Announcements

- **Reading**
  - 7.1-7.2

- **Midterm #2 re-grade requests due 9 AM 11/26**
  - Solutions are on the class web page

- **Project #5**
  - Is on the web

- **Homework is worth 4% of your grade (2% each)**
Project #5

- **Goals:**
  - Develop a reliable transport layer
  - Handle multiple active connections

- **Issues:**
  - Design a packet format for your transport connection
  - Be able to detect corrupted packets

Connection Table

- Sliding Window of packets - Send
- Sliding Window of packets - Recv

Other Connection Table Fields:
- dest v6 addr
- source v6 port
- dest v6 port
DES

- Block cipher: uses 56 bit keys, 64 bits of data
- Uses 16 stages of substitution
- Variations
  - cipher block chaining: xor output of block $n$ with into block $n+1$
  - cipher feedback mode: use 64bit shift register
    - can produce one byte at a time

From: *Computer Networks*, 3rd Ed. by Andrew S. Tanenbaum, (c)1996 Prentice Hall.
Public Key Encryption

- **Split into public and private keys**
  - public key used to encrypt messages
    - publish this key widely
  - private key used to decrypt messages
    - keep this key a secret

- **RSA**
  - algorithm for computing public/private key pairs
  - based on problems involved in factoring large primes
  - for an n bit message $P$, $C = (P^e \mod n)$, and $P = (C^d \mod n)$

- **Other Public Key Algorithms**
  - knapsack
    - given a large collection of objects with different weights
    - public key is the total weight of a subset of the objects
    - private key is the list of objects
Authentication

- Identify the parties that wish to communicate
- Create a session key
  - a random string
  - used only for one session
- Authentication based on Shared Keys
  - each party already shares a private key
    - exchanged via an out of band transmission
  - challenge-response
    - send a random string
    - response is the encryption of the random string with the shared key
Authentication Example

From: *Computer Networks*, 3rd Ed. by Andrew S. Tanenbaum, (c)1996 Prentice Hall.
Simplified Protocol

- Only requires three messages
- But it is subject to a “man in the middle attack”

From: *Computer Networks*, 3rd Ed. by Andrew S. Tanenbaum, (c)1996 Prentice Hall.
Attacking the Simplified Protocol

- T can get B to respond to its own challenge
- T opens a second session with B
  - it issues B's session 1 challenge back to B in session 2
Key Distribution Center

- **Problem with Private Key Authentication**
  - Need to establish key
  - for n people need $n^2$ keys
  - keys must be established via **out-of-band** communication

- **Solution: Key Distribution Center (KDC)**
  - trusted party used to assist in authentication
  - each party establishes a private key with the center

- **have KDC trans-code a message with a session key**
  - A sends to KDC $<A, K_A(B, K_s)>$
  - KDC sends to B $<K_B(A, K_s)>$
  - open to replay attack
    - T logs KDC to B message **and** all traffic using $K_s$
Needham-Schroeder Authentication

- $R_A$, $R_{A2}$ and $R_B$ random strings
  - used to prevent replay attacks
- If $T$ ever gets $K_s$ can establish contact with $B$
  - can prevent this with a slight variation of the algorithm
- Used in Kerberos Authentication System
Authentication using Public Keys

- Assume each party knows the other’s public key
  \[ E_b(A, R_a) \]
  \[ E_a(R_a, R_b, K_s) \]
  \[ K_s(R_b) \]

- How To learn others Public Key?
  - use a public key server
    - but how do we trust the public key server?
    - have a public key for the public key server
    - possible to have man-in-the-middle attacks
  - interlock protocol
    - only send half the message (odd bits) at a time
    - prevents man-in-the-middle attacks
    - still possible to spoof service
Digital Signatures

- **Want to “sign” a message such that:**
  - receiver can verify the identity of the sender
  - sender cannot repudiate the contents of the message
  - receiver cannot forge a message

- **Central authority (BB)**
  - A sends BB A, $K_a(B, R_a, t, P)$
  - BB sends B $K_b(A, R_a, t, P, K_{bb}(A, t, P))$
  - everyone trusts BB
    - BB can be called on to decrypt messages to verify them
    - BB need not store all message that it validates
  - t - timestamp used to prevent replay attacks

- **Public Key**
  - need $E(D(P)) = P$ and $D(E(P)) = P$
  - A sends B $E_b(D_a(P))$
    - B keeps $D_a(P)$ and third party can use $E_a$ to verify it’s from A

Used to prevent replay attacks when t has not changed yet (i.e. slow clock)
Digital Signatures (cont.)

- **Problems**
  - Repudiation
    - inform police that the key was stolen
    - claim the “bad guy” sent the message
  - Key Changes
    - need to keep records of when keys were in use

- **Standards**
  - RSA Algorithm
    - popular with many commercial systems
  - El Gamal
    - NSA/NIST Standard
    - too new, and private to have trust
Message Digests

- **Goal: Send Signed Plain text**
  - can use slow cryptography on signature since its short
- **Need:**
  - Given P, easy to compute MD(P)
  - Given MD(P), impossible to find P
  - no P and P’ exist such that MD(P) = MD(P’)
    - use hash functions that produce >= 128 bit digest
- **Operation**
  - A sends P, Da(MD(P))
- **Digest Functions**
  - MD5
    - produces 128 bit digest
  - SHS
    - NSA/NIST effort
    - produces 160 bit output