Metrics for quantifying information leakage assume that an adversary's gain is the defender's loss. We demonstrate that this assumption does not always hold via a class of scenarios. We describe how to extend quantification to account for a defender with goals distinct from adversary failure. We implement the extension and experimentally explore the impact on the measured information leakage of the motivating scenario.

[ .pdf ]

@inproceedings{mardziel14qifgl,
  author = {Piotr Mardziel and M\'ario S. Alvim and Michael Hicks},
  title = {Adversary Gain vs. Defender Loss in Quantified Information Flow},
  booktitle = {(Unofficial) Proceedings of the International Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security (FCS)},
  month = jul,
  year = 2014
}

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