  My friend Chris, who is working on his PhD at American University, sent me this. He's studied the Clinton and Bush foreign policies in great detail. I think you’re right on about the left's critique of those of us who are in support (albeit tacit support) of the current campaign in Iraq. I haven't spent much time talking about my feelings on the matter, in part, because of what I do. I'm taking this opportunity to really observe, and it’s difficult to do that if you share your views with the people you're talking to. I believe that we have made what could turn into a monumental mistake in this war. That being said, allow me to circle back a bit. I think that Saddam must go, and that the only way this can be accomplished is through forcible removal.
However, I believe that a little more time at the UN (let's just call it a more robust diplomatic effort) could have allowed us to do so with broader international support. This is not something to be dismissed. For many years, scholars in the discipline have been speculating about an eventual backlash to American hegemony.
This was largely averted, in my opinion, by the foreign policy of the Clinton administration. We seem to forget that "expansion and enlargement," the central thrust of the Clinton era (coined by William Christopher) constituted a concerted effort to encourage the development of democratic institutions and market economies throughout the world. I find it interesting that the new Bush National Security Strategy (a document that I have spent hours upon hours on) takes up these notions of expansion and enlargement. Unfortunately, they do so in an overtly unilateralist tone. The clear implication of the Bush posture, unlike the Clinton policy, is that we are now encouraging other nations, including our allies, to balance against us.
Thus, facilitating a backlash. What I am trying to articulate it that the Bush National Security Strategy is not so much bold in the ends it is trying to achieve, but in the mechanism it chooses to pursue to foster the growth of democracies and free markets. This position will make it increasingly difficult for the US facilitate the achievement of its desires because it may foster open hostility. Our allies may support these desired ends, but it will become much more difficult for them to be on board with our means of accomplishing them. In the end, they will become obstructionist because we give them no other choice (a la, the French). 
