

Web security

With material from Dave Levin, Mike Hicks, Lujo Bauer

Previously

- Attack and defense at host machines
 - Applications written in C and C++
 - Violations of memory safety


- Web security now
 - Attacking web services
 - Problems: Confusion of code/data; untrusted input

Web security topics

- Web basics (today)
- SQL injection, defenses (today)
- Stateful web and session problems (Thursday)
- Dynamic web and XSS (Thursday)

Web Basics

The web, basically



(Much) user data is part of the browser

DB is a separate entity, logically (and often physically)

Interacting with web servers

Resources which are identified by a URL

(Universal Resource Locator)

http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~mmazurek/index.html

Protocol

ftp https tor

Hostname/server

Translated to an IP address by DNS (e.g., 128.8.127.3)

Path to a resource

Here, the file index.html is static content i.e., a fixed file returned by the server

Interacting with web servers

Resources which are identified by a URL

(Universal Resource Locator)


Path to a resource

http://facebook.com/delete.php?f=joe123&w=16

Arguments


Here, the file delete.php is dynamic content i.e., the server generates the content on the fly

Basic structure of web traffic



- HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
 - An "application-layer" protocol for exchanging data

Basic structure of web traffic



- Requests contain:
 - The URL of the resource the client wishes to obtain
 - Headers describing what the browser can do
- Request types can be GET or POST
 - GET: all data is in the URL itself
 - POST: includes the data as separate fields

HTTP GET requests

https://krebsonsecurity.com

HTTP Headers

https://krebsonsecurity.com/

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: krebsonsecurity.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:40.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/40.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

DNT: 1

Connection: keep-alive

User-Agent is typically a **browser** but it can be wget, JDK, etc.

According to security firm Shavlik, the patches that address flaws which have already been publicly disclosed include a large Internet Explorer (IE) update that corrects 17 flaws and a fix for Microsoft Edge, Redmond's flagship replacement browser for IE; both address this bug, among others.

A critical fix for a Windows graphics component addresses flaws that previously showed up in two public disclosures, one of which Shavlik says is currently being exploited in the wild (CVE-2015-2546). The 100th patch that Microsoft has issued so far this year — a salve for **Windows**



HTTP Headers

https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-1421

GET /view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-1421 HTTP/1.1

Host: web.nvd.nist.gov

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:40.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/40.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

DNT: 1

Referer: https://krebsonsecurity.com/

Connection: keep-alive

Referrer URL: site from which this request was issued.

HTTP POST requests

Posting on Piazza


HTTP Headers https://piazza.com/logic/api?method=content.create&aid=hrteve7t83et POST /logic/api?method=content.create aid=hrteve7t83et HTTP/1.1 Host: piazza.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2.11) Gecko/20101013 Ubuntu/9.04 (jaunty) Firefox/3.6.11 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Implicitly includes data Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 as a part of the URL Connection: keep-alive Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Referer: https://piazza.com/class Content-Length: 339 Cookie: piazza session="DFwuCEFIGvEGwwHLJyuCvHIGtHKECCKL.5%25x+x+ux%255M5%22%215%3F5%26x%26%26%7C%22%21r... Pragma: no-cache

Explicitly includes data as a part of the request's content

{"method":"content.create","params":{"cid":"hrpng9q2nndos","subject":"Interesting.. perhaps it has to do with a change to the ...

Cache-Control: no-cache

Basic structure of web traffic



- Responses contain:
 - · Status code
 - Headers describing what the server provides
 - · Data
 - Cookies (much more on these later)
 - Represent state the server would like the browser to store

HTTP responses

HTTP version

Status code

Reason

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Cache-Control: private, no-store, must-revalidate

Content-Length: 50567

Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5

Set-Cookie: CMSPreferredCulture=en-US; path=/; HttpOnly; Secure

Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=4l2oj4nthxmvjs1waletxlqa; path=/; secure; HttpOnly

Set-Cookie: CMSCurrentTheme=NVDLegacy; path=/; HttpOnly; Secure


X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

x-ua-compatible: IE=Edge


X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319


X-Powered-By: ASP.NET, ASP.NET

SQL injection










http://xkcd.com/327/

Server-side data



Long-lived state, stored in a separate *database*

Need to **protect this state** from illicit access and tampering

Databases

- Provide data storage & manipulation
- Database designer organizes data into tables
- Programmers query the database
- Database Management Systems (DBMSes) provide
 - semantics for how to organize data
 - transactions for manipulating data sanely
 - a language for creating & querying data
 - and APIs to interoperate with other languages
 - management via users & permissions

SQL (Standard Query Language)

Table

_		(Users)					
	Name	Gender	Age	Email	Password		
	Connie	F	12	connie@bc.com	sw0rdg1rl		
	Steven	М	14	steven@bc.com	c00kieC4t		
	Greg	М	34	mr.uni@bc.com	i<3ros3!		
	Vidalia	М	35	vidalia@bc.com	sc&On!0N		

Row Record)

Column

```
SELECT Age FROM Users WHERE Name='Greg'; 34

UPDATE Users SET email='mr.uni@bc.com'
   WHERE Age=34; -- this is a comment

INSERT INTO Users Values('Pearl', 'F', ...);
DROP TABLE Users;
```

Server-side code

Website


Username:	Password:	Log me on automatically each visit Log in

"Login code" (PHP)

Suppose you successfully log in as \$user if this returns any results

How could you exploit this?

SQL injection



Login successful!

Problem: Data and code mixed up together


SQL injection: Worse




Can chain together statements with semicolon: STATEMENT 1; STATEMENT 2


SQL injection: Even worse

	Username:	Password:		Log me on automatica	lly each visit Log in			
 		***************************************	**************	*******************************				
					backdoor	/	ADD';	










http://xkcd.com/327/

SQL injection attacks are common



http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/statistics



SQL injection countermeasures


The underlying issue

- This one string combines the code and the data
 - Similar to buffer overflows

When the boundary between code and data blurs, we open ourselves up to vulnerabilities

The underlying issue

```
$result = mysql_query("select * from Users
     where(name='$user' and password='$pass');");
```



Prevention: Input validation

- We require input of a certain form, but we cannot guarantee it has that form, so we must **validate it**
 - Just like we do to avoid buffer overflows
- Making input trustworthy
 - Check it has the expected form, reject it if not
 - Sanitize by modifying it or using it such that the result is correctly formed

Sanitization: Blacklisting

' ; --

- Delete the characters you don't want
- Downside: "Lupita Nyong'o"
 - You want these characters sometimes!
 - How do you know if/when the characters are bad?
- Downside: How to know you've ID'd all bad chars?

Sanitization: Escaping

- Replace problematic characters with safe ones
 - Change ' to \'
 - Change; to \;
 - Change to \-
 - Change \ to \\
- Hard by hand, there are many libs & methods
 - magic_quotes_gpc = On
 - mysql_real_escape_string()
- Downside: Sometimes you want these in your SQL!
 - And escaping still may not be enough

Checking: Whitelisting

- Check that the user input is known to be safe
 - E.g., integer within the right range
- Rationale: Given invalid input, safer to reject than fix
 - "Fixes" may result in wrong output, or vulnerabilities
 - Principle of fail-safe defaults
- Downside: Hard for rich input!
 - How to whitelist usernames? First names?

Sanitization via escaping, whitelisting, blacklisting is HARD.


Can we do better?

Sanitization: Prepared statements

- Treat user data according to its type
 - Decouple the code and the data

Decoupling lets us compile now, before binding the data

Using prepared statements



Binding is only applied to the leaves, so the structure of the tree is *fixed*

Additional mitigation

- For **defense in depth**, *also* try to mitigate any attack
 - But should always do input validation in any case!
- Limit privileges; reduces power of exploitation
 - Limit commands and/or tables a user can access
 - e.g., allow SELECT on Orders but not Creditcards
- Encrypt sensitive data; less useful if stolen
 - May not need to encrypt Orders table
 - But certainly encrypt <u>creditcards.cc</u>_numbers