

On the Algebraic Eraser and the Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban Attack

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January 8, 2017

Abstract

We give an overview of the Algebraic Eraser and the Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP), following Anshel et al. [1]. We provide a worked example of the protocol with small parameters in order to elucidate the scheme. Finally, we discuss a recent attack on this protocol due to Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban [2].

1 Preliminaries

We begin by introducing the notion of braid groups. The *Artin braid group* B_m [4] is the group generated by elements $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{m-1}$ satisfying the following “braid relations”:

- For all $i, j \in \{1, 2, \dots, m-1\}$ with $|i-j| \geq 2$, it holds that $\sigma_i \sigma_j = \sigma_j \sigma_i$.
- For all $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, m-2\}$, it holds that $\sigma_k \sigma_{k+1} \sigma_k = \sigma_{k+1} \sigma_k \sigma_{k+1}$.

Let $n \geq 7$ be an integer and $q > n$ be prime. Let $t = (t_1, \dots, t_n, t_1^{-1}, \dots, t_n^{-1})$ be commutative indeterminates and their inverses. Define

$$x_1 = \begin{bmatrix} -t_1 & 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1 \end{bmatrix} \in (\mathbb{F}_q[t])^{n \times n} \text{ and}$$

$$x_i = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & & & & & \\ & \ddots & & & & \\ & & 1 & 0 & 0 & \\ & & t_i & -t_i & 1 & \\ & & 0 & 0 & 1 & \\ & & & & & \ddots \\ & & & & & & 1 \end{bmatrix} \in (\mathbb{F}_q[t])^{n \times n} \text{ for } 2 \leq i \leq n-1.$$

That is, x_i (for $i > 1$) is the identity matrix but with the $(i, i-1)$ th entry set to t_i , the (i, i) th entry set to $-t_i$, and the $(i, i+1)$ th entry set to 1. Each x_i is invertible since

$$x_1^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} -t_1^{-1} & t_1^{-1} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1 \end{bmatrix} \in (\mathbb{F}_q[t])^{n \times n} \text{ and}$$

$$x_i^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & & & & & \\ & \ddots & & & & \\ & & 1 & 0 & 0 & \\ & & 1 & -t_i^{-1} & t_i^{-1} & \\ & & 0 & 0 & 1 & \\ & & & & & \ddots \\ & & & & & & 1 \end{bmatrix} \in (\mathbb{F}_q[t])^{n \times n} \text{ for } 2 \leq i \leq n-1.$$

Let $M \leq \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q[t])$ denote the subgroup generated by $\{x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}\}$ under matrix multiplication. (This is called the *reduced Burau representation* of B_n .) Fixing nonzero elements $\kappa_1, \dots, \kappa_n \in \mathbb{F}_q$, we define the evaluation homomorphism $\varphi : M \rightarrow \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ in which the value κ_i is substituted for the indeterminate t_i .

Let S_n be the symmetric group on n elements, with the identity denoted by e . For $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n-1\}$, let $s_i = (i \ i+1) \in S_n$ be the transposition of elements i and $i+1$. (Elements of S_n can be represented either as a product of transpositions or in cyclic notation, as these are polynomially equivalent.) We let \cdot denote the group operation in the direct-

product group $GL_n(\mathbb{F}_q) \times S_n$. Also, let $M \rtimes S_n$ denote the *colored Burau group* with group operation \circ defined by $(m_1, \sigma_1) \circ (m_2, \sigma_2) = (m_1^{\sigma_1} m_2, \sigma_1 \sigma_2)$, where $\sigma_1 m_2$ is the action of σ_1 on m_2 in which the indeterminates t_1, \dots, t_n are permuted according to σ_1 .

Define the function $*$: $(GL_n(\mathbb{F}_q) \times S_n) \times (M \rtimes S_n) \rightarrow GL_n(\mathbb{F}_q) \times S_n$ by

$$(n, \sigma_1) * (m, \sigma_2) = (n\varphi(\sigma_1 m), \sigma_1 \sigma_2).$$

The following lemma is used crucially in the key-agreement protocol.

Lemma 1.1. *For all $(n, \sigma) \in GL_n(\mathbb{F}_q) \times S_n$ and $(m_1, \sigma_1), (m_2, \sigma_2) \in M \rtimes S_n$,*

$$((n, \sigma) * (m_1, \sigma_1)) * (m_2, \sigma_2) = (n, \sigma) * ((m_1, \sigma_1) \circ (m_2, \sigma_2)).$$

Proof. We have:

$$\begin{aligned} ((n, \sigma) * (m_1, \sigma_1)) * (m_2, \sigma_2) &= (n\varphi(\sigma m_1), \sigma \sigma_1) * (m_2, \sigma_2) \\ &= (n\varphi(\sigma m_1)\varphi(\sigma^{\sigma_1} m_2), \sigma \sigma_1 \sigma_2) \\ &= (n\varphi(\sigma m_1^{\sigma_1} m_2), \sigma \sigma_1 \sigma_2) \\ &= (n\varphi(\sigma(m_1^{\sigma_1} m_2)), \sigma \sigma_1 \sigma_2) \\ &= (n, \sigma) * (m_1^{\sigma_1} m_2, \sigma_1 \sigma_2) \\ &= (n, \sigma) * ((m_1, \sigma_1) \circ (m_2, \sigma_2)), \end{aligned}$$

as desired. □

Elements $(a, \sigma), (b, \sigma') \in M \rtimes S_n$ are said to be **-commuting* if

$$(\varphi(a), \sigma) * (b, \sigma') = (\varphi(b), \sigma') * (a, \sigma).$$

Two sets S_1, S_2 are **-commuting* if s_1, s_2 are **-commuting* for all $s_1 \in S_1$ and $s_2 \in S_2$.

One can show that the set $\{(x_1, s_1), \dots, (x_{n-1}, s_{n-1})\}$ generates $M \rtimes S_n$. Let $A = \{(x_{l_1}, s_{l_1}), \dots, (x_{l_\alpha}, s_{l_\alpha})\}$ and $B = \{(x_{r_1}, s_{r_1}), \dots, (x_{r_\beta}, s_{r_\beta})\}$ be subsets of these generating elements such that $|l_i - r_j| \geq 2$ for all i, j . Define

$$\begin{aligned} A^1 &= \{(x_{l_1}, s_{l_1})^{-1}, \dots, (x_{l_\alpha}, s_{l_\alpha})^{-1}\} \\ B^{-1} &= \{(x_{r_1}, s_{r_1})^{-1}, \dots, (x_{r_\beta}, s_{r_\beta})^{-1}\}; \end{aligned}$$

That is, A^{-1} and B^{-1} are the sets containing the (right) inverses of the elements of A and B , respectively, in the group $M \rtimes S_n$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} A^{-1} &= \{(s_{l_1}^{-1} x_{l_1}^{-1}, s_{l_1}^{-1}), \dots, (s_{l_\alpha}^{-1} x_{l_\alpha}^{-1}, s_{l_\alpha}^{-1})\} = \{(s_{l_1} x_{l_1}^{-1}, s_{l_1}), \dots, (s_{l_\alpha} x_{l_\alpha}^{-1}, s_{l_\alpha})\} \\ B^{-1} &= \{(s_{r_1}^{-1} x_{r_1}^{-1}, s_{r_1}^{-1}), \dots, (s_{r_\beta}^{-1} x_{r_\beta}^{-1}, s_{r_\beta}^{-1})\} = \{(s_{r_1} x_{r_1}^{-1}, s_{r_1}), \dots, (s_{r_\beta} x_{r_\beta}^{-1}, s_{r_\beta})\}, \end{aligned}$$

using the fact that $s_i = s_i^{-1}$ (since s_i is simply a transposition).

Claim 1.2. $A \cup A^{-1}$ and $B \cup B^{-1}$ are $*$ -commuting.

Proof. Let $(\tilde{x}_k(t), s_k) \in A \cup A^{-1}$ and $(\tilde{x}_l(t), s_l) \in B \cup B^{-1}$ be arbitrary. Without loss of generality, assume $k < l$, so $l = k + j$ for some $2 \leq j < n - 1$. It is clear that $s_k s_l = s_k s_{k+j} = s_{k+j} s_k = s_l s_k$ since $j \geq 2$. It is also easily verified that $\tilde{x}_k(t) \tilde{x}_l(t) = \tilde{x}_k(t) \tilde{x}_{k+j}(t) = \tilde{x}_{k+j}(t) \tilde{x}_k(t) = \tilde{x}_l(t) \tilde{x}_k(t)$ due to the fact that $j \geq 2$ and the structure of $x_i(t)$ and $x_i(t)^{-1}$ each contain only non-zero elements along the main diagonal and to the left and right of the main diagonal in the i^{th} row of each matrix. Similarly, since $2 \leq j < n - 1$, $s^i \tilde{x}_k(t) = \tilde{x}_k(t)$ and $s^k \tilde{x}_l(t)$ due to the fact that neither s_l nor s_k permute the elements of t found in $\tilde{x}_k(t)$ and $\tilde{x}_l(t)$ respectively. Thus, the following equalities hold.

$$\begin{aligned} (\varphi(\tilde{x}_k(t)), s_l) * (\tilde{x}_l(t), s_l) &= (\varphi(\tilde{x}_k(t)) \varphi(s^l \tilde{x}_l(t)), s_l s_l) \\ &= (\varphi(\tilde{x}_k(t)) \varphi(\tilde{x}_l(t)), s_l s_l) \\ &= (\varphi(\tilde{x}_k(t) \tilde{x}_l(t)), s_l s_l) \\ &= (\varphi(\tilde{x}_l(t) \tilde{x}_k(t)), s_l s_k) \\ &= (\varphi(\tilde{x}_l(t)) \varphi(\tilde{x}_k(t)), s_l s_k) \\ &= (\varphi(\tilde{x}_l(t)) \varphi(s^l \tilde{x}_k(t)), s_l s_k) \\ &= (\varphi(\tilde{x}_l(t)), s_l) * (\tilde{x}_k(t), s_k) \end{aligned}$$

The result follows. □

Claim 1.2 trivially implies that A' and B' $*$ -commute as well.

Now, fix a matrix $m_0 \in \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ of order $q^n - 1$. Let $C \leq \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ be the subgroup

$$C = \left\{ \sum \ell_i m_0^{k_i} \mid \ell_i \in \mathbb{F}_q, k_i \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \right\}.$$

Note that C is abelian.

2 The Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol

The Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP) requires a trusted authority to generate public data. This is done by choosing a uniform $z \in M \rtimes S_n$ and then publishing (descriptions of) the $*$ -commuting groups $A = z \circ \langle A' \rangle \circ z^{-1}$ and $B = z \circ \langle B' \rangle \circ z^{-1}$ where $\langle A' \rangle$ and $\langle B' \rangle$ denote the groups generated by of A' and B' respectively.

Claim 2.1. *A and B are $*$ -commuting subgroups of $M \rtimes S_n$.*

Proof. Let $z = (m_z, s_z) \in M \rtimes S_n$ be uniformly chosen but otherwise arbitrary, and let $A = z \circ \langle A' \rangle \circ z^{-1}$ and $B = z \circ \langle B' \rangle \circ z^{-1}$ where A' and B' are the subsets of generators of $M \rtimes S_n$ defined in Section 1. Let $(m_a, s_a) \in A$ and $(m_b, s_b) \in B$ be arbitrary. Thus, we can express (m_a, s_a) and (m_b, s_b) as

$$\begin{aligned} (m_a, s_a) &= z \circ (y_{a'_1}, \sigma_{a'_1}) \circ (y_{a'_2}, \sigma_{a'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{a'_u}, \sigma_{a'_u}) \circ z^{-1} \\ (m_b, s_b) &= z \circ (y_{b'_1}, \sigma_{b'_1}) \circ (y_{b'_2}, \sigma_{b'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{b'_v}, \sigma_{b'_v}) \circ z^{-1}, \end{aligned}$$

where each $(y_{a'_i}, \sigma_{a'_i})$ and $(y_{b'_j}, \sigma_{b'_j})$ are elements from $A' \cup A^*$ and $B' \cup B^*$, respectively. From the proof of Claim 1.2, we know that each $(y_{a'_i}, \sigma_{a'_i})$ and each $(y_{b'_j}, \sigma_{b'_j})$ commute with each other with respect to the operation induced from $M \rtimes S_n$. Thus, by the use of Lemma 1.1, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} (\varphi(m_a), s_a) * (m_b, s_b) &= ((I_n, e) * (m_a, s_a)) * (m_b, s_b) \\ &= (I_n, e) * ((m_a, s_a) \circ (m_b, s_b)) \\ &= (I_n, e) * ((z \circ (y_{a'_1}, \sigma_{a'_1}) \circ (y_{a'_2}, \sigma_{a'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{a'_u}, \sigma_{a'_u}) \circ z^{-1}) \\ &\quad \circ (z \circ (y_{b'_1}, \sigma_{b'_1}) \circ (y_{b'_2}, \sigma_{b'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{b'_v}, \sigma_{b'_v}) \circ z^{-1})) \\ &= (I_n, e) * (z \circ (y_{a'_1}, \sigma_{a'_1}) \circ (y_{a'_2}, \sigma_{a'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{a'_u}, \sigma_{a'_u}) \\ &\quad \circ (y_{b'_1}, \sigma_{b'_1}) \circ (y_{b'_2}, \sigma_{b'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{b'_v}, \sigma_{b'_v}) \circ z^{-1}) \\ &= (I_n, e) * (z \circ (y_{b'_1}, \sigma_{b'_1}) \circ (y_{b'_2}, \sigma_{b'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{b'_v}, \sigma_{b'_v}) \\ &\quad \circ (y_{a'_1}, \sigma_{a'_1}) \circ (y_{a'_2}, \sigma_{a'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{a'_u}, \sigma_{a'_u}) \circ z^{-1}) \\ &= (I_n, e) * ((z \circ (y_{b'_1}, \sigma_{b'_1}) \circ (y_{b'_2}, \sigma_{b'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{b'_v}, \sigma_{b'_v}) \circ z^{-1}) \\ &\quad \circ (z \circ (y_{a'_1}, \sigma_{a'_1}) \circ (y_{a'_2}, \sigma_{a'_2}) \circ \cdots \circ (y_{a'_u}, \sigma_{a'_u}) \circ z^{-1})) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (I_n, e) * ((m_b, s_b) \circ (m_a, s_a)) \\
&= ((I_n, e) * (m_b, s_b)) * (m_a, s_a) \\
&= (\varphi(m_b), s_b) * (m_a, s_a)
\end{aligned}$$

The result follows. □

The security of Algebraic Eraser is based on the hardness of the *generalized simultaneous conjugacy search problem*. This problem is stated as such: G is a group, given $y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n \in G$ and $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n \in G$, find ζ such that $y_i = \zeta x_i \zeta^{-1}$ for all i .

According to the Trusted Third Party (TTP) algorithm given in [1], A and B are published through the following steps:

1. The TTP chooses the sets A' and B' described in Section 1.
2. The TTP chooses a secret element $z \in M \rtimes S_n$.
3. Choose words $\{w_1, \dots, w_\gamma\}$ of bounded length from the set A' and it's inverses. Note that $\{w_1, \dots, w_\gamma\}$ are all elements in the groups A .
4. Choose words $\{v_1, \dots, v_\gamma\}$ of bounded length from the set B' and it's inverses. Similarly $\{v_1, \dots, v_\gamma\}$ are all elements in the group B .
5. For $1 \leq i \leq \gamma$, do the following.

- (a) Calculate the left normal form $z \circ w_i \circ z^{-1}$ and reduce the result modulo the square of the fundamental braid Δ , which is defined as

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta = & ((x_{n-1}(t), s_{n-1}) \circ (x_{n-2}(t), s_{n-2}) \circ \dots \circ (x_1(t), s_1)) \\
& \circ ((x_{n-1}(t), s_{n-1}) \circ (x_{n-2}(t), s_{n-2}) \circ \dots \circ (x_2(t), s_2)) \circ \dots \circ (x_{n-1}(t), s_{n-1})).
\end{aligned}$$

Let w'_i be the result of this modulus.

- (b) Calculate the left normal form $z \circ v_i \circ z^{-1}$ and reduce the result modulo the square of the fundamental braid Δ . Let v'_i be result of this modulus.

6. Publish the sets $\{w'_1, \dots, w'_\gamma\}$ and $\{v'_1, \dots, v'_\gamma\}$.

Because any even power of the fundamental braid is a central element of the braid group, reducing the element $z \circ z^{-1}$ by the square of Δ and any odd power of the fundamental braid can be replaced by the fundamental braid itself; set w'_i equal to the resulting braid.

If the private braid element z is known by an attacker, Anshel et al. give an attack [1, Section 6] that recovers the shared secret between Alice and Bob in a negligible amount of time. This is why having a truly secure TTP is of paramount importance.

A party Alice generates her private key by choosing a matrix $c = \sum \ell_i m_0^{\alpha_i} \in C$ and a element $(a, g) \in A$. The element (a, g) is chosen arbitrarily from A , but note that it would be beneficial for Alice to choose an element that is composed of a significant amount of elements from the generating set as the second element g of (a, g) will be made public. Having a long product of elements from the generating set of A helps to defend against brute force attacks. Alice then sets her public key equal to $(c, e) * (a, g) = (c\varphi(a), g) \in \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q) \times S_n$.

A second party Bob acts symmetrically, though using B rather than A . I.e., Bob chooses a uniform matrix $d = \sum \ell'_i m_0^{\beta_i} \in C$ and a uniform $(b, h) \in B$, and then sets his public key equal to $(d, e) * (b, h) = (d\varphi(b), h) \in \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q) \times S_n$.

Bob and Alice can now compute a shared key k . Alice, given her private key and Bob's public key, will compute the shared key as

$$k = (c, e) \cdot \left(((d, e) * (b, h)) * (a, g) \right).$$

Analogously, Bob can compute k using his private key and Alice's public key as

$$k = (d, e) \cdot \left(((c, e) * (a, g)) * (b, h) \right).$$

Claim 2.2. For all $(a, g) \in A, (b, h) \in B$, and $c, d \in C$,

$$(c, e) \cdot \left(((d, e) * (b, h)) * (a, g) \right) = (d, e) \cdot \left(((c, e) * (a, g)) * (b, h) \right)$$

Proof. Let $(a, g) \in A, (b, h) \in B$, and $c, d \in C$. Consider:

$$\begin{aligned} (c, e) \cdot \left(((d, e) * (b, h)) * (a, g) \right) &= (c, e) \cdot ((d\varphi(b), h) * (a, g)) \\ &= (c, e) \cdot (d\varphi(b^h a), hg) \\ &= (cd\varphi(b^h a), hg) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (cd, e) \cdot (\varphi(b^h a), hg) \\
&= (cd, e) \cdot ((\varphi(b), h) * (a, g)) \\
&= (dc, e) \cdot ((\varphi(a), g) * (b, h)) \\
&= (dc, e) \cdot (\varphi(a^g b), gh) \\
&= (dc\varphi(a^g b), gh) \\
&= (d, e) \cdot (c\varphi(a^g b), gh) \\
&= (d, e) \cdot ((c\varphi(a), g) * (b, h)) \\
&= (d, e) \cdot (((c, e) * (a, g)) * (b, h))
\end{aligned}$$

By using the *-commuting property of the sets A and B as well as the fact that elements of C commute, we see that the shared key computed by the two parties is indeed the same. \square

Since the second component of the shared secret is just the product of the symmetric group elements from Alice and Bob's public keys, the symmetric group component of the shared secret is indeed not a secret at all.

3 A Worked Example

Let $q = 11$ and $n = 7$. Set $\tau_i = i$ for $i = 1, \dots, 7$. Define the two subsets A' and B' as

$$\begin{aligned}
A' &= \{(x_1(t), s_1), (x_2(t), s_2)\} \\
B' &= \{(x_4(t), s_4), (x_5(t), s_5), (x_6(t), s_6)\},
\end{aligned}$$

and let

$$m_0 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 10 & 6 & 2 & 0 & 10 & 7 \\ 5 & 4 & 8 & 3 & 9 & 5 & 10 \\ 4 & 0 & 3 & 4 & 9 & 6 & 1 \\ 10 & 8 & 7 & 4 & 2 & 9 & 10 \\ 4 & 7 & 5 & 4 & 8 & 4 & 3 \\ 3 & 10 & 5 & 5 & 2 & 4 & 7 \\ 8 & 10 & 1 & 9 & 2 & 9 & 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

(Since the characteristic polynomial of m_0 is nonzero, we assume its order is $11^7 - 1$. We have not yet verified this.)

Say the secret element $z \in M \rtimes S_n$ is chosen as

$$z = (x_1(t), s_1) \circ (x_6(t), s_6) \circ (x_3(t), s_3)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{bmatrix} -t_1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & t_3 & -t_3 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & t_6 & -t_6 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ , (1 \ 2)(6 \ 7)(3 \ 4) \end{array} \right).$$

With this choice of z , z^{-1} then becomes

$$z^{-1} = (s_1 s_6 s_3 x_1(t)^{-1} x_6(t)^{-1} x_3(t)^{-1}, s_1 s_6 s_3)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{bmatrix} -t_1^{-1} & t_1^{-1} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & -t_3^{-1} & t_3^{-1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -t_6^{-1} & t_6^{-1} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ , (1 \ 2)(6 \ 7)(3 \ 4) \end{array} \right)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{bmatrix} -t_2^{-1} & t_2^{-1} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & -t_4^{-1} & t_4^{-1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -t_7^{-1} & t_7^{-1} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ , (1 \ 2)(6 \ 7)(3 \ 4) \end{array} \right)$$

Then

$$A = z \circ \langle (x_1(t), s_1), (x_2(t), s_2) \rangle \circ z^{-1}$$

$$B = z \circ \langle (x_4(t), s_4), (x_5(t), s_5), (x_6(t), s_6) \rangle \circ z^{-1}.$$

The sets A and B are published by calculating the left normal form of each $z \circ a_i \circ z^{-1}$ and $z \circ b_j \circ z^{-1}$ and then reducing each $z \circ a_i \circ z^{-1}$ and $z \circ b_j \circ z^{-1}$ modulo the square of the fundamental braid.

Alice's public/private keys. Say Alice chooses $c \in C$ as

$$c = m_0 + 2m_0^2 + 3m_0^3 = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & 8 & 5 & 3 & 6 & 6 \\ 3 & 6 & 1 & 3 & 2 & 6 & 6 \\ 6 & 5 & 4 & 8 & 9 & 8 & 9 \\ 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 & 8 & 4 & 0 \\ 1 & 5 & 4 & 10 & 8 & 1 & 0 \\ 7 & 2 & 10 & 9 & 5 & 4 & 5 \\ 2 & 10 & 5 & 6 & 8 & 2 & 2 \end{bmatrix},$$

and $(a, g) \in A$ as

$$(a, g) = (z \circ (x_1(t), s_1)) \circ z^{-1}$$

$$= \left(\begin{bmatrix} -t_1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & t_3 & -t_3 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & t_6 & -t_6 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -t_2 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, (6 \ 7)(3 \ 4) \right) \circ z^{-1}$$

$$= \left(\begin{bmatrix} t_1 t_2 & -t_1 + 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & t_3 & -t_3 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & t_6 & -t_6 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -t_2^{-1} & t_2^{-1} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & -t_3^{-1} & t_3^{-1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -t_6^{-1} & t_6^{-1} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, (1 \ 2) \right)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{bmatrix} -t_1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ (1 \ 2) \end{array} \right).$$

Her public key is then

$$(c, e) * (a, g) = (c\varphi(a), g)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & 8 & 5 & 3 & 6 & 6 \\ 3 & 6 & 1 & 3 & 2 & 6 & 6 \\ 6 & 5 & 4 & 8 & 9 & 8 & 9 \\ 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 & 8 & 4 & 0 \\ 1 & 5 & 4 & 10 & 8 & 1 & 0 \\ 7 & 2 & 10 & 9 & 5 & 4 & 5 \\ 2 & 10 & 5 & 6 & 8 & 2 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \\ \begin{bmatrix} -1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ (1 \ 2) \end{array} \right)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{bmatrix} 9 & 2 & 8 & 5 & 3 & 6 & 6 \\ 8 & 9 & 1 & 3 & 2 & 6 & 6 \\ 5 & 0 & 4 & 8 & 9 & 8 & 9 \\ 6 & 10 & 4 & 4 & 8 & 4 & 0 \\ 10 & 6 & 4 & 10 & 8 & 1 & 0 \\ 4 & 9 & 10 & 9 & 5 & 4 & 5 \\ 9 & 1 & 5 & 6 & 8 & 2 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \\ (1 \ 2) \end{array} \right).$$

Bob's public/private keys. Say Bob chooses $d \in C$ as

$$d = 4m_0^2 + m_0^5 + 2m_0^6 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 9 & 2 & 3 & 0 & 2 & 8 \\ 8 & 7 & 8 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 \\ 7 & 4 & 5 & 10 & 1 & 8 & 6 \\ 2 & 9 & 7 & 6 & 4 & 1 & 8 \\ 7 & 3 & 5 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 9 \\ 1 & 8 & 4 & 3 & 9 & 8 & 9 \\ 4 & 0 & 2 & 5 & 4 & 9 & 3 \end{bmatrix},$$

and $(b, h) \in B$ as

$$(b, h) = (z \circ (x_6(t), s_6)) \circ z^{-1}$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} -t_1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & t_3 & -t_3 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & t_6 & -t_6 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & t_7 & -t_7 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right], (1 \ 2)(3 \ 4) \\ \circ z^{-1} \end{array} \right)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} -t_1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & t_3 & -t_3 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & t_6 - t_6 t_7 & t_6 t_7 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} -t_1^{-1} & t_1^{-1} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & -t_3^{-1} & t_3^{-1} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -t_7^{-1} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right], (6 \ 7) \end{array} \right)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & t_6 & -t_6 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ , (6 \ 7) \end{array} \right).$$

His public key is then

$$(d, e) * (b, h) = (d\varphi(b), h)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 9 & 2 & 3 & 0 & 2 & 8 \\ 8 & 7 & 8 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 \\ 7 & 4 & 5 & 10 & 1 & 8 & 6 \\ 2 & 9 & 7 & 6 & 4 & 1 & 8 \\ 7 & 3 & 5 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 9 \\ 1 & 8 & 4 & 3 & 9 & 8 & 9 \\ 4 & 0 & 2 & 5 & 4 & 9 & 3 \end{bmatrix} \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 6 & -6 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ , (6 \ 7) \end{array} \right)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 9 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 10 & 8 \\ 8 & 7 & 8 & 6 & 0 & 7 & 9 \\ 7 & 4 & 5 & 10 & 5 & 7 & 6 \\ 2 & 9 & 7 & 6 & 10 & 5 & 8 \\ 7 & 3 & 5 & 2 & 9 & 5 & 9 \\ 1 & 8 & 4 & 3 & 2 & 7 & 9 \\ 4 & 0 & 2 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 3 \end{bmatrix} \\ , (6 \ 7) \end{array} \right).$$

Shared key.

$$\begin{aligned}
 (c, e) \cdot ((d, e) * (b, h)) * (a, g) &= \left(\left(\begin{bmatrix} 2 & 7 & 9 & 5 & 6 & 10 & 5 \\ 2 & 9 & 5 & 4 & 9 & 9 & 0 \\ 1 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 10 & 9 & 9 \\ 2 & 10 & 0 & 5 & 2 & 3 & 7 \\ 8 & 9 & 0 & 9 & 8 & 5 & 7 \\ 6 & 8 & 7 & 3 & 6 & 4 & 5 \\ 3 & 1 & 5 & 8 & 4 & 2 & 5 \end{bmatrix}, (1 \ 2)(6 \ 7) \right) \\
 &= (d, e) \cdot ((c, e) * (a, g)) * (b, h).
 \end{aligned}$$

Alice's Calculation

$$\begin{aligned}
 (c, e) \cdot ((d, e) * (b, h)) * (a, g) &= (c, e) \cdot ((d\varphi(b), h) * (a, g)) \\
 &= (c, e) \cdot \left(\left(\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 9 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 10 & 8 \\ 8 & 7 & 8 & 6 & 0 & 7 & 9 \\ 7 & 4 & 5 & 10 & 5 & 7 & 6 \\ 2 & 9 & 7 & 6 & 10 & 5 & 8 \\ 7 & 3 & 5 & 2 & 9 & 5 & 9 \\ 1 & 8 & 4 & 3 & 2 & 7 & 9 \\ 4 & 0 & 2 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 3 \end{bmatrix}, (6 \ 7) \right) * (a, g) \right) \\
 &= (c, e) \cdot \left(\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 5 & 10 & 0 & 8 & 3 & 5 \\ 1 & 7 & 8 & 10 & 8 & 5 & 5 \\ 7 & 0 & 10 & 7 & 6 & 6 & 7 \\ 5 & 8 & 5 & 7 & 1 & 10 & 5 \\ 7 & 5 & 1 & 7 & 6 & 2 & 10 \\ 10 & 5 & 1 & 1 & 9 & 2 & 5 \\ 8 & 5 & 7 & 2 & 1 & 10 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, (6 \ 7)(1 \ 2) \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (c, e) \cdot \left(\begin{array}{c} \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 10 & 10 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 10 & 8 \\ 3 & 4 & 8 & 6 & 0 & 7 & 9 \\ 4 & 0 & 5 & 10 & 5 & 7 & 6 \\ 9 & 0 & 7 & 6 & 10 & 5 & 8 \\ 4 & 10 & 5 & 2 & 9 & 5 & 9 \\ 10 & 9 & 4 & 3 & 2 & 7 & 9 \\ 7 & 4 & 2 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 3 \end{array} \right] \\ , (6 \ 7)(1 \ 2) \end{array} \right) \\
&= \left(\begin{array}{c} \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 2 & 7 & 9 & 5 & 6 & 10 & 5 \\ 2 & 9 & 5 & 4 & 9 & 9 & 0 \\ 1 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 10 & 9 & 9 \\ 2 & 10 & 0 & 5 & 2 & 3 & 7 \\ 8 & 9 & 0 & 9 & 8 & 5 & 7 \\ 6 & 8 & 7 & 3 & 6 & 4 & 5 \\ 3 & 1 & 5 & 8 & 4 & 2 & 5 \end{array} \right] \\ , (6 \ 7)(1 \ 2) \end{array} \right)
\end{aligned}$$

Bob's Calculation

$$\begin{aligned}
&(d, e) \cdot ((c, e) * (a, g)) * (b, h) = (d, e) \cdot ((c\varphi(a), g) * (b, h)) \\
&= (d, e) \cdot \left(\left(\begin{array}{c} \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 9 & 2 & 8 & 5 & 3 & 6 & 6 \\ 8 & 9 & 1 & 3 & 2 & 6 & 6 \\ 5 & 0 & 4 & 8 & 9 & 8 & 9 \\ 6 & 10 & 4 & 4 & 8 & 4 & 0 \\ 10 & 6 & 4 & 10 & 8 & 1 & 0 \\ 4 & 9 & 10 & 9 & 5 & 4 & 5 \\ 9 & 1 & 5 & 6 & 8 & 2 & 2 \end{array} \right] \\ , (1 \ 2) \end{array} \right) * (b, h) \right)
\end{aligned}$$

$$= (d, e) \cdot \left(\begin{array}{c} \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 0 & 9 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 9 & 1 \\ 10 & 9 & 0 & 3 & 4 & 1 & 9 \\ 3 & 8 & 3 & 8 & 4 & 0 & 6 \\ 2 & 9 & 1 & 8 & 1 & 4 & 9 \\ 3 & 9 & 1 & 8 & 0 & 8 & 3 \\ 8 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 8 & 1 \\ 0 & 9 & 6 & 4 & 1 & 4 & 0 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 6 & -6 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right] , (1 \ 2)(6 \ 7) \end{array} \right)$$

$$= (d, e) \cdot \left(\begin{array}{c} \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 9 & 2 & 8 & 5 & 6 & 8 & 6 \\ 8 & 9 & 1 & 3 & 5 & 8 & 6 \\ 5 & 0 & 4 & 8 & 2 & 7 & 9 \\ 6 & 10 & 4 & 4 & 10 & 9 & 0 \\ 10 & 6 & 4 & 10 & 3 & 5 & 0 \\ 4 & 9 & 10 & 9 & 7 & 9 & 5 \\ 9 & 1 & 5 & 6 & 9 & 10 & 2 \end{array} \right] , (1 \ 2)(6 \ 7) \end{array} \right)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 1 & 9 & 2 & 3 & 0 & 2 & 8 \\ 8 & 7 & 8 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 \\ 7 & 4 & 5 & 10 & 1 & 8 & 6 \\ 2 & 9 & 7 & 6 & 4 & 1 & 8 \\ 7 & 3 & 5 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 9 \\ 1 & 8 & 4 & 3 & 9 & 8 & 9 \\ 4 & 0 & 2 & 5 & 4 & 9 & 3 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 0 & 9 & 0 & 1 & 10 & 1 & 1 \\ 10 & 9 & 0 & 3 & 10 & 5 & 9 \\ 3 & 8 & 3 & 8 & 4 & 0 & 6 \\ 2 & 9 & 1 & 8 & 3 & 9 & 9 \\ 3 & 9 & 1 & 8 & 4 & 7 & 3 \\ 8 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 5 & 7 & 1 \\ 0 & 9 & 6 & 4 & 3 & 9 & 0 \end{array} \right] , (1 \ 2)(6 \ 7) \end{array} \right)$$

$$= \left(\begin{array}{c} \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 2 & 7 & 9 & 5 & 6 & 10 & 5 \\ 2 & 9 & 5 & 4 & 9 & 9 & 0 \\ 1 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 10 & 9 & 9 \\ 2 & 10 & 0 & 5 & 2 & 3 & 7 \\ 8 & 9 & 0 & 9 & 8 & 5 & 7 \\ 6 & 8 & 7 & 3 & 6 & 4 & 5 \\ 3 & 1 & 5 & 8 & 4 & 2 & 5 \end{array} \right] , (1 \ 2)(6 \ 7) \end{array} \right)$$

4 The Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban (BBT) Attack

Assume that Eve, the adversary, sees all public information. With the public information, Eve hopes to produce the Shared Secret between Alice and Bob, which is retrieved directly instead of through discovering each of their respective private keys. Before going through the attack specifically, a few definitions will be needed.

Let H be an arbitrary group of $n \times n$ matrices over \mathbb{F}_q . Let $\text{Alg}(H)$ denote the \mathbb{F}_q -algebra generated by H ; that is, $\text{Alg}(H)$ is the collection of a \mathbb{F}_q -linear combinations of elements in H . Furthermore, let $\text{Alg}^*(H)$ denote the set of all invertible matrices in $\text{Alg}(H)$. Note that in the CBKAP, $C = \text{Alg}^*(C)$.

Let $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_\rho \in C$ be a basis for C , which Eve will need to compute. Let $P \trianglelefteq A$ be the *pure subgroup* of A defined as

$$P = \{(\alpha, e) \in A\}.$$

Thus, $\varphi(P)$ is a subgroup of $\text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$.

Eve's main goal is to find $\tilde{c} \in C$, $(\tilde{a}, g) \in M \times S_n$, and

$$\sum_{i=1}^k \ell_i \varphi(\alpha_i),$$

where $(\alpha_i, e) \in P$ and $\ell_i \in \mathbb{F}_q$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$, that satisfy

$$(c, e) * (a, g) = \tilde{c} \cdot \left(\sum_{i=1}^k \ell_i \varphi(\alpha_i), e \right) * (\tilde{a}, g),$$

where $(c, e) * (a, g)$ is Alice's public key. The reason is that, with these elements in hand, Eve can compute the shared secret as follows:

- First compute the matrix

$$\beta' = \sum_{i=1}^k \ell_i \varphi({}^h \alpha_i),$$

where h is the element from the symmetric group from Bob's public key.

- Eve can then compute

$$(\tilde{c} d \varphi(b) \beta', h) * (\tilde{a}, g),$$

which is exactly the shared secret between Alice and Bob. (See [2] for the proof of this claim)

The rest of the attack is devoted to finding the desired elements that allow Eve to construct the shared secret.

1. **Find the α_i 's:** Eve needs to find the elements (α_i, e) 's from A such that the collection $\{\varphi(\alpha_1), \dots, \varphi(\alpha_j)\}$ form a basis for $\text{Alg}^*(\varphi(P))$. The authors note that this step can be carried out before the transmission of messages between Alice and Bob take place as this does not rely on their public keys.

Following the method given in [3], Eve generates an element $(a', g') \in A$ such that the order of $g' \in S_n$ is smaller than n , and then computes $\alpha_1 = (a', g')^r$. Eve repeats this process to find $\alpha_2, \alpha_3, \dots$, until the dimension of the \mathbb{F}_q -linear span of the matrices $\varphi(\alpha_i)$ stops growing, usually when the dimension stops growing after four α_i 's are added. Eve then fixes a linearly independent subset of these matrices, and thus we have that the matrices $\varphi(\alpha_1), \dots, \varphi(\alpha_j)$ are a basis for a subspace V of $\text{Alg}(\varphi(P))$. With high probability, we expect that $V = \text{Alg}(\varphi(P))$, so this is assumed from now on.

2. **Find \tilde{a} :** Again using the method found in [3], we find a product of generators of A whose second component is equal to g , and this product will be (\tilde{a}, g) . Also, define $\delta \in \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ by

$$(\delta, e) = (c\varphi(a), g) * (\tilde{a}, g)^{-1}.$$

3. **Find \tilde{c} :** Assume that Eve has already found the elements $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_\rho \in C$ that form a basis for C (recall that $C = \text{Alg}(C)$ by assumption). Eve then finds element $y_1, \dots, y_\rho \in \mathbb{F}_q$ such that

$$\delta^{-1}(y_1\gamma_1 + y_2\gamma_2 + \dots + y_\rho\gamma_\rho) \in \text{Alg}(\varphi(P)), \text{ and} \tag{4.1}$$

$$y_1\gamma_1 + y_2\gamma_2 + \dots + y_\rho\gamma_\rho \in \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q) \tag{4.2}$$

Let $\tilde{c} = y_1\gamma_1 + y_2\gamma_2 + \dots + y_\rho\gamma_\rho \in C$. To find the elements $y_1, \dots, y_\rho \in \mathbb{F}_q$, Eve randomly generates solutions y_i to the equation given in 4.1. Due to the linearity of 4.1, this

turns out to be easy. If the solution that satisfies 4.1 also satisfies 4.2, then Eve stops; otherwise, Eve starts the process again. Ben-Zvi et al. show in [2] that the proportion of solutions to 4.1 that satisfy 4.2 is bounded by $1 - n/q$. The element \tilde{c} is used in the calculation of the shared secret.

4. **Everything Else:** Since $\delta^{-1}\tilde{c} \in \text{Alg}(\varphi(P))$, it follows that $\tilde{c}^{-1}\delta \in \text{Alg}(\varphi(P))$ as well. Thus, Eve can calculate coefficients ℓ_i that satisfy

$$\sum_{i=1}^k \ell_i \varphi(\alpha_i) = \tilde{c}^{-1}\delta.$$

Therefore, Eve can calculate Alice's public key as follows.

$$(\delta, e) * (\tilde{a}, g) = ((p, g) * (\tilde{a}, g)^{-1}) * (\tilde{a}, g) = (c\varphi(a), g).$$

The BBT attack has been implemented and recovers the shared secret for a transmission where $n = 16$, $q = 256$, and generating words of A being length 650 in less than 8 hours, using only 64MB of memory and running on a 2GHz core. The attack has yet to be optimized, but the mathematical beauty of the scheme remains!

References

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