  What a terrible thing it is to wake up sometimes. A vivid and powerful dream starring a certain someone (it's so not fair to out her as a fantasy ? although most of you know I'm smitten). Makes me want to call her up and ask her to... uh... lunch. Makes me want to follow my impulses and be a little brazen sometimes, however well informed I am of her prudishness. Once in a while it's worth the risks. Just to grab her hand and kiss her palm. In my little life, experience tells me that you're not going to get your face slapped. Quite the contrary, miss mary. When I opened my eyes this morning, I was more that a little upset that I'd been imagining the whole affair. Looking at my increasingly squishy figure and feeling impotent to transform fantasy into anything more than that. I thought long and hard about going for a run (part drive, part punishment), but I opted instead to just fuck myself and take a shower. But cheer up, young one. I've got a job interview at the brewery in two hours. If only I could get women into my bed as easily as I get job interviews.
When there's money involved... I want the new Woodward book. I WANT IT. I like this bit revealed by Dr. Rice on FOX News Sunday : WALLACE: All right. Let's talk about the book, Bob Woodward's account of the lead-up to the war in Iraq. According to Woodward, the president asked Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense, in November of 2001, 72 days after 9/11, to come up with plans for a possible war against Iraq. This is at a time when we were still heavily engaged in Afghanistan. True? RICE: The president apparently did talk to Don Rumsfeld and say to him, you know, "I need to know what my options might be concerning Iraq. " The president, on September the 15th at Camp David, decided that our response to September 11th was going to be against Afghanistan. We planned for Afghanistan; we fought the war in Afghanistan. By the end of November, things are starting to wind down in Afghanistan, and I do think the president's mind was beginning to move to what else he would have to do to deal with the blow, with the threat that had emerged as a result of 9/11.
And Saddam Hussein and Iraq was, of course  this was the most hostile relationship that we had in the Middle East. It's not at all surprising that the president wanted to know what his options were before he began a course of diplomatic activity, of going to the United Nations, of trying to figure out how to carry out, by the way, a regime-change policy that had been the law of the land in the United States since 1998.
WALLACE: The book also reports that after the CIA briefed the president in December of 2002 on the evidence that it had about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, that Mr. Bush said this, and let's put it up: "I've been told all this intelligence about having WMD, and this is the best we've got? " And CIA Director Tenet answered the president, "Don't worry. It's a slam dunk. " Did that happen? RICE: It did happen. The fact is that we all thought that the intelligence case against Iraq was very strong  not just the United States intelligence agencies... WALLACE: But that's not what he's saying there. He seems to be saying, "That's all you've got? " RICE: Well, the presentation, let's say, was not, I think, overwhelming to people. But let's review what we knew about Saddam Hussein. We knew that this was somebody who has used weapons of mass destruction, who was still deceiving the international community about weapons of mass destruction, who had a kind of association with them that was... WALLACE: Dr. Rice... RICE: ... well-, well-known. WALLACE: But all I want to ask you about, how could the presentation to the president of the United States not be overwhelming?
RICE: That's what the president wanted to know. But the intelligence underlying the National Intelligence Estimate, which was the basis for the president's  the intelligence basis  not, by any means, the entire basis for or against Iraq, but the intelligence basis, was pretty categorical. At that particular moment in time, the presentation was not that categorical. But it did say  the National Intelligence Estimate said he has chemical and biological weapons, he's been improving his capability, and by the end of the decade, if something's not done, he could have a nuclear weapon.
That was the assessment. Chris, even since David Kay has been there and Charlie Duelfer has been there, we are learning that the Iraqis did have an active program. They were seeking capabilities beyond those that they already had. And this was, after all, a state that had already succeeded in making weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein was in violation, material breach of Resolution 1441. The president went to war on a total picture about Iraq. And he went to war on an intelligence basis that was sound. WALLACE: And what about Woodward's contention that Cheney and  the vice president, Cheney, and Secretary of State Powell are so estranged on policy that they don't talk?
RICE: Well, first of all, I haven't read Bob's book. And I'm really looking forward to it because he's a great reporter, he's a wonderful writer. And I think it will be a good read. He's explaining a complex set of arrangements in which we, of course, were trying to manage diplomacy and military issues and so forth. But I can tell you, I've had lunch on a number of occasions with Vice President Cheney and with Colin Powell, and they're more than on speaking terms. They're friendly. WALLACE: You don't have to pass notes between the two of them? (LAUGHTER) RICE: No, no, of course not. They're very friendly. 
