Problem 1. [50 points]

This problem and program Protocol below is based on section 11.2 of the text. The client program has a thread that repeatedly opens and closes a session. The server has a thread that always waits to receive a session request; for each received request, it starts a new thread to handle that request. The attacker can send and receive messages as A. The server program uses a map to store the ids of its threads. Conventions concerning maps is on the next page.

```
Protocol(A, B) {
                                                            Attacker() {
   chan \leftarrow [];
                                                              \alpha; // everything attacker has read
                                    // channel
   hst \leftarrow [];
                                    // conn history
                                                              <send message [A,B,...]>
   K \leftarrow random();
                                    // master key
                                                              <receive message [B,A,...]>
   startSystem(Server(B,A,K)); // server B
                                                            }
   startSystem(Client(A,B,K));
                                   // client A
   startSystem(Attacker());
                                   // attacker
}
                                                            Server(B, A, K) { // atomicity points: 1, 2
                                                               Map t \leftarrow [];
                                                               t[0] ← startThread(listen());
Client(A, B, K) { // atomicity points: 1
                                                               return;
   function listen() {
   return:
                                                                   while (true) {
   function doSessions() {
                                                                 1: msg \leftarrow rx([A,B,1,..]);
      while (true) {
                                                                      nA \leftarrow msg[3];
                                                                      if (nA \neq 0 and msg[4] = 0)
         nA \leftarrow random();
         tx([A,B,1,nA,0]);
                                                                         t[nA] ← startThread(serveClient(nA));
                                                                   }
     1: msg \leftarrow rx([B,A,1,..]);
                                                                }
         if (msg[4] = enc(K,nA)) {
             nB \leftarrow msg[3];
                                                               function serveClient(nA) {
             S \leftarrow enc(-K, nA+nB);
                                                                      nB \leftarrow random();
             hst.append([A,S]);
                                                                      tx([B,A,1,nB,enc(K,nA)]);
             tx([A,B,2,nA,enc(K,nB)]);
                                                                 2: msg ← rx([A,B,2,nA,.]);
         }
      }
                                                                      if (msg[4] = enc(K, nB)) {
  }
                                                                         S \leftarrow enc(-K, nA+nB);
}
                                                                         hst.append([B,S]);
                                                                      }
                                                                   }
                                                               }
                                                            }
```

For each part below, answer yes or no. If yes, come up with an argument. If no, come up with a counter-example evolution.

Does Inv A_1 hold, where $A_1: \psi(K)$	// attacker does not learn K
Does Inv A_2 hold, where A_2 : ([A,p] in hst) $\Rightarrow \psi(p)$	// attacker does not learn any session key of A
Does Inv A_3 hold, where A_3 : ((i,j in hst.keys) and $i \neq j$ and $hst[i][0] = hst[j][0] = A$) $\Rightarrow hst[i][1] \neq hst[j][1]$	// A uses a session key only once
Does Inv A_4 hold, where A_4 : (i > 0 and hst[i] = [B,p]) \Rightarrow hst[i-1] = [A,p]	// attacker cannot connect to the server as A

e. Can the attacker learn K by dictionary attack, assuming that K is a weak key.

Problem 2. [50 points]

Repeat problem 1 after changing the protocol so that the server uses key K+1 to respond to the client's message and the client uses key K-1 to respond to the server's message.

That is, modify program Protocol so that:

- Client A expects message [B,A,1,nB, enc(K+1, nA)] (instead of [B,A,1,nB, enc(K, nA)]) in response to its message [A,B,1,nA,0].
- Server B expects message [A,B,2,nA, enc(K-1, nB)] (instead of [A,B,2,nA, enc(K, nB)]) in response to its message [B,A,1,nB, enc(K+1, nA)].

Answer parts a-e for this modified program.

Conventions (applicable outside this homework also)

Maps:

Collections of 2-tuples where the first element is a key and the second is a value, the keys are distinct, and map entries can be indexed by the key.

For a map x:

- x.size: number of 2-tuples in the map.
- x.keys: sequence of its keys.
- x.vals: sequence of its values.
- x[j], where j is a key, refers to the value associated with j; i.e., x has the tuple [j,x[j]].
- x.add(j,v): adds the tuple [j,v] to x, replacing any prior [j,.] tuple.
- $x[j] \leftarrow v$: same as x.add(j,v).
- x.remove(j): removes any [j,.] tuple.

For example, if x is the map [[2, 5], [4, 7], ['A', 8], ['Z', 'SRVR']], then the following hold: x.size = 4; x.keys = [2,4,'A','Z']; x.vals = [5,7,8,'SRVR']; x['Z'] = 'SRVR'.

Referring to thread-specific quantities:

If, in a predicate or in an argument, you need to refer to a quantity specific to a thread in server B, you can do so by prefixing its name with the thread id.

For example, B.t[nA].nB refers to the nB value of the instance of function serveClient being executed by thread B.t[nA]. Thus the following may be a desired property of Protocol:

Inv (exists(A.nB, B.t[A.nA].nB) \Rightarrow A.nB = B.t[A.nA].nB)

Strong key assumption:

Unless otherwise mentioned, assume that keys are strong.

Predicates with non-program free variables:

For brevity, we may write a predicate containing variables that do not appear in the program being analyzed. When evaluating the predicate at a program state, treat these variables as universally quantified.

For example, predicate A_2 is ([A,p] in hst) $\Rightarrow \psi(p)$ Variable p is not defined in Protocol. So when evaluating A_2 at a program state, we treat A_2 as forall(p: ([A,p] in hst) $\Rightarrow \psi(p)$)