Adversary Gain vs. Defender Loss in Quantified Information Flow. Piotr Mardziel, Mário S. Alvim, and Michael Hicks. In (Unofficial) Proceedings of the International Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security (FCS), July 2014.

Metrics for quantifying information leakage assume that an adversary's gain is the defender's loss. We demonstrate that this assumption does not always hold via a class of scenarios. We describe how to extend quantification to account for a defender with goals distinct from adversary failure. We implement the extension and experimentally explore the impact on the measured information leakage of the motivating scenario.

[ .pdf ]

@INPROCEEDINGS{mardziel14qifgl,
  AUTHOR = {Piotr Mardziel and M\'ario S. Alvim and Michael Hicks},
  TITLE = {Adversary Gain vs. Defender Loss in Quantified Information Flow},
  BOOKTITLE = {(Unofficial) Proceedings of the International Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security (FCS)},
  MONTH = JUL,
  YEAR = 2014
}

Back


This file has been generated by bibtex2html 1.69