First problem set is out. Due on Tuesday, Sep. 13, noon (i.e., before the start of class) on Gradescope.

You can find the assignment on Gradescope, ELMS, or the course web page.

**Reminder:** Extensions need prior approval and valid reason.

Hopefully this one should not be too challenging, but the problem sets will get harder.

I have reorganized the course web page slightly to give more prominence to the slides and homework assignments. Today’s slides are posted there.

**Please,** if you are reading the slides before we get to a point in the lecture and see a **Vote**, **stop and think** about your answer before reading further.
Definition: A private-key encryption protocol is a set of three probabilistic algorithms \((\text{Gen, Enc, Dec})\).

- **Gen** is the key generation algorithm. It takes as input \(s\), the security parameter, and outputs a key \(k \in \{0,1\}^*\).
- **Enc** is the encryption algorithm. It takes as input \(k\) and a plaintext or message \(m \in \{0,1\}^*\) and outputs a ciphertext \(c \in \{0,1\}^*\).
- **Dec** is the decryption algorithm. It takes as input \(k\) and \(c\) and outputs some \(m' \in \{0,1\}^*\).

An encryption protocol is correct if

\[
\text{Dec}(k, \text{Enc}(k, m)) = m
\]

Unless otherwise stated, assume that \(\text{Gen}(n)\) chooses a random bit string of length \(s\). Note that there may be some restrictions on the allowed space of messages (e.g., length).
The one-time pad is defined as follows:

The security parameter $s$ should be chosen to be equal to the message length to be used.

Gen: Choose uniformly random bit string $k$ of length $s$.

Enc: Acts on message $m$ of length $s$ as $Enc(k, m) = m \oplus k$.

Dec: Acts on ciphertext $c$ of length $s$ as $Dec(k, c) = c \oplus k$. 
Definition A: An encryption protocol $(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ provides perfect secrecy if for any distribution $M$ of valid messages and any $m \in M$, ciphertext $c$ such that $\Pr(\text{Enc}(k, m) = c) \neq 0$,

$$\Pr(M = m \mid C = c) = \Pr(M = m)$$

averaged over keys $k$ and randomness in $\text{Enc}$ and $\text{Dec}$.

Alternatively,

Definition B: An encryption protocol $(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ provides perfect secrecy if for any pair of valid messages $m_1, m_2$, and any ciphertext $c$,

$$\Pr(\text{Enc}(k, m_1) = c) = \Pr(\text{Enc}(k, m_2) = c)$$

with probability averaged over keys $k$ and randomness in $\text{Enc}$ and $\text{Dec}$.

These are known as soundness conditions.
Definition A, $\Pr(M = m \mid C = c) = \Pr(M = m)$, says that Eve’s best guess about the message after seeing the ciphertext is the same as her best guess before: She hasn’t learned any information.

Definition B, $\Pr(Enc(k, m_1) = c) = \Pr(Enc(k, m_2) = c)$, says that any given ciphertext is equally likely to result from either $m_1$ or $m_2$. This definition is often easier to work with, but it might be a little less obvious what it has to do with secrecy.

Definition B basically says that if Eve is trying to choose between the two messages, seeing the ciphertext doesn’t help her.

Should we choose definition A or definition B?
Equivalence of Definitions

Definition A ↔ Definition B

Proof: Relies on Bayes’ theorem

\[
\Pr(M = m \mid C = c) = \frac{\Pr(C = c \mid M = m)\Pr(M = m)}{\Pr(C = c)}
\]
Proof: Relies on Bayes’ theorem

\[ \Pr(M = m | C = c) = \frac{\Pr(C = c | M = m) \Pr(M = m)}{\Pr(C = c)} \]

A → B: Consider a distribution of messages that contains both \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) as possibilities. Then definition A says that

\[ \Pr(M = m_i | C = c) = \Pr(M = m_i) \]

(unless \( \Pr(C = c) = 0 \)). By Bayes’ theorem, this implies that

\[ \Pr(C = c | M = m_1) = \Pr(C = c) = \Pr(C = c | M = m_2) \]
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$$\Pr(C = c \mid M = m_1) = \Pr(C = c) = \Pr(C = c \mid M = m_2)$$

But $\Pr(C = c \mid M = m_i) = \Pr(Enc(k, m_i) = c)$ by the definition of $Enc$, so we get definition B.
Equivalence of Definitions

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But \(Pr(C = c | M = m_i) = Pr(Enc(k, m_i) = c)\) by the definition of \(Enc\), so we get definition B.

If \(Pr(C = c) = 0\), then \(Pr(Enc(k, m_i) = c) = 0\) for both \(i\).
A: For any two messages $m_1$ and $m_2$, we have

$$\Pr(C = c \mid M = m_1) = \Pr(\text{Enc}(k, m_1) = c)$$

$$= \Pr(\text{Enc}(k, m_2) = c) = \Pr(C = c \mid M = m_2)$$
B \rightarrow A: For any two messages \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \), we have

\[
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= \Pr(\text{Enc}(k, m_2) = c) = \Pr(C = c \mid M = m_2)
\]

This implies that \( \Pr(C = c \mid M = m) = P \), with \( P \) a constant independent of \( m \). Then

\[
\Pr(C = c) = \sum_{m \in M} \Pr(C = c \mid M = m)\Pr(M = m) = P \sum_{m \in M} \Pr(M = m) = P
\]

using the fact that probabilities sum to 1.
B  A: For any two messages \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \), we have

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using the fact that probabilities sum to 1.

We get \( \Pr(C = c) = \Pr(C = c \mid M = m) \), and if we plug this into Bayes’ theorem, we get definition A:

\[
\Pr(M = m \mid C = c) = \frac{\Pr(C = c \mid M = m)\Pr(M = m)}{\Pr(C = c)}
\]
Perfect Secrecy of One-Time Pad

**Theorem:** The one-time pad has perfect secrecy.

**Proof:** We will use definition B.

Let us calculate $\Pr(Enc(k, m) = c)$ for some $m$ and $c$, averaged over keys $k$. 

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Given *any* $m$ and $c$, then $Enc(k, m) = c$ iff $k = m \oplus c$. Therefore, there is exactly one value of $k$ for which $Enc(k, m) = c$. Thus,

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\Pr(Enc(k, m) = c) = \frac{1}{2^s}
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$$\Pr(Enc(k, m) = c) = \frac{1}{2^s}$$

This is true regardless of $m$, so in particular, for any $m_1, m_2$,

$$\Pr(Enc(k, m_1) = c) = \Pr(Enc(k, m_2) = c) = \frac{1}{2^s}$$
Now we have proven the one-time pad is perfectly secure, so we are done with encryption.
What Does Perfect Security Imply?

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Well, maybe not quite …

The one-time pad has a key as long as the message. That can be inconvenient. And why is it called the one-time pad?

What if we use the same key twice for different messages?
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What if we use the same key twice for different messages?

\[ c_1 = m_1 \oplus k \]
\[ c_2 = m_2 \oplus k \]

Add these:

\[ c_1 \oplus c_2 = (m_1 \oplus k) \oplus (m_2 \oplus k) = m_1 \oplus m_2 \]

This gives us a new ciphertext \( c_1 \oplus c_2 \) which is effectively one message encrypted using the other. This is like using a book with the Vigenère cipher: It is vulnerable to frequency analysis.
The definition of perfect secrecy assumes only one message. If you are going beyond it, e.g. by sending two messages, then it does not provide any security guarantee.

This matters: For instance, during the Cold War, Soviet spies in the U.S. were using the one-time pad to communicate, but they had some duplicated pages in their codebooks, causing them to use some keys twice. The U.S. was able to break some of their messages (the Venona project), helping to uncover many spies.

But security definitions and proofs help to delineate exactly what a cryptographic protocol can do and what it can’t do.

The need to replace the key after each message is extremely inconvenient and limits the one-time pad to the applications needing highest security.
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Vote: If we do, is the result stronger/weaker/the same?
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**Vote:** If we do, is the result stronger/weaker/the same?

**Answer:** *Weaker*! Why? The scheme is no longer perfectly secret: If Eve sees ciphertext \( c \), she now knows \( m \neq c \), which she might not have known before.
Shorter Key Lengths?

We would like to make the one-time pad more convenient to use. One way to do this would be to find an encryption protocol with perfect secrecy and a shorter key.

**Theorem:** Any protocol with perfect secrecy must have as many possible keys as possible messages.
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In particular, there must be some key $k_1$ and choice of randomness such that $Enc(k_1, m_1) = c$ and some key $k_2$ and randomness such that $Enc(k_2, m_2) = c$. By correctness,

$$Dec(k_i, c) = m_i$$

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$$Dec(k_i, c) = m_i$$

which implies that $k_1 \neq k_2$. But this is true for all pairs $m_1$ and $m_2$, so there must be at least one key for each message.

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Beyond Perfect Secrecy

To do better, we must give up some of the conditions of perfect secrecy. We don’t need that Eve’s gain of information is 0, provided it is very small. Unfortunately, by itself, this is not enough for much improvement.

One idea is to work on the key. In the Vigenère cipher with a book as a key, Alice and Bob’s short key gave them a recipe for how to generate a much longer sequence of shifts for the encryption algorithm by looking at the book. Unfortunately, that approach was still vulnerable to frequency analysis.

But what if we used some other source of bits that looks more random than a book even though it is not?

What counts as looking random, and how can we be sure Eve doesn’t have a way of analyzing our source of bits that reveals patterns that can be used to decrypt?

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We need to **precisely** define Eve’s **capabilities** and what she is trying to. We shouldn’t assume **how** she will attack our protocol, since she might think of a different approach.

- **Be precise:** Define Eve’s capabilities precisely, so that we can evaluate if our assumption about them is satisfied or not.
- **Be conservative:** It is safer to assume Eve has more power than she actually has rather than to assume she has less power than she actually has.
- **Make (only) necessary assumptions:** There may be some assumptions we need to make in order to have any security at all. Minimize these, but since they are critical, try to make sure they are true.

This analysis will give us the **threat model**.
Eve’s Capabilities

Eve has the following capabilities and limits:

- Eve cannot access Alice’s or Bob’s computer. (Necessary; otherwise the encryption won’t help.)
- Eve does not know the key.
- Eve does know the protocol being used.
- Eve has large but limited computational power.
- Eve can read the ciphertext of the transmitted message.
  - Or the ciphertext of multiple messages.
  - Or knows both the ciphertext and plaintext of multiple messages before this one.
  - Or chooses the plaintext of multiple messages and sees the resulting ciphertexts. (Chosen plaintext attack)
  - Or …
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What Is “Limited” Computation?

We need a precise definition of what it means for Eve to have limited computational power.

- **Limit Eve’s computational time**, e.g.: at most $10^6$ years.
  
  This is what we are most interested in in practice; but it is very vulnerable to improvements in computer technology.

- **Limit Eve’s computational steps**.
  
  This is more robust against improvements in computers, but different architectures can still require a different number of steps; and what if we increase the security parameter?

- **Limit the rate of asymptotic scaling** of Eve’s number of computational steps as we increase the security parameter.
Big-O Notation

We quantify asymptotic number of steps by big-O notation, e.g. $O(s^2)$, $O(2^s)$.

**Definition:** We say a function $f(s) = O(g(s))$ if there exist constants $C, s_0$ such that $f(s) \leq Cg(s)$ for all $s > s_0$.

Why? This expresses the leading-order behavior up to a constant factor. For large $s$, the leading order behavior always dominates: $s^5 + 100s^3 = O(s^5)$. And $s^5 > 100s^3$ whenever $s > 10$. The rate of growth of larger functions rapidly overcomes even large constants.

In particular, for large enough $s$, $2^s$ is always bigger than $As^c$ for any constants $A$ and $c$. For instance,

$$A = 1000, \ c = 10: \ 2^s > 1000s^{10} \ \text{when} \ s \geq 72.$$ 

**Exponential wins out over polynomial** even for modest size $s$. 

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In complexity theory, we like to categorize functions as polynomial time vs. exponential time.

- Different models of computation can give different numbers of computational steps to compute the same function, but they only seem to differ by polynomial factors (excepting quantum computation).
- The set of polynomial functions is closed under most operations: addition, multiplication, composition. This means that the property of being "polynomial" is robust under a variety of different transformations. For instance, a polynomial number of calls to a subroutine that itself takes polynomial time is also polynomial.

We say that a computation that can be completed in polynomial time as a function of the size of the input is efficient. In this course, I will generally allow probabilistic algorithms.
Negligible Probabilities

We also need to consider how much information we will allow Eve to learn. Usually this manifests as a probability, for instance as an increase in the probability that Eve can correctly guess the message.

If we choose polynomial time as the measure of efficiency and assume everything that Eve does should be in polynomial time, then what probability $\epsilon$ should we accept for Eve to do something she is not supposed to?

If Eve achieves her goal with probability $\epsilon$ in one attempt and she can try $f(s)$ times, then we need that $f(s)\epsilon$ is small. Therefore, we call a function $g(s)$ negligible if

$$f(s)g(s) < 1$$

for all polynomials $f(s)$ (and $s > s_0$ for some constant $s_0$).

Example: $2^{-\sqrt{s}}$ and $s^{-\log s}$ are both negligible functions.
This approach to characterizing efficient attacks and protocols and negligible probabilities allows a clean and well-defined theory. However, it does have some drawbacks:

• It is not really possible in this approach to quantify the security of protocols of fixed size, only of protocols where there is an adjustable security parameter $s$.

• While any exponential will always beat any polynomial \textit{eventually}, for large enough parameters, any real protocol has specific numerical values assigned and the polynomial might be bigger for those specific values.

Therefore, to evaluate any protocol for real-world use, you must plug in real numbers to see if the security is sufficiently good in practice.