PhD Defense: Language-Based Techniques for Secure Programming

Ian Sweet
06.08.2022 10:00 to 12:00

IRB 5105

Secure Computation (SC) encompasses many different cryptographic techniques for computing over encrypted data. In particular, Secure Multiparty Computation enables multiple parties to jointly compute a function over their secret inputs. MPC languages offer programmers a familiar environment in which to express their programs, but fall short when confronted with problems that require flexible coordination. More broadly, SC languages do not protect non-expert programmers from violating obliviousness or expected bounds on information leakage. We aim to show that secure programming can be made safer through language-based techniques for expressive, coordinated MPC; probabilistically oblivious execution; and quantitative analysis of information flow. We begin by presenting Symphony, an expressive MPC language that provides flexible coordination of many parties, which has been used to implement the secure shuffle of Laur, Willemson, and Zhang. Next, we present λObliv, a core language guaranteeing that well-typed programs are probabilistically oblivious, which has been used to type check tree-based, non-recursive ORAM (NORAM). Finally, we present a novel application of dynamic analysis techniques to an existing system for enforcing bounds on information leakage, providing a better balance of precision and performance.
Examining Committee:

Chair:Dean's Representative:Members:

Dr. Michael Hicks Dr. Lawrence Washington Dr. Jonathan Katz Dr. David Van Horn Dr. David Darais (Galois Inc.)