Building Security In

CMSC 330 Spring 2020
Security breaches

Just a few:

- **TJX** (2007) - 94 million records*
- **Adobe** (2013) - 150 million records, 38 million users
- **eBay** (2014) - 145 million records
- **Anthem** (2014) - Records of 80 million customers
- **Target** (2013) - 110 million records
- **Heartland** (2008) - 160 million records

*containing SSNs, credit card nums, other private info

The 2017 Equifax Data Breach

• 148 million consumers’ personal information stolen
• They collect every details of your personal life
  • Your SSN, Credit Card Numbers, Late Payments…
• You did not sign up for it
• You cannot ask them to stop collecting your data
• You have to pay to credit freeze/unfreeze
Defects and Vulnerabilities

- Many (if not all of) these breaches begin by exploiting a **vulnerability**

- This is a *security-relevant* software defect (bug) or **design flaw** that can be **exploited** to effect an undesired behavior

- The **use of software is growing**
  - So: more bugs and flaws
  - Especially in places that are new to using software

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Google

Windows

2B LOC

50M LOC
“Internet of Things” (IOT)

Amazon Alexa

Google Home

Stuxnet specifically targets … processes such as those used to control … centrifuges for separating nuclear material. Exploiting four zero-day flaws, Stuxnet functions by targeting machines using the Microsoft Windows operating system …, then seeking out Siemens Step7 software.

The result of their work was a hacking technique—what the security industry calls a zero-day exploit—that can target Jeep Cherokees and give the attacker wireless control, via the Internet, to any of thousands of vehicles.

http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/
Driverless Cars
Considering **Correctness**

- **All software is buggy**, isn’t it? Haven’t we been dealing with this for a long time?

- A **normal user never sees most bugs**, or figures out how to **work around** them

- Therefore, **companies fix the most likely bugs**, to save money
Considering Security

Key difference:

An attacker is not a normal user!

- The attacker will actively attempt to find defects, using unusual interactions and features
  - A typical interaction with a bug results in a crash
  - An attacker will work to exploit the bug to do much worse, to achieve his goals
Cyber-defense?
FireEye, Kaspersky hit with zero-day flaw claims

Researchers have disclosed severe security flaws within the firm's products over the holiday weekend.

By Charlie Osborne for Zero Day | September 8, 2015 -- 09:45 GMT (02:45 PDT) | Topic: Security

Researchers have revealed the existence of zero-day vulnerabilities within Kaspersky and FireEye's systems which could compromise customer safety.

Over the holiday weekend, security researcher Tavis Ormandy disclosed the existence of a vulnerability which impacts on Kaspersky products. Ormandy, known in the past for publicly revealing security flaws in Sophos and ESET antivirus products, said the vulnerability is "about as bad as it gets." In a tweet, the researcher said:

Security researcher Tavis Ormandy disclosed the existence of a vulnerability which impacts on Kaspersky products. Hermansen, another researcher, publicly disclosed a zero-day vulnerability within cyberforensics firm FireEye's security product, complete with proof-of-concept code.

Exploitable bugs

• Some **bugs** can be **exploited**
  • An attacker can control how the program runs so that any incorrect behavior serves the attacker

• **Many kinds of exploits** have been developed over time, with technical names like
  • Buffer overflow
  • Use after free
  • SQL injection
  • Command injection
  • Privilege escalation
  • Cross-site scripting
  • Path traversal
  • …
What is a buffer overflow?

• A buffer overflow is a dangerous bug that affects programs written in C and C++

• **Normally**, a program with this bug will simply **crash**

• But an **attacker** can alter the situations that cause the program to do much worse
  • **Steal** private information
  • **Corrupt** valuable information
  • **Run code** of the attacker’s choice
Buffer overflows from 10,000 ft

- **Buffer** =
  - Block of memory associated with a variable

- **Overflow** =
  - Put more into the buffer than it can hold

- Where does the overflowing data go?

*Learn more in CMSC 414!*
1. print “Password?” to the screen
2. read input into variable X
3. if X matches the password then log in
4. else print “Failed” to the screen

Data

X = abc123

Instructions
Instructions

1. print “Password?” to the screen
2. read input into variable X
3. if X matches the password then log in
4. else print “Failed” to the screen

Data

Password?
Overflow!!!!! 3.log in
Access granted

X = Overflow!!!!! 3.log in

Exploitation
What happened?

- For C/C++ programs
  - A buffer with the password could be a local variable

- Therefore
  - The input is too long, and overruns the buffer
  - The attacker’s input includes machine instructions
  - The overrun rewrites the return address to point into the buffer, at the machine instructions
  - When the call “returns” it executes the attacker’s code

```c
strcpy(buff, "abc");
```
Stopping the attack

• **Buffer overflows** rely on the ability to **read or write outside the bounds of a buffer**

• **C and C++** programs expect the **programmer** to ensure this never happens
  • But humans (regularly) make mistakes!

• Other languages (like **Python, OCaml, Java**, etc.) ensure buffer sizes are respected
  • The **compiler** inserts checks at reads/writes
  • Such checks can halt the program
  • But will **prevent a bug from being exploited**
Instructions

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Password?
Overflow!!!!! 3. log in

Data

X = Overflow!!!

Program halted
Key idea

- The key feature of the buffer overflow attack is the attacker getting the application to treat attacker-provided data as instructions (code) or code parameters.

- This feature appears in many other exploits too:
  - SQL injection treats data as database queries.
  - Cross-site scripting treats data as browser commands.
  - Command injection treats data as operating system commands.
  - Etc.

- Sometimes the language helps (e.g., type safety):
  - Sometimes the programmer needs to do more work.
Attack Scenarios
The Internet, in one slide

Client

Browser

Server

Web/FTP/etc. server

Need to protect this state from illicit access and tampering

(Private) Data

(Much) user data is part of the browser

FS/DB is a separate entity, logically (and often physically)

(Filesystem/Database/etc.)
• Calls to remote services could be intercepted by an adversary
  • Snoop on inputs/outputs
  • Corrupt inputs/outputs

• Avoid this possibility using cryptography (CMSC 414, CMSC 456)
Malicious clients

- Server needs to **protect itself against malicious clients**
  - Won’t run the software the server expects
  - Will probe the limits of the interface
Passing the buck

- **Server needs to protect good clients** from malicious clients that will try to launch attacks via the server
  - Corrupt the server state (e.g., uploading malicious files or code)
  - Good client interaction affected as a result (e.g., getting the malware)
Defensive measures

- Two key actions the server can take:
  - **Validate that client inputs are well formed**
    - Fallacy: Focus on testing that good inputs produce good behavior
    - Must (also) ensure that malformed inputs result in benign behavior
  - Mitigate harm that might result by **minimizing the trusted computing base**
    - Isolate trusted components, or minimize privilege to precisely what is needed, in case something goes wrong
Quiz 1: What are reasonable assumptions?

Suppose you are writing a PDF viewer that is leaner and better than Acrobat Reader. Which can you assume?

A. PDF files given to your reader will always be well-formed  
B. PDF files will never exceed a particular size  
C. You viewer will never be used as part of an Internet-hosted service  
D. None of the above
Quiz 1: What are reasonable assumptions?

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D. None of the above
Validating inputs
What’s wrong with this Ruby code?

catwrapper.rb:

```ruby
if ARGV.length < 1 then
    puts "required argument: textfile path"
    exit 1
end

# call cat command on given argument
system("cat "+ARGV[0])

exit 0
```
Possible Interaction

> ls
catwrapper.rb
hello.txt

> ruby catwrapper.rb hello.txt
Hello world!

> ruby catwrapper.rb catwrapper.rb
if ARGV.length < 1 then
  puts "required argument: textfile path"
...

> ruby catwrapper.rb “hello.txt; rm hello.txt”
Hello world!

> ls
catwrapper.rb
Quiz 2: What happened?

A. `cat` was given a file named `hello.txt`; `rm hello.txt` which doesn’t exist

B. `system()` interpreted the string as having two commands, and executed them both

C. `cat` was given three files – `hello.txt`; and `rm` and `hello.txt` – but halted when it couldn’t find the second of these

D. `ARGV[0]` contains `hello.txt` (only), which was then catted

---

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exit 0
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> ruby catwrapper.rb "hello.txt; rm hello.txt"

```
Hello world!
```

> ls

```
catwrapper.rb
```
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> ruby catwrapper.rb “hello.txt; rm hello.txt”

```
Hello world!
```

> ls

```
catwrapper.rb
```
Possible deployment

Client

Browser

GET foo.txt

<output>

Server

Web server

catwrapper.rb
Consequences?

• If catwrapper.rb is part of a web service
  • Input is **untrusted** — could be anything
  • But we only want requestors to read (see) the contents of the files, not to do anything else
  • Current code is too powerful: vulnerable to **command injection**

• How to fix it?

**Need to validate inputs**

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Command_Injection](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Command_Injection)
Equifax: What happened

- Equifax used Struts which failed to properly vet input prior to using deserialization. Ruby had a similar bug sometime back.

- Vulnerability was discovered in a popular open-source software package Apache Struts, a programming framework for building web applications in Java.

- The framework’s popular REST plugin is vulnerable. The REST plugin is used to handle web requests, like data sent to a server from a form a user has filled out.

- The vulnerability relates to how Struts parses that kind of data and converts it into information that can be interpreted by the Java programming language.

- When the vulnerability is successfully exploited, malicious code can be hidden inside of such data, and executed when Struts attempts to convert it.

- Intruders can inject malware into web servers, without being detected, and use it to steal or delete sensitive data, or infect computers with ransomware, among other things.
Input Validation

• We expect input of a certain form
  • But we cannot guarantee it always has it
    - it’s under the attacker’s control
  • So we must validate it before we trust it

• Making input trustworthy
  • Sanitize it by modifying it or using it in such a way that the result is correctly formed by construction
  • Check it has the expected form, and reject it if not
Checking: Blacklisting

- **Reject** strings with possibly bad chars: ‘ ; --

```ruby
if ARGV[0] =~ /;/ then
  puts "illegal argument"
  exit 1
else
  system("cat "+ARGV[0])
end
```

> ruby catwrapper.rb “hello.txt; rm hello.txt”

illegal argument
Sanitization: Blacklisting

- Delete the characters you don’t want: ‘ ; --

```
system("cat "+ARGV[0].tr(";"",""))
```

```
> ruby catwrapper.rb "hello.txt; rm hello.txt"
Hello world!
cat: rm: No such file or directory
Hello world!
> ls hello.txt
hello.txt
```
Sanitization: Escaping

• **Replace problematic characters with safe ones**
  • change ’ to \’
  • change ; to \;
  • change – to \–
  • change \ to \\

• Which characters are problematic depends on the interpreter the string will be handed to
  • Web browser/server for URIs
    - URI::escape(str,unsafe_chars)
  • Program delegated to by web server
    - CGI::escape(str)
Sanitization: Escaping

def escape_chars(string)
    pat = /(\'|"|\.|\*|\/|\-|\\|;|\|\|\s)/
    string.gsub(pat){|match|"\\" + match}
end

system("cat "+escape_chars(ARGV[0]))

> ruby catwrapper.rb "hello.txt; rm hello.txt"
cat: hello.txt; rm hello.txt: No such file or directory
> ls hello.txt
hello.txt
Quiz 3: Is this escaping sufficient?

A. No, you should also escape character &
B. No, some of the escaped characters are dangerous even when escaped
C. Both of the above
D. Yes, it’s all good

catwrapper.rb:

```ruby
def escape_chars(string)
  pat = %r(\'|\"|\.\|\*|\||\-|\\||\s)/
  string.gsub(pat){|match|"\\" + match}
end
system("cat "+escape_chars(ARGV[0]))
```
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`catwrapper.rb`:

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    pat = /(/\'|"|\.|\*|\||\-|\\\|;|\\|s)/
    string.gsub(pat){|match|"\\" + match}
end
system("cat "+escape_chars(ARGV[0]))
```
Escaping not always enough

```
> ls ../passwd.txt
passwd.txt
> ruby catwrapper.rb "../passwd.txt"
bob:apassword
alice:anotherpassword
```

• A web service probably only wants to give access to the files in the current directory
  • the .. sequence should have been disallowed

• Previous escaping doesn’t help because . is replaced with \. which the shell interprets as .
Path traversal

This is called a **path traversal** vulnerability. Solutions:

- Delete all occurrences of the . character
  - Will disallow legitimate files with dots in them (hello.txt)

- Delete occurrences of .. sequences
  - Safe, but disallows foo/../hello.txt where foo is a subdirectory in the current working directory (CWD)

- Ideally: Allow any path that is within the CWD or one of its subdirectories

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Path_Traversal](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Path_Traversal)
Checking: Whitelisting

• Check that the user input is known to be safe
  • E.g., only those files that exactly match a filename in the current directory

• Rationale: Given an invalid input, safer to reject than to fix
  • “Fixes” may result in wrong output, or vulnerabilities
  • Principle of fail-safe defaults
Checking: Whitelisting

```ruby
files = Dir.entries(".").reject { |f| File.directory?(f) }

if not (files.member? ARGV[0]) then
  puts "illegal argument"
  exit 1
else
  system("cat " + ARGV[0])
end
```

*reject inputs that do not mention a legal file name*

> ruby catwrapper.rb "hello.txt; rm hello.txt"  
*illegal argument*
Validation Challenges

- **Cannot always delete or sanitize problematic characters**
  - You may want dangerous chars, e.g., “Peter O’Connor”
  - How do you know if/when the characters are bad?
  - Hard to think of all of the possible characters to eliminate

- **Cannot always identify whitelist cheaply or completely**
  - May be expensive to compute at runtime
  - May be hard to describe (e.g., “all possible proper names”)
Key Questions

• Which inputs in my program should not be trusted?
  • These start from input from untrusted sources
  • And these inputs influence ("taint") other data that flows through my program
    - And could be stored in files, databases, etc.

• How to ensure that untrusted inputs, no matter what they are, will produce benign results?
  • Sanitization, checking, etc. as early as possible
    - How to do this depends on the program, and how the inputs are used
Quiz 4: As a developer, security is

A. Something I can help address by writing better code
B. Something that writing better code can do little to address
C. Something that is the purview of the government, e.g., DHS
D. Something that will never be solved so long as market forces do not value security

(Pick an answer you think is best)
Security for the Web

Thanks to Dave Levin for some slides
The Web

- **Security for the World-Wide Web (WWW)** presents new vulnerabilities to consider:
  - **SQL injection**,  
  - Cross-site Scripting (**XSS**),

- These share some common causes with memory safety vulnerabilities; like **confusion of code and data**
  - **Defense** also similar: **validate untrusted input**

- New wrinkle: **Web 2.0’s use of mobile code**
  - How to protect your applications and other web resources?
Interacting with web servers

**Resources which are identified by a URL**
(Universal Resource Locator)

![URL example](http://www.cs.umd.edu/~mwh/index.html)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Hostname/server</th>
<th>Path to a resource</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ftp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>https</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translated to an IP address by DNS (e.g., 128.8.127.3)

Here, the file `index.html` is **static content**
i.e., a fixed file returned by the server

```
http://facebook.com/delete.php?f=joe123&w=16
```

Path to a resource **Arguments**

Here, the file `delete.php` is **dynamic content**
i.e., the server generates the content on the fly
**Basic** structure of web traffic

- HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
  - An “application-layer” protocol for exchanging collections of data
Basic structure of web traffic

- **Requests contain**:
  - The **URL** of the resource the client wishes to obtain
  - **Headers** describing what the browser can do

- **Request types** can be **GET** or **POST**
  - **GET**: all data is in the URL itself (no server side effects)
  - **POST**: includes the data as separate fields (can have side effects)
HTTP GET requests

http://www.reddit.com/r/security

User-Agent is typically a browser but it can be wget, JDK, etc.
Referrer URL: the site from which this request was issued.
HTTP POST requests

Posting on Piazza

Implicitly includes data as a part of the URL

Explicitly includes data as a part of the request’s content
Basic structure of web traffic

User clicks

- Responses contain:
  - Status code
  - Headers describing what the server provides
  - Data
  - Cookies (much more on these later)
  - Represent state the server would like the browser to store on its behalf
HTTP responses

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 08:20:34 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: session-zdnet-production=6bhqcai0cbeagi11sac2p3; path=/; domain=zdnet.com
Set-Cookie: zdregion=MTL45lE1Lmp1czp1czpjZDJmN1WY5Y8lODU1N2Q3yzM5NGU3M2Y1ZTRmN6
Set-Cookie: zdregion=MTL45lE1Lmp1czp1czpjZDJmN1WY5Y8lODU1N2Q3yzM5NGU3M2Y1ZTRmN6
Set-Cookie: edition=us; expires=Wed, 18 Feb 2015 08:20:34 GMT; path=/; domain=zdnet.com
Set-Cookie: session-zdnet-production=59ob97fpingese4bg6de4dvq11; path=/; domain=zdnet.com
Set-Cookie: user_agent=desktop
Set-Cookie: zdnet_ad_session=f
Set-Cookie: firsttpg=0
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
X-UA-Compatible: IE=edge,chrome=1
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Length: 18922
Keep-Alive: timeout=70, max=146
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html> ...... </html>
Quiz 1

HTTP is

A. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol
B. The main communication protocol of the WWW
C. The means by which clients access resources hosted by web servers
D. All of the above
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SQL injection
Defending the WWW

Long-lived state, stored in a separate *database*

Need to **protect this state** from illicit access and tampering
Server-side data

• Typically want **ACID** transactions
  
    - **Atomicity**
      - Transactions complete entirely or not at all

  - **Consistency**
    - The database is always in a valid state

  - **Isolation**
    - Results from a transaction aren’t visible until it is complete

  - **Durability**
    - Once a transaction is committed, its effects persist despite, e.g., power failures

• **Database Management Systems** (DBMSes) provide these properties (and then some)
SQL (Standard Query Language)

```
SELECT Age FROM Users WHERE Name='Dee';
UPDATE Users SET email='readgood@pp.com'
    WHERE Age=32; -- this is a comment
INSERT INTO Users Values('Frank', 'M', 57, ...);
DROP TABLE Users;
```
Server-side code

Website

“Login code” (Ruby)

result = db.execute "SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE Name='#{user}' AND Password='#{pass}';"

Suppose you successfully log in as user if this returns any results

How could you exploit this?
SQL injection

```
result = db.execute "SELECT * FROM Users
    WHERE Name='#{user}' AND Password='#{pass}';"
```

```
resultado = db.execute "SELECT * FROM Users
    WHERE Name='frank' OR 1=1; --'
    AND Password='whocares';"
```

Always true
(s: dumps whole user DB)

Commented out
SQL injection

result = db.execute "SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE Name='#{user}' AND Password='#{pass}';"

result = db.execute "SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE Name='frank' OR 1=1;
DROP TABLE Users; --'
AND Password='whocares';";

Can chain together statements with semicolon:
STATEMENT 1 ; STATEMENT 2
Hi, this is your son's school. We're having some computer trouble.

Oh, dear — did he break something? In a way—

Did you really name your son Robert?); drop table Students;-- ?

Oh, yes. Little Bobby Tables, we call him.

Well, we've lost this year's student records. I hope you're happy.

And I hope you've learned to sanitize your database inputs.

http://xkcd.com/327/
SQL injection countermeasures
The underlying issue

This one string combines the code and the data

- Similar to buffer overflows
- and command injection

When the boundary between code and data blurs, we open ourselves up to vulnerabilities
The underlying issue

```sql
result = db.execute "SELECT * FROM Users
    WHERE Name='#{user}' AND Password='#{pass}';"
```

Intended AST for parsed SQL query

Should be *data*, not *code*
Defense: Input Validation

Just as with command injection, we can defend by validating input, e.g.,

- **Reject** inputs with bad characters (e.g., ; or --)
- **Remove** those characters from input
- **Escape** those characters (in an SQL-specific manner)

These can be effective, but the best option is to avoid constructing programs from strings in the first place.
Sanitization: Prepared Statements

- **Treat user data according to its type**
  - Decouple the code and the data

```python
result = db.execute("SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name='#{user}' AND Password='#{pass}';")
```

```python
result = db.execute("SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name = ? AND Password = ?", [user, pass])
```
Using prepared statements

```python
result = db.execute("SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name = ? AND Password = ?", [user, pass])
```

Binding is only applied to the leaves, so the structure of the AST is `fixed`
Quiz 2

What is the benefit of using “prepared statements”?

A. With them it is easier to construct a SQL query
B. They ensure user input is parsed as data, not (potentially) code
C. They provide greater protection than escaping or filtering
D. User input is properly treated as commands, rather than as secret data like passwords
Quiz 2

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