We will use three characters: Alice and Bob who want to communicate secretly, and Eve who wants to see what they are talking about. Alice and Bob do not want Eve to be able to decode their messages.

1. The **Plaintext** is the message you want to send. For example *CMSC 389 is a great course! Math is fun. Yeah!*

2. The **Ciphertext** is the message after it is encoded. For example *DNTD4 90JT B HSFBU DPVST FNUI JTGVO ZFB,* (See note on this below.)

3. If Alice and Bob want to exchange messages then they need to both know SOMETHING ahead of time. What they know is called a **key**. This will be clearer with examples.

**Note 0.1** In the above example of coding

*CMSC 389 is a great course! Math is fun. Yeah!*

I used several conventions:

1. I wrote the message in all capitals. This is a standard convention—the plaintext is in normal font, the ciphertext is all capitals.

2. I wrote the message in blocks of five. This is also a standard convention. If I wrote it like

   *DNTD 490 JT B HSFBU DPVSTF NBUI JT GVO ZFB*  

   then it would be MUCH easier for Eve to decode. Using the blocks-of-five does NOT make it much harder for Alice and Bob.

3. In the above I shifted the letters by 1. This is a standard cipher discussed below.

   Does Eve know what type of cipher Alice and Bob are using? We will assume yes.

**Definition 0.2** *Kerckhoff’s Principle* states that in cryptography, Alice and Bob should assume that Eve knows the type of cipher but not the key.

Why does it make sense to assume this?

1. While very few people know the key, many will know the type of cipher being used. "Loose Lips Sink Ships".

2. If your security is based on Eve not knowing the cipher, then as soon as you find out the cipher has been hacked, you have to change the entire cipher. If your security is just based on the key, you just need to change the key.

3. If you prove that your system is secure even given that Eve knows what type of cipher you are using, then that’s a very strong statement.
1 Shift Cipher

Alice and Bob have wanted to exchange secret messages for the last 4000 years. One of the earliest techniques for this, called the Caesar Cipher, operates as follows:

First imagine all letters as numbers. A is 0, B is 1, C is 2, etc, Z is 25. Map every letter to the letter that is three higher (modulo 26). So, the the last three letters shift to the first three. Then

A goes to D
B goes to E
.:V goes to Y
W goes to Z
X goes to A
Y goes to B
Z goes to C.

More generally, a shift cipher is a code where every letter shifts a constant amount.

Lets say that Alice shifts by \( s \in \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, 25\} \). We can write this as

\[
 f(x) = x + s \mod 26.
\]

If Alice uses \( f \) what does Bob use to decode? He will use

\[
 g(x) = x - s \mod 26.
\]

Note that \( f(g(x)) = x \). Also note that for ANY choice of \( s \) there is a \(-s\). We do not actually use \(-s\), we use \(26 - s\) which accomplishes the same thing.

Are shift ciphers good?

**PROS**

1. The scheme is easy to describe, easy to code, and easy to decode. So Alice and Bob can operate very fast.

2. Alice and Bob only have to agree on the shift. Since the shift is in \( \{1, \ldots, 25\} \), they can easily communicate to each other which shift to use.

**CONS**

1. The scheme is easy so Eve may spot the pattern.

2. If Eve knows that it is a shift cipher then she can just try all 25 possible shifts. But there is an issue here— how does Eve know that she has the right shift? She could look at all 26 and see which one looks like English but can this process be automated? This will be more important when we look at the affine cipher which has 312 possibilities.
3. The most common letter in English is $e$. The second most comment letter in English is $t$. The third most common letter is $a$. So Eve might not even have to try all 26, just find the letter that is most common and try out that it maps to $e$, $t$, or $a$, and that probably works. In this case Eve will only have a few to look at and could see which one looks like English. Still, we will later look at automating the process.

4. Alice and Bob do have to meet privately once to agree on the shift. (Is this avoidable?)

**Historical Note:** This is a very old cipher. The very name, the Caesar Cipher indicates how old it is. This cipher was used by the ancient Greeks. Note that they WOULD NOT have phrased it as Map $x$ to $x + s \pmod{26}$. They did not have the notation and they might have had the notion of mod. They would instead say to do the following (I use the English alphabet- they would have used Greek letters.)

Take the sequence

$$a \ b \ c \ d \ e \ f \ g \ h \ i \ j \ k \ l \ m \ n \ o \ p \ q \ r \ s \ t \ u \ v \ x \ y \ z$$

If you want to shift by three then place the shifted-by-3 sequence right below it to obtain the following:

$$a \ b \ c \ d \ e \ f \ g \ h \ i \ j \ k \ l \ m \ n \ o \ p \ q \ r \ s \ t \ u \ v \ x \ y \ z$$

That gives you the following sequence:

$$d \ e \ f \ g \ h \ i \ j \ k \ l \ m \ n \ o \ p \ q \ r \ s \ t \ u \ v \ x \ y \ z \ a \ b \ c$$

That gives you how to encode a message. We leave it to the reader to obtain the table to decode.

The point is that when studying mathematics of an older era its important to keep in mind that they had different ideas then we do now. In these notes we will express things in the modern way, but just be aware that they did not.

**Breaking the Cipher:**

As noted above Eve could just “try” all 26 possible shifts. But what does that mean? She could, for each shift, decode and see which text “makes sense”. But this would be time consuming by hand. Worse- it may be hard to automate. What does it mean to a computer to “make sense?” Is there a better way?

YES! See the file english.pdf for this.

## 2 Keyword-Shift Cipher

This cipher is still one that maps letters but has a much bigger key space then the shift cipher and is still easy to use. We do an example.

**KEYWORD:** FUNKYTOWN  
**SHIFT:** 6
We begin by writing out the letters of FUNKYTOWN but omitting repeats. so we have FUNKYTOW. We then write the A,B,C... but omit the letters already there:

FUNKYTOWABCDEGHIJLMQPSVWXZ

We the use THIS sequence to do our shift on. For example $f$ maps to the letter 6 over in the ABOVE sequence (not the usual ordering of the alphabet) which is o.

$$
\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc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$3 \times 4 = 12$
$3 \times 5 = 15$
$3 \times 6 = 18$
$3 \times 7 = 21$
$3 \times 8 = 24$
$3 \times 9 = 27 \equiv 1$

AH- so 9 is the number we seek. We set $A = 9$.

$$3B + 4 = 0$$

Mult both sides by 9 and reduce mod 27.

$$B + 4 \times 9 = 0$$

$$B + 36 = 0$$

$$B + 10 = 0$$

$$B = -10 = 16$$

So Bob uses $g(x) = 9x + 16$.

Does EVERY affine cipher have an inverse? Let's try $f(x) = 2x$. We need an inverse of 2 mod 26. There isn't one— 2x is always even mod 26.

It turns out that the coeff of $x$ is relatively prime to 26 iff an inverse exists. So the coeff can be any of \{1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25\}. The constant term can be anything.

Are these codes good?

**PROS**

1. The scheme is easy to describe, easy to code, and easy to decode (once you know the trick). So Alice and Bob can operate very fast, though not as fast as with the shift cipher.

2. Alice and Bob only have to agree on the multiplier and the shift. This amounts to knowing one number from \{1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25\} and another from \{0, 1, \ldots, 25\}. We represent the numbers in base 2. Each number is 5 bits long, so two numbers take 10 bits. This is small.

**CONS**

1. The scheme is easy so Eve may spot the pattern, though it's not as easy as the Shift Cipher.


2. If Eve knows that it is a affine cipher then she can just try all $12 \times 26 = 312$ possible affine ciphers. Notice that this is harder than for a shift cipher. And again, we will later look at testing when a text Looks Like English.

3. Using that $e, t, a$ are the three most frequency letters in English might help Eve cut down on possibilities, though its not as clear cut as with the Shift Cipher.

4. Alice and Bob have to meet privately to agree on the parameters. (Is this avoidable?)

4 Quadratic Cipher

One can look at quadratic ciphers, for example:

$$f(x) = (2x^2 + 5x + 9) \mod 26.$$  

This raises the question: for which $(a, b, c)$ is $ax^2 + bx + c \pmod{26}$ a bijection? We can just look at $ax^2 + bx$ since $ax^2 + bx$ is a bijection iff $(\forall c)[ax^2 + bx + c]$ is a bijection.

**Theorem 4.1** Given $a, b$ let $f(x) = ax^2 + bx \pmod{26}$.

1. Let $d = \gcd(a, b)$. Let $a' = a/d$ and $b' = b/d$. If $a'$ is rel prime to 26 then $f(x)$ is NOT a bijection. Note that as a subcase if $a$ is rel prime to 26 then $f(x)$ is NOT a bijection.

2. If $b \equiv 13 \pmod{2Aa}$ (so an even multiple of $a$) then $f(x)$ is NOT a bijection.

**Proof:**

We first do some algebra which will be helpful for both directions of the proof

Given $a, b$ we wonder if there is an $x \neq y$ such that $f(x) = f(y)$:

$$ax^2 + bx \equiv ay^2 + by$$  

$$a(x^2 - y^2) + b(x - y) \equiv 0$$  

$$a(x - y)(x + y) + b(x - y) \equiv 0$$  

$$(x - y)[a(x + y) + b] \equiv 0$$

One way for this to happen (not the only way since 26 is not prime) is for

$$a(x + y) + b \equiv 0.$$
1) Assume \( \text{gcd}(a, b) = d \) and that \( a' = a/d \) is rel prime to 26.

\[
(x - y)[a(x + y) + b] \equiv 0
\]

\[
d(x - y)[a'(x + y) + b'] \equiv 0
\]

Since \( a' \) is rel prime to 26 it has an inverse. Hence the second factor being 0 is equivalent to

\[
x + y + b'(a')^{-1} \equiv 0
\]

\[
x + y \equiv -b'(a')^{-1}
\]

There are 26 solutions to this hence there is one where \( x \neq y \).

2) We seek \( x, y \) such that

\[
(x - y)[a(x + y) + b] \equiv 0
\]

Substitute \( b = 13 + 2Aa \).

\[
(x - y)[a(x + y) + 13 + 2Aa] \equiv 0
\]

We achieve this by finding \( x, y \) such that

\[
a(x + y) + 13 + 2Aa \equiv 13
\]

\[
x - y \equiv 2A
\]

We rewrite these as:

\[
ax + ay \equiv -2Aa
\]

\[
ax - ay \equiv 2Aa
\]

Add these to obtain

\[
2ax \equiv 0
\]

Let \( x = 13 \) and \( y = 13 - 2A \).
We leave it to the reader to determine which \( ax^2 + bx \) are invertible. For just mod 26, and using the theorem above to eliminate many cases, this is not hard. Will I ask you a problem like:

Martians have a 100 letter alphabet. For which \((a, b)\) can they use the cipher where \(x\) is mapped to \( ax^2 + bx \pmod{100} \)?

NO I will not ask such questions. Why not? Because, unlike affine ciphers \((ax + b\) is fine iff \(a\) is rel prime to 100) there is no easy formulation Even for mod \(p\) where \(p\) is a prime this is a hard problem. (We discuss this more in the next section.)

These ciphers are called quadratic ciphers. Or they would be called that if they were ever used. They have never been used. This is because its hard to determine when a quadratic has an inverse.

### 5 Polynomial Cipher

One can look at any polynomial, for example:

\[
f(x) = (2x^8 + 5x^2 + 9) \pmod{26}.
\]

(Frankly I do not know if this would work.)

The higher the degree the harder for Alice and Bob to tell if it has an inverse AND the harder for Eve to try to decode it.

Polynomials that are invertible (over an understood field) are called Permutation Polynomials. There is a vast study of them that I advice you take a look at by Googling.

### 6 General Substitution Cipher

Alice and Bob pick a random permutation of \(\{A, \ldots, Z\}\). So Alice and Bob meet in a dark alley and generate a random re-ordering of \(\{A, \ldots, Z\}\). For example, they may end up with this:

\[
\begin{align*}
  a &\ b & c & d & e & f & g & h & i & j & k & l & m & n & o & p & q & r & s & t & u & v & x & y & z \\
  q & w & e & r & t & y & u & i & o & p & a & s & d & f & g & h & j & k & z & x & c & v & b & n & m
\end{align*}
\]

That gives you how to encode a message. We leave it to the reader to obtain the table to decode. (NOTE- I didn’t really generate that encoding at random. I leave it to the reader to determine how I did it.)

Is this a good code?

**PRO:**

Eve has to go through ALL 26! possibilities to crack this code! Hence this code is UNBREAKABLE!!!!! (Note- this is NOT TRUE as we will see soon. This is typical of the entire history of crypto which can be summarized as:
CODE MAKER: I have an unbreakable code!
CODE BREAKER: I just broke it.
CODE MAKER: Whoops.

Throughout history codes thought unbreakable were devised to thwart any attack that the inventor could think of, but then broken in a way that inventor had not thought of.

CONS: The key Alice and Bob use is a list of the letters of the alphabet in some order. In base 2 this is $26 \times 5 = 130$ bits (though it can be done in somewhat less).

## 7 Keyword-Mixed Cipher

The General Substitution Cipher in the last section is good for looking random to Eve, but somewhat unwieldy for Alice and Bob. Is there a way to get a short key length for a cipher that looks random? There is, though this is not really rigorous.

We describe the **Keyword Mixed Sequence Cipher** by example. Alice and Bob agree on a word in English, fairly long. Let's say its *elementary*. If a letter appears more than once they remove copies of letters. Hence we have *elmntary*. We then write out all of the letters in the alphabet but we start with that word. Hence we have

$$ e \ l \ m \ n \ t \ a \ r \ y \ b \ c \ d \ f \ g \ h \ i \ j \ k \ o \ p \ q \ s \ u \ v \ w \ x \ z $$

We COULD put $a,b,c,...,z$ above this sequence and hence map $a$ to $e$, $b$ to $l$, etc. This is not very good since letters towards the end of the alphabet will tend to map to letters towards the end of the alphabet. Instead we will first break up this sequence of length 26 into three sequences of lengths 9,9,8:

$$
\begin{align*}
& e \ l \ m \ n \ t \ a \ r \ y \ b \\
& c \ d \ f \ g \ h \ i \ j \ k \ o \\
& p \ q \ s \ u \ v \ w \ x \ z 
\end{align*}
$$

We now read this sequence by column. Hence we map $a$ to $e$, $b$ to $c$, $c$ to $p$, etc.

Why is this good? The key *elementary* is pretty short; however, the cipher we get has no real mathematical pattern. Its not a shift or an affine cipher, or anything else really.

Let's say Eve knows that you are using this. What is the size of the key space she could search. Any word in English can be a key, but lets say that it has to be a word between 5 and 12 letters. There are many such words. There are two other factors, one working for Eve, one working against her. Working for Eve is that she can presume that the word is in common use. For example, its unlikely that Alice and Bob’s word is *skeuomorph* (I found that one on a list of rare words on the web.). Working against Eve is that Alice and Bob may have words that only they know! For example, what if Alice thinks Bob is just so *adorkable*. 
8 Frequency Analysis

Given a text that came from a random permutation how can Eve crack it? NOT by going through all 26! possibilities. That would take too long. What about a Keywords mixed sequence cipher? Harder to estimate, but probably also too big a keyspace.

But note that e is the most common letter in the English Language. th is the most common two-letter pair. People have compiled tables of such information and these can be used to crack a coded text if its long enough.

Also, if Eve knows you are cracking (say) military codes she may use that to her advantage—slightly different patterns may hold.

In old times (say 2000 years ago) it was still fine to use a random cipher since the computation power to do a Freq. Analysis wasn’t there yet. But now it is. Hence in the real world today nobody uses any of the ciphers mentioned above.

All of the ciphers discussed so far are mono-sub ciphers, meaning that they map the alphabet letter by letter. Any such cipher can be broken by a Freq. Analysis.

Its easy to just say use Freq. Analysis and this is fine for (say) cryptograms in newspapers. But how would you really code this up?

Writing a program that, given a text, determines how many times each letter appears, is easy.

Given a potential decoding, checking if its correct can be done similar to the methods shown above. You would not want to check all 26! of them, so use Freq. Analysis to cut down on the number of options.

You can also use the most common 2-letter pairs and 3-letter triples as well.

9 Matrix Codes

Here is one way to defeat the Freq. Analysis.

Let $A$ be the following matrix.

$$ A = \begin{pmatrix} 8 & 9 \\ 11 & 7 \end{pmatrix} $$

We can map pairs of numbers with this matrix as follows. The pair $(x, y)$ will map to the pair you get by applying the matrix and reducing modulo 26, which is

$$ ((8x + 9y) \mod 26, (11x + 7y) \mod 26). $$

The matrix must have determinant that is rel prime to 26 to guarantee that it has an inverse.

From start to finish: take a text, convert the letters to numbers, (assume it has an even number of letters), break the sequence of numbers into blocks of 2 numbers each, and apply the matrix to each pair to get an encoded pair.
Notice that this can be extended to $3 \times 3$ matrices or more generally $k \times k$ matrices.

If a 2 by 2 matrix is used then a Freq. Analysis based on pairs may still be possible. Same for 3 by 3. What about for 10 by 10 code?

**PRO:** It would seem that Eve has a hard time using Freq Anal if the matrix is large enough. Brute force also looks hard (see later in this section when we discuss cracking the code).

**CON:** Alice and Bob still have to meet to establish the key. Is that avoidable?

**Definition 9.1** A sequence of $k$ letters is called a $k$-gram. Freq. anal. usually uses 1-grams and 2-grams. For a $k \times k$ matrix we would need to use $k$-grams.

**Ways to Crack a $k \times k$ Matrix Code**

1. Try to use Freq. Analysis with $k$-grams.

2. There are roughly $26^k$ possible matrices. You can try them all (and use the summation technique above to check).

If $k = 20$ then can these attacks work? No. But can other attacks work? There are two answers to this question:

1. We are assuming that Eve has just the ciphertext and also knows that its a matrix code with a $20 \times 20$ matrix. In reality Eve will also likely know some prior messages and what they decoded to. She can use this and affine algebra to get get the matrix, or at least narrow down options for the matrix.

2. Even if Eve just has the ciphertext and the dimension of the matrix then there are still ways to do crack the code that take less than $26^{k^2}$ steps. See the notes on this on the course website. This is actually research in progress!

## 10 General 2-Char Cipher

Recall that we first had shift and affine ciphers to have a simple way to obtain a 1-1 and onto mapping of \{0, \ldots, 25\} and then we allowed any 1-1 and onto mapping, which was the general sub cipher.

Similarly, the $2 \times 2$ matrix cipher is a simple way to obtain a 1-1 and onto mapping of \{0, \ldots, 25\} $\times$ \{0, \ldots, 25\} to \{0, \ldots, 25\} $\times$ \{0, \ldots, 25\} (and a similar statement holds for $k \times k$ matrix cipher). We could instead just allow any 1-1 and onto mapping of \{0, \ldots, 25\} $\times$ \{0, \ldots, 25\} to \{0, \ldots, 25\} $\times$ \{0, \ldots, 25\} be allowed. To specify a mapping you need to list out $26^2$ pairs of digraphs (two-letter pairs). For example \{(AB, QI)\}. Each such digraph requires 20 bits. So the number of bits needed is $26^2 \times 20 = 676 \times 20 = 13520$. Today this can be handled easily.

Frequency analysis may still works on such codes but its harder since Eve can only use digraphs. Since this code is not based on math (e.g., matrices) it is unlikely that Eve can use math on it.
11 Playfair Cipher

Recall that the Keyword mixed cipher was a way to have a general sub cipher look random which is harder for Eve, but have a short Key which is good for Alice and Bob. The Playfair Cipher achieves a similar goal for Alice and Bob using a general 2-char cipher. The Wikipedia entry on this is so good that we recommend it rather than write it up here.

12 Vigenere Cipher

Here is another way to defeat Freq. Analysis is the Vigenere Cipher. Here is an example:

- Every letter that is in a place $\equiv 0 \text{ mod } 5$ is coded by a shift-3.
- Every letter that is in a place $\equiv 1 \text{ mod } 5$ is coded by a shift-14.
- Every letter that is in a place $\equiv 2 \text{ mod } 5$ is coded by a shift-6.
- Every letter that is in a place $\equiv 3 \text{ mod } 5$ is coded by a shift-12.
- Every letter that is in a place $\equiv 3 \text{ mod } 5$ is coded by a shift-0.

Alice could communicate the key to Bob as the sequence (3, 14, 6, 12, 0). Or she could just say DOGMA since D is the third letter of the alphabet (recall that A is 0) O is the 14th, etc. We call DOGMA the key, and 5 the keylength. They could be any word (or sequence of numbers in $\{0, \ldots, 25\}$) and any length.

How to crack it? We give two methods. Both require long texts. Both involve finding the key length and then doing a Freq. Analysis on the appropriate subtexts (e.g., in the above example you would do a Freq. Analysis on every 5th letter).

Kasiski Examination: We first find the key length. Imagine that in the text you see ABDUQ several times. It is likely that the DISTANCE between them is the key length or a multiple of it. So find the differences between the repeated text and then find a common factor for all of them. This gives you a SMALL set of key lengths to look at.

Assume you have the key length (or a small set of candidates for it). IMPORTANT POINT: The freqs of letters in English are about the same if you look at (say) every 5th letter. We now use this:

1. Given $T$ the text and $m$ the key length.
2. For $0 \leq i \leq m - 1$
   (a) Look at the letters in the positions $\equiv i \pmod{m}$. 


(b) Treat these letters as if they came from *the same* shift cipher.

(c) Use the techniques discussed earlier to find the shift $s_i$. (If they do not work then $m$ is the wrong key length and try another candidate for key length.)

(d) Shift all of the letters positions $\equiv i \pmod{m}$ by $26 - s_i$.

We defer PROS and CONS to the next section.

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### 13 Vigenere Plus Cipher

In the Vig cipher we used a SHIFT on every $L$th letter. We could instead use a Affine, Quadratic, Polynomial, Matrix on every $L$th letter.

To my knowledge no such code was ever used. This is just an accident of history. Let $Y$ be a year (I do not know what year it is). Before year $Y$, using a Vig Plus Cipher would have been too cumbersome for Alice and Bob. After year $Y$, there were better techniques.

There is another difficulty in using (say) affine. For Shift we had a very short key: just a word and then use the letters positions. Any word works. For affine we would need two words. But the first one can only use letters whose corresponding numbers are rel prime to 26. There are ways around this.

**PROS:** Very Short Key give you very large complexity. Even though it’s crackable, we need to make Eve really work at it. Some texts say that it was uncracked for 300 years, though Jon Katz doubts this. And note that if it was cracked then the crackers wouldn’t want to brag about it.

**CONS:** Alice and Bob have to meet. Is this avoidable?

---

### 14 Autocode- BAD VERSION

We would really like a Vigenere code where the key is infinite. We can’t quite have that; however, here is one way to have a long key. The key is actually very short—just one number in \{0, \ldots, 25\}.

Here is how it works. The key is, say, 3. So the FIRST letter is shifted by 3. Look at what it shifted to. Use that to guide how much you shift the next letter, etc. We’ll take $A=0$, $\ldots$, $Z=25$.

**Example:**

- The KEY is 3
- The word to be coded is *students*

  Code *s* by shifting it 3 to *v*.
  *v* is the 21st letter of the alphabet. So we shift the *t* by 21 (or by -5)
  Code *t* by *o* (thats the letter o, NOT zero).
o is the 14th letter of the alphabet. So we shift o by 14.

etc.

We do a full example. Shift is 3 We already do the letters to numbers, so we want to code:

2,7,14,5

the 2 maps to 2 + 3 = 5.
NOW 5 is the shift
the 7 maps to 7 + 5 = 12
NOW 12 is the shift
the 14 maps to 14 + 12 = 26 = 0
NOW the shift is 0
the 5 maps to 5 + 0 = 5.
So the final output is
(5, 12, 0, 5)
This is actually a TERRIBLE IDEA (it was my idea!). Lets look at the example.
Eve sees (5,12,0,5) Eve lets s be the initial shift which she does not know. Eve
Lets (m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4) be the real message (we know its (2,7,14,5)). Eve lets = mean ≡ mod 26.
Eve knows: m_1 + s = 5
m_1 = 5 - s Not much help there.
Eve knows that 5 was used for the next shift. So she knows
m_2 = 12 + 5 = 17 OH, thats worth knowing!
Eve knows that 12 was used for the next shift. So she knows
m_3 = 0 + 12 = 12 OH, thats worth knowing!
Eve knows that 0 was used for the next shift. So she knows
m_4 = 0 + 12 = 12 OH, thats worth knowing!

15 Autocode- GOOD VERSION
The problem with the Autocode in the last section is that we used the cipher text (which Eve sees) for the shifts. We should instead use the plaintext which Eve does not see.

Here is how it works. The key is, say, 3. So the FIRST letter is shifted by 3. Look at what it shifted to. Use that to guide how much you shift the next letter, etc. We’ll take A=0, . . ., Z = 25.
Example:
The KEY is 3 For now = means ≡ mod 26.
The word to be coded is (in numbers) 4,5,19,10
Code 4 by 4 + 3 = 7.
USE 4 for the next shift

14
Code 5 by 5 + 4 = 9.
USE 5 for the next shift
Code 19 by 19 + 5 = 24
USE 19 for the next shift
Code 10 by 19 + 10 = 29 = 3
Note that we are not coding letter-for-letter so cannot use Freq Analysis. Cannot the way we cracked Vig cipher. There are no patterns. So is this code UNCRACKABLE!?  
YES and NO, but more NO. If we ignore Kerckhoff’s Principle (which in some cases may be reasonable) then this is a good code to use. If your opponent does not know that you are using it, and doesn’t know what it is (which may have been the case when it was first used) it would be very hard to detect.

But what if your opponent DOES know? Then he can try all 26 possible keys and use the technique explained in the cracking of SHIFT cipher to tell which one looks like English.

16 An Uncrackable Code: the One-Time Pad

**Definition 16.1** If $a$ and $b$ are bits (0 or 1) then $\oplus$ (also written XOR and called “exclusive or”) is defined as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$a$</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$a \oplus b$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following facts are easy to verify.

**Fact 16.2** Let $a, b, c$ be bits.

1. $(a \oplus b) \oplus c = a \oplus (b \oplus c)$. 
2. For all bits $a$, $a \oplus a = 0$. 
3. $a \oplus b \oplus b = a \oplus (b \oplus b) = a \oplus 0 = a$. 

We now describe the one-time pad.

1. Alice and Bob have to meet and agree on a randomly generated sequence of bits – a VERY long sequence. Say it’s $r_1 r_2 \cdots r_N$. 

---

15
2. If (later) Alice wants to send
\[a_1a_2a_3\cdots a_m\]
she sends
\[(r_1 \oplus a_1)(r_2 \oplus a_2)\cdots(r_m \oplus a_m).\]
When Bob gets this string, which he sees as
\[s_1\cdots s_m\]
he can decode it by taking
\[(r_1 \oplus s_1)(r_2 \oplus s_2)\cdots(r_m \oplus s_m) = (r_1 \oplus (r_1 \oplus a_1))(r_2 \oplus (r_2 \oplus a_2))\cdots(r_m \oplus (r_m \oplus a_m)) = ((r_1 \oplus r_1) \oplus a_1)((r_2 \oplus r_2) \oplus a_2)\cdots((r_m \oplus r_m) \oplus a_m) = a_1a_2\cdots a_m\]

3. If either Alice or Bob wants to send another message they will start with \(r_{m+1}\).

**PROS:** This is impossible to crack! Since the original key was random, if Eve sees the message
\[s_1s_2\cdots s_m\]
it will look random to her.

**CONS:** \(N\) is LARGE! They have to meet and exchange A LOT of information. In fact, if they plan to later communicate \(N\) bits they need to have a key of length \(N\).

**PROBLEM:** Can Alice and Bob use a shorter key?

**ANSWER:** They can if they use a recurrence to generate the sequence, like
\[r_n = r_{n-1} + r_{n-2} \pmod{2}\]
but then the sequence is no longer random. People have looked at getting random-looking sequences.

**PROBLEM:** Can Alice and Bob agree on a secret key (e.g., \(r_1r_2\cdots r_N\)) without having to meet?

### 17 Alice and Bob Do Not Have To Meet

The following problem plagues all of the systems we have considered: Alice and Bob must meet in secret to establish a key.

Is there a way around this? Is there a way for Alice and Bob to NEVER meet, and yet establish a secret key? That is, can they, by talking *in public* establish a shared secret key?

The answer will be yes, assuming that whoever is listening in has some limits on what they can compute.
17.1 Needed Math

We’ll use multiplication modulo \( p \) in the set \( Z_p = \{1, 2, \ldots, p - 1\} \), where \( p \) is a prime number. It will be useful to find an element \( g \in Z_p \), called a “generator”, for which the sequence \( g^0, g^1, g^2, \ldots, g^{p-2} \), taken modulo \( p \), contains all of the elements of \( Z_p \).

Let’s look at \( p = 11 \). Notice that

\[
\begin{align*}
2^0 &\equiv 1 \pmod{11} \\
2^1 &\equiv 2 \pmod{11} \\
2^2 &\equiv 4 \pmod{11} \\
2^3 &\equiv 8 \pmod{11} \\
2^4 &\equiv 5 \pmod{11} \\
2^5 &\equiv 10 \pmod{11} \\
2^6 &\equiv 9 \pmod{11} \\
2^7 &\equiv 7 \pmod{11} \\
2^8 &\equiv 3 \pmod{11} \\
2^9 &\equiv 6 \pmod{11}
\end{align*}
\]

These calculations are not hard if you use that \( 2^n \equiv 2 \times 2^{n-1} \pmod{11} \). Notice that \( \{2^0 \pmod{11}, 2^1 \pmod{11}, \ldots, 2^9 \pmod{11}\} = \{1, 2, \ldots, 10\} \).

Do all elements of \( Z_{11} \) generate the entire set? No:

\[
\begin{align*}
5^0 &\equiv 1 \pmod{11} \\
5^1 &\equiv 5 \pmod{11} \\
5^2 &\equiv 3 \pmod{11} \\
5^3 &\equiv 4 \pmod{11} \\
5^4 &\equiv 9 \pmod{11} \\
5^5 &\equiv 1 \pmod{11} \\
5^6 &\equiv 5 \pmod{11} \\
5^7 &\equiv 3 \pmod{11} \\
5^8 &\equiv 4 \pmod{11} \\
5^9 &\equiv 9 \pmod{11}
\end{align*}
\]

Notice that \( \{5^0 \pmod{11}, 5^1 \pmod{11}, \ldots, 5^9 \pmod{11}\} = \{1, 3, 4, 5, 9\} \). This is NOT all of \( Z_{11} \).

**Convention 17.1** We will be using a prime \( p \). We will assume that \( p \) is LARGE but that \( \log p \) is not too large. Hence if Eve needs a computation of \( p \) steps to crack a code we will consider it a good code. Even if Eve needs a computation of \( \sqrt{p} \) steps (or \( p^\epsilon \) steps where \( \epsilon > 0 \)) this is a long time and we will consider it a good code. Also, if Alice and Bob have to do operations that take \( \log p \) steps, that’s okay, they can do that. Even if they have to take \( (\log p)^2 \) (or some larger polynomial in \( \log p \)) that’s okay, they can do that.
Convention 17.2 For the rest of this document when we say “roughly $p^\epsilon$” we will mean $p^\epsilon$ for some $\epsilon$, $\epsilon > 0$. When we say “roughly $\log p$” we will mean $(\log p)^a$ for some $a \in \mathbb{N}$.

Theorem 17.3 For every prime $p$ there is a $g$ such that \{ $g^0 \mod p, g^1 \mod p, \ldots, g^{p-2} \mod p$ \} = $\mathbb{Z}_p = \{1, \ldots, p - 1\}$. There is an algorithm which will, given $p$, find such a generator $g$ in roughly $\log p$ steps.

We have already seen that $+, -, \times$, and (if $p$ is prime) division can be done modulo $p$. We now have a way to do LOGARITHMS modulo $p$.

Definition 17.4 Let $p$ be a prime and $g$ be a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Let $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. The Discrete Logarithm of $x$ with base $g$ is the $y \in \{0, \ldots, p - 2\}$ such that $g^y \equiv x \mod p$. We denote this $DL_g(x)$.

Example 17.5 We rewrite the table above for $p = 11$ and add to it. The Discrete Logarithm lines follow from the prior line. We assume $g = 2$ and denote $DL_2$ by just
\[ DL. \]

\[ \begin{align*}
2^0 & \equiv 1 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(1) &= 0 \\
2^1 & \equiv 2 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(2) &= 1 \\
2^2 & \equiv 4 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(4) &= 2 \\
2^3 & \equiv 8 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(8) &= 3 \\
2^4 & \equiv 5 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(5) &= 4 \\
2^5 & \equiv 10 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(10) &= 5 \\
2^6 & \equiv 9 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(9) &= 6 \\
2^7 & \equiv 7 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(7) &= 7 \\
2^8 & \equiv 3 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(3) &= 8 \\
2^9 & \equiv 6 \text{ mod } 11 \\
DL(6) &= 9
\end{align*} \]

**COMMON BELIEF:** It is believed that the problem of computing the discrete logarithm requires roughly \( p \) steps. This is a long time, so we assume Eve cannot do this.

**THIS IS THE REPEATED SQUARING METHOD:**

**Lemma 17.6** *Given* \( p, a \in \{0, 1, \ldots, p - 1\} \), *and* \( m \), *determining* \( a^m \text{ mod } p \) *takes roughly* \( \log m \) *steps. (This is by repeated squaring.)*

**Proof:** We do an example which should show the general idea.

We want to compute \( 3^{278} \pmod{17} \).
First write 278 in binary: 100010110
So we really want \( 3^{2^8 \cdot 2^7 \cdot 2^2 \cdot 2^1} \pmod{17} \)
(All computation in this example is now mod 17).

We will compute more than we need: We will compute \(3^{2^i}\) for \(0 \leq i \leq 8\).

\[
\begin{align*}
3^{2^0} &\equiv 3^1 \equiv 3 \\
3^{2^1} &\equiv (3^{2^0})^2 \equiv 3^2 \equiv 9 \text{ (NOTE- we knew } 3^{2^0} \text{ from the prior line)} \\
3^{2^2} &\equiv (3^{2^1})^2 \equiv 9^2 \equiv 81 \equiv 13 \text{ (NOTE- we knew } 3^{2^1} \text{ from the prior line)} \\
3^{2^3} &\equiv (3^{2^2})^2 \equiv 13^2 \equiv (-4)^2 \equiv 16 \text{ (NOTE- we knew } 3^{2^2} \text{ from the prior line)} \\
&\quad \text{(NOTE- This is not really part of the proof, but it made life slightly easier to write 13 as } -4. \text{ I may do this again without commenting on it.)} \\
3^{2^4} &\equiv (3^{2^3})^2 \equiv 16^2 \equiv (-1)^2 \equiv 1 \text{ (NOTE- we knew } 3^{2^3} \text{ from the prior line)} \\
3^{2^5} &\equiv (3^{2^4})^2 \equiv 1^2 \equiv 1 \text{ (NOTE- we knew } 3^{2^4} \text{ from the prior line)} \\
3^{2^6} &\equiv (3^{2^5})^2 \equiv 1^2 \equiv 1 \text{ (NOTE- we knew } 3^{2^5} \text{ from the prior line)} \\
3^{2^7} &\equiv (3^{2^6})^2 \equiv 1^2 \equiv 1 \text{ (NOTE- we knew } 3^{2^6} \text{ from the prior line)} \\
3^{2^8} &\equiv (3^{2^7})^2 \equiv 1^2 \equiv 1 \text{ (NOTE- we knew } 3^{2^7} \text{ from the prior line)} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Hence

\[
3^{2^8}3^{2^4}3^{2^2}3^{2^1} \equiv 1 \times 1 \times 13 \times 9 \equiv -4 \times 9 \equiv -36 \equiv 34 - 36 \equiv -2 \equiv 15
\]

More generally: to compute \(a^b \pmod{c}\) you compute \(a^{2^i}\) as above, using \(a^{2^i}\) to compute \(a^{2^i+1}\). Once you have all of the powers of 2 you can then write \(b\) in binary and use the powers of two that you need. 

\[\blacksquare\]

**Lemma 17.7**

1. Given \(p\), testing if \(p\) is prime can be done in roughly \(\log p\) steps.

2. Given \(n\), finding a prime \(p\) such that \(n \leq p \leq 2n\) can be done in roughly \(\log^2 n\) steps.

3. Given \(n\), finding a prime \(p\) such that \(n \leq p \leq 2n\) and a generator \(g\) for \(\mathbb{Z}_p\) can be done in roughly \(\log^3 n\) steps.

**Proof:**

1) This is known and we skip it.

2) It is known (the prime number theorem) that between \(n\) and \(2n\) there are roughly \(\frac{n}{\log n}\) primes. Hence if we pick numbers between \(n\) and \(2n\) at random we will almost surely encounter a prime within the first \(O(\log n)\) picks. This leads to the following algorithm:

1. Input \(n\)

2. Repeat until you find a prime:

   (a) Pick a number \(p \in [n, 2n]\) at random.
(b) Test if it is a prime using part 1. If so then output \( p \) and STOP.

Each iteration takes roughly \( \log n \) steps, and the number of iterations will be at most roughly \( \log n \). Hence the algorithm takes \( \log^2 n \) steps.

We give some notes on how to speed this up, though we ignore plus or minus 1’s. 

NOTE: We can speed this up by only guessing odd numbers. Do that by picking \( q \in [n/2, n] \) at random and guessing \( p = 2q + 1 \). Instead of having to guess from \( n \) numbers, we only have to guess from \( n - n/2 = 0.5n \) numbers!

NOTE: We can speed this up by even more by only guessing numbers that are not divisible by 2 or 3, so numbers that are \( \equiv 1, 5 \pmod{6} \). Do that by picking \( q \in [n/6, n/3] \) at random, picking \( i \in \{1, 5\} \) at random, and guessing \( 6q + i \). Instead of having to guess from \( n \) numbers, we only have to guess from

\[
n - n/2 - n/3 + n/6 = n/3 \sim 0.33n
\]

numbers!

NOTE: We can speed this up by even more by only guessing numbers that are not divisible by 2 or 3 or 5, so numbers that are \( \equiv 1, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29 \pmod{30} \). Do that by picking \( q \in [n/30, n/60] \) at random, picking \( i \in \{1, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29\} \) at random, and guessing \( 30q + i \). Since there are 8 \( i \)'s to pick the number of numbers we are looking at is \( 8n/30 = 0.26n \)

We could go on. If \( n \) was really big and we were the NSA we would go on. However, past some point the gains are not worth the effort. We stop here.

These improvements help the constant but not the main term of \( \log n \).

3) We first give an algorithm that is too slow.

1. Input\( (n) \)

2. Find a prime \( p \in [n, 2n] \) by using the algorithm from part 2.

3. For \( g = 2, 3, 4, \ldots \) until you get a generator do the following:

   - If \( \{g^0, g^1, g^2, \ldots, g^{p-1}\} = \{1, 2, \ldots, p-1\} \) (in a diff order) then output \( (p, g) \) and STOP

The problem with this is that looking at \( g^2, g^3, \ldots, g^{p-1} \) is \( p \) calculations which is too many.

BUT notice the following: it is known that if \( g \) is not a generator then there exists a number \( i < p - 1 \) such that \( i \) divides \( p - 1 \) and \( g^i = 1 \). This inspires this next algorithm that does not work fast enough.

1. Input\( (n) \)

2. Find a prime \( p \in [n, 2n] \) by using the algorithm from part 2.
3. Factor $p - 1$. Let $F$ be the set of factors (not including $p - 1$). $F$ will be small—roughly log $n$.

4. For $g = 2, 3, 4, \ldots$ until you get a generator do the following:
   - Find $A = \{g^a : a \in F\}$.
   - If $1 \notin A$ then output $(p, g)$ and STOP.

GOOD NEWS: the calculation of the set $A$ is fast.
BAD NEWS: We need to factor $p - 1$. That could be hard! In fact, many protocols in crypto are based on factoring being hard.
IDEA: Choose your prime $p$ so that $p - 1$ is easy to factor. We will choose $p$ to be a *safe prime* which means that $p - 1 = 2q$ where $q$ is a prime. It is known that the number of safe primes in $[n, 2n]$ is roughly $\frac{n}{\log^2 n}$.

1. **Input**($n$)

2. **Repeat** until you find a prime:
   - (a) Pick a number $p \in [n, 2n]$ at random.
   - (b) Test both $p$ and $q = \frac{p - 1}{2}$ for primality part 1. If both are primes then get out of this loop and goto the next step. NOTE: We know that $p - 1 = 2q$.

3. Let $F = \{2, q\}$. Note that this is the set of ALL factors of $p - 1$.

4. For $g = 2, 3, 4, \ldots$ until this is the set of ALL factors of $p - 1$.
   - Find $A = \{g^a : a \in F\}$.
   - If $1 \notin A$ then output $(p, g)$ and STOP.

Since there are roughly $\frac{n}{\log^2 n}$ safe primes there will be roughly $\log^2 n$ iterations of the first loop. Each iteration takes roughly log $n$ steps. Hence the first phase where you find $p$ takes $\log^3 n$ steps.

we hope there are a lot of generators so that the second loop ends quickly. One can show the the number of generators is also the number of numbers $\leq p - 1$ that are rel prime to $p - 1$. We are in luck! Since $p - 1 = 2q$ and $q$ is prime the numbers relatively prime to $p - 1$ are

$$\{1, 3, 5, 7, 9, \ldots, p - 2\} - \{q\}$$

Which is roughly half of the numbers. So the second loop goes a constant number of iterations. Each iteration takes 2 calculations which take log $n$ each. So the second loop takes roughly log $n$ steps.

Hence the entire process takes $O(\log^3 n)$ steps.
17.2 Diffie Helman Key Exchange

We can USE this mathematics to have Alice and Bob exchange information in public and in the end they have a shared secret key.

1. Alice generates a large prime $p$ and a generator $g$ (this takes roughly $\log p$ steps) and sends it to Bob over an open channel. So now Alice and Bob know $p, g$ but so does Eve.

2. Alice generates a random $a \in \{0, \ldots, p-2\}$. Bob generates a random $b \in \{0, \ldots, p-2\}$. They keep these numbers private. Note that even Alice does not know $b$, and even Bob does not know $a$.

3. Alice computes $g^a \mod p$. Bob computes $g^b \mod p$. Both use repeated squaring so it takes roughly $\log p$.

4. Alice sends Bob $g^a \mod p$ over an open channel. Notice that Eve will NOT be able to compute $a$ if computing $DL_g$ is hard (which is the common belief). Even Bob won’t know what $a$ is.

5. Bob sends Alice $g^b \mod p$. Notice that Eve will NOT be able to compute $b$ if computing $DL_g$ is hard. Even Alice won’t know what $b$ is.

6. RECAP: Alice now has $a$ and $g^b$. SHE DOES NOT HAVE $b$. Bob has $b$ and $g^a$. HE DOES NOT HAVE $a$. Eve has $g^a$ and $g^b$. SHE DOES NOT HAVE $a$ OR $b$.

7. Alice computes $(g^b)^a \mod p = g^{ab} \mod p$. Bob computes $(g^a)^b \mod p = g^{ab} \mod p$. They both use repeated squaring so this is fast.

8. SO at the end of the protocol they BOTH know $g^{ab} \mod p$. This is their shared secret key. Eve likely does NOT know $g^{ab}$ since she only gets to see $g^a$ and $g^b$.

This scheme LOOKS good but we must be very careful about what is known about it.

1. Alice and Bob can execute the scheme quickly.

2. If Eve can compute $DL_g$ quickly then she can crack the code.

3. There MIGHT BE other ways for Eve to crack the code. That is, being able to compute $DL_g$ quickly is sufficient to crack this scheme, but might not be necessary.

4. This scheme can be used for Alice and Bob to establish a secret key without meeting. This can then be used in other schemes such as the one-time pad.
5. Reality: This scheme is used in the real world for secret key exchange. The RSA algorithm and the ElGamal methods are also used for Public Key Cryptography (which is similar).

6. Reality: Quantum Key distribution is also a way for Alice and Bob to not have to meet.