Problem Set #2

CMSC/Math 456 Instructor: Daniel Gottesman

Due on Gradscope, Thursday, Sep. 14, noon (before start of class)

General instructions: If you collaborate or use any outside resources, remember to cite them in your solutions.

Problem #1. Big-O Notation and Negligible Functions (40 points)

For parts a-c, you need only give your answers, but if you explain your reasoning, you may qualify for partial credit in cases where your answer is incorrect. Parts a-c refer to the following five functions of n:

$$f_1(n) = 3n + 15 \tag{1}$$

$$f_2(n) = \frac{1}{2}(n^3 + n^{-3}) \tag{2}$$

$$f_3(n) = \frac{n^{-11}}{18} \tag{3}$$

$$f_4(n) = \left(\frac{3}{2}\right)^{\sqrt{n}} \tag{4}$$

$$f_5(n) = \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{\sqrt{n}} \tag{5}$$

- a) (10 points) For each of the five functions $f_i(n)$, say if it is $O(n^3)$.
- b) (10 points) For each of the five functions $f_i(n)$, say if it is O(1). (I.e., if it is O(g(n)), where g(n) = 1 is a constant function.)
- c) (10 points) For each of the five functions $f_i(n)$, say if it is negligible.
- d) (10 points) Let ε(s) be a negligible function of s and let p(s) be a polynomial function of s. Show that there exists s₁ such that for any s > s₁, p(s)ε(2s) < 1.
 Hint: Let t = 2s and find another polynomial function q(t) such that by applying the definition of negligible to ε(t), you get the desired result.
 Comment: This result is the main step to proving that if ε(s) is negligible then ε(2s) is also negligible.

Problem #2. Combining Pseudorandom Generators (80 points)

For this problem, let G(y) and H(y) be two efficiently computable pseudorandom generators with $\ell(s) = 2s$. Recall that G (or H) takes inputs of arbitrary length s and outputs bit strings of length $\ell(s)$.

- a) (20 points) Let | represent concatenation, so if m and n are two bit strings of length 2s, then m|n is the string of length 4s formed by bits of m followed by the bits of n. Then let $K_1(y) = G(y)|G(y)$ (which takes inputs of length s and outputs bit strings of length 4s) and find an attack that shows that K(y) is not a pseudorandom generator.
- b) (20 points) Is $K_2(y) = G(y)|H(y)$ a pseudorandom generator for all pairs of functions G(y) and H(y) such that $G(y) \neq H(y)$ for all y? Why or why not?

c) (20 points) Let $K_3(y) = H(G(y))$, which also takes inputs of size *s* and outputs bit strings of length 4*s*. (*G*(*y*) and *H*(*y*) do not always have to be different here.) Explain how to create a reduction which turns an efficient attack on $K_3(y)$ into an efficient attack on G(y). (In fact, this reduction shows that $K_3(y)$ is a pseudorandom generator but you don't need to go through all the other details. In particular, you don't need to calculate the success probability of the attack on G(y), merely set up the reduction.)

Hint: This reduction will look similar to the one showing the security of the pseudo one-time pad.

- d) (5 points) Let $G^{(k)} = G^{(k-1)}(G(y))$ for $k \ge 2$, where $G^{(1)}(y) = G(y)$. If the input to $G^{(k)}$ is a bit string of length s, how long is the output?
- e) (15 points) Define $G^{(k)}$ as in part d. Let $K_4(y) = G^{(s)}(y)$ when the length of y is s. Which of these two arguments is correct?
 - 1. $K_4(y)$ is a pseudorandom generator, because the reduction in part c shows that if $H(y) = G^{(k-1)}(y)$, then $G^{(k)}(y)$ is also a pseudorandom generator.
 - 2. $K_4(y)$ is not a pseudorandom generator, because Eve can do a brute force attack by trying all possible inputs y to distinguish $K_4(y)$ from a random string.