathcal{NP} -complete, this implies that there exist zero-knowledge proofs for all languages in \mathcal{NP} .

Our zero-knowledge proof assumes the existence of a statistically binding and computationally hiding commitment scheme. We assume the reader is familiar with commitment schemes; if not, see [Gol01, §4.4.1]. The existence of such a commitment scheme is implied by one-way functions [Gol01, §4.4.1.3].



Completeness is straightforward to show. For soundness, we have the following claim:

Theorem 1 *If the commitment scheme com is statistically binding, then the above protocol has soundness $1/2$.*

Proof This follows from the fact that the commitment scheme is statistically binding, and thus cannot be broken. Thus, if P^* can answer correctly for both $b = 0$ and $b = 1$, then G must have a Hamiltonian cycle. ■

Finally, we have the following theorem for the zero-knowledge property:

Theorem 2 *If the commitment scheme com is computationally hiding, then the above protocol is zero-knowledge.*

Proof Fix a PPT verifier V^* . We construct a simulator $\mathcal{S}(G, z)$, which takes as input a graph G and an auxiliary string z , as follows:

- Do the following at most k times:

1. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$.

¹See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamiltonicity> for a summary of the graph Hamiltonicity problem.

2. If $b = 0$, let M' be the adjacency matrix representation of a random permutation of G , and send $\text{com}(M')$ to V^* .
3. If $b = 1$, let M' be the adjacency matrix representation of a random permutation of an n vertex Hamiltonian cycle, and send $\text{com}(M')$ to V^* .
4. If V^* sends $b' = b$, then open $\text{com}(M')$ accordingly and output the transcript.
5. If V sends $b' \neq b$, then repeat.

We claim that $\{\mathcal{S}(G, z)\}_{G, z} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ \mathbf{View}_{\langle P(x, w), V^*(x, z) \rangle}^{V^*}(1^k) \right\}_{G, z}$. We prove this via a hybrid argument. Consider the following hybrid $\mathbf{Hybrid}(G, w, z)$:

- Do the following at most k times:
 1. Choose $b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$.
 2. Compute $\text{com}(M')$ as in the real protocol and send it to V^* .
 3. If V^* sends $b' = b$, then open $\text{com}(M')$ accordingly and output the transcript.
 4. If V sends $b' \neq b$, then repeat.

Claim 3 $\{\mathbf{Hybrid}(G, w, z)\}_{G, z} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ \mathbf{View}_{\langle P(x, w), V^*(x, z) \rangle}^{V^*}(1^k) \right\}_{G, z}$.

Proof Because of the uniform choice of b , the probability that \mathbf{Hybrid} *never* succeeds is 2^{-k} . Conditioned on succeeding, \mathbf{Hybrid} is equal to \mathbf{View} , and thus the above claim holds. ■

Claim 4 $\{\mathbf{Hybrid}(G, w, z)\}_{G, z} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \{\mathcal{S}(G, z)\}_{G, z}$.

Proof We prove this by reduction to the hiding property of the commitment scheme. Let \mathcal{D} be a distinguisher between \mathbf{Hybrid} and \mathcal{S} that succeeds with probability $\varepsilon(k)$. Let $\text{com}(\cdot, \cdot)$ be a “left-right” commitment oracle which returns either a commitment to its left input or a commitment to its right input. Define an attacker $\mathcal{A}^{\text{com}(\cdot, \cdot)}$, which takes as input a graph G , a witness w , and an auxiliary string z , as follows:

- Repeat k times:
 1. Choose $b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$.
 2. If $b = 0$ then commit to a random permutation of G as above.
 3. If $b = 1$ then commit to the Hamiltonian cycle in a random permutation of G , and then for all other indices in the adjacency matrix E input the pair $(E_{i, j}, 0)$ to the commitment oracle.
 4. If V^* sends $b' = b$, then open the commitments and run \mathcal{D} on the resulting transcript, and stop, outputting what \mathcal{D} outputs.
- Output \perp .

If $\text{com}(\cdot, \cdot)$ commits to the left input, then the transcript is distributed exactly as in **Hybrid**; if $\text{com}(\cdot, \cdot)$ commits to the right input, then the transcript is distributed exactly as in \mathcal{S} . Thus, \mathcal{A} succeeds in distinguishing the commitments with probability $\varepsilon(k)$, and thus by the assumed security of the commitment scheme it must be that $\varepsilon(k) \leq \text{negl}(k)$. ■

Thus, we have that $\{\mathcal{S}(G, z)\}_{G,z} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ \mathbf{View}_{\langle P(x,w), V^*(x,z) \rangle}^{V^*}(1^k) \right\}_{G,z}$, completing the proof. ■

References

- [Gol01] Oded Goldreich. *Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1, Basic Tools*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.