
Total points: 60. Total time: 75 minutes. 6 problems over 7 pages. No book, notes, or calculator

1. [14 points]

Are $n=323$ and $e=5$ valid numbers for RSA. Explain. If you answer yes, obtain the corresponding d .

2. [5 points]

Recall that a **DES encryption operation** takes a 64-bit plaintext block and a 56-bit key and produces a 64-bit ciphertext block. Recall also that each DES encryption operation itself consists of a number of iterations, which we shall refer to as **basic iterations**.

For the DES encryption in CBC mode of a plaintext message of N 64-bit blocks, obtain the following (in terms of N):

- a. Total number of DES encryption operations.
- b. Size of the output. Explain briefly.
- c. Total number of basic iterations. Explain briefly.

3. [6 points]

Is there an integer K in the range $1, \dots, 47$ such that $K^{48} \bmod 105$ is not equal to 1?

If you answer yes, produce such a K and the value of $K^{48} \bmod 105$ (as an integer in the range $1, \dots, 47$).

If you answer no, explain.

4. [10 points]

Consider a public key infrastructure with principals A_1, A_2, \dots, A_{20} and B_1, B_2, \dots, B_{20} . There are three certification authorities, namely, X, Y, and Z. Each principal (i.e., A_i and B_i) has X's public key. X issues certificates for Y and Z. Y issues certificates for A_1, A_2, \dots, A_{20} . Z issues certificates for B_1, B_2, \dots, B_{20} .

Suppose A_1 wants the public key of B_2 . What are the documents (e.g., certificates) that A_1 looks for. For each document, describe its fields and any constraints that must hold.

5. [10 points]

The chart below shows a skeleton of an authentication protocol. Initially, principals A and B share a secret key K and public Diffie-Hellman parameters g and p . Assume an attacker that can eavesdrop, intercept messages, and send messages with another's sender id. Supply an authentication protocol (i.e., the part indicated by the "• • ... • •") such that:

- A initiates the protocol.
- A and B authenticate each other (i.e., the attacker cannot impersonate one to the other).
- A and B establish a session key S (for encrypting data) such that after A and B disconnect and forget S , even if the attacker learns K , the attacker cannot decrypt the data exchanged.
- The authentication involves *at most* 4 messages (it can be fewer). (Only one cell can be used in each row.)

A (has K, g, p)	B (has K, g, p)
•	
•	
•	
•	
<----- A and B exchange data -----> <----- A and B disconnect ----->	

6. 15 points]

In the authentication protocol below, pw is A's password and J is a key derived from pw.

A (has pw)	B (has J)
send [A, B, conn] // msg 1	receive [A, B, conn] generate random challenge R_B $S_B \leftarrow \text{encrypt}(R_B)$ with key J send [B, A, S_B] // msg 2
receive [B, A, S_B] compute J from pw $T_B \leftarrow \text{decrypt}(S_B)$ with key J $U_B \leftarrow \text{encrypt}(T_B+1)$ with key J generate random challenge R_A $S_A \leftarrow \text{encrypt}(R_A)$ with key J send [A, B, U_B , S_A] // msg 3	
	receive [A, B, U_B , S_A] $V_B \leftarrow \text{decrypt}(U_B)$ with key J if $V_B = R_B+1$ then A is authenticated else abort $T_A \leftarrow \text{decrypt}(S_A)$ with key J $U_A \leftarrow \text{encrypt}(T_A+1)$ with key J send [B, A, U_A] // msg 4
receive [B, A, U_A] $V_A \leftarrow \text{decrypt}(U_A)$ with key J if $V_A = R_A+1$ then B is authenticated else abort	

- Consider an attacker that can **only eavesdrop** (i.e., can hear messages in transit but cannot intercept messages or send messages with somebody else's sender id). Can this attacker obtain pw by off-line password guessing. If you answer no, explain briefly. If you answer yes, describe the attack.
- Consider an attacker that can **only spoof A** (i.e., send messages with sender id A and receive messages with destination id A, but not eavesdrop or intercept messages). Can this attacker obtain pw by off-line password guessing. If you answer no, explain briefly. If you answer yes, describe the attack.
- Consider an attacker that can **only spoof B** (i.e., send messages with sender id B and receive messages with destination id B, but not eavesdrop or intercept messages). Can this attacker obtain pw by off-line password guessing. If you answer no, explain briefly. If you answer yes, describe the attack.

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