Wys*: A Verified Language Extension for Secure Multi-Party Computations. Aseem Rastogi, Nikhil Swamy, and Michael Hicks, November 2017.

Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables a set of mutually distrusting parties to cooperatively compute, using a cryptographic protocol, a function over their private data. This paper presents Wys*, a new domain-specific language (DSL) implementation for writing MPCs. Wys* is a Verified, Domain-Specific Integrated Language Extension (VDSILE), a new kind of embedded DSL hosted in F*, a full-featured, verification-oriented programming language. Wys* source programs are essentially F* programs written against an MPC library, meaning that the programmers can use F*'s logic to verify the correctness and security properties of their programs. To reason about the distributed semantics of these programs, we formalize a deep embedding of Wys*, also in F*. We mechanize the necessary metatheory to prove that the properties verified for the Wys* source programs carry over to the distributed, multi-party semantics. Finally, we use F*'s extraction mechanism to extract an interpreter that we have proved matches this semantics, yielding a verified implementation. Indeed, Wys* is the first DSL to enable formal verification of source MPC programs, and also the first MPC DSL to provide a verified implementation. With Wys* we have implemented several MPC protocols, including private set intersection, joint median, and an MPC-based card dealing application, and have verified their security and correctness.

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  AUTHOR = {Aseem Rastogi and Nikhil Swamy and Michael Hicks},
  TITLE = {Wys$^*$: A Verified Language Extension for Secure Multi-Party Computations},
  YEAR = 2017

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