MALWARE: CASE STUDIES


CMSC 414 FEB 13 2018



BRAIN

First IBM PC virus (1987)

- Propagation method
 - Copies itself into the boot sector
 - Tells the OS that all of the boot sector is "faulty" (so that it won't list contents to the user)
 - Thus also one of the first examples of a **stealth** virus
 - Intercepts disk read requests for 5.25" floppy drives
 - Sees if the 5th and 6th bytes of the boot sector are 0x1234
 - If so, then it's already infected, otherwise, infect it
- Payload:
 - Nothing really; goal was just to spread (to show off?)
 - However, it served as the template for future viruses



Downloaded from <u>wikipedia.org</u>

ROOTKITS

Malicious code that hides from discovery

- Ways to hide:
 - By intercepting system calls, patching the kernel, etc.
 - Often effectively done by a man in the middle attack
- Rootkit revealer: analyzes the disk offline and through the online system calls, and compares
- Mark Russinovich ran a rootkit revealer and found a rootkit in 2005...

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- How it worked:
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 - Hid itself from the user (to avoid deletion)

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- How it messed up
 - Morally: violated trust
 - Technically: Hid all files that started with "\$sys\$"
 - Seriously?: The uninstaller did not check the integrity of the code it downloaded, and would not delete it afterwords.

STUXNET

June 2010

- Virus in that it initially spread by infected USB stick
 - Once inside a network, it acted as a worm, spreading quickly
- Exploited **four** zero-day exploits
 - Zero-day: Known to only the attacker until the attack
 - Typically, one zero-day is enough to profit
 - Four was unprecedented
 - Immense cost and sophistication on behalf of the attacker
- Rootkit: installed *signed* device drivers
 - Thereby avoiding user alert when installing
 - Signed with certificates stolen from two Taiwanese CAs

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
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 - .. then drop back to normal range

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- Man-in-the-middle between Windows and Siemens control systems; looked like it was working properly to the operator




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
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
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
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
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STUXNET FALLOUT

- Iran denied they had been hit by Stuxnet
- Then claimed they were, but had contained it
- Understood now that it took out 1k of Iran's 5k centrifuges
- Security experts believe the U.S. did it (possibly along with Israel) due to its sophistication and cost
- Legitimized cyber warfare

VIRUSES: SUMMARY

- Technological arms race between those who wish to detect and those who wish to evade detection
- Started off innocuously, capable by only a few very clever people
- But viruses have become commoditized; any scriptkiddy can launch one (creation remains hard)
- No longer purely of academic interest
 - Economic pursuits (zero-day markets)
 - Cyber warfare

OTHER WORK

- Detecting malware in the Android app store
- Lots of drive-by-download work
- Malware distribution networks: use enterprise-wide network traces to detect malware downloads
- Side-channel defenses: Measure, e.g., power consumption of benign vs. malicious code
- Metamorphic arms race

- Hunting For Metamorphic, Péter Ször, Peter Ferrie
- The Ghost In The Browser Analysis of Web-based Malware, Niels Provos, Dean McNamee, Panayiotis Mavrommatis, Ke Wang, Nagendra Modadugu
- Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution, Yajin Zhou, Xuxian Jiang
- Hey, you, Get Off of My Market: Detecting Malicious Apps in Official and Alternative Android Markets, Yajin Zhou, Zhi Wang, Wu Zhou, Xuxian Jiang
- All Your iFrames Point to Us, Niels Provos, Panayiotis Mavrommatis, Moheeb Abu Rajab, Fabian Monrose
- Android Permissions Demystified, Adrienne Porter Felt, Erika Chin, Steve Hanna, Dawn Song, David Wagner
- Prudent Practices for Designing Malware Experiments: Status Quo and Outlook, Christian Rossow, Christian J. Dietrich, Chris Grier, Christian Kreibich, Vern Paxson, Norbert Pohlmann, Herbert Bos, Maarten van Steen
- Detection and Analysis of Drive-by-Download Attacks and Malicious JavaScript Code, Marco Cova, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna
- Towards Automatic Generation of Vulnerability-Based Signatures, David Brumley, James Newsome, Dawn Song, Hao Wang, Somesh Jha
- Nazca: Detecting Malware Distribution in Large-Scale Networks, Luca Invernizzi, Stanislav Miskovic, Ruben Torres, Sabyasachi Saha, Sung-Ju Lee, Marco Mellia, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna
- WattsUpDoc: Power Side Channels to Nonintrusively Discover Untargeted Malware on Embedded Medical Devices, Shane S. Clark, Benjamin Ransford, Amir Rahmati, Shane Guineau, Jacob Sorber, Kevin Fu, Wenyuan Xu
- Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story, Bruce Schneier
- Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode, J. Alex Halderman, Edward W. Felten