
DART:
Directed Automated Random Testing
based on PLDI '05 presentation
[Patrice Godefroid](#) Nils Klarlund Koushik Sen
Bell Labs Bell Labs UIUC

Motivation

- Software testing is expensive
- Unit testing applied to individual software components
 - One possible goal is 100% code coverage
- Can require test harness/driver code & takes time, so often not as effective as it might be
- DART helps automate unit testing by eliminating/reducing the need for writing manually test driver and harness code and automatically generating test inputs

DART: Directed Automated Random Testing

1. **Automated** extraction of program interface from source code
 2. Generation of test driver for **random** testing through the interface
 3. Dynamic test generation to **direct** executions along alternative program paths
- DART can detect program crashes and assertion violations
 - Pre- and post-conditions can be added to generated test-driver

Example (C code)

```
int double(int x) {  
    return 2 * x;  
}
```



(1) Interface extraction:

- parameters of toplevel function
- external variables
- return values of external functions

```
void test_me(int x, int y) {  
    int z = double(x);  
    if (z==y) {  
        if (y == x+10)  
            abort(); /* error */  
    }  
}
```



(2) Generation of test driver for random testing:

```
main(){  
    int tmp1 = randomInt();  
    int tmp2 = randomInt();  
    test_me(tmp1,tmp2);  
}
```



Closed (self-executable) program that can be run

Problem: probability of reaching **abort()** is extremely low!


DART Step (3): Directed Search

	Concrete Execution	Symbolic Execution	Path Constraint
<pre>main(){ int t1 = randomInt(); int t2 = randomInt(); test_me(t1,t2); } int double(int x) {return 2 * x; } void test_me(int x, int y) { int z = double(x); if (z==y) { if (y == x+10) abort(); /* error */ } }</pre>			
← x = 36, y = 99		create symbolic variables x, y	
	↓	↓	↓


DART Step (3): Directed Search

	Concrete Execution	Symbolic Execution	Path Constraint
<pre>main(){ int t1 = randomInt(); int t2 = randomInt(); test_me(t1,t2); } int double(int x) {return 2 * x; } void test_me(int x, int y) { int z = double(x); if (z==y) { if (y == x+10) abort(); /* error */ } }</pre>			
← x = 36, y = 99, z = 72		create symbolic variables x, y z = 2 * x	
	↓	↓	↓

DART Step (3): Directed Search



DART Step (3): Directed Search




DART Step (3): Directed Search

	Concrete Execution	Symbolic Execution	Path Constraint
<pre>main(){ int t1 = randomInt(); int t2 = randomInt(); test_me(t1,t2); } int double(int x) {return 2 * x; } void test_me(int x, int y) { int z = double(x); if (z==y) { if (y == x+10) abort(); /* error */ } }</pre>			
←	x = 1, y = 2	create symbolic variables x, y	
	↓	↓	↓


DART Step (3): Directed Search

	Concrete Execution	Symbolic Execution	Path Constraint
<pre>main(){ int t1 = randomInt(); int t2 = randomInt(); test_me(t1,t2); } int double(int x) {return 2 * x; } void test_me(int x, int y) { int z = double(x); if (z==y) { if (y == x+10) abort(); /* error */ } }</pre>			
←	x = 1, y = 2, z = 2	create symbolic variables x, y z = 2 * x	
	↓	↓	↓


DART Step (3): Directed Search




DART Step (3): Directed Search




DART Step (3): Directed Search




DART Step (3): Directed Search




DART Step (3): Directed Search



DART Step (3): Directed Search



DART Step (3): Directed Search



Directed Search: Summary

- Dynamic test generation to **direct** executions along alternative program paths
 - collect symbolic constraints at branch points (whenever possible)
 - negate one constraint at a branch point to take other branch (say **b**)
 - call constraint solver with new path constraint to generate new test inputs
 - next execution driven by these new test inputs to take alternative branch **b**
 - check with dynamic instrumentation that branch **b** is indeed taken
- Repeat this process until all execution paths are covered
 - May never terminate!
- Significantly improves code coverage vs. pure random testing

Simultaneous Concrete & Symbolic Executions

```
void foo(int x,int y){  
    int z = x*x*x; /* could be z = h(x) */  
    if (z == y) {  
        abort(); /* error */  
    }  
}
```

- Assume we can reason about linear constraints only
- Initially $x = 3$ and $y = 7$ (randomly generated)
- Concrete $z = 27$, but symbolic $z = x*x*x$
 - Cannot handle symbolic value of z !
 - Stuck?

Simultaneous Concrete & Symbolic Executions

```
void foo(int x,int y){  
    int z = x*x*x; /* could be z = h(x) */  
    if (z == y) {  
        abort(); /* error */  
    }  
}
```

Replace symbolic expression by concrete value when symbolic expression becomes unmanageable (e.g. non-linear)

- Assume we can reason about linear constraints only
- Initially $x = 3$ and $y = 7$ (randomly generated)
- Concrete $z = 27$, but symbolic $z = x*x*x$
 - Cannot handle symbolic value of z !
 - Stuck?
 - NO! Use concrete value $z = 27$ and proceed...
- Take else branch with constraint $27 \neq y$
- Solve $27 = y$ to take then branch
- Execute next run with $x = 3$ and $y = 27$
- DART finds the error!

NOTE: whenever symbolic execution is stuck, static analysis becomes imprecise!

Comparison with Static Analysis

```
1  foobar(int x, int y){
2    if (x*x*x > 0){
3      if (x>0 && y==10){
4        abort(); /* error */
5      }
6    } else {
7      if (x>0 && y==20){
8        abort(); /* error */
9      }
10   }
11 }
```


- Symbolic execution is stuck at line 2...
- Static analysis tools will conclude that **both** aborts **may** be reachable
 - “Sound” tools will report both, and thus one false alarm
 - “Unsound” tools will report “no bug found”, and miss a bug
- Static-analysis-based test generation techniques are also helpless here...
- In contrast, DART finds the only error (line 4) with high probability
- Unlike static analysis, **all bugs** reported by DART are guaranteed to be **sound**

Other Advantages of Dynamic Analysis

```
1  struct foo { int i; char c; }
2
3  bar (struct foo *a) {
4    if (a->c == 0) {
5      *((char *)a + sizeof(int)) = 1;
6      if (a->c != 0) {
7        abort();
8      }
9    }
10 }
```

- Dealing with dynamic data is easier with concrete executions
- Due to limitations of alias analysis, static analysis tools cannot determine whether “a->c” has been rewritten
 - “the abort **may** be reachable”
- In contrast, DART finds the error easily (by solving the linear constraint $a \rightarrow c == 0$)
- In summary, all bugs reported by DART are guaranteed to be sound!
- But DART may not terminate...

DART for C: Implementation Details



Experiments: NS Authentication Protocol

- Tested a C implementation of a security protocol (Needham-Schroeder) with a known attack
 - About 400 lines of C code; experiments on a Linux 800Mz P-III machine
 - DART takes less than 2 seconds (664 runs) to discover a (partial) attack, with an unconstrained (possibilistic) intruder model
 - DART takes 18 minutes (328,459 runs) to discover a (full) attack, with a realistic (Dolev-Yao) intruder model
 - DART found a new bug in this C implementation of Lowe's fix to the NS protocol (after 22 minutes of search; bug confirmed by the code's author)
- In contrast, a systematic state-space search of this program composed with a concurrent nondeterministic intruder model using [VeriSoft](#) (a sw model checker) does not find the attack

A Larger Application: oSIP

- Open Source SIP library (Session Initiation Protocol)
 - 30,000 lines of C code (version 2.0.9), 600 externally visible functions
- Results: **Attack: send a packet of size 2.5 MB (cygwin) with no 0 or “|” character**
 - DART crashed 65% of the externally visible functions within 1000 runs
 - Most of these due to missing(?) NULL-checks for pointers...
 - Analysis of results for oSIP parser revealed a simple attack to crash it!

oSIP version 2.0.9 (August 2004)

```
Int osip_message_parse (osip_message_t * sip,  
                        const char *buf)
```

```
{ [ ... ]  
  char *tmp;  
  tmp = alloca (strlen (buf) + 2);  
  osip_strncpy (tmp, buf, strlen (buf));  
  osip_util_replace_all_lws (tmp);  
  [ etc. ]
```

alloca fails and returns NULL

crash!

oSIP version 2.2.0 (December 2004)

```
Int osip_message_parse (osip_message_t * sip,  
                        const char *buf, size_t length)
```

```
{ [ ... ]  
  char *tmp;  
  tmp = osip_malloc (length + 2);  
  if (tmp==NULL) { [... print error msg and return -1; ] }  
  osip_strncpy (tmp, buf, length);  
  osip_util_replace_all_lws (tmp);  
  [ etc. ]
```

Conclusion

- DART = Directed Automated Random Testing
- Key strength/originality:
 - No manually-generated test driver required (fully automated)
 - As automated as static analysis but with higher precision
 - Starting point for testing process
 - No false alarms but may not terminate
 - Smarter than pure random testing (with directed search)
 - Can work around limitations of symbolic execution technology
 - Symbolic execution is an adjunct to concrete execution
 - Randomization helps where automated reasoning is difficult
 - Overall, complementary to static analysis...

