Solutions to HW10 Problems

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PRG: $G(b_1 \cdots b_n) = b_1 \cdots b_n (\sum_{i=1}^n b_i \pmod{4})$ written in binary). Give poly strategy for E for PRG-Game that wins $> \frac{1}{2}$ the time.

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Give poly strategy for E for PRG-Game that wins $> \frac{1}{2}$ the time. Note when E is SURE that she wins and when she is NOT sure. Prove that E wins OVER half the time.

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Prob E wins is $\geq \frac{3}{4}$.

Not going over it- but tell me how it turned out.

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$$3k_1 + 6k_2 + 9k_3 + 15k_4 + 20k_5 \sim 0 \pmod{37}$$

$$4k_1 + 5k_2 + 6k_3 + 7k_4 + 9k_5 \sim 7 \pmod{37}$$

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B sends (6, 9, 12, 15, 27; 31)

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 $12k_1 + 13k_3 + 14k_3 + 15k_4 + 24k_5 \sim 31 + 18 = 12 \pmod{37}$

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 $12k_1 + 13k_3 + 14k_3 + 15k_4 + 24k_5 \sim 31 + 18 = 12 \pmod{37}$ B sends (12, 13, 14, 15, 24; 12)

A receives $17k_1 + 11k_2 + 15k_3 + 21k_4 + 29k_5 \sim 25 \pmod{37}$. What bit did B send?

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A receives $17k_1 + 11k_2 + 15k_3 + 21k_4 + 29k_5 \sim 25 \pmod{37}$. What bit did B send? SOLUTION

A plugs in her private key (1, 3, 5, 8, 22) and sees if what she gets is close to 25 or around 18 away from 25.

 $17\times1+11\times3+15\times5+21\times8+29\times22\equiv6$

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6 around 18 away from from 25, so the bit is 1.

This turns out to be a terrible set of equation for secrecy. This is NOT because the the p, n, m are too small. There is ANOTHER reason. Speculate on what that is.

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Discuss

A, B, E playing cards scenario.

A and B want to establish a secret key of n bits.

What is m such that if start with (m, m, m) then can get n bits?

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You wrote program for this.

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Discuss what you found.