

Robust ECN Signaling with Nonces

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
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
Problem

Bugs and misbehavior may hide ECN marks from the sender



① ECN properly echoed

ECT – ECN Capable Transport
CE – Congestion Experienced
CWR – Congestion Window Reduced
ECE – ECN-Echo



① CE improperly hidden
② Sender infers no congestion
③ Then sends too fast

Motivation

[SCWA99] lists how and why receivers can fool senders

- Ack division, DupACK spoofing
- Challenging to implement
- Easy to protect against at server

Receivers can't hide drops if they want data.

Receivers can hide ECN marks and still get data.

Want robust ECN mechanism

- Don't assume senders trust receivers

How to hide congestion signals

linux-2.4.0/include/net/tcp_ecn.h

Normal:

```
51: static __inline__ void
52: TCP_ECN_send(...)
...
67:     if (tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR)
68:         skb->h.th->ece = 1;
```

Misbehaving:

```
68:         skb->h.th->ece = 0;
```

ECN nonce review

One-bit random nonce sent with each packet

- Using same IP header bits as ECT/CE

Nonce is erased to signal congestion


Sum (parity) of nonces returned with each ack

- A new bit from TCP's reserved field


Sender verifies clear ECN-echo with nonce sum:

- Incorrect sum implies failure
- Should disable ECN and reduce sending rate

Visual ECN nonce review



- ① ECN properly echoed
- ② Nonce sum (**NS**) ignored
- ③ Synch. **NS** after **CWR**



- ❶ CE improperly hidden
- ❷ Guessed **NS** is wrong
- ❸ Sender disables ECN

TCP processing state

Receiver stores

- Nonce bit for each out of order packet
- Current nonce sum

Sender stores

- Nonce sum expected for each unack'd packet
- Synchronization offset bit

Packet adds TCP header bit for nonce sum:


4 bit header length	reserved (3 bits)	N S	C W R	E C E	U R G	A C K	P S H	R S T	S Y N	F I N
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Penalty


Disabling ECN is not sufficient incentive to behave

Set $\text{cwnd} = \text{ssthresh} = 1$

- Intended to negate gains from misbehavior



Normal cwnd sawtooth



$\text{cwnd}=1$ on misbehavior
(but not disabling ECN)

Alternative approaches

Test correct operation by setting CE bit at sender.

- If it is correctly echoed, receiver is behaving
- Performance or accuracy cost

Off-line testing like TBIT

- Blacklist misbehaving destination IP's

ECN nonce protects all packets

Backward compatibility

How do we deal with existing ECT/CE implementations?


Routers: straightforward, described in latest ECN draft

TCPs:

- Use third bit in negotiation procedure? (111 \rightarrow 101)
- Easy to notice when nonce is unsupported?
(111 \rightarrow 001)
- Support nonce-less ECN for transition period?

SACKs

Should nonces cover SACK'd packets?



ECN-echo set for subsequent acks

Nonce applies only to in-order acknowledged segments

SACKs don't increase the window.

Conclusion

ECN without nonces allows receivers to hide signals

- Hard to verify correct behavior
- Misbehaving receivers benefit

ECN with nonces prevents concealment

- One more header bit
- Minor TCP state

Questions? Insults?

Doc: draft-ietf-tsvwg-tcp-nonce-00.txt

Offline: nspring@cs.washington.edu

Talk slides: <http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/nspring/talks/ietf-ecn.ps.gz>