

BILL, RECORD LECTURE!!!!

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Other Topics I Could Have Covered

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CON Details on how they cracked it are too detailed.

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I may be wrong about this.

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More Fun for Me than for You!

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CON Other problems with voting— gerrymandering, disenfranchisement, replacing non-partisan voter commissioners with lackeys.

Proofs of Security, More Rigor

No Fun for me or for you.