

- Scribes?

- OT preprocessing + extension

- Malicious security (2-party setting)

- WI, ZK, PoK

- The GMW compiler (2-party setting)

Preprocessing



$s_0, s_1$

$b \oplus c$

$c$

$$\begin{aligned} r_0 &= s_0 \oplus x_{b \oplus c} \\ r_1 &= s_1 \oplus x_{1 \oplus b \oplus c} \end{aligned}$$

$c_0, r_1$

$$s_c = r_c \oplus x_b$$

$$= (s_c \oplus x_{c \oplus b \oplus c}) \oplus x_b$$

$$= s_c \oplus x_b \oplus x_b$$

$$= s_c$$

OT extension

parties will generate  $m$  OTs on  $k$ -bit strings

from

$k$  OTs on  $m$ -bit strings — base OTs

$m \gg k, k \sim \text{security parameter}$

Total Cost =  $O(k)$  public key operations +  $O(m)$  private-key operations

Aside: given  $k$ -bit OT, easy to get  $m$ -bit OT for any  $m > k$

$$P_1(X_0, X_1)$$

$$P_2(b)$$

$$k_0, k_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k$$





$$\text{Enc}_{k_0}(X_0), \text{Enc}_{k_1}(X_1)$$

$$P_1$$


$$P_2$$

$$r = r_1 \dots r_m$$


(wants  $X_{i,r_i}$  for all  $i$ )



base OTs



$$s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k$$



$$T_i = q_i \oplus r_i \oplus s$$


$$X_{i,r_0} \oplus H(q_i), X_{i,r_1} \oplus H(q_i \oplus s)$$

$$X_{i,r_i} = C_{i,r_i} \oplus H(T_i)$$

$$q_i = T_i \oplus r_i \oplus s$$

## Malicious security (2-party)

- real-world execution of protocol  $\Pi$  w/ some adversary  $A$   
(Output of honest party, view of  $A$ )
- ideal-world evaluation of  $\mathcal{F}$



## Zero-knowledge (proofs of knowledge)

NP language  $L$

i.e., there exists an efficient  $R_L$  s.t.  $x \in L \iff \exists w$  s.t.  $R_L(x, w) = 1$

I.e.,  $L = \text{SAT} = \{ \text{boolean formulas } \phi \text{ that are satisfiable} \}$

$R_{\text{SAT}}(\phi, x) = 1 \iff \phi(x) = \text{true}$

I.e.,  $L = \text{HAM} = \{ \text{directed graph } G \text{ s.t. } G \text{ has a Ham. cycle} \}$

$R_{\text{HAM}}(G, v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n) = 1 \iff v_1, \dots, v_n \text{ is a Ham. cycle in } G$




$b = 1 \iff x = x'$   
and  $R_L(x, w) = 1$

Zero-Knowledge proofs - evaluating  $\mathcal{P}_{zk}$  against a malicious  $V$   
 proofs of Knowledge - evaluating  $\mathcal{P}_{zk}$  against a malicious  $P$

ZKPoK - secretly evaluating  $\mathcal{P}_{zk}$

Show ZKPoK protocol for an NP-complete language  
 $\Rightarrow$  ZKPoK protocol for all of NP



if  $b=0$

prove that A corresponds to G

if  $b=1$

prove the A has a Ham cycle

if  $b=0$

open everything

show isomorphism to G

if  $b=1$

open Ham cycle only

verify