Errata/Typos for “Introduction to Modern Cryptography, second edition”

(Last updated December 4, 2017)

Note: negative line numbers correspond to counting from the bottom of the page.

• Page 5, line 12: The reference to Figure 1.2 should be to Figure 1.1 instead.

• page 11, Figure 1.3: The percentage listed for the letter ‘o’ should be 7.5, not 1.5.

• page 102, Exercise 3.6(a): \( \lfloor n/2 \rfloor \) should be \( \lceil n/2 \rceil \).

• page 129, line 12: \( X \) and \( X' \) should be \( X_i \) and \( X_j \), respectively.

• page 129, equation (4.6) should read:

\[
Pr[\text{Coll}] \leq \sum_{i,j: i < j} Pr[\text{Coll}_{i,j}] < \frac{q^2}{2} \cdot \max_{i<j} \{Pr[\text{Coll}_{i,j}]\}.
\]

• page 129, line 15: \( \text{Coll}_{i,j} \) should be \( \max_{i<j} \{Pr[\text{Coll}_{i,j}]\} \).

• page 146, second displayed equation: \( K(m_0, t_0) \) should be \( K(t_0) \).

• page 149, Exercise 4.11: the question assumes that \( \Pi' \) is a secure MAC that uses canonical verification.

• page 150, Exercise 4.20: the question assumes that \( \Pi' \) is strongly secure.

• page 210: In the second and third paragraphs on that page, the roles of \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \) were confused. These paragraphs should read as follows:

A better attack is possible by noting that individual bits of the output depend on only part of the master key. Fix some given input/output pair \((x, y)\) as before. Now, the adversary will enumerate over all possible values for the first byte of \( k_1 \). It can XOR each such value with the first byte of \( x \) to obtain a candidate value for the input of the first \( S \)-box. Evaluating this \( S \)-box, the attacker learns a candidate value for the output of that \( S \)-box. Since the output of that \( S \)-box is XOR’d with 8 bits of \( k_2 \) to give 8 bits of \( y \) (where the positions of those bits depend on the mixing permutation and are known to the attacker), this yields a candidate value for 8 bits of \( k_2 \).

To summarize: for each candidate value for the first byte of \( k_1 \), there is a unique possible corresponding value for some 8 bits of \( k_2 \). . . .

(The rest is the same, exact that \( k_2 \) should be replaced with \( k_1 \).)
• page 237, Exercise 6.4: the attack in the text already considers $S$-boxes with 8-bit input. So the first part of the question should instead consider a block length of 64 bits and 16 $S$-boxes taking 4-bit input.

• page 240, Exercise 6.16: there is in fact an attack taking time $2^{56}$ and using only constant space.

• page 255, line -12: $\mathcal{A}(x, r \oplus e^i)$ should be $\mathcal{A}(f(x), r \oplus e^i)$.

• page 358, Exercise 9.2: show instead that the algorithm outputs $p$ with overwhelming probability.

• page 424, last line of Construction 11.36: $\hat{m}$ should be $m'$.

• page 434, Exercise 11.7: $m$ should be in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, not $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

• page 455, line -13: $\text{Sig-Forge}_{A',\Pi'}(n)$ should be $\text{Pr}[\text{Sig-Forge}_{A',\Pi'}(n) = 1]$.

• page 459, line -9: $h$ should be $y$ (twice).

• page 460, line 3: $Gm$ should be $G$.

• page 484, Exercise 12.5(c): the encoding should be $\text{enc}(m) = 0^{\kappa/10}m0^{\kappa/10}$.

• page 490, last line of Construction 13.4: $\text{Inv}_I(c)$ should be $\text{Inv}_{td}(c)$.

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