

# Admin and The Shift Cipher

lecture 01

# Welcome!

- ▶ Crypto is amazing
  - ▶ Can do things that initially seem impossible
- ▶ Crypto is important
  - ▶ It impacts us every day
- ▶ Crypto is fun!
  - ▶ Deep theory
  - ▶ Attackers' mindset

# Necessary administrative stuff

- ▶ Course webpage:  
<https://www.cs.umd.edu/users/gasarch/COURSES/456/F18/index.html>
- ▶ Prerequisites/information posted there
- ▶ Syllabus posted there
- ▶ HWs posted there
- ▶ Announcements posted there
- ▶ Midterm already scheduled- Oct 29 in class.

# Necessary administrative stuff

- ▶ Canvas/ELMS or Gradescope (still working that out)
  - ▶ Used only to submit homework electronically-Must be Typed
  - ▶ Let me know if unable to access
  
- ▶ Piazza
  - ▶ Useful for discussions/questions
  - ▶ Preferable to email if you think others will have the same question

# TAs

- ▶ Nathan Grammel
- ▶ Jeremy Klein
- ▶ Dan McVicker
- ▶ Jacob Prinz
- ▶ Jake Yamada

# What You Need For This Class

- ▶ Mathematical prerequisites
  - ▶ Discrete math, probability, modular arithmetic
- ▶ Requires mathematical maturity
  - ▶ Proofs, abstraction

# What You Need For This Class

- ▶ CS prerequisites
  - ▶ Binary, hex, pseudocode, algorithms, big-O notation
- ▶ Programming assignments
  - ▶ Hard part should not be the programming, but the thought behind it
  - ▶ Flexibility in choice of language

# How to Get the Most Out of This Class

1. Read textbook and/or slides before class  
**Note:** On Slide Website it says on some line  
**WHAT IS BELOW IS STILL A WORK IN PROGRESS.**  
Should not read slides that are below that line.
2. Ask questions on Piazza and/or bring questions to class
3. This course will be taped so can catch up or review. Caution:
  - 3.1 If cut class and DO watch videos in sync, fine.
  - 3.2 If cut class and INTEND to watch videos insync, not fine.



# HWs/exams

- ▶ HWs most weeks.
- ▶ Due Monday on **before** class begins.
- ▶ **Sick Cat Policy:** Can post Wed **before** class without penalty
- ▶ **WARNING:** YOU have already been given an extension, HW solutions will be posted on Wed, so NO extensions past that.
- ▶ We will keep track of your lateness NOT for grade, but for letters.
- ▶ In-class midterm and final

# Textbook

**Required** textbook: “Introduction to Modern Cryptography, 2nd Edition,” Katz and Lindell

Can buy on Amazon used.

Don't tell Katz I said so.

# Laptops/electronics

- ▶ No laptops/electronics policy
  - ▶ Distracting to you
  - ▶ Distracting to others
- ▶ If you feel you need an exception, talk to me

# How to contact Prof or TAs

- ▶ Prof email: [gasarch@cs.umd.edu](mailto:gasarch@cs.umd.edu)
- ▶ Please put “CMSC456” in subject line
- ▶ Prof Office hours MW 12-2, 3:30-5:00 or by Appt.
- ▶ Prof around a lot outside of office hours, feel free to drop in, but he will feel free to say *Sorry, I'm busy.*
- ▶ TA's - email and office hours on syllabus.

# Course goals

- ▶ Understand real-world crypto via a rigorous approach
- ▶ When you encounter crypto in your career
  - ▶ Understand the key terms
  - ▶ Understand the security guarantees provided
  - ▶ Know how to use crypto
  - ▶ Understand what goes on “under the hood”
- ▶ “Crypto mindset”

# Course non-goals

- ▶ Designing your own crypto-schemes
- ▶ Implementing your own crypto for real-world use
- ▶ Course goal:

Realize when to consult an expert!

# A Personal Note

This is a theory course much of what we do has **direct** application!

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**CMSC 858R: Ramsey Theory and its "Applications"**

There were applications

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And also

**CMSC 858R: Ramsey Theory and its "Applications"**

There were applications to other parts of pure mathematics.

# Classical VS Modern cryptography

**Classical:** (1900 BCE?–1975)

1. More of an art. Not much Mathematics.
2. WW II: They used people good at crossword puzzles.
3. Turing and others brought math into it, but not much math compared compared to **Modern**

**Modern:** (1976-today)

1. Lots of Math. Lots of Rigor.
2. The notion of **Provably Secure** important.

**Note:** The cutoff of 1975–1976 is approximate.

# Rough course outline

	<b>Secrecy</b>	<b>Integrity</b>
<b>Private-key setting</b>	Private-key encryption	Message authentication codes
<b>Public-key setting</b>	Public-key encryption	Digital signatures

# Classical Cryptography

lecture 01

# Motivation

- ▶ Allows us to “ease into things. . . ,”
- ▶ Shows why unprincipled approaches are dangerous (unprincipled means **not-rigorous**, not **immoral**)
- ▶ Illustrates why things are more difficult than they may appear



# Alice, Bob, and Eve

- ▶ Alice sends a message to Bob in code.
- ▶ Eve overhears it.
- ▶ We want Eve to not be able to decode it.

This can mean one of two things:

- ▶ Eve does not have enough information to decode it. So even if Eve had unlimited computing power she could not decode.
- ▶ Assuming Eve can't Factor quickly (or some other function) then Eve cannot break the code.

# The First Step in Any Cipher-Spaces

I want to encode

*Cryptography is an important part of security*

Spaces give away information! For example, SHIFT-BY-1 yields:

*Dszuphsbqiz jt bo jnqpsubou qbsu pg tfdvsjuz*

Without any fancy math Eve knows that the second and third word are two letters long. That's information she can use!

What to do?

# The First Step in Any Cipher-Blocks of Five

I want to encode

*Cryptography is an important part of security*

Break it up into blocks of 5:

*Crypto graph yisan impor tantp artof secur ity*

However you code it, spaces will not give anything away.

# The First Step in Any Cipher-Other Issues

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*Are my TAs for CMSC/MATH 456 awesome? YES!*

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More generally, set your mod equal to your alphabet size.

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**Note:** In this class we will use 26-letter English only.

# The Shift Cipher

lecture 01

# The Shift Cipher

- ▶ Consider encrypting English text
- ▶ associate 'a' with 0; 'b' with 1; ...; 'z' with 25
- ▶  $k \in \mathcal{K} = \{0, \dots, 25\}$  (or could think of  $k \in \{a, \dots, z\}$ )
- ▶ To encrypt using key  $k$ , shift every letter of the plaintext by  $k$  positions (with wraparound)
- ▶ Decryption just does the reverse

```
hello world
+22222 22222
=jgnnq yqtnf
```

# Modular arithmetic

- ▶  $x \equiv y \pmod{N}$  if and only if  $N$  divides  $x - y$ .
- ▶  $[x \bmod N]$  = the remainder when  $x$  is divided by  $N$ .
  - ▶ i.e. the unique value  $y \in \{0, \dots, N - 1\}$  such that  $x \equiv y \pmod{N}$ .
- ▶  $25 \equiv 35 \pmod{10}$
- ▶  $25 \neq [35 \bmod 10]$
- ▶  $5 = [35 \bmod 10]$

# The Shift Cipher, Formally

- ▶  $\mathcal{M} = \{\text{all texts in lowercase English alphabet}\}$   
All arithmetic mod 26.
- ▶ Choose uniform  $k \in \{0, \dots, 25\}$
- ▶ Encode  $(m_1 \dots m_t)$  as  $(m_1 + k, \dots m_t + k)$
- ▶ Decode  $(c_1 \dots c_t)$  as  $(c_1 - k, \dots c_t - k)$
- ▶ Can verify that correctness holds.



# Is the Shift Cipher Secure?


- ▶ No – only 26 possible keys!
  - ▶ Given a ciphertext, try decrypting with every possible key
  - ▶ Only one possibility will “make sense”
- ▶ Example of a “brute-force” or “exhaustive-search” attack

# Example

- ▶ Ciphertext uryyb jbeyq
- ▶ Try every possible key...
  - ▶ tqxxa iadxp
  - ▶ spwwz hzcwo
  - ▶ ...
  - ▶ hello world

**Question:** We can tell that **hello world** is correct but how can a computer do that. Can we mechanize the process of picking out **the right one**?

# Letter Frequencies



# Use Letter Freqs to Test "Looks Like English"

Let  $T$  be a long text of normal English.

Let  $\vec{f}$  be the freq vector of English. The components are all between 0 and 1 and add up to 1.

We assume freq vector of  $T$  is approx  $\vec{f}$ .

- ▶ One can compute that

$$\vec{f} \cdot \vec{f} \approx 0.065$$

- ▶ Let  $s \in \{1, \dots, 25\}$ . Let  $T_s$  be the text shifted by  $s$ . Let  $\vec{g}$  be the freq vector for  $T_s$ . One can compute that

$$\vec{f} \cdot \vec{g} \leq \approx 0.038$$

# Is English

We describe a way to tell if a text **Is English** that we will use throughout this course.

Let  $\vec{f}$  be the freq vector for English.

1. Input( $T$ ) a text
2. Compute  $\vec{g}$ , the freq vector for  $T$
3. Compute  $\vec{g} \cdot \vec{f}$ . If  $\approx 0.065$  then output YES, else NO

# Cracking Shift Cipher

- ▶ Given  $T$  a long text that you KNOW was coded by shift.
- ▶ For  $s = 0$  to 25
  - ▶ Create  $T_s$  which is  $T$  shifted by  $s$ .
  - ▶ If  $\text{Is English}(T_s) = \text{YES}$  then output  $T_s$  and stop. Else try next value of  $s$ .

**Note:** No Near Misses. There will not be two values of  $s$  that are both close to 0.065.

**Pedagogical Note:** Would normally have written **Key** instead of **Note** but the word **Key** is important in crypto so I can't use it to say something is important. Oh Well.

# A Note on Cracking Shift Cipher

In the last slide we tried *all* shifts in order.

Can do better:

- ▶ Given  $T$  a long text that you KNOW was coded by shift.
- ▶ Find frequencies of all letters, form vector  $\vec{f}$
- ▶ Sort vector. So most common letter is  $\sigma_1$ , next is  $\sigma_2$ , etc.
- ▶ For  $i = 0$  to 25
  - ▶ Create  $T_s$  which is  $T$  shifted as if  $\sigma_i$  maps to  $e$ .
  - ▶ Compute  $\vec{g}$ , the freq vector for  $T_s$
  - ▶ Compute  $\vec{g} \cdot \vec{f}$ . If  $\approx 0.065$  then stop:  $T_s$  is your text. Else try next value of  $s$ .

**Note:** Quite likely to succeed in the first try, or at least very early.

# What if only transmit one letter?

**Odd Situation:** What if message is only one letter long?

**Discuss:** Can Eve crack a one-letter message?



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Yes

**Scenario:**

In clear: **Is Jacob a double agent working for the Klingons?**

The answer comes via a shift cipher: **A** (which is either Y or N)

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The answer comes via a shift cipher: **A** (which is either Y or N)

Eve knows Jacob is working for either both or neither.

# Eve Can Tell if Two Message Are Same or Not

**Issue:** If Eve sees two message, will know if they are the same or different.

**Does this leak information:** Discuss

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**What to do about this?** Discuss

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
**Does this leak information:** Discuss

**What to do about this?** Discuss

**For Now Nothing** Will come back to this issue after a few more ciphers.


**For Now** A lesson in how even defining **security** and **leak** must be done carefully and rigorously.

# Private-key encryption





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# Private-key encryption

- ▶ A *private-key encryption scheme* is defined by a message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and algorithms (**Gen**, **Enc**, **Dec**):
  - ▶ **Gen** (key generation algorithm): outputs  $k \in \mathcal{K}$   
(For SHIFT this is  $k \in \{0, \dots, 25\}$ . Should 0 be included?)
  - ▶ **Enc** (encryption algorithm): takes key  $k$  and message  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  as input; outputs ciphertext  $c$

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m)$$

(For SHIFT this is  $\text{Enc}(m_1, \dots, m_n) = (m_1 + k, \dots, m_n + k)$ .)

- ▶ **Dec** (decryption algorithm): takes key  $k$  and ciphertext  $c$  as input; outputs  $m$  or “error”

$$m := \text{Dec}_k(c)$$

(For SHIFT this is  $\text{Dec}(c_1, \dots, c_n) = (c_1 - k, \dots, c_n - k)$ .)

$$\forall k \text{ output by Gen } \forall m \in \mathcal{M}, \text{Dec}_k(\text{Enc}_k(m)) = m$$

(For SHIFT this is  $(m + k) - k = m$ )

# Kerckhoffs's principle

We made the comment We KNOW that SHIFT was used. More generally we use this principle.

- ▶ *The encryption scheme* is not secret
  - ▶ Eve knows the encryption scheme
  - ▶ The only secret is the key
  - ▶ The key must be chosen at random; kept secret
- ▶ Some arguments in favor of this principle
  - ▶ Easier to keep *key* secret than *algorithm*
  - ▶ Easier to change *key* than to change *algorithm*
  - ▶ Standardization
    - ▶ Ease of deployment
    - ▶ Public validation

# Byte-wise Shift Cipher

lecture 01

# Byte-wise Shift Cipher

- ▶ Instead of  $a, b, c, d, \dots, z$  have (for example) 0000, 0001, ..., 1111.
- ▶ Works for an alphabet of *bytes* rather than (English, lowercase) *letters*
  - ▶ Data in a computer is stored this way anyway. So works natively for arbitrary data!
- ▶ Use XOR instead of modular addition. Fast!
- ▶ Decode and Encode are both XOR.
  - ▶ Essential properties still hold

# Hexadecimal (base 16)

Hex	Bits ("nibble")	Decimal	Hex	Bits ("nibble")	Decimal
0	0000	0	8	1000	8
1	0001	1	9	1001	9
2	0010	2	A	1010	10
3	0011	3	B	1011	11
4	0100	4	C	1100	12
5	0101	5	D	1101	13
6	0110	6	E	1110	14
7	0111	7	F	1111	15

# Hexadecimal (base 16)

**Notation:** 0x before a string of  $\{0, 1, \dots, 9, A, B, C, D, E, F\}$  means that the string will be base 16.

▶ 0x10

▶  $0x10 = 16*1 + 0 = 16$

▶  $0x10 = 0001\ 0000$

▶ 0xAF

▶  $0xAF = 16*A + F = 16*10 + 15 = 175$

▶  $0xAF = 1010\ 1111$

# ASCII

- ▶ Characters (often) represented in ASCII with TWO hex-digits.
- ▶ Potentially 256 characters via  $\{0, \dots, 9, A, \dots, F\} \times \{0, \dots, 9, A, \dots, F\}$
- ▶ Only use 128 characters via  $\{0, \dots, 8\} \times \{0, \dots, 9, A, \dots, F\}$



Hex	Dec	Char	Hex	Dec	Char	Hex	Dec	Char
0x00	0	<b>NULL</b> null	0x20	32	<b>Space</b>	0x40	64	<b>@</b>
0x01	1	<b>SOH</b> Start of heading	0x21	33	<b>!</b>	0x41	65	<b>A</b>
0x02	2	<b>STX</b> Start of text	0x22	34	<b>"</b>	0x42	66	<b>B</b>
0x03	3	<b>ETX</b> End of text	0x23	35	<b>#</b>	0x43	67	<b>C</b>
0x04	4	<b>EOT</b> End of transmission	0x24	36	<b>\$</b>	0x44	68	<b>D</b>
0x05	5	<b>ENQ</b> Enquiry	0x25	37	<b>%</b>	0x45	69	<b>E</b>
0x06	6	<b>ACK</b> Acknowledge	0x26	38	<b>&amp;</b>	0x46	70	<b>F</b>
0x07	7	<b>BELL</b> Bell	0x27	39	<b>'</b>	0x47	71	<b>G</b>
0x08	8	<b>BS</b> Backspace	0x28	40	<b>(</b>	0x48	72	<b>H</b>
0x09	9	<b>TAB</b> Horizontal tab	0x29	41	<b>)</b>	0x49	73	<b>I</b>
0x0A	10	<b>LF</b> New line	0x2A	42	<b>*</b>	0x4A	74	<b>J</b>
0x0B	11	<b>VT</b> Vertical tab	0x2B	43	<b>+</b>	0x4B	75	<b>K</b>
0x0C	12	<b>FF</b> Form Feed	0x2C	44	<b>,</b>	0x4C	76	<b>L</b>
0x0D	13	<b>CR</b> Carriage return	0x2D	45	<b>-</b>	0x4D	77	<b>M</b>
0x0E	14	<b>SO</b> Shift out	0x2E	46	<b>.</b>	0x4E	78	<b>N</b>
0x0F	15	<b>SI</b> Shift in	0x2F	47	<b>/</b>	0x4F	79	<b>O</b>
0x10	16	<b>DLE</b> Data link escape	0x30	48	<b>0</b>	0x50	80	<b>P</b>
0x11	17	<b>DC1</b> Device control 1	0x31	49	<b>1</b>	0x51	81	<b>Q</b>
0x12	18	<b>DC2</b> Device control 2	0x32	50	<b>2</b>	0x52	82	<b>R</b>
0x13	19	<b>DC3</b> Device control 3	0x33	51	<b>3</b>	0x53	83	<b>S</b>
0x14	20	<b>DC4</b> Device control 4	0x34	52	<b>4</b>	0x54	84	<b>T</b>
0x15	21	<b>NAK</b> Negative ack	0x35	53	<b>5</b>	0x55	85	<b>U</b>
0x16	22	<b>SYN</b> Synchronous idle	0x36	54	<b>6</b>	0x56	86	<b>V</b>
0x17	23	<b>ETB</b> End transmission block	0x37	55	<b>7</b>	0x57	87	<b>W</b>
0x18	24	<b>CAN</b> Cancel	0x38	56	<b>8</b>	0x58	88	<b>X</b>
0x19	25	<b>EM</b> End of medium	0x39	57	<b>9</b>	0x59	89	<b>Y</b>
0x1A	26	<b>SUB</b> Substitute	0x3A	58	<b>:</b>	0x5A	90	<b>Z</b>
0x1B	27	<b>FSC</b> Escape	0x3B	59	<b>;</b>	0x5B	91	<b>[</b>
0x1C	28	<b>FS</b> File separator	0x3C	60	<b>&lt;</b>	0x5C	92	<b>\</b>
0x1D	29	<b>GS</b> Group separator	0x3D	61	<b>=</b>	0x5D	93	<b>]</b>
0x1E	30	<b>RS</b> Record separator	0x3E	62	<b>&gt;</b>	0x5E	94	<b>^</b>
0x1F	31	<b>US</b> Unit separator	0x3F	63	<b>?</b>	0x5F	95	<b>_</b>
						0x60	96	<b>`</b>
						0x61	97	<b>a</b>
						0x62	98	<b>b</b>
						0x63	99	<b>c</b>
						0x64	100	<b>d</b>
						0x65	101	<b>e</b>
						0x66	102	<b>f</b>
						0x67	103	<b>g</b>
						0x68	104	<b>h</b>
						0x69	105	<b>i</b>
						0x6A	106	<b>j</b>
						0x6B	107	<b>k</b>
						0x6C	108	<b>l</b>
						0x6D	109	<b>m</b>
						0x6E	110	<b>n</b>
						0x6F	111	<b>o</b>
						0x70	112	<b>p</b>
						0x71	113	<b>q</b>
						0x72	114	<b>r</b>
						0x73	115	<b>s</b>
						0x74	116	<b>t</b>
						0x75	117	<b>u</b>
						0x76	118	<b>v</b>
						0x77	119	<b>w</b>
						0x78	120	<b>x</b>
						0x79	121	<b>y</b>
						0x7A	122	<b>z</b>
						0x7B	123	<b>{</b>
						0x7C	124	<b> </b>
						0x7D	125	<b>}</b>
						0x7E	126	<b>-</b>
						0x7F	127	<b>DEL</b>

Source: <http://benborowiec.com/2011/07/23/better-ascii-table/>

# ASCII

- ▶ '1' = 0x31 = 0011 0001
- ▶ 'F' = 0x46 = 0100 0110

# Useful observations

- ▶ Only 128 valid ASCII chars (128 bytes invalid)
- ▶ 0x20-0x7E printable
- ▶ 0x41-0x7A includes upper/lowercase letters
  - ▶ Uppercase letters begin with 0x4 or 0x5
  - ▶ Lowercase letters begin with 0x6 or 0x7

# Byte-wise shift cipher

- ▶  $\mathcal{M} = \{\text{strings of bytes}\}$
- ▶ *Gen*: choose uniform byte  $k \in \mathcal{K} = \{0, \dots, 255\}$
- ▶  $Enc_k(m_1 \dots m_t)$ : output  $c_1 \dots c_t$ , where  $c_i := m_i \oplus k$
- ▶  $Dec_k(c_1 \dots c_t)$ : output  $m_1 \dots m_t$ , where  $m_i := c_i \oplus k$
- ▶ Verify that correctness holds...

## Example

Key is 11001110.

Alice wants to send 00011010, 11100011, 00000000

She sends

$$00011010 \oplus 11001110, 11100011 \oplus 11001110, 00000000 \oplus 11001110$$

$$= 11010100, 00101101, 11001110$$

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**Question:** Should it worry Alice and Bob that the key itself was transmitted? **Discuss**

No. Eve has no way of knowing that.

# Is this cipher secure?

- ▶ No – only 256 possible keys!
  - ▶ Given a ciphertext, try decrypting with every possible key
  - ▶ If ciphertext is long enough, only one plaintext will “look like English” (use the vector method of the last set of slides).
- ▶ Can further optimize
  - ▶ First nibble of plaintext likely 0x4, 0x5, 0x6, 0x7 (assuming letters only)
  - ▶ Can reduce exhaustive search to 26 keys (how?)
  - ▶ Talk to your friends or blood enemies about this.



# Sufficient key space principle

- ▶ The key space must be large enough to make exhaustive-search attacks impractical
  - ▶ How large do you think that is?
- ▶ Note: this makes some assumptions. . .
  - ▶ English-language plaintext
  - ▶ Ciphertext sufficiently long so only one valid plaintext