

# Measuring Domain Impersonation with Certificate Transparency Logs

Richard Roberts, Yaelle Goldschlag, Dave Levin

## Motivation

TLS-validated domains aren't always who they appear to be:


- amazon.com.es-nav-youraccount-btn.es-login-signonv3.com
- account.paypal.com-page-auth-u7dn6x13is.ml
- apple.com.find-device-location.review
- docusign.com.common-oauth2.gq
- ebay.com-item-apple-iphone-x-gray-256gb-unlocked.kl7.us
- paypal.com.verif-unusual-id-000263-160526.com
- oldschool.runescape.com-wz.ml

**Question** Why and how often are attackers given impersonating certificates?

## Methodology



Impersonating domains are far more likely to be malicious




Final Impersonating Set


- Unique Domains: 173,321
- Unique Certificates: 290,239

## Who is being targeted?

Paypal and Apple are the most popular targets, but we see a long tail by the target's Alexa ranking.



## Who is Issuing Certificates?




## What is the barrier for entry?


**Free**

- Certificates: COMODO, Let's Encrypt
- Registrars: .ml, .gq, .tk, .cf, .ga
- Hosting: aws, CLOUDFLARE

## Where does the target appear?



**Safari on iOS** Left justifies entire domain  
**Chrome on Android** Right justifies from TLD



## Are attacks evolving?

Attacks are increasing in complexity by composing multiple forms of domain impersonation, such as Unicode homographs:

www.facebook.com.msg130.top

## Uncovering Large Campaigns

	RUNESCAPE	STAR WARS
Google Safe Browsing	845 Unique Domains	1,079
CT Logs	4,522	3,071
Safe Browsing Coverage	18.89%	35.14%